Diodorus (18.58.4; cf. 19.44.2) states that after the receipt of the request for the alliance from the new regent “[Eumenes] decided not to take orders from
Antigonus.” The implication here is clear. Eumenes must at some point have
been taking such orders. Strabo (14.5.10), additionally, reports that Eumenes
“revolted” from Antigonus; and Pompeius Trogus apparently stated that “the
war was renewed by Eumenes” ( Prol. 4). Besides, the terms offered by Antigonus were basically the same as those demanded by the Cardian shortly after the siege
began, and which demands contained no references to the kings or Olympias
(Diod. 18.41.6–7; Plut. Eum. 10.6). Eumenes had endured being besieged for a year with no help forthcoming from any quarter. Justin (14.2.4) states that
Antipater sent aid, but this is an obvious mistake for Arrhidaeus (Bosworth
2002: 100 n. 7; Anson 2004: 134 n. 62). Antigonus, after establishing the siege
and hearing Eumenes’ terms, had forwarded the matter to Antipater (Diod.
18.41.7). Later, likely after the defeat of the remaining Perdiccans, Eumenes had sent Hieronymus, the future historian, to Antipater in the hopes of obtaining
some aid, but that was not forthcoming. It is unknown if Hieronymus ever even
reached Macedonia. He is later found in Antigonus’ camp, suggesting that he
may have been captured attempting to reach Antipater (Diod. 18.50.4; Anson
2004: 134). Eumenes, having exhausted all methods of escaping his confinement
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(Nep. Eum. 5.7), after almost a year under siege, would have welcomed the offer from Antigonus as an unexpected reprieve.
From the spring, when he was released, until that summer when he formed
an alliance with the new regent, Eumenes served the interests of Antigonus.
Eumenes was probably to join Antigonus in the late summer. Diodorus (18.53.6)
vaguely mentions that Eumenes was, after his release, but before his alliance
with Polyperchon, preparing for a campaign, probably Antigonus’ proposed
offensive to reorder the satrapies of Asia, replacing those governors who were
not personal y loyal to himself (Diod. 18.50.5).
In Macedonia, after Cassander’s departure for Asia, Polyperchon and his advisors
discussed various options to counter this threat to the regent. They knew that
in addition to possible alliances with Ptolemy and Antigonus many of the Greek
cities were either held by garrisons placed there by Antipater or in the control of governments loyal to Antipater’s house (Diod. 18.55.2). Indeed, soon after his
father’s death, and before news of his disloyalty to the regent became known,
Cassander, in his capacity as chiliarch, replaced Menyl us, the Macedonian garrison commander in Munychia, the fortified hill dominating the Athenian harbor of
Piraeus, with Nicanor,11 an individual personal y loyal to the former regent’s son (Plut. Phoc. 31.1; cf. Diod. 18.64.1). Polyperchon’s council decided to meet the threat posed by Cassander’s loyalists in Greece by issuing in the name of King Philip III a decree calling for a restoration of “the peace and the constitutions that our father Philip [II] established … preparing peace and such governments as you
enjoyed under Philip and Alexander” (Diod. 18.56.2–3). As Diodorus (18.55.4–
56.8, 64.3) relates, even though not specifical y noted in the decree itself, this decree meant the restoration of democratic governments and a return of those specifical y exiled by Antipater in the Spartan and Lamian wars (Diod. 18.8–17; Just. 13.5;
Plu. Phoc. 23–6; Paus. 1.25.3–5; Hyp. 6.1–20). This arrangement was based on that inaugurated by Alexander the Great’s father, Philip II, who put forth the decree
establishing the famous League of Corinth in 337, in which the cities then were
to retain their traditional governments, i.e., those in existence “when they took the oath concerning the peace” ([Dem.] 17.10; IG II2 329, lines 12–14). While this proclamation mirrored many of the features of Philip’s League of Corinth, this was not a re-creation of that former alliance (Poddighe 2002: 187; contra: Dixon 2007: 151–
78). The decree does not mention “freedom” or “autonomy” specifical y, even
though these concepts are found in the subsequent correspondence with the Greek
cities (Diod. 18.64.3–5, 66.2, 69.3–4; Plut. Phoc. 34.4). Certainly, demands made in the accompanying correspondence that the former oligarchs be executed and
democratic governments installed would violate any pretense of autonomy. The
emphasis on democratic governments was also absent from the original League’s
charter. In the formal oath setting forth the terms of the 337 alliance, the governments of the states in existence when the oath was sworn were to be maintained
in power against outside attack and inside revolution (Tod 1950: 224–5; Rhodes
and Osborne 2007: 372–4). Then, a great many of the governments that were to
be upheld were oligarchies, and many of these had come into power through the
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actions of the Macedonian monarch prior to the establishment of his league
(Roebuck 1948). Moreover, there is never any mention of a league in the new decree, no league council made up of representatives from the Greek cities having legislative authority as had existed in Philip’s original organization. The new decree was an appeal to those who had been disfranchised by Antipater, especial y after the
Lamian War, and intended to eliminate the garrisons imposed by that former
regent, which now likely supported his son Cassander. Much of the phrasing,
the references to Philip II and Alexander the Great, may have been meant more for a Macedonian audience than for a Greek one. In his contest with Cassander,
Polyperchon could not let it appear that he was compromising Macedonian inter-
ests. The appeal to democratic interests in the Greek cities cal s attention to one of the great struggles that often dominated the internal politics of the Greek
city-states. Most of these states at one time or another were convulsed by violent revolutions between those who wished to limit the government to those who
possessed property and those who believed that all male citizens, regardless of
wealth, should be enfranchised. These divisions within the Greek world were in
the main responsible for the large numbers of exiles floating about the Hellenic
world, many of whom sought their livelihood as mercenaries. Philip II, in his
struggles to dominate the southern Greek city-states, was most often opposed by
those states with democratic governments, primarily Athens. He therefore favored
oligarchic governments. His son Alexander, while following his father’s policy
of supporting oligarchies on the Greek mainland, found himself an advocate of
democratic government with respect to the Greek communities in the Aegean
and in Asia Minor. This curiosity of an autocrat favoring democracy becomes
understandable in light of the Persian support of oligarchies or even tyrannies.
Since the empire Alexander was seeking to conquer was favored by the Greek
oligarchic governments in these locations, the Macedonian king would support
their rivals (Anson 2013b: 130–1). The Greek democrats in the Aegean island
communities and in Asia Minor were willing to live with the irony.
The new decree would then return the governments of the Greek cities to what
they had been before Alexander left for Asia (Diod. 18.56.3). Since after the Lamian War oligarchies were installed in most of the former democratic states such as
Athens, this would entail the restoration of
democratic institutions where Antipater had overturned them (Diod. 18.55.2–4). As also promulgated in the original
understanding, all now were to pass laws ensuring that “no one shall engage either in war or in public activity in opposition to us [the kings]” (Diod. 18.56.7). This decree was issued in the winter of 319/18. The decree gave the cities until the
thirtieth day of the Macedonian month of Xandicus, late March/early April (see
Parker and Dubberstein 1956: 26, 36; Samuel 1972: 140–1, 143) for full imple-
mentation (Diod. 18.56.5). While the time to the deadline might appear to
be short, it clearly was meant to be. If the absent Cassander’s powers in Greece
were to be short-circuited, this would need to take place before the refugee’s allies could rally to his cause. Moreover, the decree was announced to representatives
from the Greek cities already present in Pel a, who were immediately sent to
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89
promulgate the decree in their respective cities. Polyperchon also wrote personal letters to many Greek cities ordering them to exile or execute those who had led
their states as Antipater’s allies (Diod. 18.57.1).
What the document makes very clear is that the changes from the original
provisions of the League of Corinth and the rule of Philip II and Alexander III
were the policies of Antipater and that he, and by implication his family, were
responsible for all the suffering that had then ensued. The decree also obscured
the differences in the policies of Philip and those of his son Alexander, subsuming all the changes since 337 under the aegis of the former Macedonian regent Antipater (Poddighe 2013: 226–38). Moreover, this decree in essence proclaimed that anyone
who had interfered or who continued to interfere with the original settlements of the two previous monarchs was an enemy of all Greeks, and thereby the decree was
a call to arms against those who continued to enforce these violations (Dmitriev
2011: 114).
With respect to the critical Greek city of Athens, not only was the democracy to
be restored but, sweetening the deal, Samos was again to be Athenian (Diod.
18.56.7). In his letter to the city, Polyperchon declared that King Philip “ordered that all Athenians were to take part in the administration of the city” (Plut. Phoc.
32.1). Nothing is stated specifical y in the decree or in the letter with respect to the various Macedonian garrisons established throughout Greece, but the Athenians
and others certainly thought that these were to be eliminated by the terms of
the new proclamation (Diod. 18.64.1, 5; cf. Diod. 18.55.2, 65.1). When Nicanor
refused to evacuate Munychia, the Athenians called upon the kings and their
regent “to send them aid in accordance with the edict that had been issued concerning the autonomy of the Greeks” (Diod. 18.64.3; emphasis added).
The effect of the decree and letters on Athens was immediate. The constitution
imposed on Athens by Antipater had banned from voting or holding office those
possessing less than 2000 drachmas of property (Diod. 18.18.4–5). As many as
12,000 Athenians may have left their homeland under compulsion (Diod.
18.18.5; cf. Plut. Phoc. 28.7; Green 2003: 2). Those still in Athens but without ful political rights were now joined by increasing numbers of returning exiles, who
referring to the decree, demanded a full restoration of their former status (Plut.
Phoc. 33.2). When Nicanor, with a promised safe-conduct from the Athenian leader Phocion, attempted to address the Athenians, he was nearly seized, with
the Athenians berating Phocion for not taking the Macedonian garrison
commander into custody. Nicanor later, by promising much, prevented the
Athenians from taking action. During this delay he strengthened his hold on
Munychia and even seized the Athenian harbor of Piraeus (Diod. 18.64.2, 4; Plut.
Phoc. 32; Nep. Phoc. 2.5). The plan to capture the latter apparently had been revealed to Phocion by informers, but he told the informers that he did not believe the allegation and promised to assume all responsibility (Nep. Phoc. 2.4–5).
Later, he did not call out the army to recover the lost port, and when the people armed themselves, he refused to lead them (Nep. Phoc. 2.5). Given the Athenian’s later action, fleeing to Polyperchon’s son Alexander, and not to Nicanor, Phocion
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may not have been a party to the Macedonian’s action, but rather a victim of
Cassander’s agent’s duplicity.
After the issuance of this proclamation regarding the Greek cities, Polyperchon
also wrote to Olympias, inviting her to return to Macedonia to take charge of her grandson (Diod. 18.57.2). He had written to her immediately after becoming
regent (Diod. 18.49.4), but she had hesitated so long as Cassander remained in
Macedonia (cf. Diod. 18.57.2). With the second request, she wrote to Eumenes to
seek his advice, likely checking with one she trusted about the new regent from
someone who knew him on campaign (Anson 2004: 141–2). He was after all her
old enemy Antipater’s choice. This was likely not her first correspondence with the Cardian. As suggested earlier, Cleopatra’s offer of her hand to the then regent
Perdiccas in 321 probably resulted from correspondence between Eumenes and
Olympias. Eumenes had remained in contact with Cleopatra after her settling in
Sardis, carrying to her Perdiccas’ marriage proposal in 320 (Arr. Succ. 25.2–6; 26), and himself meeting with her after Perdiccas’ death in Egypt (Plut. Eum. 8.6–7).
To offset Cassander’s alliances with Antigonus and Ptolemy, Polyperchon
opened communications in the name of the kings with Eumenes in Cappadocia as
soon as he learned of his release from Nora (Diod. 18.57.3–4, 58.1; Plut. Eum. 13.1; cf. Anson 2004: 142–5). Eumenes was offered either a share in the guardianship,
if he decided to march to Macedonia, or to remain in Asia as “the supreme gen-
eral in Asia” (Diod. 18.58.1). The title, “Strategos Autocrator” (supreme general) of Asia was that given to Antigonus for his campaign against Eumenes (Diod.
18.50.1; cf. 18.39.7, 40.1; Arr. Succ. 1a.38). That commander’s authority, therefore, had at the time of this offer to Eumenes been official y superseded. If Eumenes
accepted the offer from the new regent, he would be at least theoretical y the
supreme authority in Asia, with all the satraps, generals, garrison commanders,
and treasurers there official y subject to his commands. Along these same lines,
letters would also be sent to the argyraspids, then in Cilicia, as well as to the treasurer of the royal treasury in Cyinda, commanding them to place themselves
under Eumenes’ authority (Diod. 18.58.1). The argyraspids had been separated
from the royal army at Triparadeisus and under the command of Antigenes, their
leader under Perdiccas, and the newly appointed satrap of Susiane (Arr. Succ.
1a.35), sent to transport some of the vast treasure then in Susa to Cyinda in Cilicia (Arr. Succ. 1a.38). The wealth which was housed in Cyinda after the transfer from Susa was enormous.12
Although appointed satrap of Susiane at Triparadeisus, Antigenes apparently
never governed this province directly (Heckel 2006: 30). It is possible that those in charge of the city of Susa and its treasury may have assumed authority over the
satrapy. In 331, Alexander had left Archelaus, the son of Theodorus, as general
(Arr. Anab. 3.16.9; Curt. 5.2.16–17), and either Mazurus (Arr. Anab. 3.16.9) or Xenophilus as commander of the citadel of Susa (Curt. 5.2.16). Indeed, Xenophilus is found commanding both the ci
tadel and the treasury in 316 (Diod. 19.17.3, 18.1, 48.6). These individuals would be answerable to the royal government and not the
local satrap (Anson 2013b: 141–5). Another very real possibility is that Peucestas,
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91
the satrap of Persis, assumed authority over Susiane (see Tarn 1969 [1953]: 477), although this is never attested by any source.13 After the return from Susa, the
argyraspids and their commander Antigenes, who came to share his command
with an otherwise unknown Macedonian named Teutamus, remained in Cilicia.14
All of these efforts show considerable diplomatic skill on the part of Polyperchon and his advisors. His call for a restoration of the Greek exiles and the reestablishment of the previous governments was to counter the power Cassander would
possess with the oligarchies established by his father. Unfortunately, Polyperchon, due primarily to his failures militarily, was unable to capitalize on this goodwil . By associating Olympias in the rule, the regent strengthened his connection to the
Argead family and thereby his hold on Macedonia. Her influence was powerful
enough that Nicanor was shaken by her demand in 318 that he surrender Munychia
to the Athenians (Diod. 18.65.1). With Olympias, however, there was also a down-
side. Her actions upon returning to Macedonia turned much of the country against
her and her sponsor, Polyperchon. Perhaps, because Eumenes was well aware of
her tendencies, he had advised her to remain where she was in Epirus and not to
return to Macedonia (Diod. 18.58.4). Polyperchon’s offer to Eumenes was designed
to open a second front in Asia. The choice might appear an unlikely one, given that Eumenes had agreed to follow Antigonus and had only recently been freed from
Nora. But, there was no one else to choose. The choice needed to be someone who
had been closely associated with Alexander, seen as having the tested ability to
command, and having the auctoritas to challenge Antigonus, Polyperchon’s most serious threat in Asia.
Eumenes’ favorable response to the offer from the new regent is a clear testimony to the Cardian’s ambitions. Just as the appointment as “supreme general in Asia”
whetted Antigonus’ desire to carve out a vast domain in Asia, so it did for Eumenes as wel . As Plutarch observed nineteen centuries ago, Eumenes was not satisfied
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