Guderian: Panzer General

by Macksey, Kenneth

  Controversy surrounds every aspect of Guderian’s visit to Rastenburg on 23rd August, as perhaps befits a turning point in the campaign. Liebenstein records in his diary for 23rd August (an entry obviously written shortly afterwards, perhaps with the intention of protecting Guderian’s reputation):

  ‘The commander flies with the Chief of the General Staff with the aim of preventing Panzer Group being sent into action in the south. As he says upon his return, he was met by the C-in-C [Brauchitsch] with the words. “The attack to the south has been ordered. Now it only depends on how”.’

  In Panzer Leader Guderian elaborates upon his meeting that night with Brauchitsch who, he wrote, forbade him to mention the question of Moscow to the Führer. One asks, did Brauchitsch know about the plan to depose him? Probably not, but Guderian goes on to say that the conversation with the Führer (at which neither Brauchitsch nor Haider were present) got round to an attack against Moscow and that he reasoned the case strongly for this strategy and against that of going to Kiev. Hitler, in the company of Keitel, Jodl and Schmundt, replied with reasons – economic, political and military – for entering the Ukraine and for neutralising the Crimea, adding the patronising phrase, ‘My generals know nothing about the economic aspects of war’. Members of the entourage nodded their heads in agreement. In the face of this tirade Guderian, unsupported, took the view, according to Liebenstein’s account, that he cannot debate a resolved issue with the Head of State in the presence of all his company’. It would have been as much to the point had he mentioned the inhibiting effect of knowing that his future prospects of becoming C-in-C and, perhaps, saving Germany were in jeopardy. A headlong row with Hitler at this moment would have damaged them beyond repair. By arguing only mildly at this point he could enhance the Führer’s goodwill and turn the prospect of maximum influence in the near future into a probability. It is one of the sad commonplaces of relationship among senior German generals with Hitler that they tended always, when posed with the dilemma of mutual confidence, to bargain concessions in the hope of an improvement in their future relative status – and every time to see those hopes dashed. Each in his turn suffered and so, therefore, did the Army and Germany.

  What now transpired was the complete destruction of accord and faith between Haider and Guderian, those two who were probably Germany’s last hope in the struggle to curb Hitler’s irrationality. Liebenstein wrote: The commander is being accused by the Chief of the General Staff of having given way’. And Haider commented scathingly on Guderian:

  ‘Previously he said he could not go south. Now he declares that in view of the Führer’s demands to move as soon as possible to the south … he has changed his mind. Guderian says that he gave this [original] explanation in order to hinder the operation to the south. Once the Führer declared his determination he felt it his duty to make the impossible possible. This shows in a shattering way how official reports can be used to serve an individual’s purpose. As a result an order is being issued on how to make reports. But you cannot alter characters through orders.’

  Guderian says that ‘Haider suffered a complete nervous collapse’ when he reported failure of his mission, and Bock confirms this collapse on Haider’s part. It was reasonable for Haider to be disappointed, but an over-reaction on this scale needs a more convincing explanation than that. In the first place Haider, on the face of it, had been extraordinarily optimistic if he imagined that a relatively junior officer could change Hitler’s mind in a few minutes when he and Brauchitsch had failed over the weeks – and more than hopeful if he believed that a resolved matter could be challenged in a way that was quite contrary to the code of Prussian discipline. For Haider had been less than straightforward with Guderian: he had omitted to tell him that orders had been issued already by OKU to Army Group Centre instructing it to co-operate with Army Group South using ‘… a strong force, preferably commanded by Generaloberst Guderian’.

  If one admits that Haider knew of the move to replace Brauchitsch with Guderian then his behaviour becomes comprehensible since, for a start, he must have been fairly – if not strongly – convinced that Guderian had special influence with the Führer as well as the determination to succeed where others had given way. Moreover, if Guderian had changed Hitler’s mind the chances of his becoming C-in-C would assuredly have been enhanced. On 23rd August, therefore, Haider could well have looked on Guderian as his future commander with all that implied. Therefore his fury and disappointment must have been redoubled at the outcome and hence the scale of his outburst of pent-up emotions along with accusations of disloyalty and remarks to Bock on the telephone that Guderian had let them all down. The fact remains that from this moment Haider was Guderian’s enemy who, over the years, came to perpetuate the legend of Guderian as a maverick at odds with the elite of the General Staff, along with the notion, as he wrote after the war, that Guderian was shallow. But Haider was also thrown upon the defensive when the king he thought to have played turned out, in his opinion, to be a knave. For there were those on the staff (among them Oberst Fritz Bayerlein, Guderian’s la) who contended that, as the result of the events of 23rd August, Brauchitsch and Haider should have resigned, not Guderian whom the Haider faction thought should have gone.

  Be these things as they may, the soured future relationship between Haider and Guderian can now be seen in a new light that looks still clearer when one realises that the move to replace Brauchitsch gathered further momentum while at the same time the adherents of Guderian came under what almost amounted to persecution by Haider – as the ensuing train of events demonstrates.

  The drive into the Ukraine demanded every atom of Guderian’s ingenuity since his fight was against both the Russians and Haider’s obdurate opposition. Haider’s diary states his opinion about the new operation as tackled by Guderian:

  ‘24th Aug. The intention of the Panzer Group to strike out … with its left wing … leads too far east. Everything depends upon it helping Second Army across the Desna and then the Sixth Army across the Dnieper.’

  In other words the ‘fast units’ were once more to have their effectiveness curtailed by placing them in support of the slowest marching formations. Yet within forty-eight hours, on the 26th, he was noting that ‘the infantry moves slowly forward in face of stiffening resistance’ though he persisted, on the 27th, in demanding of Bock, ‘Not to let Guderian run south but keep him in readiness for the Second Army’s crossing of the Desna’. Speed was far from being the essence of this operation.

  Liebenstein registered his commander’s protest at this splitting up of the panzer group by the removal of XLVI Panzer Corps into reserve. But, although deprived of one third of his force, Guderian resolutely ignored Haider and Bock in an attempt to achieve dramatic results in the usual way. This time, however, there was much more urgency than usual since only by a rapid conclusion of the Kiev operation could a start be made against Moscow in sufficient time before the onset of winter. The initial advances struck an astonished enemy who had not expected an attack in this direction, but the Russian reaction grew daily stronger and heavy fighting stretched the two panzer corps to the limit. Haider recorded a message from Bock on the 27th in which he said that ‘Guderian rages since he fails to make progress because of being attacked in flank and demands reinforcement of his remaining fast units. Bock feels unable to do so because he must keep a reserve. I am of the same opinion and request him not to give way to Guderian … In addition I ask him to keep a tight rein on Guderian …’ And on the 28th – after Paulus, now Haider’s chief assistant, had pleaded Guderian’s case for support: ‘I realise the difficulty of the situation. But in the final analysis all war consists of difficulties. Guderian will not tolerate any army commander and demands that everybody up to the highest position should bow to the ideas he produces from a restricted view-point. Regrettably Paulus allowed himself to be caught. I will not give way to Guderian. He has got himself into this fix. Now he can get himself out of it.’

  Kiev and Tu
la

  Matters came to a head on the 31st when Haider wrote about the ‘… decidedly uncomfortable position of Guderian’s Group (this day Guderian had to deploy a field bakery company to hold a threatened sector) … he throws out accusations and insults in a telephone conversation with Bock. He can only be helped by infantry but that will take several days, so he must sit tight as the result of a faulty attack. I consider it wrong to help him … Bock, however, intends to send forward two infantry divisions’. Later that day Haider mentioned a telephone conversation with Bock in which the latter complained of Guderian’s tone, ‘… which he cannot in any circumstances tolerate, and demands, in order to have his way, a decision by the Führer. That is an unheard of insolence!’

  Liebenstein’s diary puts it another way on 1st September:

  ‘It is a major mistake … that insufficient forces have been committed to achieve success quickly to reach our goals before the onset of winter. Repeated requests for the XLVI Panzer Corps are refused … The commander has the impression that Army Group, as well as the Chief of Staff, still cling to the old plan for a drive to Moscow. It is certain that the Führer is against dispersal of panzer groups, as he told the commander on the 23rd. Therefore the commander sends a message to Army Group Centre and points out that in view of Second Army’s slow progress the operational goal cannot be reached without additional forces, and proposes support from XLVI Corps, 7th Panzer, 11th Panzer and 14th Mot. and requests decision by the Führer … As can be expected this wireless message created house-high waves … Result: The immediate placing of an SS division with us ‘… The Chief of Army Group tells me in a private conversation “There have been errors …”’ The next day Generalfeld-marschall Kesselring of the Luftwaffe arrived and confirmed to Liebenstein that the Führer supported Guderian’s activities. On the 3rd Liebenstein wrote: ‘Army Group refuses to state its objectives. Evasions.’

  The plot intensified, on the 4th, when Haider persisted with what now looked suspiciously like a vendetta: with intrigue against Guderian through Hitler: ‘Great agitation has taken place. The Führer very angry with Guderian who will not abandon his intention to move to the south … The order is issued to bring Guderian back to the west bank of the Desna. Tension between Bock and Guderian. The former demands that Guderian should be relieved of his command.’ And on this day, when Oberst-leutnant Nagel, Haider’s liaison officer, repeated Guderian’s views in conference, he was removed from his post for being ‘a loudspeaker and propagandist’.* Liebenstein, lacking clear orders, was in the dark as to the reasons for complaint and wrote that Guderian was ‘deeply affected’ by OKW’s apparent dissatisfaction with the Panzer Group and his feeling that ‘… a scapegoat is being looked for from above for lack of speed, whereas we are sure that, with sufficient reinforcement, we would have succeeded. He is of the opinion that the entire situation should be reported to the Führer.’ Significantly, on the 5th, Liebenstein cried: ‘When can we expect orders, not criticisms?’

  And yet, although the roads were crumbling as the first deluge of autumn rain swept down and brought the motorised troops to the pace of the marching men in the glutinous mud, advances were made. For it was no easier for the Russians, of course. They too became mired whenever, in inclement weather, they strove to break the encircling German pincers which thrust southward from Smolensk and (not until 14th September) northward, under Kleist, from Kremenchug. Each despairing Russian thrust was beaten off, though not without moments of crisis and drama. German defensive localities, strung-out like beads in a necklace behind the advancing spearheads, were often rescued in the nick of time by tanks scurrying to their aid. On 16th September Guderian and Kleist joined hands at Lokhvitsa and the encirclement was accomplished. On the operational maps it was made to appear that 3rd Panzer Division completed the job, as indeed it had, but so far as its tank strength was concerned that was but a shadow – a mere 10 roadworthy machines of which 6 were the obsolete Pz IIs. Ten days would pass before the spoils of this achievement were harvested, days in which nearly half a million Russian prisoners, over 800 tanks and 3,500 guns fell into German hands. Few escaped.

  Liebenstein began to piece together the tale of intrigue from above. On the 13th a repentant von Bock told him that he would have liked to send Guderian more divisions but Haider regarded the drive on Moscow as more important. Who then was disobeying orders? Later, on 30th September, it was revealed by Schmundt that ‘… the Führer’s intentions were incorrectly executed. Army Group Centre had pursued their own goal towards Moscow. The Führer wants panzer groups to act in unison but he is shy to order it. He played with the idea of having panzer groups under himself as Göring has with the Air Fleets’. Of course it would have been almost a unique event in history if there had been total agreement among fellow military commanders over strategy, even surprising had there been a total absence of intrigue. The remarkable aspect of Haider’s behaviour at this juncture was his apparent willingness to sacrifice German soldiers to the benefit of his own ambition. The fact that he did so and played a double game boded ill for Guderian. For Haider never forgave the alleged betrayal of 23rd August while his own omissions he sought to conceal. Having delayed the completion of the Kiev operation he now hastened to restart the attack on Moscow, late as it was in the campaign season.

  As the pincers closed in the Ukraine, orders were issued that the drive on Moscow was approved at last and was to start with the least delay. Tentatively, on 24th September, Bock fixed 2nd October for the start but withheld confirmation until the 27th when an inevitably complex regrouping and redeployment seemed assured. But there were even more fundamental matters to worry Guderian. On 27th August a liaison officer who had gone to see von Schell in Berlin in an effort to obtain spares for the wheeled vehicles, had returned with Schell’s answer: ‘We are on the verge of a catastrophe … There is a shortage of steel, therefore the production of several kinds of vehicle has had to be cut by as much as 40 per cent.’ Liebenstein adds: ‘Resupply is often senseless. For instance, sometimes we receive mortar ammunition which contains a high percentage of concrete bombs, or mudguards instead of spare parts for engines’.

  The hours of daylight were getting short, the weather both colder and wetter. The forces Bock had been promised were spread, before redeployment, between the Leningrad front and Konotop in the south, their establishment was 15 per cent below strength and their tank strength at a bare 75 per cent – Guderian’s was actually down to 50 per cent. But though infantry strengths were low the actual number of tank crewmen was sufficient since their casualties had not been heavy. Fuel stocks were down, transport – horse and motor – beginning to fail on the rough tracks, and, though the railheads were being pushed forward, a shortage of rolling stock was acute. Therefore regrouping was governed by the desire to reduce movement to the minimum: hence the headquarters of armies found themselves placed over formations with whose personalities they were unfamiliar. For example, Guderian whose command of XLVI Panzer Corps had been relinquished to Hoepner’s Panzer Group 4, in the north, took over XLVIII Panzer Corps from Kleist’s Panzer Group 1, in the south, because it was geographically convenient to do so. A mere twenty-four hours elapsed between taking command and sending them into action.

  The shortest distance to Moscow was the 200 miles separating the city from Panzer Groups 3 and 4 where they formed up on either side of Smolensk. That distance represented five days combat motoring in June against a Russian Army which had yet to suffer its first defeat. In September, therefore, the likelihood of reaching the ultimate goal seemed within the bounds of theoretical feasibility, for the Russians were severely depleted, particularly in tanks, and were as badly directed as ever. It mattered less, to German minds, that the two Panzer Groups destined to drive from Yelnya to Moscow should be spread over a 150-mile frontage and that Guderian’s Group, to the south, was separated from them by yet another 150 miles. The Germans were becoming accustomed to winning victories with isolated panzer groups which operated on
a shoestring, and a measure of their confidence can be found in the nature of Guderian’s contribution to Bock’s plan.

  Divorced as he was in space from Panzer Group 4 to his left, he opted to open the attack on 28th September, two days before the rest of the Army Group. Only in that way, since his was a subsidiary operation, could he obtain maximum bomber support, but principally he was concerned with fighting his way into closer company with the other formations since there was insufficient time to redeploy nearer to them while out of contact with the enemy. Moreover he gambled upon reaching the slightly better communication system at Orel before the autumn rains brought about a total collapse of the poor tracks between Konotop and Orel. He knew, as did everybody else, that they were engaged quite as much in a race against the weather and time as against the Russians.