When Crime Pays

by Milan Vaishnav

  142. “Kalaignar TV Got Rs. 200 Crores through 2G Scam: ED,” Press Trust of India, June 2, 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kalaignar-tv-got-rs-200-crores-through-2g-scam-ed/article7271324.ece (accessed November 9, 2015). In October 2014, Raja was formally charged with money laundering in connection with the scam. Final arguments in the case were set for December 2015. See “2G Case: Raja, Kanimozhi Charged with Money Laundering,” Press Trust of India, October 31, 2014, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/special-court-frames-charges-against-former-telecom-minister-a-raja-dmk-mp-kanimozhi-and-others-in-2g-scamrelated-money-laundering-case/article6551462.ece (accessed November 7, 2014).

  143. In August 2015, the CBI registered a disproportionate assets case against Raja and fifteen others. Prosecutors allege that Raja acquired more 270 million rupees in unexplained cash between 1999 and 2010. See Devesh K. Pandey and S. Vijay Kumar, “CBI Files Assets Case against Raja,” Hindu, August 19, 2015.

  144. It is worth pointing out that politicians need not always make direct regulatory interventions on behalf of firms to make sure the “right” companies get their work done. Quite often, the links between firms and politicians are publicly known, which sends a powerful signal to bureaucrats to approve the favored firms’ projects or risk professional sanction. See S. S. Gill, The Pathology of Corruption (New Delhi: HarperCollins India, 1999), chap. 12.

  145. World Bank data on the ease of doing business in India are available here: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/india. A 2011 survey of Indian firms conducted by international auditor KPMG reported that companies perceive construction/real estate to be the single most corrupt industry in India. See KPMG, Survey on Bribery and Corruption (December 2011), https://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/bribery-corruption.pdf (accessed May 16, 2012).

  146. The savviest politicians encourage their relatives to establish real estate firms so that the favors and monetary benefits can remain within the family. A 2001 media investigation revealed that a quarter of ministers in the Gujarat state cabinet had familial or other close links with builders. See Ranjit Bhushan, “Builders and Friends,” Outlook, February 19, 2001.

  147. Some insiders have speculated that in states headed for polls, there is a spike in the issuance of “change of land use” (or CLU) certificates by the government immediately before elections are held. The clearances are a demonstration of political commitment by fund-seeking politicians. See Bhavdeep Kang, “Inside Story: How Political Parties Raise Money,” Yahoo! News India, September 25, 2013, https://in.news.yahoo.com/inside-story—how-political-parties-raise-money-091455119.html (accessed October 1, 2013).

  148. The builder-politician nexus is by no means restricted to India. One study of 166 corporate bribery cases worldwide found that construction was the single most bribe-laden industry. See Yan Leung Cheung, P. Raghavendra Rau, and Aris Stouraitis, “How Much Do Firms Pay as Bribes and What Benefits Do They Get? Evidence from Corruption Cases Worldwide,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 17981, April 2012.

  149. Devesh Kapur and Milan Vaishnav, “Quid Pro Quo: Builders, Politicians, and Election Finance in India,” Center for Global Development Working Paper 276, March 29, 2013, http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/Kapur_Vaishnav_election_finance_India-FINAL-0313.pdf (accessed April 1, 2013).

  150. The decline in cement consumption also cannot be simply explained away by the decline in government activity around elections given the lag built into all tenders and contracts.

  151. This insight is nicely captured in “Marriage of Money and Politics,” Economic and Political Weekly 44, no. 45 (November 7, 2009): 5–6.

  152. Virendra Nath Bhatt, “Raja Bhaiya: The Godfather IV,” Tehelka, March 16, 2013. Authors of a book on the 2012 state election in Uttar Pradesh write that Raja Bhaiya has become “a synonym for [the] criminal-political nexus.” See Manish Tiwari and Rajan Pandey, Battleground U.P. Politics in the Land of Ram (New Delhi: Tranquebar, 2013), 218.

  153. Kunal Pradhan, “Raja Bhaiyya and the Badlands of Kunda,” India Today, March 8, 2013.

  154. Yogesh Vajpeyi, “Honour Thy Brother, Flay Thy Foe,” Tehelka, May 1, 2004.

  155. Bhatt, “Raja Bhaiya.”

  156. Affidavit of Raghuraj Pratap Singh (alias Raja Bhaiya) submitted to the Election Commission of India in advance of the 2012 Uttar Pradesh state assembly election. In 2013, Raja Bhaiya was charged with orchestrating the murder of a deputy superintendent of police. He was forced to resign from the state cabinet, but when the CBI later cleared him of this charge, he was re-inducted. See “Raja Bhaiya’s New Portfolio a Comedown?” Times of India, November 5, 2015.

  157. Of course, not all of this support was entirely voluntary, especially among those who suffered the brunt of the coercive aspects of Raja Bhaiya’s repertoire. One village politician remarked of Raja Bhaiya, Kuch bhay vash karte hain, kuchh prem vash karte hain (Some support out of fear, some out of affection). See Ramendra Singh, “The Raja’s Backyard,” Indian Express, March 9, 2013.

  158. Prem Panicker, “The Secret of Raja Bhaiya’s Success,” Rediff, February 20, 2002, http://www.rediff.com/election/2002/feb/20_upr_prem_spe_1.htm (accessed March 30, 2013).

  159. Mehul Srivastava and Andrew MacAskill, “Poor in India Starve as Politicians Steal $14.5 Billion of Food,” Bloomberg Business, August 28, 2012; Ashish Khetan, “The Raja Who Stole from the Poor,” Tehelka, April 21, 2012.

  160. Srivastava and MacAskill, “Poor in India Starve.”

  161. Sukhtankar and Vaishnav, “Corruption in India.”

  162. Paul Niehaus, Antonia Atanassova, Marianne Bertrand, and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Targeting with Agents,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5, no. 1 (February 2013): 206–38.

  163. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Economic Crime: A Threat to Business Globally, PwC 2014 Global Economic Crime Survey, 2014, https://www.pwc.ie/media-centre/assets/publications/2014_global_economic_crime_survey.pdf (accessed April 22, 2016).

  164. Robert Wade, “The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India,” Journal of Development Studies 18, no. 3 (1982): 287–328; and Robert Wade, “The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State Is Not Better at Development,” World Development 13, no. 4 (1985): 467–97.

  165. Varinder Bhatia, “Hooda Govt Bent Rules to Favour Robert Vadra Firm: CAG,” Press Trust of India, March 26, 2015, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/cag-raps-haryana-govt-for-showing-undue-favours-to-robert-vadra/ (March 26, 2015).

  166. Anand Kumar Patel, “Bureaucrat Ashok Khemka Won’t Face Charges in Robert Vadra Case,” NDTV, November 4, 2015, http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/haryana-government-drops-charges-against-bureaucrat-ashok-khemka-1239906 (accessed November 13, 2015).

  167. Sukhbir Siwach, “Ashok Khemka, Whistleblower IAS Officer, Transferred Again,” Times of India, April 2, 2015.

  168. Lakshmi Iyer and Anandi Mani, “Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India,” Review of Economics and Statistics 94, no. 3 (August 2012): 723–39.

  169. Mani Shankar Aiyar, “The Politics of Poverty,” India Today, August 13, 2009.

  170. Nazmul Chaudhury et al., “Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 91–116; Karthik Muralidharan, Jishnu Das, Alaka Holla, and Aakash Mohpal, “The Fiscal Cost of Weak Governance: Evidence from Teacher Absenteeism in India,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 20299, July 2014.

  171. Rajan, “Is There a Threat of Oligarchy in India?”

  172. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Report of the Comptroller . . . , 2011–12. To date, the CBI has filed at least eleven chargesheets against Jagan Reddy in relation to corruption charges. However, he has not yet been convicted of any criminal wrongdoing. “DA Case: The 10 Chargesheets against Jaganmohan Reddy,” Press Trust of India, September 23,
2013, http://www.firstpost.com/india/da-case-the-10-chargesheets-against-jaganmohan-reddy-1128925.html (accessed November 13, 2015); “CBI Files 11th Chargesheet against Jagan Mohan Reddy in Disproportionate Assets Case,” Press Trust of India, September 9, 2014, http://www.ndtv.com/south/cbi-files-11th-chargesheet-against-jagan-mohan-reddy-in-disproportionate-assets-case-661542 (accessed November 13, 2015).

  173. Sreenivas Janyala, “Reddy-Reddy Link: Mining a Friendship,” Indian Express, September 7, 2011.

  174. Jim Yardley, “Despite Scandals, Indian Mining Bosses Thrive,” New York Times, August 18, 2010; Vijay Simha, “‘Mining Lease Is Used as James Bond’s Gun,’” Tehelka, April 3, 2010.

  175. Sanjana, “The Reddy Flag over Bangalore,” Tehelka, June 14, 2008; Sugata Srinivasaraju, “Lotus Loofahs,” Outlook, November 16, 2009; Anil Kumar Sastry, “Ten MLA-Hopefuls Cross 100-Crore Mark,” Hindu, April 21, 2013.

  176. Sanjana, “The Revenge of the Reddy Republic,” Tehelka, November 14, 2009.

  177. Ashok Malik and Imran Khan, “The Baron Might Go: The Robbery Goes On,” Tehelka, August 6, 2011.

  178. Karnataka Lokayukta, Report on the Reference Made by the Government of Karnataka under Section 7(2-A) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984, Report No. COMPT/LOK/BCD/89/2007, July 27, 2011, http://www.thehindu.com/multimedia/archive/00736/Report_on_the_refer_736286a.pdf (accessed April 22, 2016); Simha, “‘Mining Lease Is Used as James Bond’s Gun.’”

  179. Hari Kumar and Jim Yardley, “India Charges Mining Barons with Fraud,” New York Times, September 5, 2011.

  180. Rama Lakshmi, “In Indian Mining District, the Barons Are Back,” Washington Post, May 2, 2013.

  181. Karnataka Lokayukta, Report on the Reference Made by the Government of Karnataka; Sugata Srinivasaraju, “‘Bellary Is Mine,’” Outlook, August 10, 2009.

  182. As Karnataka’s anticorruption ombudsman (Lokayukta) Santosh Hegde stated, “There was no cross-checking of facts, no counter-checking, and no sending of a team of surveyors and of the mining department to find out if there was a place of such a description.” See Simha, “‘Mining Lease Is Used as James Bond’s Gun.’”

  183. T.A. Johnson, “Bellary Brothers Are Back,” Indian Express, June 24, 2009; “Yeddyurappa Sheds Tears over His Plight,” Indo-Asian News Service, November 7, 2009, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/yeddyurappa-sheds-tears-over-his-plight/story-IdWuV45T0yHHrHpsimFgtI.html (accessed November 13, 2015).

  184. Shailendra Pandey, “The Hell Diggers,” Tehelka, April 3, 2010.

  185. Ibid.

  186. Sanjana, “The Reddy Flag over Bangalore.” According to the affidavit Sriramulu submitted to the Election Commission of India ahead of the 2014 general election, he faced charges in eight separate criminal cases. In the case involving the alleged assault of the Congress worker, where a judge had already framed charges, the lawmaker stood accused of attempted murder.

  187. Lakshmi, “In Indian Mining District, the Barons Are Back.”

  188. Karnataka Lokayukta, Report on the Reference Made by the Government of Karnataka.

  189. B. Krishna Prasad and Anil Kumar, “Illegal Mining: CBI Arrests Former Karnataka Minister Janardhana Reddy, Cash Seized,” Times of India, September 5, 2011. Although he still awaits trial, Janardhana was granted bail in January 2014.

  190. Lakshmi, “In Indian Mining District, the Barons Are Back”; “Somashekar Reddy Held in Bail Scam,” Hindu, August 7, 2012.

  CHAPTER 3. CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE

  1. Syed Firdaus Ashraf, “The Rediff Interview: Arun Gawli,” Rediff, August 1997, http://m.rediff.com/news/aug/13gawli.htm (accessed July 25, 2013).

  2. S. Hussain Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai: Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia (New Delhi: Lotus, 2011), 93–5.

  3. Suyash Padate and Sumit Bhattacharya, “Dagdi Chawl’s Daddy Cool,” Tehelka, April 3, 2004.

  4. Suhas Palshikar, “Revisiting State Level Parties,” Economic and Political Weekly 39, no. 14/15 (April 3–16, 2014): 1477–79.

  5. Ajith Pillai, “Byculla Bhai,” Outlook, January 8, 1997.

  6. S. Hussain Zaidi, Byculla to Bangkok (New Delhi: HarperCollins India, 2014).

  7. “The Milkman Who Became a Gangster,” Hindustan Times, August 25, 2012.

  8. Arun Gawli himself has told inquiring journalists that the Shiv Sena abandoned him during his jail stint because it believed he had a hand in the killing of several Sena associates, a charge he denies. See Tony Cross, “Profile of a Gangster Turned Politician,” Radio France Internationale, April 29, 2009, http://www1.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/112/article_3631.asp (accessed July 15, 2013); Zaidi, Byculla to Bangkok.

  9. Ashraf, “Rediff Interview: Arun Gawli.”

  10. Pillai, “Byculla Bhai.”

  11. Saira Menzies, “Twister in the Tiger’s Tale,” Outlook, August 6, 1997.

  12. S. Hussain Zaidi and Jane Borges, Mafia Queens of Mumbai (New Delhi: Westland, 2011).

  13. Ashraf, “Rediff Interview: Arun Gawli.”

  14. At the time of writing, a Bollywood film based on Gawli’s life, tentatively titled “Daddy,” was in production.

  15. National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, “Review of Election Law, Processes, and Electoral Reforms,” Consultation Paper, January 8, 2001, http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/v2b1-9.htm (accessed April 22, 2016).

  16. An example of this narrative comes from a former senior official in India’s Central Bureau of Investigation, N. K. Singh. Singh writes that the immediate post-independence period witnessed the criminalization of politics, whereby politicians took the help of criminals in winning elections. But in due course, he states, “A stage came when criminals felt that rather than helping politicians, why did they not get themselves into the legislatures or Parliament and occupy ministerial positions, and use these to further their criminal activities?” See N. K. Singh, The Politics of Crime and Corruption: A Former CBI Officer Speaks (New Delhi: HarperCollins India, 1999), 38.

  17. Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

  18. As anthropologist Jeffrey Witsoe has argued, “Highly visible instances of ‘booth looting’ and electoral violence, therefore, were a reaction to the practical absence of the right to vote for many lower-caste people in the past.” See Jeffrey Witsoe, “Caste and Democratization in Postcolonial India: An Ethnographic Examination of Lower Caste Politics in Bihar,” Democratization 19, no. 2 (August 2012): 13.

  19. Yogendra Yadav, “Electoral Politics in the Time of Change: India’s Third Electoral System, 1989–99,” Economic and Political Weekly 34, no. 34/35 (August 21–September 3, 1999): 2393–99.

  20. Ibid., 2397.

  21. This statement is supported by a February 2014 report by the government of India’s Law Commission, which makes reference to fears about a possible nexus between politicians and criminals even during the pre-independence period. See Government of India, Law Commission of India, Electoral Disqualifications, Report No. 244 (New Delhi: Law Commission of India, February 2014), http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report244.pdf (accessed April 22, 2016).

  22. E. Sridharan and Milan Vaishnav, “India,” in Pippa Norris and Andrea Abel van Es, eds., Checkbook Elections? Political Finance in Comparative Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

  23. David Gilmartin and Robert Moog, “Introduction to ‘Election Law in India,’” Election Law Journal 11, no. 2 (June 2012): 140.

  24. Election Commission of India, Report on the First General Elections in India, 1951–52 (New Delhi: Election Commission of India, 1955), http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/eci_publications/books/genr/FirstGenElection-51-52.pdf (accessed July 5, 2013).

  25. Vikasa Kumara Jha, Bihar: Criminalisation of Politics (Patna: Srishti Prakashan, 1996).

  26. Ibid., 134–35.

  27. Ibid., 132–33.

  28. Although democratic India initially experienced one-party dominance, it was emphatically not a one-party syst
em. In addition to the existence of opposition parties (fractured though they were), Congress itself was the site of tremendous internal political competition and factionalism. See Rajni Kothari, “The Congress ‘System’ in India,” Asian Survey 4, no. 12 (December 1964): 1167.

  29. Prem Shankar Jha, In the Eye of the Cyclone: The Crisis in Indian Democracy (New Delhi: Penguin, 1993), 25.

  30. James Manor, “Parties and the Party System,” in Atul Kohli, ed., India’s Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 65.

  31. Historically speaking, the local-level organization and reach of the Congress should not be overestimated. In several parts of the country, the party was either poorly organized or present only in a formal sense. See Pradeep Chhibber, Democracy without Associations: Transformation of the Party System and Social Cleavages in India (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), chap. 3.

  32. Steven I. Wilkinson, “Where’s the Party? The Decline of Party Institutionalization and What (If Anything) That Means for Democracy,” Government and Opposition 50, no. 3 (July 2015): 424.

  33. Christophe Jaffrelot, “Indian Democracy: The Rule of Law on Trial,” India Review 1, no. 1 (2002): 98.

  34. James Manor, “Party Decay and Political Crisis in India,” Washington Quarterly 4, no. 3 (Summer 1981): 26.

  35. According to criminologist Arvind Verma, politicians would often target booths that were geographically isolated or had a minimal police presence to avoid detection. See Arvind Verma, “Policing Elections in India,” India Review 4, no. 3/4 (2005): 354–76.

  36. S. S. Agarwalla, Contemporary India and Its Burning Problems (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1994), 31.

  37. Pranava K. Chaudhary, “Where Booth Capturing Was Born,” Times of India, February 14, 2005.

  38. Verma, “Policing Elections in India.”

  39. Jha, Bihar: Criminalisation of Politics, 44. When Kamdev Singh was finally killed in a police encounter in 1980, the Bihar chief minister personally paid a visit to his ancestral village to apologize for the police action and to seek his family’s forgiveness—a sign of the gangster’s considerable political clout. See Sankarshan Thakur, Subaltern Saheb: Bihar and the Making of Laloo Yadav (New Delhi: Picador, 2006), 66.