Alexanders Heirs

by Edward M. Anson

  (cf. Diod. 19.37.5–6).42

  Antigonus’ army set out into the desert about the time of the winter solstice

  (Diod. 19.37.3). Antigonus ordered that while fires might be used during the day, they would have to be extinguished at night so that they would not be seen from

  the hil s. But after five days, the bitter cold of the desert night became too severe and the soldiers built fires at night as wel . These, as Antigonus had feared, were observed by the mountain vil agers and reported to both Eumenes and Peucestas

  (Diod. 19.37.4–6; Polyaen. 4.6.11, 8.4; Plut. Eum. 15.7; Nep. Eum. 9.1, 3). When Peucestas heard the news, he was afraid that Antigonus would arrive before the

  whole army could be assembled. He was days away and it would take longer to

  gather their army and prepare for battle. Consequently, he wished to withdraw the army to safety in the most distant part of Gabene (Diod. 19.38.1). In a meeting of the satraps and generals there was general panic (Nep. Eum. 9.2; Plut. Eum. 15.8).

  Eumenes stemmed the chaos by proposing to delay Antigonus by a ruse. The

  satraps and generals now began to gather their forces as rapidly as possible (Plut.

  Eum. 15.10; cf. Nep. Eum. 9.2). Eumenes directed the commanders of those units directly under his personal command to collect their troops and bring with them

  fire vessels. These troops then dispersed along the mountains which fringed the

  desert, setting fires each evening in exposed areas to create the il usion of a camp to those approaching across the desert (Diod. 19.38.3–4; Polyaen. 4.8.4; Nep. Eum.

  9.3–5; Plut. Eum. 15.11). The fires were seen by Median shepherds and reported

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  to Pithon, who informed Antigonus. When Antigonus learned of these sightings,

  he held up his march, since he believed his plan had been betrayed to Eumenes and an army awaited him on the desert’s fringe. He now turned aside and went into the inhabited areas bordering the desert to refresh his troops before confronting what he believed to be Eumenes’ ful y assembled and fresh forces (Diod. 19.38.5–6; Plut.

  Eum. 15.11–12; Nep. Eum. 9.5–6; Polyaen. 4.8.4). The delay in Antigonus’ advance gave Eumenes’ forces time to assemble.

  Both armies now prepared for battle (Diod. 19.39.6). Antigonus, here as in the

  earlier conflict in Paraetacene, placed his cavalry on the wings and extended his elephants across the whole front. His army was smaller than previously, with only 22,000 heavy infantry, 9000 cavalry, 65 elephants, and an unknown number of

  light infantry (Diod. 19.40.1). As before, Antigonus strengthened his right. When Eumenes learned that Antigonus with his son Demetrius had taken their place

  on the right with his best cavalry, he drew up his army placing his best troops

  and himself on his left wing, facing Antigonus. In all Eumenes’ army consisted

  of 36,700 infantry, of which probably still close to 17,000 were heavy infantry, 6000 cavalry, and 114 elephants (Diod. 19.40.2–4). Despite Eumenes’ losses at

  Paraetacene, his infantry increased in numbers prior to the Battle of Gabene. The explanation probably lies in reinforcements arriving during the winter from Persis.

  The respective strategies for the battle were designed to take advantage of the

  strengths in each force. Antigonus planned to use his superior heavy cavalry sta-

  tioned on his right to win the victory, while the center and left held their ground (cf. Diod. 19.40.1). Pithon, as at Paraetacene, commanded Antigonus’ left. Philip, satrap of Bactria, commanded Eumenes’ weaker cavalry on his right wing. It

  appears from the course of the battle that both Pithon and Philip had been

  ordered to refrain from any large-scale engagement (cf. Diod. 19.42.7). Eumenes

  placed his hope for victory on his phalanx and especial y the argyraspids (Diod.

  19.40.2; Plut. Eum. 16.6).43

  Prior to the battle “most” of Eumenes’ fellow-commanders, led by Antigenes

  and Teutamus, decided that after defeating Antigonus they would eliminate their

  commander (Plut. Eum. 16.1–3, 6; cf. Diod. 19.41). Even though the plot is not mentioned by Diodorus, includes the usual y loyal Antigenes (Diod. 18.62.6;

  19.12.2, 17.4, 21.1) as one of the main conspirators (Plut. Eum. 16.1), and though it is clearly an exaggeration that most of the commanders were involved (Bosworth 1992b: 70), the story appears to be genuine (Anson 2013a; Schäfer 2002: 158). At

  this point it is unknown how much information regarding activities in Europe had

  filtered through to the armies on the Iranian plateau, but if any news concerning the death of King Philip or Cassander’s successes in Macedonia had become

  known, Eumenes’ influence would have been severely undermined (cf. Bosworth

  2002: 150). Our sources are silent on these matters, suggesting that, perhaps,

  none of it was known. In any case, the desire for chief command by the leaders of the argyraspids is clear from the moment they joined Eumenes (Diod. 18.60–61.3),

  and Peucestas had never ful y acknowledged Eumenes’ supremacy. Moreover,

  Antigenes’ loyalty to Eumenes was based primarily on self-interest (Diod. 18.62.6–7).

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  Certainly, the purpose of the plot was not to benefit Antigonus. The conspirators planned on assassinating Eumenes after their forces had defeated Antigonus (Plut.

  Eum. 16.3). The plan, then, was to eliminate both Antigonus and Eumenes, leaving the field clear for the conspirators. The absence of any mention of such a plot in our main narrative source, Diodorus, most probably results from that author’s

  abbreviation of his source. Certainly many of Eumenes’ commanders were dis-

  pleased with his popularity with the troops (Plut. Eum. 16.1–2; cf. Plut. Eum. 18.1), and they must have realized that after the battle a victorious Eumenes would, at the least, cease to treat them as equals. With the probable addition of Antigonus’

  defeated forces, plus those troops already directly under his authority, Eumenes’

  power would be preponderant. When the plot was revealed to Eumenes through

  informants, the Cardian found himself in a very difficult position. He contemplated flight to the west, but in the end decided to await events (Plut. Eum. 16.3). A victorious and wary Eumenes could turn the tables on the conspirators after the battle.

  If the conflict ended in defeat, he would flee to the west with whatever forces

  still remained loyal to him (Anson 2013a: 104, 105–6). In any case, Eumenes alerted his closest advisors to the danger, made up his wil , and destroyed all his papers which might be used against his correspondents (Plut. Eum. 16.4–6).

  The Battle of Gabene began with an engagement by the elephants, followed by

  the cavalries stationed on the Antigonid right and Eumenid left (Diod. 19.42.1, 7).

  Since the plain was large and barren because of the high salt content of the soil, the fighting raised a cloud of dust which obscured the battlefield. When Antigonus

  observed these conditions, he sent units of his cavalry to capture Eumenes’ camp, while Pithon engaged in diversionary activity to keep his counterpart Philip from observing this action. These troops rode around the enemy’s flank unnoticed, and

  easily defeated those guarding Eumenes’ camp (Diod. 19.42.3; Polyaen. 4.6.13;

  Plut. Eum. 16.10–11; Just. 14.3.3). In the battle itself, Antigonus’ cavalry on the right defeated Eumenes’ left. This victory was achieved primarily because

  Peucestas retired at the start of the enemy’s onslaught. Because the dust generated by the troop movements obscured the battlefield, 1500 other troops, not realizing the circumstances, followed Peucestas in his flight (Diod. 19.42.4). After these

  withdrawals, Eumenes’ left was overwhelmed. With his defeated forces he

  retreated behind
his phalanx to his right wing (Diod. 19.42.4). While defeated on the left in the cavalry battle, Eumenes’ infantry swept all before it. Once again it was the skill of the argyraspids that brought victory. In the course of the infantry battle 5000 of the enemy were slain, while only 300 of Eumenes’ men, and none

  of the argyraspids, fell (Diod. 19.43.1; Polyaen. 4.6.13; Just. 14.3.5). After Eumenes’

  withdrawal to his right wing, Antigonus sent half of his cavalry under Pithon’s

  command against the argyraspids, who were now without cavalry support.

  Under this attack the Macedonians formed a square and withdrew safely from

  the battlefield (Diod. 19.43.4–5).

  The battle had ended much as the previous one, in a relative stalemate. Eumenes

  attempted to collect all of his remaining cavalry and renew the battle, but Peucestas refused to join him and only retreated further. Since night was approaching,

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  Eumenes was forced to withdraw (Diod. 19.43.2–3). That evening all of the satraps and commanders took counsel together. The satraps believed it was necessary to

  retreat as rapidly as possible, but Eumenes declared that they should stay and

  renew the fight. The phalanx had been victorious, inflicting heavy losses on the

  enemy. Moreover, their cavalry had not been significantly reduced (Diod. 19.43.6).

  The argyraspids, however, since their baggage had been taken with the capture of

  the camp and with it their children, wives, relatives, and the loot of a decade’s service in Asia (Plut. Eum. 9.6; Just. 14.3.3, 6–7, 10), ignored both suggestions (Diod.

  19.43.7). As a result, the meeting broke up without a decision being reached as to any future course of action (Diod. 19.43.7; Polyaen. 4.6.13; Just. 14.3.3, 6–7, 10).

  With the dissolution of the meeting, Teutamus immediately sent an embassy

  to Antigonus to treat for the lost baggage (Plut. Eum. 17.1).44 Antigenes is not mentioned and was likely not a party to this action. Antigonus responded that he

  would not only return what he had seized, but would provide additional rewards

  as wel , if the argyraspids would surrender both the elephants and Eumenes to

  him. When Teutamus presented Antigonus’ terms to the argyraspids, they agreed

  to deliver Eumenes, and he was seized and placed under guard (Diod. 19.43.8–9;

  Plut. Eum. 17.2–4; Polyaen. 4.6.13; Just. 14.4.1). Eumenes had planned for victory or defeat; it apparently never occurred to him that this battle might end as had the previous one in Paraetacene, with no clear victor.

  The argyraspids were now true mercenaries; the loyalty to their kings and

  country, and even to the memory of Alexander, was all bartered away for their

  possessions. On the third day after his seizure, while he was being led to Antigonus, Eumenes requested an opportunity to speak to the army. Permission was granted,

  and Eumenes berated the argyraspids for their treachery. Despite the general

  sympathy of the majority of the troops (Plut. Eum. 17.6–18.1; Just. 14.4.1–14), no challenge was raised against the argyraspids (Plut. Eum. 18.1–2), so great was their reputation. With Eumenes’ surrender, most of the satraps fled; Peucestas

  and certain others surrendered to Antigonus (Polyaen. 4.6.13). Among those

  who surrendered and henceforward served Antigonus faithful y was Eumenes’

  fellow-countryman, the historian Hieronymus (Diod. 19.44.2). Certain of

  Eumenes’ former allies were executed (Diod. 19.44.1, 48.2). Antigenes was put in

  a pit and burned alive (Diod. 19.44.1), likely confirming his lack of involvement in the surrender of Eumenes, and he may even have been turned over to Antigonus

  along with Eumenes as part of the bargain to gain back the argyraspids’ posses-

  sions (Anson 2013a: 105). As it was to turn out, it was not only Eumenes who was

  bartered away for these soldiers’ possessions, but the future of the argyraspids

  themselves (Roisman 2012: 242). One thousand of the most troublesome were

  given to Sibyrtius, the satrap of Arachosia, who was commanded by Antigonus

  to see to their destruction. Diodorus (19.48.4) declares that these 1000 were

  those most responsible for Eumenes’ betrayal. The rest of this infamous unit were divided up and sent to various remote garrisons (Polyaen. 4.6.15; Diod. 19.48.3).

  The argyraspids, this last true vestige of Alexander the Great’s Macedonian army, were now scattered to the winds.

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  With respect to Eumenes, while Antigonus might have wished to acquire his

  adherence, he had little faith in the latter’s promises, given that Eumenes had

  violated his oath of allegiance to Antigonus after his release from Nora (Diod.

  19.44.2; cf. Nep. Eum. 10.3). Besides, Antigonus’ own Macedonian troops wanted the death of the man who had caused them so much suffering (Diod. 19.44.2; Nep.

  Eum. 10.4, 12.2–4). Therefore, even though his own son Demetrius pleaded for Eumenes’ life, Antigonus had him put to death in January of 315 (Diod. 19.44.2–4; Plut. Eum. 18.6, 19.1; cf. Nep. Eum. 12.4). The time of Eumenes’ death is fixed by the following: Antigonus left his camp to cross the desert to Gabene about the time of the winter solstice (Diod. 19.37.3); his march to Gabene took nine days (Diod.

  19.34.8, 37.3), Antigonus arrived in Gabene only a few days before the battle

  (Diod. 19.39.2–6), Eumenes was betrayed almost immediately thereafter, with

  his own death following about ten days later (cf. Nep. Eum. 12.3–4; Plut. Eum.

  18.3–19.1). With the death of Eumenes, Antigonus returned to the area around

  Ecbatana and spent the remainder of the winter there (Diod. 19.44.4).

  During this same winter, Olympias remained under siege in Pydna, but “at the

  approach of spring,” with famine becoming acute after the long siege (Just. 15.6.5), even to the point of cannibalism (Diod. 19.49.4), and with no sign of relief, the former regent and guardian of the young Alexander surrendered to Cassander on

  the condition that her life would be spared (Diod. 19.50.1–5; Just. 14.6.5; Polyaen.

  4.11.3). While his actual authority is unclear, Cassander was acting as regent.

  However, given that his position was owed to his success on the battlefield and

  little else, and his title subsequently was General “until Alexander [IV] would

  come of age” (Diod. 19.105.1), he decided to hold a trial of Olympias before the

  “Macedonians, rather than execute her himself.” The trial was to be little more

  than show and an attempt to distribute the responsibility more widely for what

  would be the murder of Alexander the Great’s mother and the grandmother of

  Alexander IV, and the guardian, prostates, of the kingdom (Anson 2008b: 139–40).

  Diodorus (19.52.4) states that Cassander planned to kil the young Alexander and

  his mother and seize the kingship, “but for the present wished to see what the

  people were thinking about the destruction of Olympias.” Prior to this “trial,”

  Cassander secured the murder of Aristonous, Olympias’ commander in

  Amphipolis. Even though he had defeated a force sent against him by Cassander,

  when ordered to surrender by Olympias after her own submission to Cassander,

  he had done so (Diod. 19.51.1; cf. 19.50.7), his previous standing with Alexander the Great, however, made him, in the eyes of Antipater’s son, a danger (Diod.

  19.51.1). Cassander was clearly very insecure in his new authority. Previously,

  when Nicanor, his naval commander and the individual who had held Munychia

  and seized Piraeus for him, began to put on airs after the naval victory in the

  Hellesp
ont in 317, Cassander, “fearing treachery,” after another farcical trial, had him killed (Diod. 18.75.1; Polyaen. 4.11.2).

  While no specific charges are listed against Olympias, the likely one was regi-

  cide. Cassander further took pains to make sure that those who hated Olympias

  would be present to accuse her, and that she would be given no opportunity to

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  defend herself (Diod. 19.51.2; Just. 14.6.6). The assembly then either voted to

  convict Olympias, or, while leaning toward a guilty verdict, was adjourned. Then, either after her conviction or during the adjournment, Cassander encouraged

  Olympias to escape to Athens, “fearing that the Macedonians would change their

  minds and free her” (Diod. 19.51.3–4). He could then claim to have killed a fleeing prisoner. Olympias, however, stated that she wished personal y to defend herself

  before “all the Macedonians” (Diod. 19.51.4). Olympias’ remark concerning

  “all the Macedonians” confirms that only a select group of Macedonians actual y

  met to consider her guilt (Carney 1994: 373). In the trial of Nicanor, Cassander

  clearly only convened those troops with him in Attica (Polyaen. 4.11.2).45 In the end it was Cassander who saw to Olympias’ execution (Diod. 19.51.5; Just. 14.6.9).

  While there is some disagreement about who actual y carried out the execution, all sources are consistent that her slaying had been ordered by Cassander (Diod.

  19.51.5; Just. 14.6.11; Paus. 1.11.4, 25.6; 9.7.2; cf. Diod. 17.118.2). Cassander immediately after the death of Olympias had Alexander IV and his mother Roxane placed under guard in Amphipolis (Diod. 19.52.4; Just. 14.6.13; 15.2.3 – Justin, however, mistakenly cal s the imprisoned Heracles and Barsine), and ordered that the king

  be treated as a commoner. In 310, by Cassander’s order, both mother and king were murdered (Diod. 19.105.2; cf. Just. 15.2.5; Paus. 9.7.3). Murdered not long after was Heracles, Alexander’s son by his mistress Barsine (Diod. 20.28; Just. 15.2.3; Paus. 9.7.2). With the death of Alexander the Great’s sons the Argead dynasty came to an end. But its true denouement had come in 315, with the sequestering of King Alexander IV. There was no love lost between Cassander and the memory of