Guderian: Panzer General

by Macksey, Kenneth

  On 14th May OKW and OKH had concurred in withdrawing XVI from Army Group B in Belgium so as to reinforce the success of Rundstedt’s Army Group A in France. On the 16th Haider was expressing delight at a breakthrough which ‘… is developing on almost classical lines’, an opinion which found support at OKW. Rundstedt, however, had begun to fuss on the 15th, when the advance from the Meuse had barely started. His War Diary suggested the necessity of halting on the River Oise for fear of the threat from the south and because the enemy must in no circumstances be allowed a success ‘… on the Aisne or later in the Laon region’. On the 16th these fears overflowed.

  The Drive to the English Channel

  Guderian thrust forward on the 16th with only 1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions, leaving 10th Panzer Division and Grossdeutschland Regiment to the south of Sedan as insurance against interference from the south and in deference to Kleist’s anxiety. The French again repeatedly attacked the hinge at Stonne and caused losses to the arriving German infantry. But they made no progress. The rest of XIX Corps shot ahead and by nightfall was 40 miles distant at Dercy on the Serre at the same moment as a battlegroup from XXXXI Corps arrived at Guise on the Oise and began the process of mopping up the stalled tanks of 2nd DCR. Conveniently overlooking Kleist’s twenty-four hour time limit, Guderian blandly sent out radio orders that evening to continue the advance next day, orders which were monitored by Kleist’s headquarters and which, at once, brought down a peremptory counter-order along with instructions for Guderian to report to Kleist next morning. At 0700 hours on the 17th Kleist stepped from his aircraft at XIX Corps Headquarters and, without ado, roundly accused Guderian of deliberately disobeying orders. Guderian at once tendered his resignation. Neither could be credited with much common sense at that moment, but both were on edge – Kleist to a far greater extent than Guderian could have known. For Kleist was not much more in favour of a halt than Guderian.

  The uncertainty was germinated by Rundstedt. Again his War Diary reflected tremors of doubt, for after it recorded, on the 16th, that the commanders of the motorised formations were convinced they could push on over the Oise ‘… especially Generals Guderian and Kleist’, it went on: ‘But looking at operations as a whole the risk involved does not seem to be justified. The extended flank between La Fere and Rethel is too sensitive, especially in the Laon area … If the spearheads of the attack are temporarily halted it will be possible to effect a certain stiffening of the threatened flank within twenty-four hours’. It is apparent that Kleist did not bother to explain Rundstedt’s underlying anxieties to Guderian – their relationship was already too far strained. But Rundstedt was shaken when Guderian’s report of resignation arrived. Things had gone too far when a favourite of Hitler did that! He sent him a curt order to remain in his post and await a plenipotentiary – no less than the Twelfth Army Commander, Generaloberst List. List arrived in the afternoon, swiftly declined Guderian’s resignation and with the authority of the Army Group Commander told him to begin a ‘reconnaissance in force’, leaving Corps HQ where it was. In effect this gave Guderian a free hand, one which he made all the freer by laying cable to his tactical headquarters so that his orders could no longer be monitored by superior officers. List confirms these events as well as Guderian’s request to be peacemaker on his own behalf with Kleist.

  Between resignation and reinstatement Guderian sat down to pour out his troubles in a letter to Gretel. It no longer exists but its purport is made plain by her reply on 27th May, in which she wrote, ‘It would be lunacy and tragic if at the crowning moment of your life’s work you stood aside … Despite all your troubles, do not take steps that will harm you and which you will regret for the rest of your life. Darling, I beg of you from the bottom of my heart not to do this. If you have to act I think you should send a direct report to the Führer: anything else would be, as always, to your disadvantage.’ She went on to warn him to have care in what he wrote – ‘that important letter of yours was opened by the censor’ – and added, ‘I almost asked Bodewin [Keitel] yesterday for an explanation but could not make up my mind since I was not sure if it would be in your best interests.’

  The vigilance of the Army authorities – it is unlikely that this act of censorship was State-inspired – seems to throw a revealing shaft of light upon their mistrust of Guderian. That the mail of a senior general should be censored (even by a rampant bureaucracy) was, to say the least, unusual, while the despatch of a Major to instruct his wife to keep silent about the letter’s content demonstrated a distinct official uneasiness at what had passed. But the disagreements that had raised the incident were but a storm in a tea-cup compared with what was brewing between the leaders of OKW, OKH and Army Group A.

  That day Hitler became scared at success and drove to see Rundstedt (a ready fellow worrier) to tell him it was more important to maintain a flow of safe successes rather than take a risk by reaching for the Channel. The scope of Guderian’s advance once more outreached the Führer’s limited notion of mobile operations: ripples of the Führer’s worries washed through OKW, sometimes in the form of direct instructions to specific Army divisions, and aroused anger in Haider who, that morning, was perfectly satisfied that there was ‘no danger whatsoever’. He assessed the situation with the same, accurate insight as the spearhead commanders, and kept his head in the days to come as Hitler and his entourage soared between euphoria and melancholy, over-confidence and funk.

  Brauchitsch, however, endorsed Rundstedt’s decision to halt at about the same time as List, on Rundstedt’s authority, was letting Guderian loose again, though that evening Haider persuaded Hitler, for the time being, that all was well. The brakes were again released but a precedent had been set. From now on Hitler pestered Rundstedt who had revealed himself as the willowly sort who, unless he lost an otherwise even temper, would bend when Hitler blew.

  Almost unnoticed, and certainly unreported to Kleist or registered with much emphasis at HQ XIX Corps, an event, exaggeratingly fixed in the history of armoured warfare, had taken place in the period the German commanders were locked in vituperation at the rear. Moving fast and unco-ordinated along the road from Laon, a battalion of French Char Bs and two battalions of light tanks had hit the left flank of 1st Panzer Division. This was the point of 4th DCR, a partially formed, under-trained formation commanded by de Gaulle, who had taken up the appointment less than a week before. Appreciating, like Guderian, that speed was salvation, he had attacked Guderian’s flank in the hope of catching the softer administrative tail of the division. As it was, and quite by chance due to the stand-fast imposed by Kleist, he hit muscle – though not without profit. Light German units were brushed aside and at 1600 hours, when Guderian was talking to List only a few miles distant, the French had broken into Montcornet, threatening the supply columns. But at this moment the French attack, for want of infantry and artillery support and from shortage of fuel, turned back when blunted by a defence which was beginning to stiffen. Now the Luftwaffe harried the French tanks and, though destroying only one, chased away the rest down the road they had come. After the war pro-de Gaulle propaganda made much of this attack, but in actuality, apart from within 1st Panzer Division, there was hardly a twitter of alarm on the German side.

  Why should there have been? Again the French had displayed lack of determination and already 10th Panzer was on its way to rejoin the spearhead approaching Rethel and poised to hit de Gaulle in flank. Moreover the leading German troops, deep in France, were better supplied with fuel and ammunition than the French. German stocks were being built up at maintenance areas in rear, at Hirson for example, their system working all the better as practice made perfect: the French arrangements were falling apart. On the evening of 18th May 1st Panzer Division was approaching Peronne, scarcely disturbed by further isolated outbursts of French resistance and taking an interested look at the first British troops to fall into their hands. At the same moment Haider managed at last to persuade Hitler that the way to the Channel was open with
the result that OKH overrode Rundstedt and Kleist was allowed to give Guderian his head. Paradoxically this acted as the signal for Guderian to slow down – though not from choice. The tanks were in need of maintenance, 10th Panzer had been held up at Ham, there was a fuel crisis because of a report that the newly created petrol depot at Hirson had been destroyed by fire, and air reconnaissance discovered a big French tank force – 4th DCR of course – concentrating to the north of Laon and threatening Guderian’s flank and rear. Guderian, in Panzer Leader, makes no mention of the fuel crisis or the need to slow down (one fancies it might have made him look slightly ridiculous), and he rather glosses over slow progress while paying his respects to de Gaulle: ‘… a few of his tanks succeeded in penetrating to within a mile of my advanced headquarters in Holnon wood … and I passed a few uncomfortable hours’. But he was right when he wrote that: The danger from this flank was slight’ (the air reports exaggerated 150 tanks into several hundred) and ‘assumed that the French, conditioned by the doctrine of positional warfare, would not make a major attack until the Germans stood still’. Guderian had no intention of standing still and 4th DCR’s attack (the only one with any hope) was beaten off without making a serious indentation in XIX Corps’ flank. The French never again enjoyed a better opportunity for, by the evening of the 19th, XIX Corps’ ailments had been cured. It also transpired that the fuel dump at Hirson had not been destroyed after all: the signal reporting it had been corrupt and, in fact, as originally drafted, read that it was ready to make distribution.

  Next day, the 20th, XIX Corps made its longest and most dramatic advance in a single day – the most in twenty-four hours by any tank formation in that campaign – 56 miles from the Canal du Nord to the sea at Abbeville. XXXXI Corps, on its right, almost kept pace and thus, that evening, Kleist could boast of having three panzer divisions lined up on a 15-mile frontage from Abbeville to Hesdin with virtually nothing to prevent them turning either south towards Dieppe and Le Havre, or north against Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. The Allied armies were not only cut in two, they were in imminent danger of being isolated from their bases.

  An officer in 1st Panzer Division remarked that ‘We had the feeling such as a fine racehorse may have, of having been held back by its rider, coldly and deliberately, then getting its head free to reach out into a swinging gallop and speed to the winning post as winner’. But racehorses, as Fuller once wrote, ‘do not pull up at the winning post’ and Guderian never willingly held back a galloping mount. Indeed he had felt the need to drive 2nd Panzer quite hard on the 20th when it came up with the well-worn excuse of a petrol shortage in order to take time for a rest. No doubt Guderian recalled Richthofen’s horse-shoe problem in 1914 at the time of the breakthrough in the same region: this time an excuse was to no avail and 2nd Panzer somehow ‘found’ the fuel to carry it to Abbeville. Haider was certainly taken by surprise and delayed until midday on the 21st before deciding to turn north against Boulogne instead of going south. At the same time Hitler’s confidence waned again as he surveyed that exposed southern flank on his map and allowed his imagination to dwell on the threat posed by French armies undisclosed.

  There was nothing of offensive value to disclose in the French Order of battle. There had been a change of C-in-C (another German achievement) and there was much talk of a counter-offensive to cut the panzer corridor. But the French and British already knew that this was practically beyond their capacity and the Germans were also able to calculate the same, and quite as accurately, on the basis of air reports, radio intercepts and information from undercover sources and prisoners of war – including several very senior French generals who had been swept into the bag.

  Haider plumped for a northward movement, but it was evening before Kleist set off again, directing Guderian into the void of the defenceless Allied rear, against Boulogne and Calais. This day the shape of ominous events emerged. The British attacked southward with tanks at Arras and caused Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division heavy losses. His difficulties were cleared up by nightfall since weight was lacking behind the British attack: but the repercussions were considerable. Though Haider was not in the least disturbed – he welcomed, as did Guderian, any abortive Allied attack which further helped to destroy their forces against a resilient and economic German defence – Kleist took the orthodox step of withdrawing a division – 10th Panzer – into reserve, thus weakening Guderian still further since elements of the Corps had also to be left behind at Abbeville and a few other key localities guarding the River Somme crossings. Reinhardt, too, felt bound to redeploy a division eastward as a precaution against the Arras threat. Inevitably Rundstedt went on fretting and needless to say Hitler fidgeted: neither could bring himself to believe in total victory, and the pliable Brauchitsch lacked enough strength of will to reassure or silence them. In the upper echelons only Haider demonstrated a real affinity with Guderian and his colleagues.

  Meanwhile the Allied armies in the north had been put on half-rations and urgent measures were being taken to evade complete encirclement. Small British groups were being sent from England to garrison Boulogne and Calais and bar the way to Dunkirk from whence an evacuation by sea was in prospect. But it would be the morning of the 22nd before Boulogne received its main garrison and so it follows that, if Guderian or Reinhardt had been sent there immediately on the 21st at the same rate as they had travelled on the 20th, they would have found the port virtually undefended. Likewise they could have had Calais for the asking since that port’s garrison was not properly in position until the 22nd. As it was Guderian made no movement on the 21st because, as mentioned above, neither OKH nor OKW had previously made up their minds: he was thus a victim of his own speed. Nevertheless there was still time enough to achieve all the objectives at low cost. He moved off northward at 0800 hours on the 22nd, his original intention being to send 10th Panzer to Dunkirk, 1st to Calais and 2nd to Boulogne. This plan had to be abandoned when 10th Panzer was taken from him by Kleist and so only 2nd Panzer was immediately available to lead the advance to Boulogne – and this Guderian despatched without awaiting Kleist’s permission, as the Corps’ diary tells. Strong resistance from French units was met on the way and, on the heights above the port, British troops, supported by heavy anti-aircraft guns used in the same way as the comparable German 88mm guns, held firm. Now the Germans had a fight on their hands of a kind they had only occasionally met from first-line French units.

  It took some thirty-six hours to clear Boulogne. In the meantime 10th Panzer Division was once more released to him and he was told to invest Calais on the 23rd. Though British troops were known to be arriving, Guderian gave no special priority to taking the port which clearly would fall in due course. His aim, and that of Kleist, was to place a solid barrier between the coast and the Allied armies to the east, thus forcing them to fight their way to safety through an ever-thickening German ring. As his contribution to forging the ring, Guderian sent 1 st Panzer Division in the direction of Gravelines and Dunkirk – above all Dunkirk – on the 23rd. XIX Corps’ War Diary leaves no doubt about it.

  Play is made in the British Official History of the campaign that Guderian gave these orders in ignorance of the difficult country into which he was throwing his troops. This overlooks the fact that Guderian knew the area too well from the First World War (and had flown over it) to be in ignorance of the risks to tanks in this terrain. On 23rd May the difficulties of ground were well outweighed by preponderance of opportunity and strength. At this critical point Kleist’s Group (despite 10 per cent losses since 10th May) outnumbered its opponents and easily outclassed them. So obviously complete was German dominance that Guderian was saying, through the Corps’ War Diary, that it was ‘opportune and possible to carry out its three tasks [Aa Canal, Calais and Boulogne] quickly and decisively’ – a revealing abandonment, in terms of confidence, of his normal insistence upon concentrated effort. By the morning of the 24th Boulogne had fallen, the Aa Canal had been crossed by 1st Panzer Division (which had b
rushed aside British tanks when they made a foray from Calais), and the panzer divisions of Reinhardt and Hoth, reinforced by additional motorised infantry divisions, were roaring up to join them. This was a formidable and versatile force. Moreover the southern flank was being gradually secured by infantry divisions marching as fast as they could towards Abbeville, and the defences of Boulogne were being worked on by Allied prisoners – a breach of the rules of war.

  At this moment, with Dunkirk but 15 miles distant and ripe for the taking next day (in British appreciations this was rated a probability), came the celebrated halt order. Without entering into a detailed discussion as to the reasons for the order and the attendant sequence of events, it is sufficient to note that it originally emanated from Rundstedt on the evening of the 23rd. Once more he had lost his nerve and was striving to hold back the advance in order to close up his forces before they became involved in heavy fighting against a desperate foe – a view with which Kluge, the commander of the marching infantry of Fourth Army, concurred. It was purely coincidental that, on the same day, Göring had suggested to Hitler that the Luftwaffe be given the honour of finishing the job at Dunkirk which the Army had nearly completed. Hitler, still nursing the anxieties which had beset him since the 15th, was delighted to find a new solution, particularly since it would enable a truly Nazi orientated organisation to seize a larger slice of glory. On the morning of the 24th he once more visited Rundstedt, learnt of the standstill order and happily confirmed it. Guderian says: ‘We were utterly speechless. But since we were not informed of the reasons for this order it was difficult to argue against it. Soon he was to learn that it was a Führer order. Yet another precedent had been set for the future: Hitler had intervened decisively in the conduct of a battle and overriden the Chief of Staff in an operational matter.