34. Cohen, 53.
35. Goure, 180.
36. “To the extent that the defense sector increases its dependence on the commercial sector for the ability to support and reconstitute its forces, it will be further pushed in the direction of a revolution by necessity.” Ibid.
37. “Virtually no one is considering [conflicts] where the next military will face competition from its peers or from major regional competitors that can adversely affect U.S. interests in key regions. This is terra incognita,” Bracken, 166.
38. Josef Joffe, “Bismarck or Britain?: Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity,” International Security 19 (Spring 1995): 31 – 32.
39. Joffe describes this as “a demand for [American] services, and that translates into political profits,” and he suggests that “[t]hese revenues can be nicely invested elsewhere, e.g., [in gaining] America's access to the [European] Single Market. To be in a position where all the powers need us… would clearly help the United States to improve the political terms of trade vis-à-is the E.U. and to contain neo-mercantilism in general.” Joffe, 113.
40. Carter and Perry, 56 – 57.
41. Ibid., 27.
42. Ibid., 42.
43. Ibid., 47.
44. Ibid., 120 – 121.
45. Martin C. Libicki, “Informational War and Peace,” Journal of International Affairs 51 (1998): 420 – 421.
46. Joseph Nye and William Owens, “America's Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs 75 (1996): 21, 28.
47. Kees van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation (Wiley, 1997), 2.
48. Ibid., 8, 7.
49. Bracken, 162.
50. See Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (Public Affairs, 2001).
51. Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security 21 (1997): 50 – 51. The Clinton administration, in its second term, plainly took these lessons of the first term to heart when it determined to prosecute a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo through the use of precision air strikes.
52. Joffe, 2.
53. Edward Luttwak, “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 74 (1995): 115.
54. See Colin L. Powell, “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs 72 (1993): 32; and Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (Warner Books, 1990).
55.Luttwak, 109, 112.
56. Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence, 101 – 102.
57. Ibid., 102.
58. Roger Hilsman, “Does the CIA Still Have a Role?” Foreign Affairs 74 (1995): 104
59. “The key professional argument advanced by the most senior U.S. military chiefs to reject all proposals to employ U.S. offensive air power in Bosnia rested on the implicit assumption… that only decisive results are worth having…” Luttwak, 120 – 121.
60. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (Random House, 1998), 142 – 158.
61. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo (Brookings Institution, 2000), 231.
62. Ibid., 4.
63. Ibid., 233.
64. “The rise of information technologies [has led to] the development of intelligent weapons that can guide themselves to their targets [but this] is only one and not necessarily the most important. The variety and ever-expanding capabilities of intelligence-gathering machines and the ability of computers to bring together and distribute to users the masses of information from these sources stem [also] from the information revolution.” Eliot Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 75 (1996): 37.
65. “Spacecast 2020” (Air University, June 1994).
66. Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolution,” National Interest (Fall 1994): 30 – 41.
67. Raffi Gregorian, “Global Positioning Systems: A Military Revolution for the Third World?” SAIS Review 13 (1993): 133.
68. For a more skeptical view of missile defense, see Joseph Cirincione and Frank von Hippel, The Last Fifteen Minutes: Ballistic Missile Defense in Perspective (Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, 1996).
69. Keith Payne, “Post-Cold War Deterrence and Missile Defense,” Orbis 39 (1995): 203.
70. Hans Mark, “Pentagon Official Touts Sea-Based Missile Defense,” Aerospace Daily, September 1, 1999, 344.
71. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 260.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: THE WARS OF THE MARKET-STATE
1. Machiavelli, Discoursi (Modern Library, 1950), 104.
2. Bodin, 200.
3. See Hume's remark that the “greatness of the state” and “the happiness of its subjects” had become interdependent. David Hume, “Of Commerce,” in Essays, Morals, Political and Literary (Oxford University Press, 1963), 1753.
4. Pole, Political Representation in England, 441.
5. Burke and Napoleon, Lenin and Wilson: how surprised they might be that, in retrospect, they were struggling to give pre-eminence to the same constitutional order.
6. See Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492 – 1992 (Blackwell, 1993), which focuses on the role of revolution in state formation. See also Michael Richards, “How to Succeed in Revolution without Really Trying,” Journal of Social History 28 (1995): 883.
7. Howard, “War and the Nation State,” in The State, ed. Stephen Graubard (Norton, 1979), 101 – 110.
8. Geoffrey Parker, “Continuity and Change in Western Geopolitical Thought during the Twentieth Century,” International Social Science Journal 43 (1991): 21.
9. Friedberg, “The Future of American Power,” 1.
10. Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
11. Peter Mancias, The Death of the State (New York: Putnam, 1974).
12. D. Beetham, “The Future of the Nation-State,” in The Idea of the Modern State, ed. Gregor McLennan, David Held, and Stuart Hall (Open University Press, 1984), 208 – 222.
13. Hans Mark in his commencement address at St. Edwards University, Austin, Texas, Saturday, May 8, 1993.
14. See John Lynn, “Clio in Arms: The Role of the Military Variable in Shaping History,” Journal of Military History 55 (1991): 83 – 95. See also Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and the European States, A.D. 90 – 1990 (Blackwell, 1990); David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Harvard University Press, 1990); Brian M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change in Early Modern Europe (Princeton University Press, 1991); Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500 – 1800 (Cambridge University Press, 1988); and David Ralston, Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600 – 1914 (University of Chicago Press, 1990); Jeremy Black, War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450 – 2000 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
15. See e.g. Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage (Heinemann, 1910); Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (Macmillan, 1947), 238 – 247.
16. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (1993): 22.
17. “Insights and Action Items for U.S. Global Relations in the 21st Century,” Report of the Project on the Future of Global Relations, 1997.
18. Bill Clinton, “Remarks on the Reinventing Government Initiative,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 30, 1994, 1763.
19. Bill Clinton, “Remarks to the Joint Session of the Louisiana State Legislature in Baton Rouge, Louisiana,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 32, 1996, 969.
20. Ibid.
21. Bill Clinton, “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 33, 1997, 136.
22. Bill Clinton, “Inaugural Address,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 33, 1997, 60. Nor
is the executive the only branch of government leading the movement toward the market-state in the United States. As Mark Tushnet has observed, the U.S. Supreme Court's “federalism decisions are the most obvious examples…. United States v. Lopez, which struck down the Gun-Free Zones Act as beyond the power given Congress in the Commerce Clause; Printz v. United States, which invalidated the Brady Handgun Control Act because it forced state executive officials to implement a national program; City of Boerne v. Flores, which invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act for exceeding the scope of Congress's power to remedy court-identified violations of the Free Exercise Clause; and a series of deci-sions restricting Congress's ability to impose retroactive monetary liability on states because such remedies violated the Eleventh Amendment.” Mark V. Tushnet, “The Supreme Court 1998 Term, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration,” 113 Harvard Law Review 26 (1999).
INTRODUCTION: THE ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
1. See Machiavelli's chapters in The Prince on “dangling the carrot” and “brandishing the stick” for a view of the state in strategic terms, i.e., those that aim for collective aggrandizement with, in principle, no limits. See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapters XV and XVII. Clifford Orwin, “Machiavelli's Unchristian Charity,” American Political Science Review 72 (1978): 1217 – 1228.
2. Stanley Hoffmann, “Politics among the Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,” The Atlantic, November 1985, 134.
3. Michael Howard, The Causes of War and Other Essays, 27.
4. Philip Bobbitt, Three Dogmas of Sovereignty.
5. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 75.
6. Hedley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society,” in The Expansion of International Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford University Press, 1984), 117.
7. Montesquieu, Oeuvres Complétes, vol. 2 (Gallimard, 1951), 237.
8. “Barbarus” is the Latin word for foreigner.
9. Murray Forsyth, “The Tradition of International Law,” in Traditions of International Ethics, ed. Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 24.
10. Ibid.
11. Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society, 8. The most important of these limitations arises from the constitutional order of the State because this governs strategy, which is the exercise of the state's power abroad.
12. Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Real New World Order,” Foreign Affairs 76 (1997): 183, 195.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: COLONEL HOUSE AND A WORLD MADE OF LAW
1. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 1, 16.
2. Ibid., 45.
3. Ibid., 46.
4. Ibid., 62.
5. Ibid., 126.
6. Profiles in Power: Twentieth Century Texans in Washington, ed. Kenneth E. Hendrickson, Jr., and Michael L. Collins (Harlan Davidson, 1993), 5.
7. Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 1,114.
8. B. W. Huebsch letter, House Files, Yale University.
9. Ibid.
10. Portland (Maine) Evening Telegram, November 30, 1912.
11. Dallas Morning News, December 30, 1912.
12. Hartford Courant, December 13, 1912.
13. Trenton Advertiser, January 5, 1913.
14. Philadelphia Public Ledger, January 12, 1913.
15. “Literary Gossip,” Los Angeles Times, February 2, 1913.
16. Cincinnati Enquirer, December 12, 1912.
17. The New York Times, January 26, 1913.
18. Los Angeles Times, February 2, 1913.
19. Philadelphia Public Ledger, January 27, 1913; see also LaFollette's, Madison, Wisconsin, March 29, 1913.
20. Chicago Record Herald, November 28, 1912.
21. Zion's Herald, February 19, 1913, Boston: “It would be much more interesting to know. For after all, it makes a difference who says a thing.”
22. Los Angeles Times, March 30, 1913.
23. Milwaukee, Wisconsin, January 18, 1913: the “story is rather amateurish in places,” Chicago News, January 18, 1913.
24. Walter Lippmann, “America's Future Pictured in a Decidedly Quaint Novel,” New York Times Book Review, December 8, 1912, 4.
25. Franklin K. Lane, The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, ed. Anne Wintermute Lane and Louise Herrick Wall (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1922).
26. Daniel P. Moynihan, On the Law of Nations (Harvard University Press, 1990), 1.
27. “Why We Went to War: President Wilson's Famous Address at the Opening of the War Congress, April 2, 1917,” in President Wilson's Great Speeches and Other History Making Documents (Stanton and Van Vliet, 1919), 17.
28. See Joyce Williams, Colonel House and Sir Edward Grey: A Study in Anglo-American Diplomacy (University Press of America, 1984), 22 – 29.
29. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 1, 240 (diary date 5/9/13).
30. Almost identical to a plan set out in Philip Dru.
31. G. M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon (Longmans, Green, 1946), 271.
32. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 1, 262.
33. Ibid., 274 – 275.
34. Indeed, Spring-Rice, the British ambassador to the United States, thought that House's mission had precipitated the German action toward Austria because it signaled to the war party in Berlin that U.S. mediation might weaken their hand with the kaiser. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. I, 286 – 287.
35. Ibid.
36. George W. Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics and International Organization, 1914 – 1919 (University of North Carolina Press, 1978), citing Grey to Spring-Rice, December 22, 1914, F.O. 800/84. See also Trevelyan, 314 – 315. House's initial reply—that the United States could not become a party to any agreement binding members to enforce the observance of treaties, see Egerton, 25—seems to have been based on constitutional grounds having to do with the war powers of the executive. See Philip Bobbitt, “War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath,” Michigan Law Review 92 (1994): 1364; (arguing that the United States can go to war on the basis of a ratified treaty without further congressional action); see also Philip Bobbitt, Three Dogmas of Sovereignty (noting that Congress can also supersede a treaty by statute and thus that the U.S. treaty commitment is only conditional, posing the possibility that U.S. constitutional law—the basis of congressional supersession—might come into conflict with doctrines of international law, e.g., pacta sunt servanda).
37. The Nation, March 14, 1914, quoted in A.J.P. Taylor, The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792 – 1939 (Indiana University Press, 1958), 115.
38. Egerton, 25.
39. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. I, 364.
40. Zimmerman to House, March 21, 1915.
41. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 1, 433 – 434.
42. House Files, Yale University.
43. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 2, 89.
44. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 2, 90 – 91.
45. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 2, 98.
46. Hildebrand in Profiles in Power, 17.
47. Patrick Devlin, Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality (Oxford University Press, 1974), 473.
48. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., “A Soldier's Faith: An address delivered on Memorial Day, May 30, 1895, at a meeting called by the graduating class of Harvard University” (Research Publications, 1984). On this change, as on so many other subjects, Michael Howard has written with insight. See Michael Howard, The Causes of War and Other Essays, 27.
49. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 2, 359.
50. “The Making of a President,” in Philip Dru, 89 – 90.
51. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 2, 359 (just as, in 1996, President Clinton ran for governor, as it were, on issues of crime, welfare reform, and the domes
tic economy).
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