Guderian: Panzer General

by Macksey, Kenneth

  Yet the development of Guderian’s feelings towards Hitler are important and brought to light by his wife’s letters, which also reflect Goerne sentiments. The Goernes (Gretel’s family) were not in the least pro-Nazi, as snatches from their letters show, and yet Gretel leaves no doubt about their convictions concerning Hitler. On 23rd March 1933, after Hitler had been granted dictatorial powers, she described to her mother her exaltation ‘… after all the hideous mess of the past years we get at last a feeling of awe and greatness’. Also she extolled his ‘… beautiful way of speaking, his iron will, his energy and good words for the Army’. It could hardly have been said better by an enthusiast for Bismarck. And next day her father wrote to say how fine it was that the new government had tidied things up: ‘All will be achieved without wounds’. A year later, on 3rd June 1934, Gretel still sang songs of high pitched praise to her mother in tune with the majority of the people: ‘I am so glad that Heinz has written to you enthusiastically about Hitler. Everybody who gets to know him is very impressed by his personality. Above all his eyes and look send a special message to the heart … I do not think we will find a more courageous and better leader’.

  Of course by then Guderian was aware that Hitler would help him in the task of building a Panzer Command and so his enthusiasm may have been conditioned by ambition and hope. In 1945 he was to write: ‘… policy was not shaped by soldiers but by politicians and the Army had to accept the political and military situation as it existed’ – adding rather typically but nevertheless in confirmation of his distaste for all party men: This was unfortunate because politicians rarely expose themselves to the hazards of war, usually remaining safely at home.’ But Germany then lay in ruins.

  It is easy to criticise the Germans in hindsight and to forget that Fascist parties throughout the world at that time of desperation contained a proportion of highly respected and distinguished people – nearly all of whom were fooled by Hitler. With the economic crisis at its height Germany happened to acquire as her saviour an unscrupulous dictator. The French remained in disarray, the British formed a so-called National Government and the Americans accorded President Roosevelt unprecedented powers to dictate. In the final analysis it was a rearmament programme which raised each Western nation out of the economic depths. Not long after France had been broken in 1940, Britain was hanging on by a thread under the dictatorship of Churchill, and the Americans were on the way back to prosperity in war having used their Constitution to good effect to curb, but not destroy, the power of Roosevelt.

  Guderian spoke for others as well as himself when he wrote of this period: ‘Literary output did not reach pre-World War I quality because of the Army’s rapid expansion which occupied the General Staff to such an extent as to leave no time for unofficial writing’. Absorbed by ambition and the feeling of urgent need in strengthening the Reichswehr for defence, in particular, of the eastern frontiers, the senior members of the German Army became fascinated by its task and allowed evil men to take over before they appreciated the implications. With the Army on his side and neutralised as a political force, Hitler had nothing to fear from the intellectuals and industrialists while the people gave thanks as more jobs were created.

  5 The Creation of the Panzertruppe

  When stupendous events in the clash of revolutionary causes overshadow the diplomatic and political scene and attract the full glare of publicity it is often symptomatic, if not endemic, that trivial changes of great importance also take place – though often unnoticed. Alongside the vivid display of Hitler’s initial struggle for supremacy in Germany, with its heavy overtones of racial prejudice, the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in October 1933; the slaughter of dissident elements such as von Schleicher and a few recalcitrant Sturm Abteilung leaders on June 30th 1934; the murder by Nazis of the Austrian Chancellor in July 1934, and the disclosure of the existence of the Luftwaffe in March 1935 (only a few days before the announcement of conscription and the reconstitution of the General Staff), significant though less discernible shifts in power and actuation were also taking place. For example the diminution of Sturm Abteilung power left room for Heinrich Himmler’s Schutz Staffeln (SS) to become the strong arm of Nazi power, and the SS was already engaged upon creating its own military wing – the Waffen SS – with enormous import for the future. Simultaneously the power of the Army was being reduced by Blomberg and Reichenau in their endeavours to create a central defence organisation – what was to become the Wehrmacht – of which the Army, Navy and Air Force were intended to be subordinate parts, answerable to a new central staff. Hitler was giving covert signs of hostility to the Army but so also were some Army officers from within the organisation. Thus the movement by Lutz, a mere Generalleutnant, and his Chief of Staff, Guderian (promoted Oberst on 1st April 1930), to form a new Command (an army within the Army, as some suggested it might be since it incorporated elements of each existing arm) was only a minor movement within one great revolution, though possibly more likely to prosper since so much attention which might have been hostile was deflected elsewhere. While their main opponents in the High Command were preoccupied, Lutz and Guderian could initially debate in relative obscurity and gain advantages by rational arguments in committee.

  But hope and temporary advantages were not enough for Guderian. He needed immediate and positive support from the highest level. Blomberg, as Minister for War, was sympathetic but too remote within the military structure. It was significant that Guderian felt that Hitler was more accessible, or so he implied when, in Panzer Leader, he wrote: ‘I was convinced that the head of the government would approve my proposals for the organisation of an up-to-date Wehrmacht if only I could manage to lay my views before him.’ The remark was prompted by Hitler’s first inspection of new equipment at Kummersdorf early in 1934 at which Guderian, for half an hour, had been allowed to demonstrate the basic elements of a panzer division – a motor-cycle platoon, an anti-tank platoon, a platoon of the first experimental light tanks (Pz I founded on a Vickers’ design and disguised under the name of ‘Agricultural Tractor’) and some reconnaissance cars; it revealed Guderian’s widesweeping concept of a totally restructured defence force in which a unified Panzer Command was the dominant equal of the Infantry and the Artillery. At the same time the oft-quoted remark of the time by Hitler, ‘That’s what I need! That’s what I want to have’, may have been misleading in that he did not necessarily say ‘why’ or in what quantity he wanted a panzer force. Standing beside him that day was Hermann Göring who was vested with enormous powers as a Minister and was in the course of setting up the Luftwaffe upon which first priority of expenditure and effort was to be conferred. Although at Kummersdorf Hitler saw something recognisably modern, fast and sensational such as would generate prestige, he said nothing to suggest that he received a vision of revolutionary land warfare. More likely he visualised a force which would add drama to the threats supporting his display of power politics. As a result the panzer force was not accorded any special priority and Guderian was left to fight as hard as ever for recognition.*

  Overriding every major consideration in connection with Army expansion – a target of 36 divisions was set by Hitler early in 1934 and revealed to the world in 1935 – was the desire to build a force which was capable of defending Germany’s frontiers. The occupation of the Ruhr by the French in 1923 – unopposed because the means of opposition were virtually non-existent – posed a persistent fear of invasion from the west which was second only to the fear of a threat by the newly created states of Poland and Czechoslovakia which, since their inception in 1918, had repeatedly preyed upon their neighbours – Poland more than Czechoslovakia. There is no evidence to show that the General Staff contemplated offensive operations either before or during the opening stages of rearmament – for practical reasons if no other: they simply could not be ready with a properly constituted force until 1943 because neither financial nor industrial capacity were equal to the task. T
hese constrictions, allied to the dread of another financial inflation if progress went ahead too quickly, overrode the launching of each project in a costly process. Economy had to be the watchword in erecting defences. Offensive weapons were last on the list. In 1936 in the pages of Achtung! Panzer! Guderian gave what undoubtedly were his true beliefs, to the effect that Germany could only afford to wage a short war in the hope that it would be brought to a tolerable conclusion before she was crippled. These were not the beliefs of a man who was hungry for war.

  Guderian’s initial concept for the panzer division, as stated in Achtung! Panzer!, was primarily as a weapon of defence; an attack on the French he considered to be hopeless. He feared the threat from the east far more and therefore strove for a highly mobile force which could knock out the Poles and Czechs, should the need arise, while delaying the French in the west. It was with defensively orientated offensive operations that he experimented throughout 1933 in exercises which, as he said, ‘… did much to clarify the relationship between various weapons and served to strengthen me in my convictions that tanks would be able to play their full part within the framework of a modern army when they were treated as that army’s principal weapon and were supplied with fully motorised supporting arms’. These supporting arms, he insisted, ‘were to be permanently attached’.

  The task of the proposed panzer divisions which, to the mind of Guderian, ought to become the pivot around which the rest of the Army revolved, was defined in a news-sheet disseminated at the end of 1933: … the widespread attack against enemy flank and rear – separated from other slower units; but it can also achieve considerable success in a breakthrough on the front. When used in pursuit it can throw a fleeing enemy into confusion. On the other hand it is less well equipped to hold captured territory; for this purpose it is usually necessary to employ motorised infantry and artillery. The manner of its engagement is not in prolonged battles but short, well-timed operations launched by brief orders. The principle is to use the battle tanks at the core of the operations, to concentrate the main fighting force at the decisive point of action … on the principle of surprise in order to avoid or avert enemy defensive action.’

  Never was the course of progress steady or mellowed by sweet accord, and frequently Guderian was compelled to draw heavily upon his inherent optimism. Alas! His tolerance was not always equal to the task and a tendency to irascibility when under stress became more pronounced. Those among his contemporaries who said he was a ‘bull’ overlooked the frustrations placed in his way and had ceased themselves to pursue the old Prussian tradition of ‘absolute frankness, even towards the King’. There are many who recall, with pleasure, his willingness to hear their case with patience and understanding.

  As he became absorbed by the pilgrimage of innovation, the time left for introspection got scarcer, yet something in him sounded a warning note on 2nd August 1934 on the eve of taking the oath of allegiance to Hitler instead of to the Constitution. To Gretel he wrote: ‘Pray God that both sides may abide by it equally for the welfare of Germany. The Army is accustomed to keeping its oaths. May the Army, in honour, be able to do so this time’. Gretel took up the theme on the 19th to her mother: ‘Over the radio I have just heard the ovation for Hitler … We need unity more than ever, it is our only strength abroad … Hitler’s faith in his mission for Germany and the faith of the people in him are practically miracles. But sometimes one can become a little afraid about excessive elevation.’ These were the first signs of trepidation that events were shaping a dangerous course, but they hardly ruffled the surface of satisfaction with a Führer whose guidance was unchallenged. Guderian looked to the Führer for salvation. As a reasonably pious member of the United Lutheran Church he did not often attend its services, for in religion too, according to his son, he was constantly seeking new ideas. Indeed, as the pressures grew heavier at work he seems to have cultivated a grimly intensive self-sufficiency in his assault upon obstacles thrown in his way.

  Frustrations there were in plenty. In 1933 acute national financial stringency led to the curtailment, for the last time under Hitler, as it happened, of the major Army manoeuvres. Also Hitler cancelled the arrangements for mutual training and development with the Russians, with the result that fruitful courses had to be ended before the new training establishments at Wünsdorf and Putlos in Germany were working fully. Moreover Lutz had to undertake some delicate negotiations with the Russians in recovering equipment left stranded at the Kama River site.

  On the other hand Hammerstein-Equord was replaced as C-in-C by Fritsch, Guderian’s old superior officer at Bartenstein. This was a blow to the few who already were trying to resist Hitler, for it has been suggested that Hammerstein, lazy though he was, had the ability, integrity and powers of decision which at any time might have been turned to ejecting the Führer before he became too well entrenched. Be that as it may, Guderian welcomed Fritsch’s appointment, rating him a thoroughly sound soldier, who had ‘… devoted a period of detached service to the study of the panzer division’. Between them was a close affinity, although it must be realised that neither were part of a circle of close friends -except for the life-long friendships made in the earliest days with their regiments.

  In years to come the Nazi hierarchy would make use of Guderian but it must not be forgotten that, in seeking support for his schemes, Guderian also made use of them. Allies being short within the Army he gathered help wherever it could be found and the head of the National Socialist Motor Corps (the NSKK) a paramilitary organisation under Adolf Hühnlein of the SA, was of fruitful importance. In Panzer Leader Guderian merely credits Hühnlein (whom he called ‘a decent upright man with whom it was easy to work’) with taking him to a Nazi Party meeting in 1933. But Hühnlein’s main contribution to Guderians ambitions was the training of truck and tank drivers in 24 NSKK-Reichsmotorsportschulen, about 187,000 being provided between 1933 and 1939 to solve largely the basic preparation of crews for highly motorised forces, all as part of the role of co-operation that evolved with the S A after the purge of its leaders in June 1934.

  Obstructors there would always be and notably from three sources. First, from the new Chief of the recreated General Staff, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, an artilleryman like Fritsch but slow and hesitant in decision, who was the opposite of Fritsch in philosophical outlook. Though most German generals, in Sir John Wheeler-Bennett’s words, ‘… did not regard war as the primary role of the soldier, but believed that Germany’s rearmament should be of such a degree that they would lessen rather than increase the danger of war by making it impossible for Germany to be attacked or gainsaid with impunity’, Beck interpreted this in its military aspects as a sufficiently strong argument for retaining the ‘delaying defensive’ or, as Fritsch called it, ‘organised flight’. Fritsch had the last word and the traditional Prussian doctrine of attack was reinstated – to Guderian’s undisguised pleasure.

  Suggestions have been made that Beck hampered the creation of panzer divisions because, as a man who became dedicated to the resistance against Hitler, he recognised the immense potency of this new instrument of war and its propensity to strengthen Hitler’s powers. There is no evidence in support of this supposition. Hardly anybody on the General Staff is on record for appreciating the potential value of armoured forces in 1934. The following conversations between Guderian and Beck, when proposals were being made, are fairly typical of the general level of understanding in those days:

  Beck: How many of these divisions do you want?

  Guderian: Two to begin with, later 20.

  Beck: And how will you lead these divisions?

  Guderian: From the front – by wireless.

  Beck: Nonsense! A divisional commander sits back with maps and a telephone. Anything else is Utopian!

  The second source of obstruction was generated by the Cavalry who persisted in their efforts to retain a full share of the manpower allocation and of resources. They saw Guderian as a threat to their existence, but in their o
pposition merely delayed the inevitable since those above them were already determined that progress should be maintained. People who say that the German military hierarchy was against the creation of a panzer force are wrong; but, sound professionals that they were, they rightly demanded convincing evidence before committing themselves to something that was huge, costly and irrevocable at a time of tight budgeting. Guderian had to provide the evidence-in-chief but already many cavalry officers, notably among the younger generation (and not only in the German Army by any means) welcomed the prospects offered by mechanisation. They had long ago lost faith in the operational role of their arm. They, and the rankers, saw practical advantages in learning about mechanical vehicles in the age of the internal combustion engine. Guderian’s antipathy to the Cavalry was probably taken a little too far -but his patience was provoked by intransigence. In adopting the line that they might be poor substitutes for the indoctrinated men of the Motor Transport Service, he argued against incorporating horse-thinking soldiers into the Panzertruppe which he hoped to form, though he was remarkably successful in encouraging many cavalry officers to transfer independently. Eventually 40 per cent of the Panzertruppe’s officers were those who had been charmed away from the Cavalry. Reichenau, of course, was fully aware of Guderian’s objections to cavalry participation and may well have heaved a sigh of relief when an opportunity to avoid a confrontation was presented by the simultaneous absence of Lutz and Guderian from Berlin in April 1934 at a moment when forward planning for expansion was at a critical point. Calling for Walther Nehring, the senior member of Lutz’s staff present, Reichenau made the quite original and unexpected suggestion that the Panzertruppe should be built up by attaching the 3rd Cavalry Division as a whole to it. Nehring instantly accepted and, although the scheme was never fully implemented, it did, at least, break the ice.