THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES
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(Cavaradossi, who has been listening to Sciarrone with mounting agitation, now in his excitement finds the strength to stand up and confront Scarpia menacingly.)
Cavaradossi: Victorious! Victorious!
God of vengeance appear,
Fill the wicked with fear!
Surge up Liberty,
Crushing all tyranny!
Giacomo Puccini, Tosca, libretto by Giuseppe Giacosa and Luigi Illica after the play by Victorien Sardou, trans. Edmund Tracey (Riverman Press, 1982), 63 – 64.
24. Quoted by André Fugier, La Revolution francaise et l'Empire Napoleonien (Hachette, 1954), 265; quoted in Robert Gildea, Barricades and Borders, Europe 1800 – 1914 (Oxford University Press, 1987), 49.
25. Michael Howard, The Causes of War and Other Essays (Temple Smith, 1983), 27.
26. With the exception of the Russian and Habsburg armies, which were drawn from multinational states. Geoffrey Best, War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770 – 1870 (Leicester University Press, 1982), 255.
27. “A wretch, never named but with curses and jeers!” Lord Byron, The Poetical Works of Lord Byron, “The Irish Avatar” (1910), 107 – 109.
28. See e.g., Sir Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh (Bell, 1950).
29. See e.g., Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (Grosset & Dunlap, 1964).
30. New Treaty of the Allied Powers, April 3,1815 (Vienna) (from the German Papers).
31. Craig and George, 27.
32. On September 21, 1809, Castlereagh fought a duel with Canning to defend his “honor and reputation” after he discovered that the intention to remove him from the cabinet had been long concealed. Canning, who was hit in the leg in the second round of the duel, had managed the concealment, and then denied doing so. Wendy Hinde, Castlereagh (Collins, 1981), 166.
33. Ibid., 99.
34. See Franklin Ford, Europe 1780 – 1830, 2nd ed. (Longman, 1989), 234.
35. Ibid., 276.
36. Quoted by Craig and George, 29.
37. Quoted by Craig and George, 31.
38. Craig and George, 31.
39. Jacques Droz, Europe between the Revolutions, 1815 – 1848 (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).
40. Quoted in Droz, 217.
41. Quoted in Craig and George, 32.
42. Quoted in F. B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution, 1814 – 1832 (Harper & Brothers, 1934), 161.
43. Lieven to Nesselrode, December 4, 1820: St. Petersburg Archive.
44. Quoted in Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789 – 1914 (Macmillan, 1937), 74.
45. Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna (Constable, 1946), 268.
46. Chateaubriand to Montmorenci, August 13, 1822; see d‘Antioche, Chateaubriand, 342,348.
47. Ford, 288.
48. Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763 – 1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
49. Brendan Simms, “The Transformation of European Politics,” Historical Journal 37 (December 1995): 999 – 1000.
50. Kissinger, A World Restored, 170 – 174.
51. John Lynn, “The Great Question Concerning the Congress of Vienna Is This: Why Was It So Successful?” Reader's Companion to Military History, ed. Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker (Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 105.
52. Lord Castlereagh, Second Marquis Londonderry, “Letter to Lord Camden,” September 25, 1793; see Sir Archibald Alsion, Lives of Lord Castlereagh and Sir C. Stewart (Blackwood, 1861), 23.
53. Neumann to Esterhazy, September 21,1822: Vienna State Archives Berichte, 216, ix.
54. Black, European Warfare, 234.
55. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D. 900 – 1990 (Blackwell, 1990), 14; see also Harold Dorn, “The Military Revolution: Military History or History of Europe?” Technology and Culture 32 (1991): 656, “The concept of the military revolution is primarily an attempt to account for the formation of the centralized nation-states of Europe by directing attention to the enormous costs and financial burdens associated with gunpowder weapons and the defensive systems they entailed, costs and burdens that only a politically centralized state could shoulder.”
56. Brian Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change (Princeton University Press, 1991), 14; see also David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).
57. Christopher Davdeker, Surveillance, Power, and Modernity (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).
58. The French royal army in 1788 – 1789, on the eve of the revolution, had about 150,000 men; by August 1793 it had reached 645,000 and the leveé en masse then doubled this number.
59. Schroeder, 391.
60. Black, European Warfare, 237.
61. “The advanced technology of steam engines and machine made tools gave Europe decisive economic and military advantages. The improvements to the muzzle loading gun (percussion caps, rifling, etc.) were ominous enough; the coming of the breech loader vastly increasing the rate of fire was an even greater advance; and the Gatling guns, Maxims and light field artillery put the final touches to a new firepower revolu-tion which quite eradicated the chances of successful resistance by indigenous peoples reliant upon older weapons. Furthermore, the steam driven gunboat meant that European power, already supreme in open waters, could be extended inland via major waterways like the Niger, the Indus and the Yangtze.” Kennedy, 150.
62. Black, European Warfare, 15 – 16, 201, n. 62. A recent study has concluded that the Maratha artillery was more advanced than the British on several counts but that their command structure was a shambles, with fatal consequences. At Assaye, Wellington's success owed much to a bayonet charge, scarcely confirming the standard image of Western armies gunning down masses of non-European troops relying on cold steel.
63. Quoted in Michael Glover, Napoleonic Wars (Hippocrene Books, 1979), 129; Kennedy, 133.
64. Mira Kamdar, “Rangoon: A Remembrance of Things Past,” World Policy Journal 16 (Fall 1999): 89.
65. Quoted by Jack R. Pole, Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic (University of California Press, 1966), 441.
66. Black, European Warfare, 195.
67. Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Cornell University Press, 1986), 232.
68. H. G. Wells, The Outline of History (Newnes, 1920), 618.
69. Gildea, 178.
70. Gildea, 179.
71. Gildea, 181.
72. Michael Doyle, Empires (Cornell University Press, 1986), 239.
73. Kissinger, A World Restored, 6.
74. Quoted by Helmut Bohme, The Foundations of the German Empire (Oxford University Press), 113 – 14.
75. Hajo Holborn, “The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Paret, 286.
76. Howard, War in European History, 102.
77. Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (Allen & Unwin, 1983), 114.
78. Quoted by Holborn, 288.
79. Gunther Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment, in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Paret, 296.
80. Howard, War in European History, 111.
81. Quoted by Helmut Bohme, Deutschlands Weg zur Grossmacht (Cologne/Berlin, 1966), 84; in Gildea, 197.
82. Lothar Gall, Bismarck: The White Revolutionary, vol. 1 (trans. J. A. Underwood) (Unwin Hyman 1986) 240
83. Ibid., 239.
84. “Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo!” Die politischen Recen des Fursten Bismarck: Historischkritische Gesammtausg, vol. 2, ed. Horst Kohl (Cotta, 1892 – 1905), 278.
85. Gall, 300.
86. See Georges Bonnin, Bismarck and the Hohenzollern Candidature for the Spanish Throne (Chatto & Windus, 1957), 70 – 71.
87. Gall, 355.
88. Quoted in Gall, 356, and cited there.
89. Winston Churchill, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples: The Great Democracies, vol. 4, (C
assell, 1956 – 1958), 276.
90. Quoted in Gall, 359.
91. Quoted in John A. S. Grenville, Europe Reshaped, 1848 – 1878 (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1976), 358.
92. Quoted in Henry Kissinger, “Reflections of Bismarck,” in Philosophers and Kings, ed. Dankwart A. Rustow (Braziller, 1970), 918.
93. Kessel, Moltke, 747 – 748; quoted by Rothenberg, 310.
94. James McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (Oxford University Press, 1990), viii; see also Harold Hyman, A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution (Knopf, 1973).
95. Bevin Alexander, Robert E. Lee's Civil War (Adams Media Corp., 1998).
96. Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative History (Random House, 1986).
97. New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 11, 273, 284 – 294.
98. See Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, which documents the repeated bankruptcies of kingly and territorial states.
99. Osiander, 312, n. 165, speech by Wilhelm before the Brandenburg regional parliament, February 24, 1892, quoted in Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Deutschen in ihren Jahrhundert, 1890 – 1990 (Rowohlt, 1990), 17.
CHAPTER NINE: THE STUDY OF THE MODERN STATE
1. Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices (New York: Norton, 1978).
2. See also Hendrick Spruyt, “Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order,” International Organization 48(1994): 527.
3. Jeremy Black, War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450 – 2000 (Yale University Press, 1998), 133. “War is not always won by the big battalions and the determinist economic account that would explain success in international relations in terms of the economic strength of particular states… is open to question.” See also Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
CHAPTER TEN: THE MARKET-STATE
1. In his essay “The Future of the Nation-State,” David Beetham makes a similar assertion: “If we consider European history, then it is only the period from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century that saw the definitive emergence of the centralized state, successfully claiming a monopoly of lawmaking and enforcement power over unified geographical territory and independence from any external authority…. If that process of state formation is comparatively recent in historical terms… it was only as late as the nineteenth century that the idea became widely accepted that the proper boundaries of the state should coincide, not with the particular territory that had been historically acquired by dynastic alliance or conquest, but with a given people, who constituted a nation.” David Beetham, “The Future of the Nation-State,” in The Idea of the Modern State, ed. Gregor McLennan, David Held, and Stuart Hall (Open University Press, 1984), 209.
2. Michael Howard, War and the Nation-State (Clarendon Press, 1978), 103.
3. Gregor Dallas, At the Heart of a Tiger: Clemenceau and His World, 1841 – 1929 (Macmillan, 1993), 501.
4. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Doubleday, 1948), 259.
5. Stalin issued orders to proceed with the development of a Soviet atomic bomb in June 1942, possibly because of information relayed by Klaus Fuchs concerning the Manhattan Project, on which he was working at Los Alamos. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist (December 15, 1967); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New American Library, 1963), 82, n. 5; and David Holloway, “Research Note: Soviet Thermonuclear Development,” International Security 4 (1979 – 1980): 192 – 197.
6. “Tojo Ordered Japan's Own Atomic-Bomb Project: Report,” Agence France-Presse, July 20,1995.
7. Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of American Power,” Political Science Quarterly 7 (1994).
8. Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 399 – 401.
9. As exemplified by Timothy McVeigh's bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. See Tom Kenworth and Lois Romano, “Nichols Prosecutor Cites ‘Avalanche of Evidence‘; Closing Arguments Underway in Bombing Trial; Defense Paints Star U.S. Witness as Drug User,” Washington Post, December 16, 1997, A8.
10. Daniel R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851 – 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
11. See e.g., Keegan, A History of Warfare, 305 – 306; and Harvey A. DeWeerd, “Churchill, Lloyd George, Clemenceau: The Emergence of the Civilian,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton University Press, 1944), 289.
12. Mary Fulbrook, The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918 – 1990 (Oxford University Press, 1991), 296.
13. Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).
14. Ralph Bryant, “Global Change: Increasing Economic Integration and Eroding Political Sovereignty,” Brookings Review 12 (1994): 42.
15. Quoted in Jeffrey A. Friden, Banking on the World: The Politics of International Finance (Harper & Row, 1987), 114 – 115; see also Walter Wriston, “Technology and Sovereignty,” Foreign Affairs 67 (1988): 63.
16. The Bush administration that took office in 2001 was, in this respect, a continuation of its predecessor, the Clinton administration. Clinton and Blair were joined in the pursuit of this new order by the Schroeder government in Germany as well. William Boston, “The Battle for Berlin: Does Gerhard Schroeder Have What It Takes to Modernize Europe's Largest Economy?” Wall Street Journal, September 29, 1999, R12; and William Drozdiak, “U.S. Urges ‘Third Way' between European Left and Right,” Washington Post, August 20,1998, A23.
17. Mancias, 192: “The ideology of democracy, freedom and equality provided much of the conceptual material for the legitimation of the state. But it may be that… these ideas now persuade too much.”
18. See, e.g., “State of the First Amendment Survey” conducted by the Center for Survey Research and Analysis, University of Connecticut, Feb. 26 – Mar. 24, 1999; see also Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina, July 19, 1991, Virginia Commonwealth Poll, match #4.
19. In Poland, the media “raised expectations, then fueled frustration. It spread official propaganda; it also provided alternative information.” Tomasz Goban-Klas, The Orchestration of the Media: The Politics of Mass Communications in Communist Poland and the Aftermath (Westview Press, 1994), 4.
20. Or in unusual cases like the BBC, partly independent, partly government controlled, the media organization is driven to seek audiences of the size of those captured by those networks that are seeking consumers.
21. Michael Howard, “Reflections on Strategic Deception,” Faculty Seminar on British Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1994.
22. See the excellent essay by A. Michael Froomkin, “The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage,” Borders in Cyberspace: Information Policy and the Global Information Infrastructure, ed. Brian Kahin and Charles Nesson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).
23. Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: A Biography (London: Macmillan, 1983).
24. Mark V. Tushnet, “The Supreme Court 1998 Term, Foreword,” 113 Harvard Law Review (1999), 26; see also Betty Sue Flowers, “The Economic Myth” (Center for International Business Education and Research, Graduate School Business, University of Texas at Austin, December 1995).
25. Hopwood v. State of Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872 (1998).
26. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
27. Michael Walzer, “The Concept of Civil Society,” in Toward a Global Civil Society, ed. M. Walzer (Berghahn Books, 1995), 13,17 (emphasis supplied).
28. Ibid., 13.
29. See Peter Drucker, The Post-Capitalist Society (Harper Business, 1993) and Peter Drucker, “The Post-Capitalist World,” Public Interest 109 (1992): 89; Peter Drucker, “The Age of Social Transformation,�
� Atlantic Monthly, November 1994, 53.
30. It is often said that we owe to Einstein and the theory of relativity the new and characteristic point of view of this century, perhaps, it is said, even something of our “relativism” in ethics. Like the Copernican revolution that reoriented man in the solar system, this intellectual breakthrough is thought to have reoriented contemporary man. I doubt this. In the first place (unlike the ideas of Copernicus and Kepler), there is nothing in the general or special theories of relativity that has much to do with the ordinary perceptions of everyday life. Second, there is nothing in Einstein's theories—except possibly the names of the theories themselves—that bears on relativism. Einstein's point, in fact, seems if anything rather the opposite: energy and mass can be related by virtue of their common relation to a constant, the speed of light. Third, there is another candidate that is more appropriate to this role. Einstein believed, when he presented the special theory of relativity, that the universe was composed of a single galaxy. Hubble has shown us that this is not the case, indeed that it is so far from being the case that our peripheral position in a peripheral galaxy appears to reduce us to cosmic insignificance. It is Hubble's observations that have, and will have, a profound effect on the attitude of every person to his or her life. How each person reacts to this repositioning is partly a matter of temperament, I suppose, but everyone will feel something, perhaps something like nothingness.