was augmented by Alexander’s Exiles’ Decree of 324 (Ashton 1983: 50–63; Habicht
1997: 34–5; contra: Dmitriev 2004).30 Moreover, likely in the winter of 325/24,
Harpalus, the royal treasurer in Babylon (Diod. 17.108.4), fearing prosecution for his massive malfeasance in office, fled to Athens. With the possibility of turmoil in the Aegean and Greece, Craterus may have been ordered by Alexander to prepare
for any such eventuality by remaining in Cilicia and seeing to the outfitting of a major sea force to meet a potential revolt (Ashton 1993: 128–9). Curtius (10.2.2; cf.
Just. 13.5.7) reports that Alexander, when he heard that his wayward treasurer
was in Athens, ordered a fleet to be prepared for an attack on the city. The plan, continues this author, was abandoned when Harpalus was arrested and later
24
Alexander’s Heirs
escaped from Athens.31 However, it is also possible that Craterus was laying the
groundwork in Cilicia for a future campaign that Alexander planned in the west
(Ashton 1993: 128–9; Bosworth 1988b: 208–10; 2002: 31). Cyinda, the formerly
Persian treasury, could supply the resources needed to amass the vast armada and
army proposed for this new expedition of conquest (Diod. 18.4.4; Arr. Anab. 7.1.2; Curt. 10.1.17). It is unknown how many of the ships that Alexander acquired when
he captured the Phoenician port cities with the subsequent surrender of their
fleets were still operating in the Aegean Sea, which after the capture of Egypt was controlled by the Macedonians. Two hundred and twenty-four warships had aided
Alexander in the siege of Tyre (Arr. Anab. 2.20.1–3; Plut. Alex. 24.4–5; cf. Curt.
4.3.11);32 thirty triremes had been left behind in Egypt (Curt. 4.8.4; Arr. Anab.
3.5.3–5). What is clear, however, with respect to Craterus is that Alexander must have known and, for whatever reason, approved of that commander’s delay in
Cilicia. At least, there is no record of his displeasure.
What is, perhaps, more interesting is Craterus’ reluctance to involve himself in
the events unfolding in Babylon. Although order was restored fairly quickly after Alexander’s death, Craterus had the resources – 10,000 Macedonian veterans
and access to the treasury – to march to Babylon and attempt to impose his own
settlement, if he so wished. Craterus, for all of his resources, did not physical y contest or apparently even voice objections to the resolutions reached in Babylon.
When he eventual y did cross to Macedonia, he immediately deferred to Antipater’s authority (Diod. 18.16.5). This is true even though the Suda, the Byzantine encyclopedia, states that in Macedonia the army preferred Craterus to Antipater (Suda s.v. Craterus). Additional y, Craterus never accused Perdiccas of usurping his prostasia. He was a loyal Macedonian and royal supporter. Later, he would angle for some role in Asia (Diod. 18.17.7), which he apparently hoped to achieve by
negotiation (Errington 1970: 61–2; Anson 2004: 63). He never seems to have
wanted the top job. This was clearly due to a lack of ambition, not a lack of courage (Suda s.v. Craterus), nor was it any absence of self-confidence or sense of self-worth.
In his dress he emulated Alexander (Suda s.v. Craterus), and at Delphi he dedicated a hunting scene of bronze figures depicting Alexander attacking a lion with
Craterus providing assistance (Plut. Alex. 40.5). Craterus was a good and confident general, but his aspirations were not equal to those of many of his contemporaries, nor certainly was his ambition comparable to that of his former king.
The other apparent loser in the final round of negotiations was the somaphylax Leonnatus. He had been part of one suggested solution to the regency issue (Curt.
10.7.8–9; cf. Just. 13.13–14), and Curtius (10.7.20) states that, during the mutiny, the leaders of the cavalry were Perdiccas and Leonnatus (Curt. 10.8.1–2, 6).
However, in the settlement following the army’s reconciliation, Leonnatus did not emerge as a major figure, but rather as the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr.
Succ. 1a.6; 1b.2; Curt. 10.10.2; Diod. 18.3.1; Just. 13.5.16). Indeed, while Alexander had associated Paphlagonia with Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. Anab. 2.4.2; Curt.
3.1.22–24; 4.5.13), the former territory now had been attached to Cappadocia and
awarded to Eumenes (Diod. 18.3.1; Arr. Succ. 1a.6; Plut. Eum. 3.3). Intrinsical y
The Death of a Conqueror
25
Hellespontine Phrygia was of great strategic importance, controlling as it did
the Asian side of the strait, but much of this significance had been negated by the peaceful relations then in existence between Antipater and Perdiccas. In the early summer of 323, Antipater was firmly in control of Macedonia; soon Lysimachus
would be in place in nearby Thrace. Craterus, with 10,000 veterans and an
acknowledged right to interfere in Macedonian affairs, was already in Cilicia (Arr.
Succ. 1a.7). Leonnatus’ diminished role becomes even more extraordinary, if Justin’s (13.2.14) claim that he was one of the four initial y agreed-upon guardians for Alexander’s successor is true. This is, therefore, another reason for rejecting Justin’s account of the aftermath of Alexander’s death in favor of the Curtian one.
In Curtius, Leonnatus is never part of any agreement on the regency, only part
of an ignored suggestion raised by Pithon. Unlike Craterus, Leonnatus’ ambition
was great, and he hoped to seize the Macedonian throne (Plut. Eum. 3.8–9; Suda s.v. Leonnatus).
In truth, Craterus was caught in a position where only someone with the ambi-
tion and the will of an Alexander would roll the dice in an attempt to secure power.
Moreover, his troops knew of the original charge and many may have been reluctant to return from whence they had come to fight their fellow Macedonians. The core
unit of these returnees was the argyraspids, Alexander’s old infantry guard, who
until late in the Conqueror’s reign were called the hypaspists.33 Hypaspists, or
shield-bearers, was the formal title given to the unit. Later, in India as a result of the hypaspists covering their shields with silver, the unit acquired the title of argyraspids, or silver-shields. Final y, his orders were to replace Antipater in Macedonia, orders rescinded by those in Babylon (Arr. Succ. 1a.7; Suda s.v. Craterus 3). For a time, Craterus was in limbo. Chaotic events were unfolding in both Europe and
Asia. There had been almost a full-blown civil war in Babylon and unrest was sim-
mering in Greece which would eventual y lead to the Lamian War.
Perhaps most curious of all is that also at this second meeting in Babylon, while the seeming provocative move of canceling Craterus’ prostasia was taken, when the satrapies were assigned, conservatism was the order of the day (Arr. Succ. 1a.5–7; 1b.2–7; Diod. 18.2.4–3.2; Curt. 10.10.1–5). In fact, most of the satrapies were
simply reassigned to those currently holding the position.34 Of the eight provinces which were reassigned, Hellespontine Phrygia, Cilicia, Caria, Cappadocia, Syria,
Egypt, Media Major, and Thrace, three most likely were vacant at the time of
their assignment and two were replacements or partial replacements of non
Graeco-Macedonian officials. Eumenes of Cardia was assigned Cappadocia and
Paphlagonia (Diod. 18.3.1; Arr. Succ. 1a.6; Plut. Eum. 3.3). Alexander had received the submission of the latter and had placed the region under the authority of Calas, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, but Alexander had barely crossed into the
former. Sabictas,35 probably a member of the Cappadocian nobility (Atkinson
1980: 135–6), was assigned the satrapy of Cappadocia, which likely only involved
at most the extreme southern region.36 The northern majority was under the total
control of the local dynast,
Ariarathes. Ariarathes I was king of Cappadocia and an al y of the Persians, but not seemingly under their direct authority (Diod. 31.19.3–4).
26
Alexander’s Heirs
Sabictas is unlikely to have survived the Persian counter-offensive in Asia Minor after Alexander’s victory over the Persian king at Issus in 333 (Curt. 4.1.34–5,
5.13). After that campaign, Sabictas disappears from the record and Ariarathes
appears in total control of the entire region of Cappadocia (Diod. 18.16.1).
Balacrus, the satrap of Cilicia, had been slain by the Larandians and the Isaurians prior to Alexander’s death (Diod. 18.22.1). That satrapy was assigned to Philotas by those in Babylon (Arr. Succ. 1a.5; Diod. 18.3.1; Just. 13.4.12). A fate similar to that of Balacrus may have also befallen Demarchus in Hellespontine Phrygia
(so Briant 1973b: 80). Media was divided into two provinces (Just. 13.4.13) with
Atropates, Perdiccas’ Persian father-in-law (Arr. Anab. 7.4.5; Just. 13.4.13), retaining Media Minor, and Media Major being assigned to the Macedonian Pithon (Just.
13.4.13; Diod. 18.3.1; Arr. Succ. 1a.5, 1b.2; Curt. 10.10.4). Lysimachus was assigned Thrace (Arr. Succ. 1a.7; 1b.3; Diod 18.3.2; App. Syr. 52), much of which had been usurped by Seuthes and the Odrysian Thracians (Curt. 10.1.45). Indeed, it is
even possible that he was not actual y a satrap, but a general answering to Antipater in Macedonia (Lund 1992: 20, 54). If this was the case, then the relationship between Macedonia and Thrace remained as it had existed during Alexander the Great’s
lifetime, with a strategos, or general, managing that region under the overal authority of the regent in Macedonia (Diod. 17.62.4–6, 63.1). It is more likely that Thrace was elevated to the status of satrapy in the aftermath of Alexander the
Great’s death (Delev 2000: 384 n. 5).
Antigonus, known as Monophthalmus (the One-eyed), was left in control of
Greater Phrygia, Lycia, Pamphylia, Lycaonia, and western Pisidia (Arr. Succ. 1a.6; 1b.2; Diod. 18.3.1; Billows 1990: 46).37 Babylonia may also have been reassigned. If it was, then it would represent the replacement of another Persian satrap. The
Persian Stamenes became satrap in 328/27 (Arr. Anab. 4.18.3) and may have been replaced by the Macedonian Archon prior to Alexander’s death (Heckel 2006:
255). If this was the case, then Archon was simply confirmed in his satrapy in the Babylonian meeting (Diod. 18.3.3; Just. 13.4.23).
Despite Perdiccas being the dominant figure in the aftermath of the reconcilia-
tion of the infantry and cavalry, he did not control these proceedings, even though certain of the sources do appear to indicate that Perdiccas alone was responsible for the satrapal division (Arr. Succ. 1a.5; 1b.7; App. Syr. 52). These sources represent the official protocol, with the regent acting in the name of the kings (“he made
appointments to the governorships of the different provinces, as if Arrhidaeus had ordered him” [Arr. Succ. 1a.5]), not the actual process. Both Diodorus 18.3.1 (“having taken the advice of the leaders,” Perdiccas assigned the satrapies), and Curtius
10.10.1 (“Perdiccas held a council of leading men in which it was decided that
the rule would be divided”) make it clear that the division was the result of the deliberations of the principes. Indeed, Diodorus (18.23.2) states that early in Perdiccas’ regency his position was “not firmly established.” Ptolemy, who had
opposed the appointment of Perdiccas as regent in the first abortive meeting in
Babylon (Curt. 10.6.15), got what he apparently desired, the satrapy of Egypt. It is likely that, if Perdiccas could have done so, he would have blocked this
The Death of a Conqueror
27
assignment. Of course, he may simply have wanted him and other powerful
members of the former king’s inner circle away from the king and the royal army
(so Bosworth 2002: 57). While these satraps’ later actions with regard to Perdiccas cannot be taken as proof of their attitudes in 323, it is instructive that Ptolemy, Leonnatus, Laomedon (cf. Diod. 18.39.6), and Asander (cf. Diod. 18.39.6) al
ultimately proved disloyal to the regent. Stil , granting such a satrapy as Egypt with all of its resources to a potential opponent should not have been, and very
likely was not, the desire of the regent. After al , Alexander had seen the potential and had distributed authority to a number of individuals in Egypt. However,
Cleomenes, the most powerful official then in Egypt,38 was made Ptolemy’s lieu-
tenant ( hyparchos) (Arr. Succ. 1a.5), probably in an attempt to keep a watch on the new satrap. Of course, Perdiccas once had a lieutenant as wel , the ill-fated Meleager.
Many of Perdiccas’ allies did not receive satrapies. Perdiccas’ own brother Alcetas, a distinguished battalion commander, did not secure a province, nor did Aristonous, who had proposed in the initial meeting that Perdiccas be made king (Curt. 10.6.16).
These omissions are especial y significant since the possession of a satrapy did not necessarily mean one’s separation from court or the loss of command in the royal
army. Pithon was made satrap of Media Major (Arr. Succ. 1a.5), but, except for a campaign in the east, remained with Perdiccas and the royal army (cf. Diod. 18.7.9, 36.5). In any case, Perdiccas needed his supporters in Babylon as well (Billows
1990: 55). Controlling the army was all important; the actual administration of
the empire was initial y only of secondary importance.
In the distribution, certain powerful individuals who were not physical y present in Babylon also had to be taken into account. As noted, Antipater was confirmed in his possession of Macedonia (Arr. Succ. 1a.7; Diod. 18.3.2), but was to share his power with Craterus (Arr. Succ. 1a.7). Antigonus Monophthalmus was maintained in his large satrapy. He would have been difficult to dislodge from lands he had held since 333 (Arr. Anab. 1.29.3; Curt. 3.1.8; Just. 13.4.14). While Antigonus had been left in Phrygia by Alexander with a force of only 1500 mercenaries (Arr. Anab.
1.29.3) and likely the surrendered 3000 Carians and 100 Greek mercenaries
who had been in Persian employ there, “very many from his garrisons” were sub-
sequently sent to Alexander (Curt. 4.1.35). That Antigonus was able to maintain
control of his province despite the major Persian counterattack after Alexander’s victory at Issus (Curt. 4.1.34–5) must have been the result of Antigonus’ recruitment of native forces and mercenaries (Anson 1988a: 475). He is reported to have
defeated the retreating Persians in three battles (Curt. 4.1.35). Later, in 316,
Antigonus deployed 1000 Phrygian and Lydian cavalry, and 3000 Lycian and
Pamphylian infantry (Diod. 19.29.2–3). At this particular time, Antigonus had
access to far larger Macedonian forces and, consequently, his numbers of troops
from Phrygia, Lycia, and Pamphylia may have been much reduced from his years
before Alexander’s death. Since Alexander’s departure from Asia Minor and
the Persian assault there late in 333, Antigonus had not moved against any of the native rulers in the area, certain of whom had renounced their allegiance to
Alexander; this suggests that he was at the least at peace with these neighbors, or,
28
Alexander’s Heirs
even more likely, in alliance with them (Anson 1988a: 475). Alexander’s longest-
serving satrap was also a “friend” of Antipater’s (Diod. 18.23.3), and at this particular point in time Perdiccas wished to cooperate ful y with Alexander’s former regent in Macedonia, and had requested the hand of Antipater’s daughter, Nicaea, to cement
the alliance (Diod. 18.23.2). Perdiccas was clearly feeling his way cautiously. His immediate ambition was to solidify his hold on the regency and to gain full control of the royal army.
At this point it is not known what Antipater’s thoughts were with respect to the
<
br /> situation in Babylon. While Perdiccas’ request for a bride went unanswered for
more than a year and a half, it likely had nothing to do with the situation in Babylon or with Antipater’s relationship with the regent, but rather the gathering storm in Greece proper. Greek dissatisfaction, especial y in Athens and Aetolia, sparked by Alexander’s Exiles’ Decree, was leading to preparations for war months before
Alexander’s death (Mitchel 1964: 16–17; Miller 1982: 101; Ashton 1983: 53–5). By
the winter of 323, Antipater was being besieged in Lamia. Moreover, after becoming regent, Perdiccas had his own concerns.
In the east, in what was known as the upper satrapies, those east of Babylonia,
large numbers of Greeks living in the many garrisons and new city foundations,
missing “their old manner of life” (Diod. 18.7.1), on the news that Alexander was dead, organized themselves for a march back to Greece. Earlier, in 326/25, while
Alexander was recovering from a wound, 3000 “Greeks,” who had been settled
in Bactria and Sogdiana, believing that the king had died, “revolted from the
Macedonians” and successful y marched back to Greece (Diod. 17.99.5; Curt.
9.7.1–11).39 Curtius (9.7.1; cf. Diod. 17.99.5) states that the revolt did not arise because of hostility toward Alexander, but rather because of their dissatisfaction with their new homes in Bactria and Sogdiana (Diod. 17.99.5). This new upheaval
in 323 was on a much larger scale.
As in the earlier uprising, there is no indication of pent-up antagonism
towards the Macedonians. Indeed, these settlements contained small numbers of
Macedonians (cf. Arr. Anab. 4.22.5; Plut. Mor. 328E)., but were primarily filled with Greek mercenaries. Even though Arrian ( Anab. 4.22.5; 7.24.7) suggests that others than Greeks were included, those in revolt are collectively called Greeks by our sources, indicating that the overwhelming majority were, indeed, former
Greek mercenaries. What is remarkable is the large number of those who joined
this revolt, given that at least 3000 settlers from this general area had already withdrawn in the earlier uprising and successful y returned to Greece (Curt. 9.7.11).
Alexanders Heirs Page 7
