India After Modi

by Ajay Gudavarthy

  This inability to expand, yet survive, is a classical dilemma of Indian politics. Nitish Kumar who left the NDA when Modi was announced as their prime ministerial candidate went back to the same arrangement within 18 months in the government with Sushil Modi of the BJP returning as the deputy CM. Nitish Kumar felt this would check the rise of Lalu and on the other hand would disallow BJP from making inroads into the social groups that he represents, after the bifurcation of Dalits and OBCs into smaller units. Whether this will prove to be suicidal or turn out to be a survival instinct depends on how the numbers will play out in coming elections in Bihar and for Lok Sabha. But what remains pertinent for our understanding is the role micro aspects play beyond generalized considerations in Indian elections. Populism is a political template that attempts to galvanize and symbolize the fragments and reintegrate them into a larger political narrative—fragmentation and integration are two constant impulses of Indian politics.

  Populism and Caste Calculus in Uttar Pradesh

  The question that should really interest us in the outcome of the Uttar Pradesh elections is how the open-ended, universal, and ‘empty categories’ intrinsic to populism are being wedded to clinical, constituency-wise, sub-caste calculations. On the one hand, the BJP grounded its campaign on slogans such as ‘sab ka saath, sab ka vikas’ signalling a new kind of politics that rises above caste and religion; on the other, it was an open fact that its president Amit Shah was inviting new leaders into the party fold based on caste calculations. He invited former chief minister Kalyan Singh to include the Lodhs; union minister Anupriya Patel to attract the Kurmis, Rajbhars, Nishads, and Kushwahas; and UP BJP Keshav Prasad Maurya to woo the OBCs.

  In spite of this kind of a micro-calculation of including various kinds of smaller OBC and Dalit sub-castes, the BJP maintained a steadfast campaign that was based on a more universal appeal such as demonetization, which was supposed to mobilize the poor against the rich, cutting across castes. In an inverted logic, the party claimed to be above sectoral appeal by not offering a single ticket to the Muslims, in order to consolidate a more generic Hindu vote.8 The BJP would like to work with a system of representation where power sharing and participation are judged in terms of citizens as recipients of policies, not participants in the decision making.

  Fragmentation and Fraternity

  The most significant fact of BJP’s strategy was to combine the more universal ‘us versus them’ kind of divisions to create a new type of political language that operationalizes the old constituency-based identity politics infused with a new meaning. Through demonetization, it created a poor versus rich kind of binary, and by not offering tickets to Muslims, it created the old Hindu versus Muslim type of a polarization. Further, with its rhetoric against the Congress, it created the ‘past versus future’ kind of separation, with Narendra Modi projected as a decisive leader. In other words, BJP is setting a fresh agenda for the nation and designing new strategies to fight poverty. Within these broad rubrics, the BJP played the hard ball with minute caste calculations including the leaders of various non-Yadav OBCs and non-Jatav Dalits.

  This new kind of combination acknowledges the inclusion of smaller castes beyond the old kind of patron-client relation. The smaller sub-castes were in a patron-client relation and dependent on the more powerful sub-castes within both the Dalits and the OBCs. The BJP’s inclusion of smaller Dalit and OBC castes articulated the already existing discontent among the lesser- privileged castes.

  This certainly is a more inclusive politics, deepening the process of representation without acknowledging it, and thereby projecting it as if it was not based on mere caste calculations. However, in fact, it was providing new opportunities to those who were denied this previously. They were deepening the representation even as they denied this logic when it came to the Muslims, which allowed them to tone the caste-calculations in the Hindutva kind of imageries and rhetoric. It was Hindus being included and not merely Dalits or the OBCs. It was the lesser-privileged, poorer social groups being included, not merely castes. The BJP managed to further invert the old kind of communal polarization this time by raising the issue of triple talaq, which ostensibly meant to mobilize the cause of Muslim women. The party was attempting a double inversion: it was, on the one hand, ostracizing the Muslims while on the other, it was mobilizing the subordinate groups within the Muslims. It should not be a surprise if the BJP appeals to the Pasmanda Muslims during the next Lok Sabha elections in UP. Its strategy was based on the limitations of the old kind of the social justice based on the larger categories of Dalit and the OBCs. It looks like both these categories would soon be of lesser relevance for active electoral mobilization. The intra-subaltern conflicts and differences are now in the open, also reflecting the fluidity or what we earlier referred to as ‘flexibilization of caste-based politics’.

  Subalternation of the Right

  Nitish Kumar’s model discussed in the previous chapter, with regard to Bihar, was replicated by the BJP in UP. Caste groups today are fluid and can align with any party that can offer them representation. While SP and BSP became reduced to a single-caste parties that were attempting to add other castes to their kitty, the BJP was in this sense beyond caste, without being identified with any single caste. All those issues which the old kind of secular politics that became sectarian could not address, the BJP is articulating and giving a new spin. This precisely was the difference and the reason why the BJP lost in Bihar, in spite of following a similar strategy. Chief Minister and JD(U) president Nitish Kumar had sensed, as we mapped in the previous chapter, it early, and in the name of second generation social justice politics, started addressing this issue of intra-subaltern discrimination by reaching out to EBC (Extremely Backward Castes) and Maha Dalits (Most Backward Dalits). The BJP, despite best efforts, could not put in place a working coalition of these caste groups around Modi’s leadership.

  The more populist slogans of the BJP around development and projecting Modi as the strongman were subverted by the equally populist binary of ‘Bahari versus Bihari’ by Nitish Kumar’s campaign. Also, it was significant that Nitish belonged to a caste smaller in number but had greater credibility in Bihar. It was a trade-off that was seen as a win-win situation for both Nitish and Lalu. This was not possible in UP between SP and BSP, both due to leadership issues as well as the sharper conflict between the Yadavs and the Jatavs. The terrain of politics has moved to sharpen intra-subaltern conflicts that needs a political articulation, which is what the SP-BSP alliance sought to correct in their coming together for the by-polls in Uttar Pradesh. With this, they managed to wrest the safe bastion of Yogi in Gorakhpur.9

  It is an irony of Indian democracy that more inclusion is being initiated by a party that is known to be socially conservative and politically authoritarian. The Hindutva politics in India, through UP, has signalled more subalternization of political representation. In no small measure, this was the decisive shift in the strategy of the BJP after electing Narendra Modi from an OBC background as its leader.

  Telangana: The Question of Internal Colonization

  Formation of a separate state of Telangana in 2014 was a very difficult decision to take. It meant siding with a political group that was weaker in terms of money power and political presence. All the lobbying by the Joint Action Committee in the heyday of the Telangana movement could have been scuttled, even if not very easily. It needed an extraordinary sense of history and some sense of justice for the decision to be taken against a very powerful lobby run by the leaders of coastal Andhra. However, the lack of clarity on why Telangana was created and whether or not this was the best way to resolve the long-standing complaint of backwardness and ‘internal colonization’ is perhaps apparent in the manner in which the Congress party went about it once it decided to create a separate state of Telangana. Jairam Ramesh, in his book, Old Histories, New Geographies provides an account of how the decisions regarding the modalities of bifurcation came to be taken. While there is some ac
knowledgment that his party recognized the backwardness of Telangana, the process he narrates and the decisions that came to be taken do not, however, seem to be guided by the commitment to undoing a historical wrong.

  The decisions seem to have been taken by treating Telangana and coastal Andhra at par. What, then, was the pressure to form a separate state?

  This, in a sense, gets reflected in Ramesh’s concluding observation that, ‘In the successor state of Andhra Pradesh, I am still considered a villain and in the state of Telangana, I am believed to have bent over backwards to appease Seemandhra sentiments’.10 This is a rather candid admission, which was reflected in the political fortunes of the Congress in the assembly elections in both Andhra Pradesh and Telangana in 2014. The party was nearly wiped out in Andhra Pradesh and fared worse than expected in Telangana.

  Demand for a Separate State

  The nuts and bolts narration in this book sheds light on how tenuous the situation was—even after a long period of consultations. There was a possibility that the decision could fail to come through at many stages, including when a Congress MP decided to use pepper spray to disturb the proceedings.

  Ramesh narrates quite a few interesting incidents where he had to convince his own party members, who were up in arms, both inside and outside Parliament. In one particular incident, BJP’s Venkaiah Naidu decided to move three or four amendments to the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Bill, 2014, in the Rajya Sabha. Ramesh writes, ‘My heart sank when I heard this. If these amendments were to pass, the government would be in a serious bind and we would have to go back to the Lok Sabha for approval. And there was no time for that’.11

  He further sheds light on the various meetings that took place as part of the working of the GoM. The proceedings included debates on special status to Andhra Pradesh, role and powers of the governor, status of Hyderabad, education and Article 371-D, Polavaram dam and issues of displacement, managing water resources, and internal security concerns. Here, one gets a sense of the opposing concerns and claims and how the Group of Ministers (GoM) managed to arrive at a decision. Given the birth pangs that the formation of the state underwent, it is only imperative to ask if the issue of backwardness got addressed with the formation of Telangana. Did it meet the demands and expectations of the various social groups who aspired for a smaller state? Do smaller states lead to more equality or even a better quality of life for the majority of population groups?

  How Is Telangana Doing?

  The state was formed after a prolonged agitation and popular protest, largely as a fall out of the deep agrarian crisis, growing unemployment, and cultural denigration. We need to ask how Telangana is doing now.

  The most visible change has been in the situation regarding power supply. The power supply that was not only irregular but also contributed to the agrarian crisis has improved dramatically. Today, all villages get uninterrupted power supply to the households and for six hours for the agricultural purposes, which the new government has promised to increase to nine in the next few months and 24/7 free from 2018 onwards.

  The government, immediately after assuming power, announced a loan waiver up to `1 lakh per family. However, this was waived in instalments of 25% every six months. According to the farmers that I met in course of a survey, this has not really helped them to get rid of the loans, and instead, they continue to reel under debts as most of the waiver is being used to pay the interests and the principal amount is being repaid only partially in small amounts. Further, they pointed out that there is no policy for providing support price or subsidies on inputs such as fertilizers, and no compensation being provided for crop failure.

  Agrarian Crisis

  Water continues to be a major problem in much of Telangana. Most of the projects are either contested in the water tribunal, or many of the pending ones have not been cleared or completed. The government has instead taken up the project called ‘Mission Kakatiya’ under which old lakes, ponds, and other water bodies that had dried up are re-dug, hoping that a good monsoon will fill them up. In a few districts, free borewells are being supplied but the ground water level is too low (in most cases bores go as deep as 800 metre to strike water). Similarly, under ‘Mission Bhagiratha’, the Telengana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) government has promised to provide tap water for every household. Labour and wages remain the other major problems in the agrarian sector. While wages have not risen for the landless after the formation of Telangana, farmers holding land continue to complain about the lack of the availability of labour making agriculture untenable.

  Many of the farmers now demand that the labour under the rural job scheme (MNREGA) needs to be shifted for agricultural purposes instead of other developmental activities, which they believe in any case, are not of much use. The policy of Re 1 per kg rice scheme with 6 kg of rice per person is a very effective scheme providing great relief to the BPL families. Along with the rice scheme, the government’s pension scheme is also popular in the rural hinterlands of Telangana. The new government has increased the pension amount from `200 to `1,000. In the last one year, after the formation of Telangana, close to 900 farmers have committed suicides, next only to Maharashtra where 2,568 farmers committed suicide.

  The agrarian crisis was the single most important reason why the demand for Telangana erupted. Questions need to be raised if it continues to be of priority for the new government. While it has disbursed a range of welfare-oriented policies (much of which are a continuation of the policies formulated by the previous Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy’s government), the agrarian crisis is yet to be averted and it needs some pressing and fast-paced steps from the government to stop further suicides.

  Populist Policies

  Similarly, alongside the farmers are the Muslims, the other social group that remains marginalized in Telangana. Under the YSR government, Muslims were awarded 4% reservation as part of the OBC reservations. The TRS government has promised to enhance it to 12%. The Subramanium Committee, instituted in 2007, had identified 28 groups out of which 14 groups were made ineligible for reservation due to their superior social status, including sects such as Sheiks, Sayeeds, and Pathans.

  These, in a sense, are perhaps the few communities that can afford higher education but having been denied the provision of reservation, we find almost 80% dropouts among Muslims. There is an impending need to provide educational loans and build social welfare hostels, which contributed in a big way towards improving literacy among the SC/STs. The most popular policy that has struck a chord among the Muslims is ‘Shaadi Mubarak’ where the government offers `50,000 to perform the marriage of girls from the economically weaker sections (the Hindu counterpart ‘Kalyana Laxmi’, with similar grant).

  Most of the Muslims continue to be self-employed and without landholding in the rural hinterlands of Telangana. They continue to live under conditions of social segregation, fear, and many a time are implicated in false cases of crime. Culturally, Telangana had a strong Sufi tradition, and even today, besides Muslims, a large number of Hindus visit dargahs. Perhaps, political parties such as the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM) are not the best representatives of this tradition. It is a literal everyday tussle between the social and political worlds. Chief Minister K. Chandrasekhar Rao performed Chandi Yaga at a whopping cost of ?7 crore. In order to balance his pro-Muslim policies, he has also appointed a Muslim as the deputy chief minister (CM). It is also a move to capture the space that the BJP-RSS combine has been laboriously building with manufactured issues of Charminar being built over the destruction of a temple and recalling the memory of Nizam’s rule and role of Razakars in wantonly using physical force against the Hindus.

  Smaller states like Telangana have given an immediate relief but the major issues remain the same as in any other state, including the issue of farmer suicides, jobless growth, and growing economic inequality between social groups and regions. Today in Telangana, farmers and students are the unhappy lot. Current TRS government has an ongoing conflict with
the students of Osmania University who were the backbone of the struggle for a separate state. Smaller states have also weakened the federal set-up instead of strengthening it. It has led to a strong centre and weak states undermining their bargaining capacity depending on their financial clout and the number of Members of parliament (MPs) they send to the parliament. This is true of Andhra Pradesh too that has been struggling for a ‘special status’. Smaller states work in halting the centralization of capital and wealth among a few castes, and it redistributes the wealth within the regional elite and creates nominal opportunities for the rural and urban poor. It shifts the hold from ‘internal colonization’ of one region over the other but seems to have no means of addressing more structural of issues. Why is it that in spite of colonization being questioned, it does not yield to an alternative model of development? The question of ‘internal colonization’ remains a very relevant issue in India since the days of reorganization of states.

  Kashmir: Is It Also a Question of Internal Colonization?

  Kashmir has remained in turmoil and simmering since the current regime under Mr Modi took over the reins in the centre. It remains central to the agenda and strategy of Hindutva in the rest of India. What has been the dominant mood in the valley under the current regime? And what has been the ‘Kashmir policy’ of the BJP? Why did the BJP align with a pro-separatist party such as the PDP and why did the alliance not last its full term? What was the nature of the hidden tension between the PDP and the BJP that eventually led to the dissolution of this unlikely coalition?