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Marble] FGrH 239 B 17). Learning that King Niococles of Paphos was secretly in alliance with Antigonus, Ptolemy through his agents forced the king’s suicide,
which was then followed by the deaths of his entire family, including the king’s
wife, Axiothea, who committed suicide, but only after murdering the couple’s
daughters (Diod. 20.21.2; Polyaen. 8.48; cf. FGrH 239 B 17). So concluded the year 309.
The following spring saw Ptolemy again active in the Aegean, sailing from
Myndus in Caria through the islands, where he separated Andros and likely many
other cities from their alliance with Antigonus, and with his large fleet proceeded to the Greek mainland. Here, he acquired Sicyon and Corinth from Cratesipolis
(Diod. 20.37.1; Polyaen. 8.58). The Egyptian satrap clearly was hoping to beat
Antigonus at his own game, and gain the support of the Greeks through a “Greek
freedom” program of his own. He likely wished to recreate the former League of
Corinth with himself as its leader (Billows 1990: 144–5 and n. 18; Dixon 2007:
173–4 and n. 63). Ptolemy had planned on “freeing” more Greek cities, but
the Peloponnesians who had agreed to assist him in these endeavors failed to
contribute the forces that they had promised, and Ptolemy returned to Egypt
(Diod. 20.37.1–2). Ptolemy had issued his own proclamation of Greek freedom
soon after Antigonus’ Tyre declaration (Diod. 19.62.1), but the Egyptian satrap’s declarations were much less well received. The fact that he garrisoned both
Sicyon and Corinth prior to his withdrawal from Greece (Diod. 20.37.2; Plut.
Demetr. 15.1; Suda s.v. Demetrius) only confirmed Greek doubts concerning his commitment to Greek freedom. It is very possible that this return to Egypt
was triggered by Antigonus’ return from his failed attempt to unseat Seleucus
(Wheatley 2002: 45–6). In Diodorus, the juxtapositioning of Ptolemy’s retreat
with Antigonus’ presence in the west does make this a real possibility (cf. Diod.
20.37.3–6). However, other than the order of Diodorus’ narrative, there is no
stated evidence supporting this supposition, especial y since Diodorus makes
no mention of Antigonus’ eastern expedition.
After his inability to remove Seleucus, Antigonus returned sometime in the
summer of 308. His arrival in the west was soon followed by the death of Alexander’s sister Cleopatra. She had been sought in marriage by many of the Diadochs:
Leonnatus (Plut. Eum. 3.9–10), Perdiccas (Diod. 18.23.1), and more recently by Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and perhaps even by Antigonus (Diod. 20.37.4). That
Antigonus sought her hand in marriage might appear a rational objective for one
who did not have other close ties to Alexander the Conqueror and the Argead
family, especial y now that the entire male line was no more. However, of the
Successors he appears to have invoked the name of Alexander the least. While in
control of many of the mints, coins issued under his authority were simply continuations of the long-standing Alexander coinage, without making any connection
between the Conqueror and himself (Mørkholm 1991: 61). His desire to marry
Cleopatra cannot be refuted, but appears doubtful. Antigonus had sufficient
laurels on which to rest: his successes on the battlefield were sufficient to ensure his reputation and claims on authority. Moreover, Diodorus (20.27.4) also states
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that Cleopatra’s hand was sought by Cassander, but this is very unlikely. Cassander had ordered the murder of Olympias, Cleopatra’s mother, in 315, and was already
married to Thessalonice, the daughter of Philip II (Diod. 19.52.1; cf. Just. 14.6.13; Paus. 9.7.3).
Cleopatra had frequently quarreled with Antigonus, but had apparently remained
in Sardis over the past decade, having arrived there in 321 seeking a marriage with the then regent Perdiccas (Arr. Succ. 1a.21; Diod. 18.23.1; Just. 13.6.4). During the years of Antigonus’ dominance she appears to have been kept under close scrutiny
(Diod. 20.37.5). The current disagreement was likely over a recent proposal of
marriage from Ptolemy (Diod. 20.37.3). He had been operating in the vicinity.
In any case, her departure was prevented by Antigonus’ commander in Sardis,
who was later ordered by Antigonus to murder her, which he did (Diod. 20.37.3–6).
Antigonus attempted to conceal his involvement by accusing “certain women”
apparently connected to her entourage with the Macedonian princess’ death. He
did give her a lavish royal burial (Diod. 20.37.6).
With respect to the Diadochs, the only other event of 308 recorded by Diodorus
that even tangential y concerns them is the campaign of Ptolemy’s commander
in Cyrene, Ophel as, who was associated with Ptolemy’ s acquisition of the city in 322. Apparently this individual had greater ambition than simply remaining as the overseer of the Libyan city. In 308, he was approached by Agathocles, the tyrant of Syracuse, concerning a joint operation against the Carthaginians in North Africa
(Diod. 20.40.1–2; Just. 22.7.4).29 The Syracusan claimed that he only wished to
have a fellow Greek in charge of North Africa and that he was ful y content with
Sicily. Ophel as quickly consented and through a family connection in Athens
began to assemble a large force for the campaign. He had married Euthydice, an
Athenian descendant of the famous victor at Marathon, Miltiades (Diod. 20.45.5;
Plut. Demetr. 14.1). There may also have been close diplomatic relations existing between Demetrius of Phalerum and Ptolemy. When the “Guardian” of Athens was
final y forced to leave the city in 307, he departed to Egypt and not to Macedonia and Cassander (Diod. 20.45.4). Ophel as set off against the Carthaginians with
10,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, 100 chariots, and many light-armed troops (Diod.
20.40.3–41.1). Not long after his arrival, Agathocles betrayed him, killing the
commander and taking control of his army (Diod. 20.42.3–5; Just. 22.7.5–6; Suda
s.v. Demetrius; s.v. Ophellas).
With the start of the new campaigning year (307), Antigonus sent his son
Demetrius out into the Aegean with instructions to free all of the Greek cities,
beginning with Athens (Diod. 20.45.1–5). The campaign is described by Plutarch
( Demetr. 8.1–2; cf. Mor. 182E–F) as a noble deed designed to garner glory and honor for the father and the son; to spend “the vast wealth which they together
had amassed from the barbarians … upon the Greeks.” While Demetrius may
have seen the noble aspects of the campaign and Antigonus no doubt hoped that
this was to be the view of those soon to be “freed,” the father was interested in the practical results. Due to Polemaeus’ betrayal and his own absence in the east,
much of Greece was now allied to and garrisoned by Cassander and Ptolemy.
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Antigonus’ previous gains now for the most part were lost. Demetrius was sent
with 5000 talents and a fleet of 250 warships from Ephesus. When he arrived in
the Saronic Gulf before Piraeus at the beginning of June (Plut. Demetr. 8.5), he launched an immediate assault on the main harbor. He caught the Athenians
unawares by separating twenty of the fastest warships from the fleet and having
them sail past Piraeus as if making for the island of Salamis. The Athenians took the ships to be Ptolemaic vessels on their way to Corinth. At the last moment the ships changed course rapidly and entered a
nd secured the harbor for the rest of
the fleet that was waiting at Cape Sunion (Polyaen. 4.7.6; Plut. Demetr. 6.6–8; Diod. 20.45.2). At this time Demetrius issued a proclamation stating that he had
come to set the Athenians free, expel Cassander’s garrison, and “restore to the
people their laws and their ancient form of government,” i.e., democracy (Plut.
Demetr. 8.7; Diod. 20.45.2; Polyaen. 4.7.6). With the fall of the harbor, the Athenians and Antigonus’ son opened negotiations. The now former “guardian” of
the Athenians, Demetrius of Phalerum, was given a safe conduct and fled to
Ptolemy in Egypt by way of Thebes.30 Only the fortress of Munychia resisted, and
this fell after a two-day siege (Diod. 20.45.2–4; Plut. Demetr. 9). Megara was also “liberated” by Demetrius, with the Megarians bestowing unspecified but
“noteworthy honors” on their savior (Diod. 20.46.3; Plut. Demetr. 9.5). In addition to their freedom, the Athenians were also given over 200,000 bushels of grain,
which was then in short supply, likely due to the imposition of a blockade of the Hellespont by Cassander’s al y Lysimachus; also given was timber sufficient for
the construction of 100 warships, and the Aegean islands of Imbros and Lemnos,
which had been secured by Antigonus when Cassander was in control of Athens
(Diod. 20.46.4; IG II2 1492b, lines 5–12, 27–31, 40–2).
“The Athenians, having recovered their freedom, decreed honors to those
responsible for their liberation” (Diod. 20.45.5). These honors included gold
statues of Antigonus and Demetrius in a chariot near the statues of the supposed
earlier liberators of the Athenians from tyranny, Harmodius and Aristogeiton
(Thuc. 1.20), gold crowns, being hailed as kings (Plut. Demetr. 10.4), having their names inserted as two new tribes in those of the ten Cleisthenic tribes, annual
games in the “saviors’” honor, having their names along with those of the gods
woven into the ceremonial garment fashioned before the Panathenaic festival and
draped on the statue of the goddess Athena, and the consecration of an altar to
the “saviors,” along with a dedicated priesthood (Diod. 20.46.2; Plut. Demetr.
10.4–7).31 The last clearly amounts to formal worship. Despite occasional lapses, the worship of living men by the Greeks only began in earnest late in Alexander
the Great’s lifetime (Anson 2013b: 114–20). Earlier there are but few examples of such behavior. “Altars were erected and sacrifice offered as to a god” to Lysander by a number of island cities, specifical y Samos, “liberated” at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War from Athenian suzerainty (Plut. Lys. 18.3–4); Agesilaus is recorded as refusing similar honors offered by the Thasians (Plut. Ages. 25; Mor.
210D; Flower 1988: 123–34); Dion in the middle of the fourth century bc received
“heroic honors” from the Syracusans (Diod. 16.20.6; Plut. Dion; contra: Badian
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155
1996: 42–3), and, perhaps, Alexander the Great’s father Philip was honored by
cities his forces had liberated from the Persians (Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 408,
line 5; Arr. Anab. 1.17.11). The key to understanding what was taking place in Athens is that these were meant as extravagant honors for what were considered
to be extraordinary conferred benefits; there was no real sense that these individuals were immortal beings. These “mortals were simply sharing ‘some of the gods’
divine prerogatives” (Green 1990: 402).
That this practice was rare prior to Alexander the Great was the function of two
factors. The first was that, prior to the emergence of such powerful individuals as Philip and Alexander, there were few who could bestow such large benefactions;
second, the Greeks, and the Athenians in particular, had twice tested the might
wielded by such individuals and been beaten. Gods were powerful beings who
could confer enormous benefits or inflict equal y severe punishments, much as
our new savior-generals. The confidence of the Greek city-states in being able
to control their own destiny was now at a low ebb and destined to remain so.
Benefactors or “saviors” were now becoming essential for the maintenance of any
sense of autonomy. After Antigonus’ son Demetrius’ later unsuccessful siege of
Rhodes (305–4), the Rhodians, grateful for the support that had been provided by
Ptolemy, proclaimed him savior ( soter) of the city and sent a delegation to the Oracle of Zeus at Siwah in Libya seeking permission to worship the Egyptian
ruler as a god. The response from the oracle was favorable and the worship was
initiated, with the creation within the city of a sacred precinct, the Ptolemaeum (Diod. 20.100.3–4).
Elated by his son’s quick success in Athens, Antigonus wrote ordering him to
summon ambassadors from the Greek cities “to consider in common what was
advantageous for Greece” (Diod. 20.46.5). Antigonus hoped to enhance the belief
that he was the only Diadoch truly interested in Greek freedom. Demetrius even
attempted unsuccessful y to bribe the Ptolemaic garrison commanders in Sicyon
and Corinth to free these cities (Plut. Demetr. 15.1). This impromptu meeting would be followed five years later by the official foundation of a new Hellenic
League at Corinth and the proclamation of Demetrius as hegemon of the Greeks, the very title held previously by Philip II and his son Alexander with respect to the League of Corinth (Plut. Demetr. 25; IG IV2 1.68; Austin 1981: 77–8).
In the spring of 306, Demetrius was ordered by his father to sail to Cyprus and
wrest that island from the Ptolemaic forces holding it (Diod. 20.46.5; Plut. Demetr.
15.12). On his way he summoned the Rhodians to join him, but they refused,
desiring to maintain their neutrality in the struggle between the two Diadochs
(Diod. 20.46.6). Demetrius continued on his mission and landed near the city of
Salamis in the spring of 306 (Paus. 1.6.6; [Parian Marble] FGrH 239 B F-21), with a force 15,000 infantry, 400 cavalry, and 163 warships. Ptolemy’s general on the
island, his brother Menelaus, contested the invasion with 12,000 infantry and
800 cavalry. The battle was of short duration with Demetrius winning a complete
victory, killing 1000 and capturing 3000 of the enemy. Menelaus, however, with
the remainder of his force retreated inside the port city thus necessitating a siege.
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Certain aspects of this siege were a preview of the more famous later operation on Rhodes. Having secured craftsmen and materials from the Asian mainland,
Demetrius had catapults and a great siege tower, the “Helepolis.” The latter,
designed by Epimachus of Athens, was a wheeled tower over nine stories tal ,
protected by armor and carrying artillery that fired through shuttered ports
(Diod. 20.48.2, 91.2–8; Plut. Demetr. 21.1; Vitr. 10.16.4).32 While the siege was in progress, Ptolemy arrived with a relief force of 140 warships and 200 transports.
Menelaus in the safety of his harbor commanded sixty additional warships,
bringing the Ptolemaic fleet total to 200. Demetrius’ armada totaled 180. In the
sea battle, both commanders placed the larger and more powerful ships on their
left, preparing to hold back the right as much as possible. The successful fleet
would then be the one that succeeded in destroying the enemy’s right and rolling
up the center before the opposing fleet could do the same. Ptolemy set his fleet
facing the harbor, forcing Demetrius’ ships to put their st
erns toward Salamis.
When the two fleets engaged, Menelaus was to sail out and attack the rear of the
enemy line. To counter this move Demetrius stationed ten of his best ships facing the harbor entrance. In the course of the battle these ten were able to delay
Menelaus’ relief force long enough for Demetrius’ fleet to achieve its objective
first, routing Ptolemy and his forces. Of the enemy’s fleet, 100 transport ships
carrying 8000 men were captured, along with 40 warships. Eighty Ptolemaic
warships were sunk. The result of the sea battle was the surrender of the entire
island to Demetrius. The victorious commander, having taken all of the cities
and their garrisons, enrolled the captured into his army. The number of those
thus incorporated was 16,000 infantry and 600 cavalry. The victory came in June
of 306 (on the battle, see Diod. 20.46.5–47.4, 7–53.1; Plut. Demetr. 15–17.1; Just.
15.2.6–9; Polyaen. 4.7.7; Paus. 1.6.6; App. Syr. 54; for the date: [Parian Marble]
FGrH 239 B 21; Wheatley 2001).
The importance of Demetrius’ victory cannot be overestimated. It was one
of the largest sea battles waged in the ancient Mediterranean, and the triumph on a par with his father’s victory over Eumenes. Demetrius at once sent news of his
victory to his father. With this victory, Antigonus had himself and his son pro-
claimed kings (Diod. 20.53.2; Plut. Demetr. 17.2–18.1; .: Just. 15.2.10; cf. [ Heidelberg Epitome] FGrH 155 F-1.7), and in this action they were followed later by Ptolemy in the first half of 304,33 and shortly thereafter by Seleucus (Diod. 20.53.4; Parker and Dubberstein 1956: 20; Gruen 1985: 258–9), Lysimachus, and Cassander
(Diod. 20.53; Plut. Demetr. 17–18; [ Heidelberg Epitome] FGrH 155 F-1.7; Just.
15.2.12). Cassander, while addressed as king by others, continued in the traditional fashion of the Argeads of being addressed by his subjects by his name without title (Plut. Demetr. 18; App. Syr. 54).34 The delay in proclaiming what must have seemed inevitable to most after the deaths of Alexander IV, Heracles, and Cleopatra, is
surprising, but with much of their authority riding on the acceptance of such titles by army and allies, caution was not an unwise policy. Their power was based on
military achievement, and that Antigonus was the first to venture forth into this new world after the twin triumphs of the liberation of Athens and the capture of