Villa and Zapata: A History of the Mexican Revolution

by Frank McLynn

  Villa enjoyed another advantage. Because of Woodrow Wilson's periodic arms embargoes and the competition from European arms dealers, Carranza was short of ammunition by 1916. Villa, on the other hand, had hidden huge caches of arms and ammunition in secret locations throughout Chihuahua. He also had a dedicated corps of young officers, who had gone with him and the dorados into the mountains in late 1915. Although some of these (Pablo Lopez, Candelario Cervantes) had fallen in the series of setbacks in early 1916, the others (Martin Lopez, Nicolas Fernandez, Baudelio Uribe) remained. Mini-Fierros in outlook and sensibility, they soon became a byword for terror. Villa was more humane than Carranza, in that he executed only the officers among captured troops, letting the rankers go free, on a promise that they would not fight against him again. Of course many did so, if only because they were press-ganged by the carrancistas. Uribe devised a novel method to stop this happening: he clipped the ears of all prisoners so that they would be instantly recognisable, and warned them that if they were caught again, it would mean instant death.

  In 1916, too, Villa enjoyed all his old popularity with the people of Chihuahua. Where the carrancistas allowed their troops free rein to sack and pillage, Villa and his men paid for the food they bought from the peasants. The harvests in 1916 were good, food was plentiful, and Villa could pay in gold and silver, so his popularity soared. His declaration that he was fighting to save Mexico from the gringo struck a sympathetic chord, as did his redistribution of land and his looting of stores which he then made over, Robin-Hood style, to the peasants. Villa's use of terror and looting was carefully selective: he liked to target American-owned property or towns that had some connection with the yanquis. By his blood-curdling threats he hoped to sap the morale of Americans in Chihuahua, making them close mines and send their women home for safety.

  The second half of 1916 saw Villa raiding up and down Chihuahua, seemingly without let or hindrance. In July 1,000 of his men took the heavily garrisoned town of Jimenez; at his approach the terrified and demoralised federal troops simply fled. The town was then systematically looted, and Baudelio Uribe pioneered his earclipping technique on the few carrancistas who had been foolish enough to remain. Momentarily, Villa grew overconfident and forgot that he was engaged in a game of catand-mouse. Moving swiftly down to Durango, he was defeated at Villa Hidalgo, but saved face by winning a couple of skirmishes. As autumn approached, he felt it was time for a major demonstration of Carranza's impotence in Chihuahua.

  Accordingly, on 15 September he launched a major attack on Chihuahua City, aiming to set free the political prisoners in the jail. A large number of orozquistas were lodged there and their leader, Orozco's former deputy Jose Ines Salazar, was under sentence of death, along with many of his men. Gone were the days when Villa loathed orozquistas for their betrayal of Madero; now he needed allies wherever he could find them and operated on the basis that `my enemy's enemy is my friend'. The odds were heavily stacked against Villa, for he had just 2,000 to pitch against the 9,000 troops of the garrison. He counted on the element of surprise, planning his attack to coincide with the Independence Day celebrations. Ignacio Enriquez's tame governor Jacinto Trevino had been advised of Villa's approach but, like Pershing at Columbus, ignored the warning and allowed most of his troops to take part in the national holiday festivities.

  Villa struck at midnight. Diversionary units attacked the palace and barracks while the main force stormed the penitentiary. Taken completely by surprise, Trevino panicked and fled. The villistas killed all the prison guards and freed Salazar, who was brought in triumph to Villa; a bearhug sealed their compact. In high euphoria Villa started retreating north with the main force, the orozquistas and some prize items of plunder, but in an unpardonable mistake, forgot to tell the diversionary units to break off their engagement. Since the carrancistas were still firing wildly at anything that moved, the villistas thought the main battle was still raging. Too late they realised their error, and then had to fight their way out of the city, losing three-quarters of their number while doing so.

  Despite this, Villa had scored a great coup and his supporters made the most of it. People began to ask how it was possible for Villa to have pulled off this feat when there were 9,000 federal troops in Chihuahua City and Pershing still had io,ooo men prowling through the northern reaches of the state. The federals were so demoralised that they had no stomach for a pursuit when Villa withdrew into Santa Clara canyon. Then came news of a defeat of government troops from Coahuila by the villista Calixto Contreras in the Laguna area. Villa's fortunes were truly revived. The unemployed and disaffected began to flock to him, so that the period September-December 1916 was a halcyon time.

  Villa's next target was the town of San Andres; this was a debt he owed the dorados, many of whom came from there. Its carrancista commander unfortunately considered himself something of a military genius. When he heard that Villa was approaching with 400 men, he divided his forces, remaining in the town with his sixty best troops and sending his deputy ostentatiously out into the desert with another 300 soldiers, to make it look as though they were fleeing for their lives. When Villa attacked, the 300 were supposed to wheel round and take him in the rear.

  Unhappily for the commander, his deputy panicked when the firing started and led his men into the wilderness instead of falling on the villista rear; forty died of starvation and thirst in the trackless and waterless wastes. The luckless commander held out in San Andres for six hours until, heavily outnumbered, he was forced to surrender. Villa executed him and the defenders without mercy. This was retaliation for the execution of the villistas taken as they tried to fight their way out of Chihuahua City. Additionally, Carranza had issued a new martial law decree that anyone caught in arms had to suffer the death penalty without possibility of reprieve. Villa capped his success by obtaining the military code book and telegraphing for reinforcements. Another twenty-five federals arrived, to be led out to the firing squad.

  After San Andres, Villa had the mining town of Cusihuiriachic in his sights, and tried to secure a bloodless victory by cabling ahead to say he was on his way. The carrancista troops panicked and evacuated the town but, just as they were leaving, a dust cloud announced the coming of a large company of armed men. A bloody shoot-out ensued, and it was only when heavy casualties had been taken on both sides that it was realised the newcomers were not villistas but federal reinforcements. Cursing their ill fortune, the survivors then turned round to face the real villistas who finally put in an appearance. The troops were quickly overwhelmed; all who were not killed in the shooting were executed on the spot.

  Villa was on a roll now, for he proceeded to take the town of San Isidro and then, a few days later, defeated another large force of federals at Santa Isabel. Flushed by his string of victories, and overconfident, Villa neglected to post guards and was nearly surprised by a second carrancista force. The federals succeeded in capturing the villista forces, forcing them to flee on foot, but, crossing the Santa Isabel battlefield, they became demoralised by the sight of so many corpses and failed to press home their initial advantage. Far from falling on the disorganised villistas, they progressively lost their nerve, fearing ambush and flank attack. Villa was able to recapture his horses and, next day, counterattacked, defeating the federals with great slaughter.

  After the non-stop roster of victories, more and more federals deserted the ranks to join up with Villa, and all the old legends of his invincibility resurfaced. As Carranza's grip on Chihuahua looked increasingly shaky, Villa assumed the psychological offensive and issued a manifesto, as if he was again a credible national leader. Once again the target was the gringos: Villa announced that in future Americans would not be able to own property or pursue any form of economic life in Mexico. To safeguard the fatherland against the Yankee octopus, he announced that there would be universal national service and that all draft-dodgers would be executed. Outraged by Villa's overweening insolence, Carranza assembled a large force to flush out Villa
once and for all. This army was to be commanded by Fortunato Maycotte, one of Obregon's most talented aides and an architect of the victory at Celaya. Accompanying Maycotte to the north would be Villa's old enemies from Durango, the Arrieta brothers.

  Obregon advised Maycotte that he was accepting a poisoned chalice, since he did not have enough ammunition to mount a credible searchand-destroy operation against Villa on his homeground in Chihuahua. Maycotte and the Arrietas spurned the advice and advanced on La Enramada. Suddenly they were attacked by a contingent led by `earcutter' Baudelio Uribe. After a few minutes' fighting, the villistas appeared to break and run. Thinking this was the main force, the federals charged in pursuit but were soon `eaten up' by devastating fire from Villa's main force in strong defensive positions. Obregon was angry with Maycotte, incensed that the federals had fallen for the tactic of feigned retreat over and over again. Villa's defeat of Maycotte convinced many that Carranza could never impose himself in Chihuahua. The useless governor Trevino sent his wife and looted fortune of US$150,000 to El Paso and refused to obey orders to take the offensive against Villa.

  Between September and December 1916 Villa was victorious in twenty-two armed encounters, in all of which he captured further arms and ammunition. By now, as in the autumn of 1913, he controlled all Chihuahua outside the big cities. His lightning raids resulted in the temporary capture of Santa Rosalia and Jimenez. On i 6 November he made his first entry into Parral, and occupied the city again in December. Parral and Jimenez changed hands so many times in 1916 that the citizens hardly knew where they were from week to week.

  In his raids on the larger towns Villa liked to target the property of Americans, Spaniards and Chinese and was insouciant when his men killed Chinese and Syrian merchants, but, ominously, he was beginning to alienate the peasantry and the middle classes now that there were no longer any oligarchs' estates to confiscate. The bourgoisie objected to the forced loans, and the peasantry to the forced military service, especially as those pressed in the `crusade' against the gringos seemed always to end up fighting the carrancistas instead.

  However, as long as Villa continued to pay his men a silver peso a day, he could always find takers, especially among those who had had property looted by the carrancistas and thirsted for revenge. As his confidence increased, he began to dream of reviving the Division del Norte and ascending from guerrilla leader to the position he held in 1915 as leader of a regular army. During the second occupation of Parral he actually had new uniforms made for his men. All this caused increased irritation and consternation in Mexico City. Obregon singled out the nepotistic payrollpadder Trevino for particular censure, saying he had no understanding of guerrilla warfare. In reply Trevino blustered, trying to shift the blame for the debacle in Chihuahua on to Pershing and then on to Obregon himself, pointing out that it was he who had organised the disastrous Maycotte/Arrietas expedition.

  On 23 November Villa made his second assault on Chihuahua City. This time his attack was not designed as a mere raid but an attempt to take the entire city, capture Trevino and destroy Carranza's credibility in Chihuahua once and for all. Villa's difficulty was that a relief column was on its way to Trevino and there was a risk that his assaulting force could be caught between the fire of the defenders and the relievers. He therefore tore up all railway track to the south of the city to hold up the advance of the reinforcements, then put his own troops on trains and steamed towards Chihuahua City. There followed four days of grim fighting. Villa's initial cavalry charges were broken up by machine-gun emplacements on the hill of Santa Rosa, overlooking the city, and on 24 November Trevino headed a counterattack that looked like being successful until Villa counterattacked strongly with his dorados. Even so Trevino thought he had won and arranged a `victory dinner' for the 28th.

  In the small hours of the morning of 27 November the villistas stormed Santa Rosa hill. The attack was led by a wounded Martin Lopez, who rose from his sickbed to be there. Once Santa Rosa fell, trainloads of panic-stricken federals pulled out. Trevino made his getaway without informing any but his inner circle, with the result that many officers found themselves left to deal with Villa after the escape routes had been closed. Some chose to commit suicide rather than be led out to the firing squad, but the remaining defenders, after stout resistance, surrendered on a personal assurance from Villa that their lives would be spared.

  The fall of Chihuahua City created a sensation, and mutual recriminations and bickering predictably broke out among the carrancistas. Trevino again tried to lay the blame on others, saying that the relief column did not arrive on time. Obregon publicly accused Trevino of cowardice, but astute observers thought Obregon's real target was Pablo Gonzalez, whose protege Trevino was. However, Trevino lost the propaganda battle as well as the battle of Chihuahua City. More objective and dispassionate observers pointed out that, whatever Obregon's parti pris, Trevino was certainly guilty of corruption, lies and incompetence, even if a bracket was put round the charge of cowardice.

  After taking the state capital, Villa truckled to the mob by letting them pillage wholesale. He did not feel strong enough to hold on to the city but loaded tons of stores, arms and ammunition on to his troop-trains. Then he turned to face the relieving force headed by Francisco Murguia, who was destined to be Villa's federal shadow over the next three years. Known as `the hangman' because of his relish for public executions, Murguia was a cruel and vicious character, utterly corrupt and venal, who specialised in hoarding food for speculation while people starved around him. To deal with the 10,000-strong relief column, Villa sent out 3,000 men under the command of the orozquista leader he had earlier rescued from jail, Jose Ines Salazar. To give Salazar the post of honour seemed unwontedly generous for Villa; students of his methods have concluded that this was typical Villa machiavellism, seeming to confer prestige on a commander who was bound to lose in a `mission impossible'. Salazar's cavalry charge predictably did not break Murguia's formation, but the villistas retired in good order, having taken light casualties, and bought the time necessary for Villa to make an efficient evacuation.

  Villa's next target was Torreon, a city full of memories of his glory days. As a prelude he sent Baudelio Uribe to extinguish the garrison at Camargo - a task easily accomplished - but Camargo was destined to deal a mortal blow to the legend of Villa. As he rode into the town, a woman tearfully implored him not to kill her husband, the carrancista paymaster. Intending to do her a favour, Villa made enquiries and discovered that the man was already dead. The woman then unaccountably flew into a rage, accused Villa of killing her husband and defied him to murder her as well. In a white heat of fury, Villa pulled out his pistol and shot her dead. This roused the blood lust of his followers, who asked permission to kill all the other `bitches' who had given their favours to carrancistas. Still trembling with anger, Villa agreed; the upshot was that ninety women went before the firing squad. This atrocity received a very wide currency and effectively killed off popular support for Villa.

  There was a new brutality evident in Villa from this moment on. He slugged it out with Murguia, matching him brutal action for brutal action, atrocity for atrocity. As in the rest of Mexico, violence begat violence and six years of non-stop warfare had extinguished most traces of humanity and provided a kind of socialisation in barbarism. It can be argued that the true villain was Carranza, who started the cycle by decreeing that all prisoners were to be killed, but in part it seems that Villa's increasing viciousness was born of frustration and disappointed idealism: he had done so much for people, and his only return was betrayal and gross ingratitude. Villa seemed to feel about the people of Chihuahua almost as if one of his mistresses had been unfaithful to him.

  Enough weapons and ammunition had been captured at Camargo to make Villa confident of being able to take Torreon, whose garrison numbered only 2,000. The federal commander sent out desperate pleas for reinforcement to Murguia, but he refused, saying that wiping out Villa's base of operations in the mountains of
western Chihuahua must be his priority. Even when given a direct order by Obregon, Murguia still refused to reinforce Torreon. Obregon tried to scrape together a force to send to Torreon's aid, but in vain - by now there were so many risings and rebellions all over Mexico that there were no troops to spare. As a result Villa found it easy, almost to the point of walkover, to storm Torreon on 22 December 1916; the federal commander committed suicide rather than fall into his hands.

  Torreon gave Villa more artillery, more troop-trains, more supplies and more press-ganged volunteers. He raised forced loans and instituted a pogrom against the Chinese merchants. Capricious as ever, he requited a throng of onlookers who came to applaud him at the Hotel Francia by arresting them all and then handpicking the most able-bodied as `volunteers'. The leading Carranza supporter Luis Herrera had been killed in the battle for Torreon, so Villa had his body publicly strung up for two days, with a paper peso in one hand and a portrait of Carranza in the other. His arbitrary actions particularly enraged the consular officials at Torreon, but then Villa had never been a favourite of diplomats, who knew how to deal with Carranza and even Huerta but were out of their depth with the Centaur. One who hated him more than most, Patrick O'Hea, said: `His career is that of a dog in rabies, a mad mullah, a Malay running amok.'