Alexanders Heirs

by Edward M. Anson

  Oetaeans, Achaeans, Melians, Locrians, Phocians, Aenianians, Alyzaeans, Dolopians, Carystians, Argives, Sicyonians, Eleans, and Messenians; among foreign peoples,

  numbers of Illyrians and Thracians (Diod. 18.11.1–2). Indeed, about the only

  people to remain outside the coalition were the Spartans, soundly defeated by the Macedonians in 331, the Boeotians (Diod. 18.11.2–3), who had both benefited

  from Alexander’s destruction of Thebes in 335 and been chastened by that act, and, perhaps, the Euboeans other than the Carystians (Hyp. 6.11; Diod. 18.11.2). While the more than a decade of Macedonian domination was sufficient for most of the

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  Alexander’s Heirs

  allies to throw in their lot with the Athenians, certain states, like the Athenians themselves, had more specific reasons for joining. The Aetolians, for one, feared retaliation from the Macedonians for their destruction of the city of the Oeniadae in Acarnania and the exile of its inhabitants (Plut. Alex. 49.14–15; Diod. 18.8.6; cf.

  Diod. 17.111.3). This action likely occurred in 330 and represented a violation of the terms of the Peace of Corinth, by which all signatories declared “not to take up arms for harm against any of those who abide by the oaths, neither by land nor by sea; not to take any city or guard post or harbor, for war, of any of those participating in the peace, by any craft or contrivance …” (Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 374). While it

  might be claimed that Alexander was himself violating the terms of the peace by

  requiring the return of the Greek exiles, the point was that Alexander could do what he wished based on his power, in which case he could use the terms of the common

  peace in whatever way suited him.

  With most of the Greek world arrayed against Macedonia, Antipater sought

  allies from the Macedonian commanders in the east. These requests went princi-

  pal y to Leonnatus and to Craterus (Diod. 18.12.1). With the Hellenic allies, united under the command of Leosthenes and having already defeated Antipater’s

  Boeotian supporters near Plataea (Diod. 18.11.5), assembled at Thermopylae,

  Antipater, along with 13,000 Macedonian infantry and 600 cavalry, marched south

  to meet the threat, accompanied by the entire Macedonian fleet of 110 warships

  and the Thessalian cavalry. He left a subordinate, Sippas, in Macedonia with what Diodorus describes as a “sufficient” force, but ordering him to recruit as many

  more men as possible (18.12.2). The size of the allied force with the Athenian

  commander is not mentioned, but it was clearly far superior to that of the

  Macedonians. Leosthenes had, perhaps, enrolled as many as 8000 of the merce-

  naries at Taenarum (Diod. 18.9.1, 3), and these were joined by an additional

  Athenian force of 5000 citizen hoplites, 2000 mercenaries, and 500 cavalry (Diod.

  18.11.3). There were 7000 Aetolians (Diod. 18.9.5) and as many as 7000 from the

  other allies present (cf. Diod. 18.12.4).51 The key to victory was, however, the desertion of Antipater’s Thessalian cavalry allies (Diod. 18.12.3). This action left the Macedonian cavalry badly outnumbered and unable to protect their brethren in

  the infantry. The result was a Macedonian defeat in southern Thessaly. Moreover,

  likely due to this Hellenic superiority in cavalry, the Macedonians were unable to flee homeward, but rather entered the nearby city of Lamia, hoping to be relieved before the defeat on the battlefield became the loss of the war (Diod. 18.12.2–4; Hyp. 6.12). The Greeks, unable to achieve victory by direct assault, settled down to a siege. While the city was being surrounded by the construction of a wall and a

  ditch, their commander was killed by a sudden sortie from the city (Diod. 18.13.5; Just. 13.5.12; Plut. Phoc. 25). The loss of Leosthenes was serious, but the real blows to “Greek freedom” were administered in the Aegean.

  In three naval battles, the Athenian fleet was defeated by its Macedonian coun-

  terpart. While the battle at sea was critical in this war, our main source, Diodorus, granted it but brief coverage. As a result, the actual number of battles is in dispute, as is their order, location, and importance.52 What does appear to be clear is that

  The Death of a Conqueror

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  a decisive battle occurred near the end of the Athenian year in late June of 322

  (Ashton 1977: 10–11). Diodorus (18.15.8–9) refers to two or three naval defeats

  suffered by the Athenians at the hands of Cleitus, the Macedonian admiral, in the archon year 323/22. The ambiguity of his language leaves the number unclear.

  “Engaging with the Athenian admiral Euetion he [Cleitus] defeated him in two

  battles and destroyed a large number of enemy ships near the island cal ed the Echinades” (emphasis added). The Parian Marble ( FGrH 239 B F-9), an inscription discovered on the island of Paros relating events chronological y from the mythic kings of Athens to 264/63, when it was likely inscribed,53 however, notes only one sea battle between the Athenians and the Macedonians, which the Macedonians

  won in 323/22, near the island of Amorgus in the eastern Cyclades. Additional y,

  two inscriptions ( IG II2 398 and 493), while dated to later years (320/19; 303/2), do make reference to a naval battle near Abydus and have been associated with the

  Lamian War (Ashton 1977: 7 n. 52). While the ambiguity of whether there were

  two or three battles might seem to be solved by proclaiming that Diodorus simply

  had a lapse in clarity, there is a further problem. From the evidence of the inscriptions it would appear that at least one battle took place in the Hellespont and,

  according to Diodorus, there was another near the Echinades islands, which,

  however, are off the coast of western Greece, in the Ionian Sea. The battle near

  Amorgus then would be a third. However, a sea battle in the Ionian Sea would be

  very unlikely in a war that was concentrated in the Aegean. The solution appears

  to be to postulate that the third battle took place near the northwestern tip of

  Euboea, near the town of Echinus, whose nearby islands may in antiquity have

  been called Echinades (Geer 1947: 57 n. 1; Morrison 1987: 93).54

  If we accept that there were three battles, the difficulty remaining is to deter-

  mine their order and significance. Since the sea battle off Amorgus came late in

  the Athenian archon year (Ashton 1977: 9–11) and the final land battle was fought at Crannon in early August of that same year (Plut. Cam. 19.6–7; Dem. 28.1; Schober 1981: 54, 66–8), with the defeated Athens being garrisoned around the

  middle of October (Plut. Phoc. 28.2; Dem. 28.1), the battle near Abydus likely occurred very early in 322 in an Athenian attempt to block any crossing by

  Macedonian forces coming from Asia. An Athenian fleet in the Hellespont also

  indicates that the Athenians must either have held on to territories in the region or had excellent relations with certain of the cities on the European side of the strait, perhaps Sestus (Cargill 1995: 29–30). Even though Lysimachus had been awarded

  the Chersonese along with Thrace in Babylon (Arr. Succ. 1a.7), it, like Thrace itself, had to be acquired by, at least, a show of force. There may even have been Athenian cleruchs still present in the area (Cargill 1995: 30). Given the nature of naval warfare in this period, it was impossible to blockade a coast by setting ships in the sea off that shore. A nearby base from which to launch interceptive attacks was necessary (see Anson 1989: 47–9). A fleet of rowed warships could not have

  operated for long periods far from shore. Warships, with their large crews and

  cramped quarters, could carry food and water only for one or, at most, two days;

  meals needed to be prepared off ship, and they had to sleep off ship as wel . Too

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  much time spent
on board in cramped conditions would lead to physical problems

  for the rowers. The most that could be done in a blockade was to have patrol ships in the channel to search out the enemy and then alert the fleet, which would

  attempt to assemble quickly enough from a nearby position to intercept the enemy.

  After the arrival of Lysimachus in Thrace and his subsequent accommodation

  with Seuthes, the European bases would likely have no longer been available. But

  during the time of Seuthes’ full independence the evidence suggests that good

  relations existed between the Athenians and the Thracians. In 330, the Athenians

  had honored Rheboulas, “the son of Seuthes [II?]” (Archibald 1998: 307). The

  battle near Abydus, then, is to be associated with the crossing of Leonnatus from his satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia to Europe in the winter of 323/22. This would have occurred before any resolution of affairs in Thrace. The first battle between Lysimachus and Seuthes had resulted in a stalemate (Diod. 18.14.2–3), and it does appear that the Thracian king maintained a high degree of independence at least

  in the area of the upper Tonsus river long after (Lund 1992: 26–7). Seuthes is called king by Diodorus both in 323 and again in 313 (Diod. 18.14.1; 19.73.8).

  Leonnatus’ assistance to those besieged in Lamia came about, in part, as the

  result of the plans of the new regent in Asia. Perdiccas wanted to remove from

  power in Asia Minor those native rulers who had resisted or rebelled against

  Macedonian authority, or simply been bypassed by Alexander on his march. As

  part of this policy, Eumenes of Cardia, the former head of Alexander’s chancellery and a past commander of a unit of the Macedonian elite Companion Cavalry,55

  was assigned the territories of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia at the conclusion of

  the Babylon settlement. These areas had been by and large bypassed by Alexander,

  and neither Cappadocia nor Paphlagonia was currently under Macedonian con-

  trol. While Alexander had formal y annexed the southern portion of Cappadocia

  (Arr. Anab. 2.4.1–2), Ariarathes, the then ruler of northern Cappadocia, had never submitted to Macedonian control (Diod. 18.16.1; Curt. 10.10.3; Plut. Eum. 3.4), and in the chaotic counterattack by Persian units retreating from the Battle of

  Issus in Asia Minor (Curt. 4.1.34–35; cf. Diod. 17.48.5–6), he had annexed all

  of southern Cappadocia (cf. Str. 12.1.3).56 Paphlagonia, likewise, was not under

  Macedonian authority. Even though the Paphlagonian tribes had submitted to

  Alexander and been put under the jurisdiction of the then satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. Anab. 2.4.1–2; Curt. 3.1.22–3), in 323 they are also found under the authority of Ariarathes (Plut. Eum. 3.3–4). Consequently, while Eumenes was allocated these territories, they would first have to be conquered.

  Perdiccas, in the name of the kings, ordered both Leonnatus and Antigonus to

  aid Eumenes in the acquisition of his satrapy (Plut. Eum 3.3–4). The task was to be accomplished through the employment of a large mercenary army with significant

  Asian elements (cf. Plut. Eum. 3.4). This was also the case with other forces leaving Babylon or being acquired on the march to or in the provinces of the newly

  assigned satraps. There were just not enough Macedonians left in the royal army

  in Babylon to be shared. As noted earlier, at the time of Alexander’s death there were only 2000 cavalry and 13,000 infantry remaining in the royal army in Babylon

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  (Curt. 10.2.8). While Perdiccas had dispatched Pithon and 3800 Macedonians to

  the east (Diod. 18.7.3), these troops were to return to Babylon after suppressing the revolt (Diod. 18.7.9). There is no mention of the return to Perdiccas of any

  troops from the army of Leonnatus and Eumenes. Moreover, the two commanders

  had received more than 5000 talents for the Cappadocian campaign (cf. Plut. Eum.

  3.11). The force, indeed, would be substantial, but composed primarily of Greek

  mercenaries, of whom, despite Alexander’s Exiles’ Decree, there remained still an abundance in Asia. There may have been as many as 100,000 mercenaries who had

  at some point seen service with Alexander (Griffith 1935: 39). Craterus in 322

  enlisted 4000 such mercenaries (Diod. 18.16.4), and in 318 Arrhidaeus, not the

  king, the then satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, raised 10,000 (Diod. 18.51.1). With 5000 talents, literal y tens of thousands of mercenaries could be employed for

  a year or more.57 The Persian coffers held in total, perhaps, as much as 200,000

  talents.58 More than enough to finance the forty years of warfare that ensued

  so soon after Alexander’s death. While Perdiccas had few Macedonian veterans to

  give out, he did have vast sums available for the employment of mercenaries,

  in addition to his substantial Asian forces.

  In the summer (perhaps as early as late June) of 323, Eumenes and Leonnatus

  departed Babylon, arriving no earlier than September and, perhaps, as late as

  November in Hellespontine Phrygia. Some time would have been spent in

  Leonnatus’ province hiring mercenaries, organizing his satrapy, and in waiting for Antigonus, who, in fact, never came. But before the campaign could commence,

  various invitations came to Leonnatus to cross to Europe. Hecataeus, the tyrant of Cardia, arrived from Antipater and renewed that commander’s earlier request for

  assistance (Diod. 18.12.1), now made more urgent by the current siege of Lamia

  (Plut. Eum. 3.6; Diod. 18.14.4–5; Just. 13.5.14). The impression given by our sources, primarily Plutarch, is that Leonnatus initial y had no intention of relieving Antipater. But this was not the only such request he received. He was now in

  receipt of letters from Alexander’s sister Cleopatra proposing marriage, if he would cross to Macedonia (Plut. Eum. 3.9). Leonnatus wished to use the marriage as a means of claiming the Macedonian throne. Alexander’s mother Olympias was

  likely behind this proposal of marriage to Leonnatus for she was no supporter of

  Antipater (Diod. 17.118.1; Plut. Alex. 68.3), and appears to have had a great deal of influence with her daughter (Carney 2000: 120, 123–4; 2006: 65–7). Olympias and

  Antipater had a long-standing hostility (Arr. Anab. 7.12.6–7), and while her famous son yet lived she had withdrawn from Macedonia and returned to her

  native Epirus (Diod. 18.58.3; Heckel 2006: 182). While the basis for this hostility is unknown, it is likely that it originated in Olympias’ desire for power (Arr. Anab.

  7.12.6–7; Plut. Alex. 68.4), in whose pursuit she could be “ruthless and tenacious”

  (Carney 2006: 1). This was not a woman who chose to sit on the sidelines. As

  Alexander’s mother and as a member of the royal Argead clan she commanded a

  great deal of respect, which she used to develop loyalists both in Macedonia and

  elsewhere in the Greek world. While most often, as a woman in the fourth-century

  Greek world, she had to operate formal y through men, her power did not need to

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  be formalized (Carney 1995: 376–91); however, at one point during the struggles

  of the Diadochi, she became regent ( prostates) for Macedonia in her own right (Diod. 18.49.4; cf. Just. 14.6.1),59 commanding troops (Diod. 19.35.3, 50.1),

  appointing generals (Diod. 19.35.4), and administering justice (Diod. 19.11.8–9).

  Reportedly and likely apocryphal y, Antipater on his deathbed had advised,

  “Never permit a woman [given the context an obvious reference to Olympias] to

  be prostates of the kingdom” (Diod. 19.11.9). Apocryphal or not, the implication is clear that this position was far more tha
n some amorphous status.

  From the relative chronology of Plutarch it would appear that the letters from

  Cleopatra arrived only after Leonnatus’ appearance in his province, since Plutarch ( Eum. 3.5) indicates that the former royal bodyguard ( somaphylax) (Arr. Anab.

  3.5.5) and possible Argead relation, likely also apocryphal (Arr. Succ. 1a.12; Suda s.v. Leonnatus; Curt. 10.7.8), initial y had every intention of aiding Eumenes.

  The ambitious Leonnatus, and, after the settlement in Babylon, the largely disap-

  pointed Leonnatus,60 decided to seize the opportunity that now opened before

  him. In the winter, having first tried and failed to entice Eumenes to join in this adventure (Plut. Eum. 3.6–11), he crossed to Macedonia aided by the victory of the Macedonian fleet over its Athenian counterpart attempting to block such

  intervention. Eumenes fled back to Perdiccas in Babylon.

  The naval victory in the Aegean must be the one noted in the inscriptions

  ( IG II2 398 and 493) and indirectly in Diodorus (18.15.8–9). With Thrace in turmoil and the bulk of the Athenian fleet patrolling the Hellespont from an

  anchorage likely at Sestus seeking to block any attempt by the Asian Macedonians

  to help their colleague besieged in Lamia, a naval presence was essential for a

  successful crossing. It was then in the winter that a Macedonian naval victory

  permitted Leonnatus and his forces to cross to Europe. Even though the number

  and class of Athenian warships operating in the Aegean at the start of the conflict is disputed, being anywhere from 170 to 233 vessels, and the nature of these

  warships, either majority trireme or quadrireme,61 it was clearly superior to the force at Antipater’s disposal. Antipater had a fleet of 110 triremes, which was

  no match for the Athenian navy, and, consequently, it likely joined with the

  main Macedonian fleet under the command of Cleitus, which presumably had

  departed for the Hellespont from its base in Cilicia as soon as Antipater’s request for assistance had been sent in preparation for Craterus’ departure scheduled for the following year. Cleitus had accompanied Craterus from Babylon (Just. 12.12.8).