description of events is, therefore, not only the most detailed, but, despite rhetorical flourishes, the most accurate. Certain discordant elements of Justin’s account may be explained. The private meeting of principes may, indeed, have been the preliminary meeting of the somaphylaces the formal bodyguards, who according to the Curtian account were the individuals who summoned the general meeting of
“principal friends and commanders” (Curt. 10.6.1). Meleager was not, however,
a member of this group, and the two divergent descriptions of Meleager’s role at
the beginning of the disturbance cannot be easily reconciled. At the time of
Alexander’s death the seven bodyguards were Leonnatus, Lysimachus, Aristonous,
Perdiccas, Ptolemy, Pithon, and Peucestas (Arr. Anab. 6.28.4).
The Death of a Conqueror
19
In Curtius, while the proposal that Arrhidaeus be made king dismayed the
principes, even bringing one of their number to tears, it quickly became the desire of the massed troops, who hailed Arrhidaeus as king under the name of Philip
(Curt. 10.7.3–4, 7–15; Just. 13.2.6–8; Arr. Succ. 1a.1–3). Meleager then left the meeting and returned with Arrhidaeus (Curt. 10.7.7). At this point whatever order that had existed broke down and a riot ensued, with the principes and the elite Macedonian aristocratic Companion Cavalry ranged against the infantry, now led
by Meleager (Curt. 10.7.16–19; Just. 13.3.3–4). In the chaos that followed, the
Macedonian leaders fled the city and, joined by the cavalry, camped outside in
the plain (Curt. 10.7.16–20). Alexander’s empire appeared to be dissolving even
before a successor could be named and the dead king’s body had grown cold.
Out of the chaos, the principes, whatever their initial disagreements, emerged unified under Perdiccas’ authority (Rathmann 2005b: 32, 50–2). These officers
now made use of their many advantages in this split between the elite Macedonian
cavalry and their compatriots in the infantry. The latter had all been at one time or another under the command of these leaders. Our sources proclaim that of the
officers only Meleager supported Arrhidaeus and the infantry (Diod. 18.2.2; Arr.
Succ. 1a.2). Meleager was not one of the principes; he had not risen above battalion commander (Heckel 1992: 167; 2006: 160). Attalus was a more substantive
character, but it is Meleager who all the sources describe as the leader of the
infantry. The charisma associated with those officers who had regularly held
independent commands and had been part of Alexander’s inner circle had saved
Perdiccas from an attempt to seize or to assassinate him prior to that officer’s
retreat from the city (Curt. 10.8.1–3; Just. 13.3.7–10). Perdiccas had stayed after the cavalry and most of the other officers had fled, hoping to achieve a reconciliation. Those sent to kill Alexander’s chiliarch, when confronted by the man
himself, became terrified and fled (Curt. 10.8.1–3). Later, the general feeling
amongst the infantry was that this attempted assassination was a shameful act
(Curt. 10.8.5).
The principes were also in control of a far more formidable force than simply the Companion Cavalry. Present in Babylon at the time of Alexander’s death was a
force of more than 50,000 Persian infantry plus units of Cossaeans and Tapurians
(Arr. Anab. 7.23.1–4). These troops had become part of Alexander’s army. In Susa, Alexander had been joined by the epigoni, 30,000 young Persians trained and equipped in the Macedonian fashion (Arr. Anab. 7.6.1; Curt. 8.5.1; Diod. 17.108.1–2; Plut. Alex. 47.3, 71.1). Later in the year, at Opis, the king created Persian units bearing Macedonian titles and Macedonian equipment (Arr. Anab. 7.11.3; Diod.
17.110.1–2; Just. 12.12.3–4). It was also at Opis that Alexander had dismissed
roughly 10,000 of his Macedonian veterans (Arr. Anab. 7.12.1; Diod. 17.109.2; 18.4.1), retaining only 2000 cavalry and 13,000 infantry (Curt. 10.2.8).17 While his regent in Macedonia, Antipater, was to bring new Macedonian recruits to Asia as
replacements for those departing, at the time of Alexander’s death these forces
were still in their homeland (Arr. Anab. 7.12.4; Just. 12.12.9). The army in Babylon was now primarily Asian. Given the attitude of the Macedonian infantry, as demonstrated
20
Alexander’s Heirs
in their reluctance to accept a half-Asian successor as their king, these Asian troops would have been loyal to the principes and the cavalry.
There were also Greek mercenaries present, but their attitudes in this struggle
are unclear. Most likely they simply awaited the outcome. Eumenes, the Cardian,
but also an hetairos (Anson 2004: 42 n. 4) and cavalry commander, claimed neutrality, and it is reasonable to assume that, while Eumenes’ proclamation
was disingenuous, since subsequent evidence would suggest that he was likely
acting as an agent for Perdiccas, seeking to undermine Meleager’s authority
with the infantry (Anson 2004: 54–7), it would have been a wise policy for al
Greeks of much less prominence, although not all did follow it. Nearchus, the fleet commander, original y from Crete, as noted earlier, had proposed Heracles as a
potential king, and at least two of the three later negotiators for the Macedonian infantry were Greek mercenary commanders (Curt. 10.8.15). What is unclear is
how many Greeks associated either with the court or army of Alexander were in
Babylon at this time. Undoubtedly Greek mercenaries were in Asia in abundance.
Many were left from the former Persian Empire, where virtual y every satrap as
well as the royal army had its Greek mercenary force. Many of these individuals
were exiles from their home countries. It was to deal with the large number of such fugitives earning their livelihoods through paid military service that, in 324,
Alexander ordered the return of tens of thousands of these Greek exiles to their
home cities (Diod. 17.109.1; 18.8.2–5; Curt. 10.2.4–7; Just. 13.5.2–5). Only those judged guilty of sacrilege or murder (Diod. 17.109.1), or those who been exiled by Alexander himself or his regent in Macedonia (Diod. 18.8.4), were to be excluded
from the returnees. After Alexander’s death, a force of 20,000 infantry and 3000
cavalry abandoned their homes in central Asia with the intent of marching back
to Greece (Diod. 18.17.2).
In Babylon, with the city surrounded by the forces loyal to the principes and supplies interdicted (Curt. 10.8.11), the resolve of the infantry began to disintegrate.
The troops demanded that their leaders, chiefly Meleager, either come to terms
with the cavalry or immediately lead them against the latter (Curt. 10.8.12–14).
Neither Meleager nor Arrhidaeus could gain effective control of their erstwhile supporters. Arrhidaeus in particular showed little capacity to lead.18 It was Meleager who had “dragged” him initial y before the assembled soldiers (Curt. 10.7.10), and Arrhidaeus had soon fled “terrified by the authority of the principes” (Curt 10.7.13).
Under these circumstances envoys were sent to the leaders outside the city and a
compromise was reached (Curt. 10.8.14–22). These particular envoys were Greeks:
Pasas, the Thessalian; Damis,19 the Megalopolitan; and Perilaus, of unknown origin, but likely also Greek (Heckel 2006: 203; contra: Atkinson and Yardley 2009: 199).
In the final settlement between the infantry and the cavalry, Arrhidaeus became
King Philip III (Arr. Succ. 1a.3), but it was also decided that, if Roxane was delivered of a male child, then that infant would also be designated as king, King
Alexander IV (Just. 13.4.3; cf. Arr. Succ. 1a.1, 8), thus creating a dual monarchy.
It is possible that Philip was
to reign only until Alexander IV came of age (App.
Syr. 55), but no other source states that this was the case, and it is likely that
The Death of a Conqueror
21
Appian or his source was confused by the fact that, given the infancy of young
Alexander, Philip was, and would be until his death in 317, the active king.
In this compromise between Meleager, the infantry, and the principes, the key to success was Craterus. Even though, or more likely especial y because, he was not
present, but rather in Cilicia with the veterans that Alexander had dismissed at
Opis and was supposedly en route to Macedonia (Arr. Anab. 7.12.4), he made the perfect foil. His name was popular with the infantry (Plut. Demetr. 14.2; Suda s.v. Craterus; Plut. Eum. 6.2, 6–7, 7.1), and Meleager had served under him (Arr.
Anab. 6.17.3). The non-present Craterus would become “Prostates of Arrhidaeus’
kingdom” (Arr. Succ. 1a.3; 1b.4), or regent for the king. Prostates was the traditional title for the regent of the kingdom of Macedonia (Anson 1992; 2009: 280–5).20
Since the king’s authority was theoretical y absolute in all areas of rule (see Anson 2004: 40–1; 2013b: 19–21), the prostates would have corresponding powers. Of course, Craterus was not present to exercise any powers. The compromise appealed
to Meleager in the main because Perdiccas was not made regent. That all concerned saw the need for a regent even with respect to the adult Arrhidaeus only confirms his unsuitability to rule. Perdiccas would retain his title of chiliarch (Arr. Succ.
1a.3; 1b.4), and be recognized as the second-in-command to the king’s prostates.
The chiliarchy in this context was to be an official title likely designating Perdiccas as the commander in Asia.21 An earlier request by the king that Meleager be made
a third leader with Perdiccas and Craterus had apparently been withdrawn (Curt.
10.8.22). Meleager would become Perdiccas’ lieutenant (Arr. Succ. 1a.3). Both sides would accede to the authority of an absent third party. Meleager, in particular, was pleased with this agreement; he was at a minimum the confidant of the only
current king and he had served under Craterus (Arr. Anab. 6.17.3), and hoped to enhance his position with his own adherents through his association with the
absent but popular commander. Craterus, like the infantry in general, had opposed Alexander’s Persianization policies (Plut. Eum. 6.3; Alex. 47.9), although he was circumspect in his opposition, and thus able to retain the king’s friendship (Plut.
Alex. 47.10; Curt. 6.8.2). He was therefore able to gain the trust of his soldiers (cf. Plut. Eum. 6.2–3, 7.1), while never losing that of his king.
Since neither Arrhidaeus, now proclaimed Philip III, nor Meleager was able to
control the infantry in his own name, that of this popular commander would be
invoked. In Meleager’s own mind he had emerged from the crisis with a new and
more powerful role in the new order than he ever would have achieved if the
principes had been left to their own devices. However, in reality Perdiccas and the other principes had no intention of abiding by this agreement. “The Perdiccans made the compromise only to get control of the king and to eliminate Meleager”
(Errington 1970: 56). While Curtius’ statement (10.9.7) that Perdiccas rested his only hope for survival on Meleager’s death is an exaggeration, it does point to the perceived need to separate Meleager from Philip. It was for this reason that
the principes were willing to grant the prostasia to the absent Craterus. For them this agreement with Meleager was never meant to come into effect (cf. Curt.
10.8.22). It was simply the means to an end, Meleager’s.
22
Alexander’s Heirs
As part of the agreement with the former battalion commander, a formal recon-
ciliation was to be staged; the period of strife had lasted a week (Curt. 10.10.9).
Treachery was planned around a ritualistic purification of the Macedonian forces
(Curt. 10.9.11). According to Curtius (10.9.8–11), Meleager was tricked by Perdiccas into agreeing to use the purification as a means to eliminate those supposedly
working against the agreement. Initial y in the negotiations the cavalry had
demanded that the leaders of the infantry be surrendered (Curt. 10.8.15). This
demand had precipitated the infantry to arm themselves and prepare for battle,
but Arrhidaeus dissuaded them and pleaded for additional negotiations, which
in turn led to the settlement, without the stated demand for the surrender of
infantry’s ringleaders (Curt. 10.8.16–23). However, once outside the wal s, sur-
rounded by the cavalry and their supporters in the plain, and with King Philip now leading one wing of the cavalry, the king at the instigation of Perdiccas demanded the surrender of thirty of the leaders of the infantry (Diod. 18.4.7; Curt. 10.9.18), the very individuals who had secured for him the throne. The dumbfounded troops
meekly watched as their compatriots were taken and subsequently trampled
to death by the war elephants.22 While Meleager was not among the thirty, he was
subsequently assassinated; it was claimed that he was plotting against Perdiccas
(Diod. 18.4.7; Curt. 10.9.21; Arr. Succ. 1a.4).
The cavalry leaders now returned to Babylon and held the conclave planned
previously to decide the fate of Alexander’s empire. This time there were no
common soldiers present (Curt. 10.10.1–4). At this meeting Philip was confirmed
as king with the understanding that, if Roxane’s child were male, he would also be king (Arr. Succ. 1a.8; cf. Diod. 18.18.6). Later, when a boy was born,23 he was presented to the army, who acclaimed him as King Alexander IV (Arr. Succ. 1a.1, 8; 1b.1; Just. 13.4.3). It is doubtful that anyone at this point thought beyond the immediate crisis of what the exact implications of a dual monarchy might be. Despite this being the case, scholars have speculated on the constitutional aspects of this diarchy.24
In this final Babylonian settlement made by the principes present in that city, in the absence of outside interference, a modified form of Perdiccas’ original
proposal was approved and Perdiccas emerged as the Prostates of the Kingdom for Philip III, and, after his birth, of that of Alexander IV as well (cf. Diod. 18.2.4, 3.1, 23.2).25 As prostates he combined the offices of regent and guardian (Anson 2009: 284; Meeus 2009b: 296–7). Neither a shared overall military command,
nor in the final analysis is the prostasia mentioned for Craterus; instead that commander was to share power in Europe with Antipater (Arr. Succ. 1a.7; cf. Curt.
10.7.9). For those in Babylon this was an ideal way to deal with the two powerful, but absent, principes; let them battle it out for control of Europe (so Badian 1964b: 266). Perdiccas, with the consent of the army, had revoked Alexander’s command
that Craterus replace Antipater in Macedonia, along with certain other of Alexander’s
“plans” (Diod. 18.4.1–6),26 and substituted the more amorphous sharing of power
between the two (Arr. Succ. 1a.3).27
Craterus was in Cilicia with the Macedonian returnees and probably in super-
visory control of the treasury there. The satrapy of Cilicia, however, had been
The Death of a Conqueror
23
given to Philotas by the principes in Babylon (Arr. Succ. 1a.5, 24.2; Curt. 10.10.2; Diod. 18.3.1; Just. 13.6.16). Even though this Philotas is later described as Craterus’
supporter (cf. Arr. Succ. 24.2), it is clear that the principes as a group wanted Craterus to move to Europe. Some time prior to Craterus’ arrival in Cilicia, the
satrap there, Balacrus (Arr. Anab. 2.12.2), had died while campaigning against the Pisidians (Diod. 18.22.1). This may in part be responsible for Craterus’ delay in moving on to Macedonia. He had left with
the veterans in the summer of 324
and was still in Cilicia more than a year later. He may also have been ordered by Alexander to await the departure of Antipater and the Macedonian replacements
from Macedonia before proceeding (Griffith 1965: 12–15). As to Antipater’s
reaction to the events in Babylon, it should be noted that even before the final
settlement was reached, he was already preparing for what became the “Hellenic
War,” or the Lamian War, the great revolt against Macedonian authority, which
saw Antipater and a Macedonian force besieged in Lamia in Thessaly in the
winter of 323/22 (Diod. 18.9.1–4, 12.1). Antipater apparently had other issues
as wel . Thrace, while initial y under the command of a Macedonian general who
was likely subject to Antipater’s authority (Anson 2013b: 128–9), had proven to be problematical. In 331, Memnon, the commander in Thrace, “revolted against
Alexander,” but later came to some sort of satisfactory terms with Antipater (Diod.
17.62.5–6, 63.1), and is found bringing reinforcements from Thrace to Alexander
in 326 (Curt. 9.3.21). This rebellion, then, most likely was actual y against Antipater’s authority, and not that of Alexander. Subsequently, Memnon’s replacement in that
office, Zopyrion, on his own authority, engaged in a disastrous campaign in the
Pontic region against the Greek city of Olbia and the Thracian tribe of the Getae (Curt. 10.1.44; Just. 12.2.17, 37.3.2), resulting in much of Thrace revolting from Macedonian authority under Seuthes, the king of the Odrysian Thracians, the
dominant tribal branch of this people,28 and formerly a Macedonian vassal
(Curt. 10.1.45).
While the Lamian War only began after the news of Alexander’s death reached
Greece, there were rumblings at least a year before (Ashton 1983: 47–56).29
Dissatisfaction with Macedonian hegemony had lingered since 338 and the defeat
of the Greek coalition by the Macedonians and the establishment of the League of
Corinth, Philip II’s mechanism to control the Greek peninsula, in the following
year. This general discontent with the loss of much of the city-states’ autonomy
Alexanders Heirs Page 6
