with a subordinate role (Plut. Comp. Eum. et Sert. 2.3). This sudden turnaround in Eumenes’ fortunes intrigued Diodorus, who appointed fate a major role in world
history (Sacks 1990: 24–35, 42–54). “All wondered at the incredible fickleness
of Fortune … for who, taking thought of the inconstancies of human life, would
not be astonished by the alternating ebb and flow of fortune?” (Diod. 18.59.4–5).15
In a few short months, Eumenes had gone from being besieged to being a major
player in the funeral games.
In the summer of 318, as soon as Antigonus discovered Eumenes’ change of
allegiance, he sent an army commanded by Menander to Cappadocia, forcing
Eumenes to flee to Cilicia with only 500 cavalry and 2000 infantry. Antigonus’
goal was either to surprise him in Cappadocia, or to separate him from the
resources of his former satrapy, where he still enjoyed wide support (Schäfer
2002: 64–5, 113; Anson 2004: 81 n. 13). It needs to be recalled that Ariarathes in 322 fielded an army of 30,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry (Diod. 18.16.2), and it took Perdiccas and the grand army two battles to defeat this force (Arr. Succ.
1a.11). In Cappadocia, Menander remained to prevent any return by that region’s
former satrap (Diod. 18.59.1–2). Antigonus did not pursue Eumenes himself,
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but remained in Hellespontine Phrygia preparing to cross to Europe with a sizable force in support of his al y Cassander (Diod. 18.72.2). At this critical juncture, Eumenes was not the major concern. However, the need for Antigonus to invade
Europe evaporated in the summer of 317 ([Parian Marble] FGrH 239 B F-13), when a land and sea victory in the Bosporus secured for his al y Cassander control of the sea, and, for himself, security on his western flank (Diod. 18.72.3–9).
The events leading to the aforementioned victory began in May of the same
summer (318) that Eumenes was gathering forces in Cappadocia after his release
from Nora. Cassander at this point in time left Asia for Athens. There his supporter Nicanor had been holding out against the Athenians and was in difficulties due to the arrival in the spring of Polyperchon’s son Alexander with an army (Diod.
18.65.3; Plut. Phoc. 33.1). His father and the kings,16 with additional forces, were to follow later. In Athens, the king’s decree had created chaos. Numbers of those previously exiled, many of whom had accompanied Polyperchon’s son Alexander
to Athens, had flooded the city and assumed their places in the meetings of the
assembly (Plut. Phoc. 33.2). Adding to the upheaval were the disingenuous motives of the newly arrived Macedonian commander. He wished to take possession of
Munychia and Piraeus himself (Diod. 18.65.3; cf. Plut. Phoc. 33.1). He had been advised soon after his arrival by Phocion, among other Athenians, that it would be prudent to hold on to the fortifications until the final defeat of Cassander (Diod.
18.65.4), advice which accorded with his own, and clearly his father’s, inclinations.
As a result, Alexander negotiated “in private” with Nicanor, not permitting any
Athenians to attend the sessions (Diod. 18.65.5; Plut. Phoc. 33.3). Within Athens itself, a radical democracy was soon in place, with the so-called government of the 9000, the oligarchy imposed by Antipater, abolished and its leaders condemned to
death or exile. New leaders were elected (Diod. 18.65.6). Those forced into exile, including Phocion, fled to Alexander to plead their case. They were well received by the young commander (Diod. 18.66.1; Plut. Phoc. 33.4–7), and with favorable letters from the son to his father, they continued on to Phocis, where Polyperchon and the kings were currently located. Arriving at the same time was an embassy
from the restored Athenian democracy, led by the new democratic leader
Hagnonides. Polyperchon clearly had made up his mind that Phocion was too
closely connected to the old regime. Dinarchus of Corinth (although he spent
most of his life in Athens as a politician [Worthington 1992: 3–9]), who had
accompanied his friend Phocion to plead with Polyperchon, was arrested on the
spot, tortured, and executed, without being permitted to say a word in his own
defense (Plut. Phoc. 33.8). At one time, he had been Antipater’s chief representative in the Peloponessus (Suda s.v. Deinarchus). In addition to the connection of those in charge of the previous Athenian government to the Antipatrid family,
Polyperchon also needed to demonstrate that his decree was not mere lip service.
He had to show his support for the “traditional” government of Athens, i.e. the
democracy (cf. Diod. 18.66.2). As a result, even though Phocion had shown a wil -
ingness to work with the Macedonians in general, and was not tied to any particular group of Macedonians, Polyperchon turned him over to the democratic leaders.
The End of a Dynasty
93
With Nicanor in control of Piraeus and Munychia, and the government of Athens
being in the hands of the democrats, Phocion was expendable. For practical
political reasons the new Athenian government was the only possible al y for
Polyperchon in the given situation. Through an alliance with the new government
he at least had access to the rest of Attica, with the hope that the Athenians and the Macedonians working together could dislodge Nicanor. For the purpose
of cementing this alliance Phocion was sacrificed, despite what were general y
perceived by all parties as his previous services to Macedonia.
Phocion and those who had joined him on the embassy were arrested and
turned over to the Athenians to decide their fate. They were tried before the
assembly and condemned (Diod. 18.66.4–67.3; Plut. Phoc. 34–6). Phocion
drank the hemlock and died early in May (Diod. 18.67.6; Plut. Phoc. 37.1–5: Nep. Phoc. 3.3–4.4). Not long after these events, Cassander arrived in Piraeus with 35 warships and 4000 soldiers given him by Antigonus (Diod. 18.68.1).
Antipater’s son, then, occupied the harbor, while Nicanor maintained the gar-
rison in Munychia. Polyperchon now left Phocis and with his army of 20,000
Macedonians, 4000 allies, 1000 cavalry, and 65 elephants, and camped near the
harbor. Diodorus (18.68.3) reports that, since the regent was short of supplies
and believed that the siege would be long, he left part of the army under the
command of his son Alexander to continue the siege and proceeded with
the larger part of his forces into the Peloponnesus to accelerate the process
of deposing those regimes imposed by Antipater and likely now loyal to
Cassander. Diodorus (18.69.3) states that Polyperchon met with delegates from
these southern Greek cities, and while this is not directly confirmed, probably
did so in the city of Corinth on the isthmus (Dixon 2007: 160–1). Corinth was
a convenient meeting place and this was an Isthmian year, when biennial
Isthmian panhellenic games were held at the sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia,
outside of Corinth. Most of the Greek cities would have representatives pre-
sent. Here, while the presence of the regent, the kings, and so many Macedonians
did encourage many of the cities in the peninsula to overthrow their existing
oligarchic governments and massacre the supporters of these regimes (Diod.
18.70.3–4), Megalopolis remained staunchly in alliance with Cassander, and
prepared to withstand a siege (Diod. 18.69.4–70.3).
In Asia, after Eumenes arrived in Cilicia, Antigenes and Teutamus, the com-
manders of the argyraspids, in obedience to the letters from the kings and
Olympias, ma
rched northeast to join him (Diod. 18.59.3). These very same troops
with the other Macedonians present in Egypt had condemned Eumenes and the
other Perdiccans. This willingness of the argyraspids now to support Eumenes is
again evidence of the remaining latent power of the Argead monarchy and also
the brief and ephemeral nature of the army assembly. With the call from the kings and regent, the argyraspids joined the very individual they had earlier condemned.
Neither the regent, nor the kings, issued a pardon; the sentence was simply
ignored. Eumenes, with the forces that had come with him from Cappadocia and
the argyraspids, then moved on to Cyinda.17
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Even though Antigenes and Teutamus promised to cooperate ful y with
Eumenes, and the argyraspids had as a body greeted Eumenes with friendship
and enthusiasm (Diod. 18.59.3; Plut. Eum. 13.3–4), this was to be a troublesome relationship between the Cardian and his new allies. The argyraspids represented
a curious blend of Macedonian nationalism and mercenary characteristics (Anson
1991). They responded to the call from their kings and his regent as loyal
Macedonians, yet these troops often acted as if they were an autonomous city-state (Nussbaum 1967: ix, 2–3; Davies 1993: 187). These troops displayed the typical
qualities of mercenaries (Parke 1933: 207–8): a distinct lack of fidelity to any
authority other than their own immediate commanders and themselves; the
military camp was their home, containing their families and all their worldly
goods; and a transcending loyalty to successful and generous paymasters. This
evolution from national army to mercenary force had begun in earnest during
the reign of Alexander the Great himself. After Darius’ death in 330, Alexander
increasingly made use of mass meetings both to instill enthusiasm in his troops
and to test his authority (Errington 1978: 86–91). There was also the tendency
of mercenaries to discuss issues involving their interests by assembly. This was
certainly true of those who accompanied Cyrus on the Anabasis recorded by Xenophon, and after the death of Alexander, this same mercenary attribute manifested itself in the assemblies that gave Arrhidaeus the throne and condemned
the surviving Perdiccans to death. It should be noted also that in the revolts of the
“Greeks” in Bactria and Sogdiana in 326/25 and again in 323, issues were resolved by voting assemblies (Curt. 9.7.5, 8, 10; Diod. 18.7.2).
These general characteristics of the troops who had long served in Asia were
exemplified by the argyraspids and their commanders. Antigenes had participated
in the assassination of Perdiccas in Egypt (Arr. Succ. 1a.35; Diod. 18.39.6; cf. Diod.
18.36.4), and the argyraspids at Triparadeisus had been separated from the army
given to Antigonus because of their mutinous behavior (cf. Arr. Succ. 1a.35, 38).
Their commanders were not pleased with the subordinate role now ordered for
them (Plut. Eum. 13.4; Just. 14.2.8–9; cf. Diod. 18.60). Eumenes was, therefore, immediately faced with a serious threat to his authority, which had to be met with a certain amount of delicacy. He needed these Macedonians. As noted, the bulk
of the army left in Asia on Alexander’s death was Asian in origin, the true professionals, however, were the Macedonians who had long served the Conqueror.
This challenge to his authority was met in part by relying on a tactic that had
worked well for him in Babylon. Eumenes told Antigenes and Teutamus, both
Macedonian aristocrats, that as a Greek his only concern was the defense of the
royal family. This was an interesting claim since he had for more than a year been resisting both the kings’ regent and their general in Asia. Furthermore, he claimed that no office was in prospect for one who was not a native-born Macedonian
(Diod. 18.60.3). The truth was quite obviously otherwise. By decree of the kings
Eumenes was royal general in Asia and satrap of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia. Yet
the claim did have some substance. Eumenes, as a non-Macedonian, likely could
not have the ambitions attributed to Perdiccas, and that were now beginning to be
The End of a Dynasty
95
ascribed to Antigonus (Diod. 18.47.5, 50.1, 5, 52.6–7, 57.3; Plut. Eum. 12.1). This appeal to his non-Macedonian heritage was just plausible enough to assuage their
fears that Eumenes would usurp the authority of these Macedonian commanders.
Of course, common Macedonian troops had shown no reluctance in accepting
Eumenes as their commander even after his condemnation in Egypt. For the
present, Eumenes found himself in dire need of the veterans commanded by
these Macedonian nobles, and needed to convince them of his limited ambitions.
As part of this effort, Eumenes refused to accept the personal gift of 500 talents offered him by the kings (Diod. 18.60.2).
These efforts alone, however, proved insufficient. Both Antigenes and Teu-
tamus continued to challenge Eumenes’ authority. To control these commanders
Eumenes decided to invoke the mystical presence of Alexander.18 Proclaiming that
in a dream he had seen their former king in full regalia, presiding over his council and actively administering the empire, Eumenes declared that in the future a
conclave of commanders would be held in a tent in the presence of a throne, with
replicas of Alexander’s diadem, scepter, and armor, all manufactured from the
Cilician gold, placed on it. These objects were not Alexander’s actual regalia
(see Errington 1976: 140–1). The original royal objects were most likely given to the new king, Philip III, and taken with that monarch by Antipater to Macedonia.19
In the morning before each meeting, the commanders would offer incense and do
obeisance as before the shrine of a god. After this ritual the meeting would be held in the tent as if in Alexander’s presence. Orders would be issued in Alexander’s
name, and during the deliberations everyone would be placed symbolical y on an
equal footing before the throne (Diod. 18.60.5–61.3; Plut. Eum. 13.5–8; Polyaen.
4.8.2). Eumenes’ cult of Alexander is the only indisputable example of an essential y military cult in the Hellenistic era (Launey 1950: 945–6, 951). Indeed, Eumenes’
innovation never caught on in the other Hellenistic armies and died with that commander’s final defeat (Launey 1950: 947, 950–1). It is possible that a similar ploy may have been behind Ptolemy’s proposal made in Babylon shortly after Alexander’s death that the empire be ruled by a council meeting in the presence of Alexander’s throne (Curt. 10.6.15; Errington 1970: 75). Why Eumenes did not inaugurate
something similar in 320, when the surviving Perdiccans were arguing over the
chief command, is hard to guess. Presumably, he simply did not think of it.20
Eumenes, however, did not by these expedients ever relinquish his command
(Diod. 18.63.4). By placing himself visual y on a par with his fellow commanders, he was able to make them more agreeable and so secured a measure of goodwill
from them. Whether the commanders believed in the cult can only be surmised,
but it is likely that amongst the common soldiers the cult was accepted (Picard
1954: 5). Clearly the Macedonian troops were superstitious. There were annual
lustrations, and most of the gods were regularly invoked for protection or victory (Launey 1950: 882, 921–2, 951). Acceptance of Alexander’s cult would have been
especial y likely in light of the prestige Ptolemy acquired through the acquisition of Alexander’s corpse (Diod. 18.28.4–5
). With regard to the attitude of the commanders, Diodorus 18.61.3 does state, “as their reverence for the king grew
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stronger, they were all filled with happy expectations, just as if some god were
leading them.” Such possible reverence notwithstanding, it is unlikely any would
have opposed the resultant increase in their own prestige through the use of
this new procedure for deliberations. In any case, most often Eumenes’ opinions
were followed (Nep. Eum. 7.3). He did, after al , have the letters from the kings, the regent, and Olympias, access to the treasuries of Asia, and control of his
mercenaries and Cappadocian cavalry.
While not accepting the personal gift of 500 talents from the royal treasury,
Eumenes did use the treasure in Cyinda to hire large numbers of mercenaries to
supplement his forces. Despite Diodorus’ (18.61.5) statement that in “little time”
Eumenes collected a considerable army, it is evident that this process took months, continuing until late in the year. His friends were sent throughout Pisidia, Lycia, Cilicia, Syria, Phoenicia, and Cyprus, recruiting soldiers (Diod. 18.61.4). Since Eumenes was offering a high rate of pay, many prospective mercenaries came from
the Greek mainland itself (Diod. 18.61.5). By the close of the year Eumenes had
collected a force, excluding the argyraspids and those who had accompanied him
from Cappadocia, of 10,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry (Diod. 18.61.4–5).
Back in Greece, Cassander’s arrival in Athens had thrown the Greek mainland
into chaos. Adding to the confusion was Polyperchon’s failure to bring to heel the city of Megalopolis (Diod. 18.70–72.1). Under the leadership of Damis, who had
served under Alexander in Asia and had been appointed the city’s epimeletes
(guardian) by Antipater (see Heckel 2006: 102), the Megalopolitans successful y
resisted all assaults. As before in Athens, Polyperchon decided in the late summer or early fall of 31821 to leave a small besieging force, while he proceeded back to Macedonia to prepare for a possible invasion from Asia (Diod. 18.72.1).22 Cleitus and the fleet were ordered to leave the vicinity of Attica and proceed to the
Alexanders Heirs Page 20
