Diodorus (18.7.2) reports that this new rebel force amounted to 20,000 infantry
and 3000 cavalry. While Diodorus emphasizes the military nature of these indi-
viduals, many may have been former camp followers who had been part of the
original settlements and were equal y discontented with their situation (cf. Diod.
17.83.2; Curt. 7.3.23; Arr. Anab. 3.28.4). In this second revolt, Perdiccas decided to stop their march and make an example of the participants (Diod. 18.7.3–4). For this purpose, Perdiccas sent a force of 3000 infantry and 800 cavalry from the
ranks of the Macedonians, chosen by lot, with an additional 10,000 infantry and
The Death of a Conqueror
29
8000 horsemen to be supplied by the satraps of the upper satrapies. This force was all under the command of the regent’s lieutenant, Pithon (Diod. 18.7.3). Pithon and his force won a complete victory. Diodorus (18.7.4) notes that Pithon, “whose ambition was great,” wished to incorporate the defeated into his army and with this large force conquer the upper satrapies. He further claims that Perdiccas suspected
Pithon’s ambition and consequently ordered that all of the insurgents be put to
death and that their possessions be distributed among the Macedonians (Diod.
18.7.5). While Pithon neglected Perdiccas’ command, the Macedonians in his
force did not and set upon the Greeks, killing them and seizing their possessions (Diod. 18.7.8–9). The claim that Perdiccas gave the order to kill the rebels because of his distrust of the intentions of his commander is doubtful. Why would
Perdiccas assign such an important mission to an untrustworthy officer when he
had numbers of other commanders at his disposal? The most likely explanation
for Pithon’s selection is that at the time Perdiccas was unaware of his ambitions.
This claimed desire on his part to become “ruler of the upper satrapies” (Diod.
18.7.4) appears to foreshadow his actual attempt to realize this goal in 317
(Diod. 19.14.1–2). The massacre of the captured Greeks was then to be a lesson to others who might leave their posts, not an attempt to thwart Pithon’s ambitions.40
With the conclusion of the campaign, Pithon and the Macedonians returned to
Babylon (Diod. 18.7.9).
Clearly the more dangerous of the two revolts occurring in 323 was that occur-
ring in the west. This war broke out likewise when the news of Alexander’s death
was confirmed and a coalition of Greek states led by the Athenians and the
Aetolians declared war “to assert their freedom and rid Greece of Macedonian
despotism” (Diod. 18.8.6–13.6, 14.4–5, 15.1–9; 16.4–18.3). The conflict was made
possible ironical y enough because of the relative prosperity brought with the
Common Peace of the League of Corinth imposed on the Greek world by
Alexander’s father Philip II (cf. Tod 1950: 224–31; Rhodes and Osborne 2007:
372–9; Diod. 16.89; 17.8.5; Just. 9.5). By forbidding war between the various signatories and cementing in place the governments of those same states that existed at the time of the agreement, the Common Peace imposed on the Greeks, who had
not accompanied Alexander to Asia, the horrors of peace. With the exception of
the brief, albeit serious, war launched by the Spartans and their allies (Elis, Achaea, except Pellene, and Arcadia except Megalopolis [Aeschin. 3.165]) against Alexander’s regent and the Macedonians in 331 (Diod. 17.48.1, 63.4; Curt. 4.1.39–40), the
European Greek world was at peace for more than a decade. While our information
is scanty with respect to economics in general, it is clear that the Athenian state at least had prospered, whether through shrewd stewardship (Green 2003: 1), or as
the result of the general peace, but likely due to a combination of both. Athens had an income at the start of the war of roughly 1200 talents a year and may have
had in its treasury as much as 18,000 talents by 323 (Plut. Mor. 841C; Green 2003: 1 n. 3).41 A talent was a unit of measure equal to roughly 57 pounds, and with
respect to these monetary evaluations that amount of silver. The annual income
was twice that of the fifth-century Athenian Empire, and Pericles’ treasury before
30
Alexander’s Heirs
the building projects on the Acropolis and the siege of Potidaea that preceded the start of the Peloponnesian War contained less than 10,000 talents (Thuc. 2.13.3).
Even accounting for inflation over the intervening century,42 these financial figures for Athens at the time of Alexander’s death are still impressive. Moreover, Athens’
fleet at this time had at least 240 warships (Diod. 18.10.2; Just. 13.5.8), and perhaps as many as 400 (Plut. Mor. 841C); its army had 5000 citizen hoplites, 2000 mercenaries, and 500 cavalry (Diod. 18.11.3).
Athenian hostility toward Macedonia stemmed from a number of factors
including its long-standing reluctance to surrender its independence to a foreign power, but recently the major cause for Athenian anger was over Alexander’s Exiles’
Decree. Athens had acquired possession of the island of Samos in 366, sending
cleruchs, settlers, to occupy the island the following year and expelling the Samians (Dem. 15.9; Isoc. 15.111; Arist. Rhet. 1384b 32–5; Diod. 18.8.7; Cargill 1995: 18–19). Athenian occupation had been confirmed by Philip in the Peace of Corinth
(Plut. Alex. 28.2). Either as part of the Exiles’ Decree or as a separate order, Alexander commanded that the Samians were to be restored to their island and the
Athenian settlers removed. While the Exiles’ Decree was official y promulgated in Greece at the Olympic Games in August of 324 (Diod. 18.8.3),43 the knowledge of
its content may have become known in the peninsula as early as March (Heisserer
1980: 188–9). Harpalus, the imperial treasurer stationed in Babylon, had arrived
seeking asylum in Athens in the late spring (Habicht 1997: 41), or perhaps as late as the middle of July, 324 (Badian 1961: 42–3), but in any case, Alexander’s emissary Nicanor, carrying with him the king’s Exiles’ Decree, was already in Greece when
the fugitive treasurer arrived.
Harpalus’ arrival in Athens created a dilemma for that city, for he brought with
him 30 ships, 6000 mercenaries, and 5000 talents, roughly 285,000 pounds of silver and, perhaps, gold, raided from the royal treasury in Babylon (Diod. 17.108.6; Curt.
10.2.1; Arr. Succ. 16; Plut. Dem. 1–2). Harpalus was one of Alexander’s long-standing
“friends” (Arr. Anab. 3.6.5; Plut. Alex. 10.4), but was unfit for military service and consequently had been made the expedition’s treasurer (Arr. Anab. 3.6.4–7). Nor was this Harpalus’ first flight. In 333, fearing that the Persians would prove victorious in the then approaching Battle of Issus, he fled with part of the royal treasury to Greece (Megarid) (Arr. Anab. 3.6.7). Alexander forgave his wayward friend and restored him to his previous position (Arr. Anab. 3.6.4). This later flight, however, found Alexander not in a forgiving mood. While at first denied entry to the city, Harpalus left his forces at Taenarum in Laconia, returned to Athens as a suppliant with a portion of the treasure, and was permitted to enter the city (Diod. 17.108.7).
Taenarum and its temple of Poseidon had long been a place of sanctuary (cf. Thuc.
1.128.1; Diod. 11.45.4), and during the fourth century bc it had become a gathering place for mercenaries. Many of these had arrived with their former Persian
employers after Alexander’s various successes (Diod. 17.111.1). It was here that the Spartan king, Agis, preparing for his war with Antipater, assembled his mercenaries (cf. Arr. Anab. 2.13.6). With the defeat of the Spartans and the death of their king at the hands of Antipater in 331, the area quickly became an independent mercenary
The Death of a Conqueror
31
center (Badian 1961: 26). This role accelerated after Alexander ordered his satraps to disband their armies, when many of those discharged by Alexander’s satraps
came there (Diod. 17.111.1; 18.9.1; cf. 17.108.7). Taenarum was attractive for a
number of reasons. It was a port with ready access to Italy and Sicily, and it was safely located at the southwest tip of Laconia.
With the arrival of Harpalus, the Athenians debated what to do with this most
dangerous of visitors. Many wished to make use of the resources he had brought
with him from Asia for what many hoped would be a coming war with the
Macedonians (Plut. Mor. 531A; cf. Paus. 2.33.4); many were also apparently bribed by Alexander’s former treasurer (Diod. 17.108.7–8; Just. 13.5.9; Plut. Dem. 25; Hyp.
5.3),44 but others were unwilling to anger Alexander and still hoped to influence his decision with respect to Samos. While admitted to the city, the fleeing treasurer was placed under guard by order of the Athenian assembly. Later, leaving behind
much of his stolen treasure (Diod. 17.108.7–8; 18.9.1), he slipped away to Crete, where he met his death (Hyp. 5.3; Diod. 17.108.7–8; 18.19.2; Curt. 10.2.3). With
demands coming from Alexander, Antipater, and even the Conqueror’s mother
Olympias for Harpalus’ surrender, most Athenians were not yet ready to provoke a
war (Hyp. 5.3; Curt. 10.2.2–4; Diod. 17.108.7; Paus. 2.33.4), at least not until
appeasement had been tried and a reversal of Alexander’s demands concerning
Samos sought (Ashton 1983: 53). Also, encouraging this decision was the presence
of a Macedonian fleet under the command of Philoxenus in the western Aegean
(Plut. Mor. 531A; Paus. 2.33.4).
In the winter of 324 (cf. Diod. 17.111.4), certain Athenians were already sending out feelers to possible allies for a revolt against Macedonian hegemony and the
enforcement of the Exiles’ Decree.45 The Athenian Leosthenes, with the tacit
approval, according to Diodorus, of the probeuleutic Council of 500, but more
likely only that of a presiding subcommittee, the prytany, opened discussions with the leaders of other dissatisfied Greek peoples, primarily the Aetolians (Diod.
17.111.2–3).46 The council or prytany also gave him 50 talents to recruit mercenaries in Taenarum (Diod. 17.111.3). Many of these had been aided in their
transfer from Asia to Europe by this same Leosthenes (Paus. 1.25.5; 8.52.5). As 324
waned the Athenians were playing a very dangerous game, surreptitiously seeking
mercenaries and allies for a possible future war (Diod. 18.9.2–3), but, at the same time as these warlike preparations were underway, attempting to get Alexander to
change his mind with respect to the Samians. Demosthenes had encouraged the
entire Greek world to send ambassadors to the Macedonian king protesting his
decision regarding the exiles (Hyp. 5.4). Moreover, after numerous hints that
Alexander would welcome the honors due a god which were in the main rebuffed
by the Greeks of Europe, in the fall of 324, Hephaestion died and, with the approval of the Oracle of Ammon in Siwah, Alexander ordered that his dead companion
be honored with the rites associated with hero worship. It was at this oracle in the Libyan desert that Alexander had been proclaimed the son of Zeus in 331 (in general, see Anson 2013b: 97–109). Heroes were at the intersection of mortals and the
immortal gods. They were those who had been elevated to divine status after
32
Alexander’s Heirs
death based on their achievements in life. Their cult was more limited in scope,
most often tied to a particular location. It is likely that, at this time, the hints that Alexander wished to be honored as a god became more assertive. The worship of
dead heroes was commonplace in the Greek world. City founders and benefactors
were often given cult after their deaths. Such honors were only very rarely given to living men (Anson 2013b: 87–8, 94–5). Hephaestion would receive hero cult, but
Alexander wished to receive the cult associated with an Olympian. This was not
the result of any belief that he bled ichor,47 but a kind of down payment on the
glory he believed he would receive after death (Anson 2013b: 83–120). Alexander
had not in his own mind become an immortal god, but he believed he deserved to
be treated like one as a reward for his achievements and to separate him from
the ranks of the rest of humanity.
Initial y, suggestions that Alexander be so honored were rejected in Athens. The
Athenian politician Demades proposed to add Alexander to the “Twelve Gods,”
but was heavily fined (Athen. 6.251B; Ael. VH 5.12). Demosthenes is reported, perhaps in reference to Demades’ suggestion, to have made a proposal to the
Athenian assembly “forbidding anyone to believe in any but the accepted gods”
(Din. 1.94; cf. Polyb. 12.12b.3). Yet subsequently this same Demosthenes “proclaimed that the people must not question the grant of divine honors to Alexander” (Din.
1.94). Demades is reported to have said after the failure of his initial proposal,
“see that in keeping heaven safe you do not lose your land” (Val. Max. 7.2.13). The turnaround for Demosthenes may have been the direct result of a reconsideration
of the wisdom in denying Alexander the honors of a god, while at the same time
lobbying him to rescind his demand respecting the Samians. In 1593 Henri de
Bourbon, a Protestant candidate for the contested French throne, when he could
not acquire the capital Paris by force, converted to Catholicism, reportedly pro-
claiming that “Paris was well worth a mass,” and it is very likely that Demosthenes and many Athenians came to a similar conclusion with respect to Alexander’s
demand: Samos was well worth the worship of a living king. In the Athenian case,
nationalism trumped piety as, in Henri’s example, personal ambition triumphed
over religious scruple. It was in the Athenian interest to placate the Macedonian monarch in hopes that he would make the Samians an exception from the general
force of the decree. This led the Athenians to send envoys to Alexander to honor
him and to bring their petitions to him. Many of these legates from various Greek communities arrived acting as theoroi or sacred ambassadors, “as if on a sacred mission to honor a god” (Arr. Anab. 7.23.2), and while there is here no evidence of actual worship, their attitude was certainly “reverential” (Bosworth 1988a: 287).
Apparently, Alexander’s response to the Athenians was not positive.48 At some
point during the discussions Alexander replied to an Athenian letter claiming that the polis had been granted Samos earlier as part of the Corinthian settlement after Chaeronea, that this decision was made by King Philip II (Plut. Alex. 28.2; cf.
Diod. 18.56.7).49 It was the issue of Samos more than any other that would bring
the Athenians to challenge the power of Macedonia (Diod. 18.8.7). They were not
willing to give up the island. Inscriptional evidence shows that at this time the
The Death of a Conqueror
33
Athenians were detaining and bringing to Athens for trial all Samian returnees
(Habicht 1957: 156–64; 1997: 33–4).
At the time of Alexander’s death, much of the Greek world was already on a
war footing (Diod. 18.9.3–4), prepared to fight for their freedom and perhaps
even for some to defend the immortal gods against gross impiety (Hyp. 6.43).
Alexander’s death precipitated what likely was an inevitable war (Diod. 18.9.4).
It was the catalyst for long-held resentments about the loss of Greek eleutheria, freedom, to explode. Thi
s desire to be free from and independent of Macedonian
authority became the slogan that reverberated through the Greek ranks (Hyp.
6.10–11, 16, 24, 34, 40; Diod. 18.9.1, 5; Just. 13.5.5). Despite the efforts of a number of Athenian leaders, primarily Phocion, a long-standing conservative
leader, having been elected one of the ten Athenian generals forty-five times
(for his career, see Heckel 2006: 220–2), the Athenians led by Hypereides,
Phocion’s long-time opponent and critic of the latter’s policies which he saw as
pro-Macedonian, voted for war. Demosthenes was not present for these debates,
having been exiled for accepting a bribe from Harpalus (Plut. Dem. 26). He, however, after the Athenians voted for war, associated himself with the Athenian
ambassadors who were seeking allies for the coming conflict, and was restored
to citizenship by the assembly (Plut. Dem. 27). Unlike certain other Athenian politicians who were pro-Macedonian and fled to Antipater after the vote (Plut.
Dem. 27.2), Phocion remained in Athens and even conducted the Athenian successful counterattack against the Macedonian Micion who landed at Rhamnous
in Attica and had begun to pil age the countryside (Plut. Phoc. 25.1–4).
With the Athenian populace clearly dreaming of their days of empire and glory,
the assembly voted “to assume the responsibility for the common freedom of the
Greeks and to liberate the cities …” (Diod. 18.10.2–4). The cry of Greek freedom
was in the air. In the Aegean, the island of Rhodes drove out its Macedonian gar-
rison (Diod. 18.8.1). This rebellion, unlike the one that would consume the Greek mainland, succeeded, and the Rhodians became a “free” state, and even though on
occasion they had to compromise some of their autonomy with respect to foreign
policy, they were still able to maintain their independence until Roman power
swamped both the island and the rest of the Hellenistic world.50
On the mainland, Athens was able to forge quite a formidable coalition against
Macedonia, which included most of the Greek world and certain of Macedonia’s
non-Greek neighbors as wel , for the Athenians were not alone in their displeasure with Macedonian hegemony. The allied forces included most of the Thessalians,
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