31. Michael Howard, War and the Nation-State (Clarendon Press, 1978), 14.
32. “Government Cleared in 1993 Branch Davidian Deaths,” Houston Chronicle, September 21, 2000, A17.
33. Sanford Levinson, “The Embarrassing Second Amendment,” Yale Law Journal 99 (1989): 637.
34. Here again, the fundamental difference between the American idea of popular sovereignty and the European idea surfaces. Whereas Europeans and Americans can agree that “a legitimate monopoly on the use of violence lies with the state, whose forces can only use violence on the authorization of responsible political leaders,” the American view holds that the right to delegate this monopoly to the State lies with the people, who, as they have done in the Second Amendment, may take a residual interest, as it were, in the monopoly. The European view assumes that the State, being sovereign, has been fully delegated the sovereignty of the people and thus has the monopoly so long as it can keep it. These fundamental differences are discussed in Philip Bobbitt, Three Dogmas of Sovereignty (unpublished manuscript).
35. William R. Hawkins, “The Transformation of War,” National Review, April 1991, 50.
36. And though voting mechanisms will persist, even flourish in the private sector—you will vote for the chairman of the condo association, for the trustees of the charter school, and the like—these mechanisms may be weighted just as shareholder voting is “weighted” in those institutions that reflect, rather than serve as counterweights (churches, synagogues) to, the market-state.
37. David Butler and Austin Ranney, Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), 34.
38. Also consider James S. Fishkin's Center for Deliberative Polling, which attempts to determine how the public would vote if it were properly educated about the issues (http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/delpol/bluebook/summary.html).
39. Baker v. Carr, 82 S. Ct. 691 (1962); and Reynolds v. Sims, 84 S. Ct. 1362 (1964).
40. Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of American Power,” Political Science Quarterly 109 (Spring 1994): 5.
41. Robert E. Litan and William D. Nordhaus, Reforming Federal Regulation (Yale University Press, 1983), 157.
CHAPTER ELEVEN: STRATEGIC CHOICES
1. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
2. Alan Tonelson, “Superpower without a Sword,” Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 166 – 182.
3. It is noteworthy that during the Gulf War, not one son or daughter of a member of Congress went off to war. Patrick J. Buchanan, “America's new nationalism: The new political fault line is emerging, and it will be drawn over prosperity at home vs. aid abroad,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 3, 1994, D3
4. Alan Tonelson, “Tremors across the America First fault line: Fearful opposition,” Washington Times, February 18, 1992, E1.
5. U.S. Congressional Research Service.
6. Alexander Haig, interview with Fox News, January 14, 2001.
7. Alan Tonelson, “Beyond Left and Right: New Thinking in Foreign Policy,” Current, May 1994, 39.
8. Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, “No New World Order: America after the Cold War,” Current, December 1993, 26, 27.
9. “Lord Salisbury, the British prime minister at the beginning of this century, once said in exasperation about his military advisers that if they had their way they would garrison the moon to protect us from an attack from Mars.” Michael Howard, The Lessons of History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).
10.As quoted in Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne, “The Case against Intervention in Kosovo,” The Nation, April 19,1999,11.
11. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1970); Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, For and Against Method: Including Lakatos's Lectures on Scientific Method and the Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence, ed. Matteo Motterlini (University of Chicago Press, 1999).
12. James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
13. James Chace, The Consequences of the Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
14. Though that day of parity may still be a ways off.
15. Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
16. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
17. The Western European Union is a body established in 1955 to facilitate coordination of European security and defense matters. It may soon be supplanted by the European Union's new Rapid-Reaction Force.
18. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).
19. Kenneth Neal Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).
20. A free rider is an agent who exploits a service provided by another without paying for it. New Zealand, for example, benefits from the United States's nuclear deterrent without paying for it, by, for example, allowing U.S. nuclear submarines to use New Zealand harbors.
21. James B. Steinberg, “Sources of Conflict and Tools for Stability: Planning for the Twenty-first Century” (Address at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, June 14, 1994), Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, July 11, 1994,464.
22. George Kennan, The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy (Little, Brown, 1977), 41 – 42.
23. Tony Smith, “Making the World Safe for Democracy,” Washington Quarterly 16 (1993): 207.
24. Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Paper #6. Hamilton wrote “Republics” where I have substituted “Democracies.” Hamilton clearly did not mean the latter as he understood the distinction, but contemporary readers today will better grasp this point, I think, if this substitution is made.
25. Graham E. Fuller, The Democracy Trap: The Perils of the Post–Cold War World (Dutton, 1991).
26. Charley Reese, “Clinton Continues U.S. Tradition of Hypocritical Meddling Abroad,” Orlando Sentinel, May 11, 1993, A8.
27. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70 (1991): 23, 24, 27.
28. William E. Odom, “NATO's Expansion: Why the Critics Are Wrong,” National Interest, Spring 1995, 38.
29. Krauthammer, 25.
30. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, “A Normal Country in a Normal Time,” National Interest, Fall 1990,40 – 44.
31. Krauthammer, 27.
32. Richard N. Haass, “Paradigm Lost,” Foreign Affairs 74 (1995): 43,44.
33. Available at www.rice.edu/projects/baker/pubs/workingpapers/efac/jan21.html.
34. Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence, 283.
35. For an elaboration of the argument for this conclusion, I refer the reader to Calabresi and Bobbitt, Tragic Choices.
36. “Instrucción que dio el Conde Duque a Felipe I,” British Museum, Egerton MS 347, fos. 249 – 290.
37. It is not only intellectuals who make this error. Insofar as the movement toward a European Defense Initiative is, for many, merely a political station on the way to an integrated European defense system, coordinated by the European Union, it reflects a similar disposition, because such a defense arrangement requires a fundamental constitutional modification of the nation-states of Europe in the direction of a superstate.
CHAPTER TWELVE: STRATEGY AND THE MARKET-STATE
1. William Poundstone, Prisoner's Dilemma: John von Neumann, Game Theory, and the Puzzle of the Bomb (New York: Doubleday, 1992).
2. Lamar Smith, “Immigration and Welfare Reform: Finally, Taxpayers Are Being Considered,” USA Today, March 1, 1997, 30. See also George Borjas, “Immigration and Welfare Benefits,” Congressional Testimony, March 12, 1996. For a contrasting view, see James Bornemeier, “Study
Says Newcomers Give More Than They Take,” Portland Oregonian, December 1, 1995, A1.
3. On February 23, 1996, the Outstanding Public Debt was $5,017,056,630,040.53. This was the first time in history the U.S. national debt surpassed the $5 trillion mark.
4. R. W. Apple, Jr., “Poll Shows Disenchantment with Politicians and Politics,” International Herald Tribune, August 14, 1995, 3, reporting on New York Times/CBS Poll; ironically this was reported a few pages away from a rather snide New York Times attack on the Clintons for refusing to reveal their private tax returns from the mid-1980s, suggesting that “the Clintons owe it to the public to… waive their privacy rights at the IRS” and concluding that until the Whitewater independent counsel publishes his report one cannot know whether the President and the First Lady “were truthful,” “The Whitewater Tax Questions,” 6.
5. Robert M. Dunn, Jr., “Has the U.S. Economy Really Been Globalized?” Washington Quarterly, Winter 2001, 54.
6. See the proposal by Ronald Asmus, Robert Blackwill, and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Can NATO Survive?” Washington Quarterly, Spring 1996, 79, for an expansion of a NATO agenda.
7. See the excellent recent books on this subject by Richard Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post –War World (Brookings Institution, 1994); and The Reluctant Sheriff (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1997).
8. James Kurth, “The Decline and Fall of Almost Everything: Paul Kennedy Peers into the Future (‘Preparing for the 21st Century’),” Foreign Affairs 72 (Spring 1993): 162. “The best way—for a nation and a person—to prepare for the 21st century will be what has always been the best way to prepare for uncertainty. That is to rely not so much upon the outer supports of plans, programs and policies but upon the inner strengths of character—resiliency and resourcefulness, discipline and cooperation, endurance and courage, and, perhaps above all, faith and hope.” See also James Fallows, More like Us: Making America Great Again (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989).
9. For an excellent analysis, see Richard O. Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What Can the History of Revolutions in Military Affairs Tell Us about Transforming the U.S. Military? (Rand, 1999).
10. “One set of possibilities relates to future advances in sensor technology; these are opening up unused portions of the electromagnetic spectrum that, when matched with improved computational capabilities and deployment in space, offer the prospect for a truly transparent battlefield…. [E]lectronic systems may be redesigned so that they will be virtually undetectable.” Dan Goure, “Is There a Military-Technical Revolution in America's Future?” Washington Quarterly 16 (1993): 179.
11. Ibid., 175.
12. Carter and Perry, 135. This change “began in the 1970's with the development of satellite reconnaissance, smart weapons, cruise missiles, stealth aircraft, and other breakthroughs that would not have been possible without the microchip…”
13. Eliot Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 75 (1996): 37. “Admiral William Owens, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has written of a ‘system of systems’: through an integrated network of powerful computers and high-speed communications. This will transform the way commanders and troops see and communicate on the battlefield. In the past, information was passed around the battlefield via radio conversations or typewritten messages. Commanders got only a fraction of the information they could really use in combat. With the system of systems envisioned in Force 21, commanders will have the ability to send and receive, in digital bursts, critical information about the location of enemy and friendly forces: the rate of use of food, fuel, and ammunition; the progress of current operations; and plans for future operations.“The effect on combat operations will be revolutionary. Every commander will have ‘battlefield awareness’: a constant, complete, three-dimensional picture of the battlefield. Every field unit will be better able to carry out its commander's orders because it will be able to see more clearly through the ‘fog of battle.’ An entire division will be able to fight as a single integrated combat system.“In battle, when a tank commander spots enemy forces, he will have a choice. He could engage the enemy with the weapons on his tanks, or he could call in attack helicopters, artillery, strike aircraft, or naval gunfire. Because of digital technology… these other units will see exactly what the tank commander sees…. As combat is underway, the supporting logistics unit will monitor the ammunition usage, so it will be able to resupply at the time and amount needed, thereby reducing the huge logistics tail otherwise needed to support combat operations.” Carter and Perry, 199.
14. Cohen, 38.
15. It had caused a complete reworking of American nuclear strategy and prompted the introduction into Europe of fast-reacting Pershing II missiles and survivable ground-launched cruise missiles.
16. Jeffrey R. Cooper, “Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs,” in In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 114.
17. Future Visions for U.S. Defense Policy, the Council on Foreign Relations Defense Policy Review, ed. John Hillen (Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 5 – 6.
18. Les Aspin, address to Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington, D.C., September 21, 1992, reprinted in Richard Haass, Intervention, 183 – 190.
19. See e.g., “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” The White House, February 1995; and see also “Annual Report to the President and the Congress,” William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense (1999), 3 – 4.
20. General Colin S. Powell, remarks to defense writers' group, September 23 1993, quoted in Harry G. Summers, The New World Strategy: A Military Policy for America's Future (Simon & Schuster, 1995), 139.
21. Paul Bracken defines this list a little differently, treating the “C” class candidates as states that, though they suffer problems rather than pose threats—for example, problems such as ethnic civil war (Yugoslavia), insurgency (Peru), terrorism (Egypt), civil disorder (Somalia), or infiltration such as by narcotics flows—these states nevertheless can impose demands on the U.S. military. Paul Bracken, “The Military After Next,” The Washington Quarterly 16 (Autumn 1993): 157.
22. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (Pocket Books, 1963).
23. This study was highly controversial insofar as it seemed to imply that current allies might become future competitors. See Patrick Taylor, “Pentagon Drops Goal of Blocking New Superpowers,” The New York Times, May 24, 1992, Ai; Barton Gellman, “Keeping the U.S. First; Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower,” Washington Post, March 11, 1992, A1. See also Francis Fukuyama, “The Beginning of Foreign Policy,” The New Republic, August 17, 1992, 24.
24. Bracken, 157.
25. Goure, 31.
26. Jeffrey Cooper, “Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs,” in In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 114.
27. This figure comes from Dr. Hans Mark, former director for defense research and engineering at the United States Department of Defense.
28. Cohen, 50.
29. “An analogy might be Germany's acquisition of a modern air force in the space of less than a decade in the 1930s. At a time when civilian and military aviation technologies did not diverge too greatly, Germany could take the strongest civilian aviation industry in Europe and within a few years convert it into enormous military power, much as the United States would do a few years later with its automobile industry.” Cohen, 51.
30. Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, “A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia,” The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, United States Department of Energy, January 10, 2001.
31. Carter and Perry, 76 – 77.
32. Cohen, 51.
33. See Paul Bracken, “The Military after Next,” 161. Clifford Rogers notes that although
the technology has been perfected, when military organizations failed either to restructure effectively, whether through lack of funds or organizational insight, they failed to achieve the benefits of revolutionary increase in military effectiveness. Clifford J. Rogers, “The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War,” The Journal of Military History (April 1993): 241– 278.
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