Alexanders Heirs

by Edward M. Anson

  kings (Briant 1989: 183 n. 2). In the late summer of 322,25 he annexed Cyrene

  without the consent of the kings or their regent (Diod. 18.19–21; Arr. Succ. 1a.16–19; FGrH 239 B F-10). While Photius’ Epitome of Arrian ( Succ. 1a.5) states that both Egypt and Libya were awarded to Ptolemy in Babylon, Curtius (10.10.1) suggests

  that this reference to Libya referred solely to those peoples routinely under the sovereignty of satrap of Egypt, and not to an independent Greek city.

  Like Alexander before him, Ptolemy also moved quickly to establish close ties

  with the true power brokers in Egypt, the priests (Müller 2009: 172–5). Ptolemy

  accepted all of the trappings of traditional Egyptian rule; he became pharaoh

  (Müller 2013: 204). Alexander had fostered close relations with the Egyptian religious establishment and Ptolemy had done the same.26 As had Alexander the

  Great, Ptolemy created conditions that permitted established elites to thrive while the Macedonian pursued his own ambitions (Briant 2002: 842–4, 870, 1046–60).

  Cyrene previously had been attacked by Thibron, the supposed Spartan friend

  and later murderer of Harpalus (Diod. 17.108.8; 18.19.2; cf. Paus. 9.7.3). Thibron had taken command of the 6000 or 7000 mercenaries who had followed Alexander’s

  former treasurer to Crete (Arr. Succ. 1a.16; Diod. 17.108.6; 18.19.2), and associating himself with certain exiles from the North African city, defeated the Cyrenaeans in battle, seized control of the harbor, and began a siege of the city (Diod. 18.19.3; Arr.

  Succ. 1a.16). The Cyrenaeans agreed to give him 500 talents and become his al y.

  Thibron now planned a campaign to subdue much of Libya. His plans began to go

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  awry when he had a falling out with one of his commanders who deserted to the

  Cyrenaeans and convinced them to renounce their treaty. As the fighting dragged

  on, the wealthy having been driven from the city by “the commons,” appealed

  to Ptolemy, who sent a fleet and an army (Diod. 18.20–21.7). The “democratic com-

  manders” in the city joined forces with Thibron. In the ensuing battle, Ptolemy’s general Ophel as won a complete victory, capturing Thibron, and delivering control over the entire region to Ptolemy (Diod. 18.21.8–9). Near the end of the campaign, Ptolemy himself appeared and the annexation was complete (Arr. Succ. 1a.19).

  Back in Asia Minor, even with the danger of invasion by the Europeans, Perdiccas’

  council decided unanimously to change plans and launch an assault on Egypt

  (Diod. 18.25.6). While Perdiccas, with the bulk of the royal army and most of the officer corps, would proceed to Egypt, Eumenes, Alcetas, and Neoptolemus would

  be left behind to resist the expected invasion by Antipater and Craterus. Eumenes was given the overall command for the defense of Asia Minor (Diod. 18.29.1–3;

  Just. 13.6.14–15; Nep. Eum. 3.2; Plut. Eum. 5.2). Alcetas and Neoptolemus, and al the satraps in the area, were ordered to obey Eumenes during this current emergency (Diod. 18.29.2). While it might appear curious that Perdiccas would place Eumenes in command of so important a military operation, this decision probably reflects, in part, Eumenes’ activities in Cappadocia and Armenia. This would explain

  Diodorus’ claim (18.29.2) that Eumenes was chosen because of his skill as a general.

  He was not just reading back into the past Eumenes’ future exploits. Eumenes does have a few recorded military commands during Alexander the Great’s lifetime

  coming towards the end of the latter’s Asian expedition. He was put in charge of a unit of the companion cavalry in 324 (Plut. Eum. 1.5; Nep. Eum. 1.6), and is referred to as “general” by Plutarch during Alexander’s campaign in India (Plut. Eum. 1.5), but his first real combat experience likely was with Perdiccas in Cappadocia. Given the dearth of evidence for Eumenes’ military activities during Alexander’s reign, it is likely that Eumenes’ military skil s were only clearly demonstrated during the Cappadocian campaign and later in Armenia. Of those left in Asia Minor, Eumenes’

  selection for overall command was in part dictated by his previous standing with

  Alexander and his efforts to effect a reconciliation between the infantry and cavalry in Babylon. Perdiccas had been sufficiently impressed in the Cynnane episode

  with the residual loyalty of his troops to those associated with the great Alexander.

  Moreover, while Neoptolemus could also claim a connection to Alexander,

  Neoptolemus was a member of the Molossian royal house of Epirus, the family

  of Alexander the Great’s mother Olympias, and, therefore, a distant relative of

  Alexander’s (Heckel 1992: 300–1; 2006: 174), and had been at one time the

  commander of Alexander the Great’s hypaspists, the later argyraspids (Plut. Eum.

  1.6), but his earlier difficulties in Armenia had undermined the regent’s confidence in him (cf. Plut. Eum. 4.1). Alcetas’ position with the troops had been damaged by his involvement in the Cynnane affair. With most of the senior officers, along

  with the bulk of the royal army, on their way to Egypt, the choice of Eumenes was in part due to a lack of clear alternatives. Seleucus commanded the companion

  cavalry (Diod. 18.3.4); Antigenes, the argyraspids (cf. Diod. 18.59.3; Arr. Succ.

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  1a.35; Anson 1981: 118–19); Aristonous accompanied Perdiccas and subse-

  quently led the expedition against the Cypriot kings, who at the start of the war declared for Ptolemy (Arr. Succ. 10.6), and Pithon, the son of Crateuas, held a prominent command as well (Diod. 18.36.5). In addition to Eumenes’ connection

  to Alexander, his successes in Armenia, and his proven loyalty to Perdiccas, his

  selection was also influenced by his command of a large force of Cappadocian

  cavalry (cf. Plut. Eum. 4.3–4).

  In Asia Minor, the first line of defense was to be the Hellespont (Diod. 18.25.6, 29.1–3). Cleitus remained in command of the majority of the royal fleet (cf. Just.

  13.6.16). While most of the transports and ninety warships sailed for Egypt under the command of Perdiccas’ brother-in-law Attalus (Diod. 18.37.2–3), most of the battle fleet, which earlier under Cleitus had defeated the Greeks in the Lamian War (Diod.

  18.15.8–9; Plut. Demetr. 11.3), sailed from Cilicia to the Hellespont, arriving in March or April of 320. While Cleitus’ earlier service with Craterus in Asia and with both Craterus and Antipater in the Lamian War (Just. 12.12.8; Diod. 18.15.8; Plut.

  Demetr. 11.3) might make it appear surprising that Perdiccas would trust him with such an important command, Cleitus had returned with the fleet to Cilicia sometime after the war in Greece, and there had undoubtedly established good relations with the regent (Hauben 1977: 104–5). An inscription dated to 322/21 and honoring

  both Alcetas and Cleitus with Ephesian citizenship suggests that this relationship between Perdiccas and Cleitus was firmly in place (Keil 1913: 235 and 241). Given the latter’s subsequent desertion, hindsight certainly indicates that it would have been wiser to have placed the Aegean fleet under the command of another. Even

  though there are few details relating to Cleitus’ command, it appears certain that he was to coordinate his activities with Eumenes for the defense of the Hellespont.

  While it is not always safe to argue on the basis of what would be the most logical strategy, stil , it would make a great deal more sense to associate immediately the fleet contingent under Cleitus with Eumenes’ command. Preventing a crossing of the

  Hellespont without control of the strait itself would be impossible (see Anson 1989: 44–9); surely, Perdiccas and his advisors knew this. As noted earlier, ancient warships were too unseaworthy and their rowers’ conditions on board too cramped, to stand

  off a coast in a blockade. In a so-called blockade, ships would be st
ationed on a friendly shore awaiting any sign of an attempt by an enemy to put to sea, and then scrambling aboard hurriedly in time to intercept them (Anson 1989: 44–9).

  Eumenes, in conjunction with the Perdiccan fleet, would maintain control of the

  Asian coast of the strait. Cleitus, operating out of any of the eastern coastal cities of the Hellespont, could intercept ships attempting to make the crossing; those that got through could be dealt with by the forces under Eumenes’ command, especial y

  given Eumenes’ superior cavalry. Moreover, in accordance with their agreement

  with Perdiccas (Diod. 18.38.1), the Aetolians, on Antipater’s and Craterus’ departure, invaded Locris and Thessaly, and defeated and killed Antipater’s general Polycles.

  Later, however, Polyperchon, the general left in charge in Macedonia by Antipater, marched into Thessaly and defeated the Aetolians and recovered the region (Diod.

  18.38.2–6; Just. 13.6.9).

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  If the defense of the Hellespont for some unforeseen reason failed, the land

  forces would fall back before the Europeans, preparing ambuscades and in general

  harassing the invaders. There was no plan to stage a decisive battle in Asia Minor.

  The quality and the numbers of the forces accompanying Antipater and Craterus

  were far superior to the forces left in Asia Minor by Perdiccas (cf. Diod. 18.30.4–5).

  This secondary strategy was predicated on the initial Perdiccan advantage of

  distance. If for any reason the defense of the Hellespont failed, Perdiccas could stil defeat Ptolemy in time to turn and catch Antipater and Craterus between his victorious army moving north from Egypt and his forces from Asia Minor trailing

  after the Europeans. In the eventuality of a successful crossing, Cleitus would

  interdict supplies, aid the Aetolians, and encourage others in Greece to renounce their allegiance to Antipater. With this strategy in place, Eumenes departed with his forces for the Hellespont, while Perdiccas left Pisidia and marched south.

  Indications in Diodorus (18.33.2, 34.7, 35.3) are that the Nile had begun to flood during Perdiccas’ invasion, suggesting that the regent may have left Pisidia too

  late, or it is possible that Perdiccas spent some time in Cilicia dealing with issues that had become known while on the march, thus delaying his march south.

  Suspecting the loyalty of Philotas, the “friend” of Craterus and the satrap of Cilicia, the regent replaced him with Philoxenus, and, likewise, doubting that Arrhidaeus

  could have planned his betrayal of Perdiccas without the complicity of Archon,

  the satrap of Babylonia, Docimus was sent to replace him (Arr. Succ. 24.1–3). The two subsequently battled for control of Babylon, with Docimus the victor and

  Archon dying from his wounds (Arr. Succ. 24.3–5). Also, while in Cilicia, Perdiccas dispatched Sosigenes to transport troops under the command of Aristonous to

  Cyprus against Ptolemy’s allies there (Arr. Succ. 10.6).

  Antipater and Craterus planned to cross the Hellespont in April to take

  advantage of the growing season in Asia Minor (Engels 1978: 29), and avoid the

  winter storms that often continued into March in the Hellespont.27 Perdiccas

  would arrive in Egypt more than a month before the Macedonian forces could

  rendezvous with Ptolemy. Even given the worst case scenario, Perdiccas and his

  advisors believed that Ptolemy could be dealt with long before Antipater and

  Craterus would arrive with reinforcements. The plan was good; its execution left

  much to be desired.

  After Eumenes was placed in charge of Asia Minor with both Neoptolemus and

  Alcetas subordinated to his authority, the Cardian departed to take up the defense of the Hellespont (Diod. 18.25.6; 29.1–3). While sending most of his forces ahead, Eumenes with a small troop rode to Sardis with a proposal of marriage for

  Cleopatra from Perdiccas (Arr. Succ. 1a.26; 25.2–6), a proposal the sister of Alexander chose for the moment to decline. Only the Heidelberg Epitome ( FGrH

  155 F-4; Wheatley 2013: 21) states that the marriage took place. Diodorus (20.37.3), later recounting the death of Cleopatra, certainly implies that there was no

  marriage. She would wait for the outcome of the coming conflict. Unknown to

  the Perdiccans, at the same time Eumenes was heading to Sardis with Perdiccas’

  proposal of marriage, Antigonus, in command of ten Athenian warships and

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  3000 men, had landed in Caria (Arr. Succ. 25.1). As most likely prearranged, Asander in Caria and Menander in Lydia joined him. Menander, while remaining

  in control of the military forces in the region, had been supplanted as satrap by Cleopatra, who had been given the authority by the regent (Arr. Succ. 25.2). The latter surrendered Ephesus and apparently much of the Ionian coast to Antigonus

  (Arr. Succ. 25.2–6). Indeed, Menander, learning that Eumenes was in Sardis, sent the news to Antigonus in Ephesus. Antigonus counseled him to remain openly

  friendly and keep Eumenes in the city. Meanwhile, Antigonus hurriedly assembled

  his 3000 infantry and some cavalry and set out for Sardis. Warned by Cleopatra,

  Eumenes managed to escape (Arr. Succ. 25.2–4, 6–7), but Antigonus had achieved a notable success. Much of western Asia Minor had repudiated the regent. Even

  Philoxenus, only recently appointed governor of Cilicia by the regent, deserted

  the cause.28 There would now be no hostile coast to impede a landing by the

  Diadochs from Macedonia. After his successes along the Asiatic coast Antigonus

  sailed to Cyprus and joined the pro-Ptolemaic faction there. (Arr. Succ. 1a.6, cf.

  Arr. Succ. 1a.30).

  The desertions of Asander and Menander, while serious, were not as devas-

  tating as other defections that soon followed. Cleitus and the Aegean fleet

  deserted the Perdiccan cause soon after their arrival in the Hellespont. While

  the sources are silent on Cleitus’ actions, his desertion to Antipater is certain. There is no evidence he ever contested Antipater’s passage to Asia. Moreover, later

  Cleitus was rewarded with the satrapy of Lydia by Antipater (Diod. 18.39.6).

  Additional y, the long neglect of Hellespontine Phrygia after Leonnatus’

  departure, now proved costly. The Hellespontine cities, in response to overtures

  from Antipater, also went over to the invaders (cf. Arr. Succ. 1a.26). Many of these Greek cities had acquired a special semi-autonomous status under Alexander

  which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was retained after his death

  (Badian 1966). A clear example of this status is the case of Cyzicus. In 318, the then satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia and former cortège commander Arrhidaeus

  tried to strengthen his position in his satrapy by placing garrisons in the coastal cities (Diod. 18.51). Cyzicus successful y resisted and Diodorus (18.51.3) states that it did so in order to “maintain [its] freedom.” The long absence of satrapal authority in the region would have heightened this sense of independence. These

  reverses forced Eumenes to abandon any attempt to block or even to hinder

  Antipater’s crossing. The secondary plan of action now became the only option,

  and Eumenes reported the situation to Perdiccas. This report reached the regent

  in Cilicia. In response to the failure on the Hellespont, Perdiccas ordered anew

  Neoptolemus and Alcetas to obey Eumenes’ commands for the operations in Asia

  Minor (Plut. Eum. 5.1–2), but problems were appearing even in the ranks of those who still remained loyal.

  While Perdiccas’ choice of Eumenes to lead the defense of Asia Minor made

  sense from the perspective of the common soldiers,
neither of the Macedonian

  aristocrats, Alcetas or Neoptolemus, was willing to be commanded by Eumenes

  (Diod. 18.29.4; Plut. Eum. 5.2–3), a Greek and a former chief secretary, although

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  for a time the Armenian satrap gave indications of cooperation. Both had personal reasons to dislike Eumenes. It had been the Cardian Greek who had salvaged

  Neoptolemus’ command in Armenia, and it was the same Cardian whose policy

  had prevailed over that of the regent’s own brother. Alcetas, since he was opposed to the policy of not recognizing Antipater’s power in Europe, may have hoped for

  a reconciliation with the Macedonian commanders (Errington 1970: 64 n. 108).

  However, much of the hostility rested on pure prejudice. Eumenes was not a

  member of the hereditary Macedonian nobility, he was a Greek, and had been for

  much of his career in their eyes a mere bureaucrat in a world of aristocratic hetairoi (see Anson 1980: 55–9; 2004: 247–51). These circumstances made both commanders jealous of Eumenes’ preferment. They may also have feared confronting

  the popular Craterus in their anxiety that he might subvert the loyalty of their

  Macedonians (cf. Plut. Eum. 5.3). Eumenes’ later measures to conceal from his troops the knowledge that Craterus was the opposing commander (Plut. Eum.

  7.2–3; Nep. Eum. 4.4) show that the problem was indeed a serious one. Craterus had been treated virtual y as a king by the Macedonians upon his return to his

  homeland (Arr. Succ. frg. 19 = Suda. s.v. Craterus). It is unlikely, however, that the troops serving with Neoptolemus and Alcetas were part of the contingent of

  veterans brought west by Craterus in 324 (as claimed by Hammond 1984: 56). Of

  the roughly 10,000 Macedonian veterans that Craterus had in Cilicia, he took 6000

  of them with him to Macedonia (Diod. 18.16.4). Of the possible 4000 left behind,

  3000 were the argyraspids (Anson 1981: 131–3; Heckel 2006: 30), who were on

  their way to Egypt with Perdiccas, leaving at most 1000 others. It is likely that these, given their earlier association with Craterus, were, along with the argyraspids,