India After Modi

by Ajay Gudavarthy

  Secularism, in essence, is the ability to forge friendships with unlikely social groups or the ability to express solidarity with strangers. It is, in a sense, the opposite of xenophobia, which means phobia of strangers. If the idea is to strike at the root of xenophobia and build friendships, and not merely tolerate the differences, then surely secularism needs to have a wider canvas than merely being obsessed with the way the state deals with the issue of religious differences. Even that role of the state has to be toned with the essential philosophical compass of how best to forge close-knit ties between different cultural groups—not merely religious but also caste, ethnic, regional, and linguistic, among others. All of these ties concern secularism as a social philosophy.

  Secularism and Neo-liberalism

  The wider canvas in the context of India, and elsewhere too, should beg the question: Can we afford secular ethos in society without a welfare state? After the 1990s, India has been unsuccessfully struggling for a secular society with a neoliberal state that practically destroyed the legitimacy of any kind of shared ethos, supplanting it with an aggressive market-oriented competitive ethic. The decline of the Congress party and the rise of the Right wing, narrow nationalism in part overlaps with the rolling back of a welfare state replaced by a private ethic of individual responsibility and voluntary association.

  A welfare state is not merely about doles and subsidies, but a state policy formulated around universal welfare and protection of dignity where no individual or social group suffers the indignity of poverty, exclusion, scarcity, or basic needs. The dismantling of the welfare state was in effect also the undoing of the secular ethos. Secularism was inbuilt in the idea that ‘basic’ needs such as education, health, and environment, among others are public goods that cannot be subjected to private trade and commerce. Economist Amartya Sen rightly pointed out that the problem of unemployment was not merely that of economic resources but that it is a question of lack of dignity, which cannot be provided for by council housing and a monthly stipend of the state. Can we, therefore, achieve secularism in society without a social democratic state?27

  Further, if secularism is a social philosophy of thick friendships and cross-cultural bonds, then it has to be guided by compassion and not merely a policy of tolerance. Philosopher Martha Nussbaum refers to this as an expansion of the ‘circle of concern’, which has to go beyond the immediate identity that we are born into.28 Such social concern has to be nurtured and made an integral part of the political culture of any nation. State policy here is not merely about how to avoid cultural and religious conflicts but also about how to nurture thick social bonds.

  The question of ethics has been left by the liberal-secular states to religion, schools, and family, which became foundational for Right-wing mobilization. Again, as Nussbaum points out, today we need to debate if the state too can mobilize secular ethics without leaving them to private institutions.29 For instance, it could well be within the reach of the state to formulate policies that make mixed neighbourhoods mandatory in urban housing schemes.30 The state could devise policies in accordance with population percentage to make it mandatory in government housing schemes for individuals from different religious, caste, and ethnic groups to cohabit.

  Similarly, the state can also make it mandatory in public/government and private educational institutions to admit a certain percentage of children from different religious and caste groups. Schools today have become havens of social isolation where children of similar economic and social backgrounds socialize, and they are deeply unaware of the kind of social diversity that exists outside their little worlds. The New Education Policy partly began this process, though it recognized only the criterion of economic status and provided for 25% reserved seats for children from economically deprived backgrounds, even that have met with stiff resistance.

  Beyond Minoritization

  Finally, secularism is not merely about the generosity of the majority communities; it also includes the responsibilities of minority communities towards collective living. The practices internal to minority communities are not merely issues that concern the minorities; they have ramifications on the way majority communities perceive, alter, and structure their relations with the minorities. This includes the question of inclusion and dignity of ‘minorities within minorities’, be it that of sub-castes within the scheduled castes, be it the question of gender, or of Pasmanda Muslims within the Muslim community. Denial of equal opportunities and justice to these internal minorities provides sufficient justification for the exclusion by the majority communities. Minorities cannot promote ‘selective secularism’.

  Similarly, minority social groups need to take responsibility not to merely protect their identities in an essentialized mode but need to strive to make positive claims as citizens. This includes not merely demanding an equal share in resources but also equal responsibility in speaking for all other marginalized social groups. In the case of India, Muslim social and political organizations need to learn to speak about the issues of the tribals, Dalits, and others. It is this voluntary apportioning of social responsibility that stalls the process of social ghettoization of the religious minorities in India. It is akin to anti-caste crusader Jyotiba Phule including even Brahmin women in his idea of shudrasthishudra and Dalit Panthers referring to all dispossessed as Dalits. It is also an expression of the ethics of compassion and solidarity with others beyond one’s own immediate identity by birth. Indian secularism has promoted ‘secular sectarianism’ of the minorities that have for long stopped imagining of collectives beyond themselves making it easy for Right-wing politics to represent them as insular, closed, and inward-looking.31

  Re-imagining secularism as a social philosophy of compassion and an act of friendship with strangers is an imperative pre-condition to guide the state policy. In turn, secularism, as a distinct social philosophy, holds clues to the possible ways in which future politics need to be reconstructed in India. The future of politics squarely lies on how far we can collectively restore and inform our institutional arrangements with deeper social roots.

  Bringing Justice Back In

  The workings of democracy are based on principles of justice. Recognition, redistribution, and representation are three distinct but inextricably linked dimensions of justice in the contemporary world. However, in the social and political dynamics, that we are currently witnessing in India, not only are these three different dimensions being pulled in different directions but are also actively undermining, blocking, and even cancelling out each other.

  By the 1980s, with a failing economy marred by the crisis in Balance of Payments (BOP), lack of political will to implement land reforms, marginal benefits reaching out due to pilferages in poverty alleviation programmes, collapse of primary education in the rural areas, and misrecognition created by progressive redistributive policies such as the reservations based on a quota system, the political landscape shifted from an emphasis on redistribution to the emergence of ‘politics of recognition’ that increasingly took the shape of identity politics.

  This was the phase where, for instance, Dalit politics shifted to a political discourse on claiming dignity against the caste-Hindu propaganda, against reservations being anti-merit, valourizing Dalit lifestyle issues such as beef eating, separate religious symbols and rituals, conversion, and a heightened rhetoric against dominant Brahmanical practices in a Hindu public sphere.This process, in a sense, culminated in the rise of political mobilization of Dalits as an independent social constituency that fructified in the phenomenon of the rise of the BSP. The BSP further strengthened the identity politics and claims to cultural recognition in taking up agenda such as of establishing Ambedkar Parks and statues, and in the process, dropped economic agenda and even social agenda such as demanding free and compulsory primary education for all.

  In the current phase, the discourse further shifted from recognition to singular emphasis on representation. This is visible in strategies adopted by social activis
ts such as Thirumavalan in TamilNadu arguing against conversions since it has the propensity of reducing the Dalits to a numerical minority in converting to Islam or Christianity, while remaining a sizeable majority is imperative to gain political power and representation for the Dalits, as we argued in some detail about Dalit Panthers in the previous section. Further, remaining within the Hindu fold was necessary to remain eligible to claim reservations for economic and educational opportunities. Not only did such strategies over a period of time lead to supplanting an active agenda for a separate cultural recognition outside the Hindu fold and issues of dignity and humiliation but also opened new avenues for renewed claims to Hindu identity and smudged the difference with far-Right Hindutva politics. It is in this context that one can make sense of the widening possibilities of BJP gaining support among the marginalized social groups such as the Dalits and the OBCs, with its preparedness to offer them political representation.

  Similarly, with the OBCs, certain sections within them had economic and political power/representation but were considered socially backward mainly due to poor educational qualifications and their absence from modern economy. While extending the provision of reservations through the OBC quota in the 1990s, in a sense, helped fight the misrecognition emerging from the policy of reservations, with OBCs making a more vigorous and unapologetic claim. It, however, also led to a phenomenon of traditional social elites such as the Jats, Rajputs, and the Marathas claiming the OBC status, and now Gujjars demanding the ST status. This once again blocked a process of internal redistribution of resources and economic opportunities within the OBCs as it happened within the various sub-castes within the Dalits.

  This brought into light the question of ‘classes within castes’ and the possibility of reservations and representation turning into ‘weapons of the strong’ with relatively more marginalized social groups within the Dalits and the OBCs falling through the cracks. In the emergent scenario, it is perhaps the Muslims who have remained marginalized across all the three dimensions of justice, with very little economic and educational opportunities, remaining culturally stigmatized and ghettoized, and shrinking in political representation. The somewhat unprecedented victory of the BJP in the general elections brought to the fore the new possibility of winning elections without the support of the religious minorities signifying a new kind of ‘politics without minorities’. Even in a new state like Telangana, which has a sizeable population of Muslims, there is a drastic reduction in providing representation to the Muslims by all major political parties and not BJP alone.

  Feminization of Labour

  At one end of the spectrum is the growth of inequalities being uneven in the sense of providing new economic opportunities for social groups that were kept out, reflected in phenomenon such as ‘feminization of labour’ and migration of marginalized social castes and classes to urban metropolitan cities from their traditional habitation in rural areas, and at the other end is the growing distress, displacement, dispossession, and impoverishment that has resulted in dependence on governmental schemes for subsistence living. Both these dynamics have contributed to a steady decline in the social mobilization and protest politics of the subaltern groups, reflected in the decline of the trade union movement of the workers and the farmers’ movements.

  The streets vacated by the subaltern have in turn been occupied by the newly emergent urban middle classes visible in street protests against urban crime and corruption. The newly emergent social elites among the Dalits and the OBCs constituting the new middle classes have also further extended their support to the neoliberal reforms and the language of growth and governance, eclipsing the social and economic demands of the relatively marginalized social groups within them. The demands of realizing justice continue to require bringing together the three dimensions of redistribution, recognition, and representation into a new kind of alignment, without which there would be large sections of the population that would remain without basic economic capabilities, dignity, and an opportunity to represent themselves. The source and possibility of generating such alternative political strategies will continue to remain in defining what the future of politics will look like in India.

  Mezzanine Elites and Alternative Political Strategies

  As we pointed out, interest in justice will make it imperative to raise new questions that have remained shrouded in the public discourse in India. One of the new phenomena gradually unfolding in Indian democracy is that of the underprivileged within dominant castes.32 This issue was undermined for long as there was no political language to articulate their interests. While on the one hand, we have the phenomenon of new social elites, as we have pointed out, emerging among the subaltern Dalit and OBC social groups, there is also issue of the disadvantaged among the more dominant castes such as the Patidars in Gujarat, Vokkaligas and Lingayats in Karnataka, Kapus in Andhra, Jats in Haryana, and finally, the question of the poor among the Brahmins in parallel.

  While Dalits and the OBCs are moving to the centre stage through a definitive impact in determining the contours of representation and political power, with a small section among the OBCs also having economic power, they remain socially backward and slighted. Those among the so-called forward castes, especially the Brahmins, have become politically less relevant and enjoy very little of economic power but continue to hold on to their social and cultural capital, in terms of education and ritual status. For instance, Brahmins have had all through disproportionate representation as public representatives, bureaucrats, and in various white-collared professions. It is this disproportionate share that marked them as elites who needed to be dislodged from other caste groups to find mobility. However, a sizeable section of these dominant groups, including the Brahmins, have either been economically poor or have become impoverished due to the changing social dynamics. How do we characterize these social groups and assess their impact on processes of democratization?

  Both the new elites among the Dalit and OBCs and the disadvantaged sections of the so-called forward castes are not elites in the traditional sense of the term, either sociologically or historically. They are best typified as mezzanine elites. It is imperative to understand the dynamics internal to these mezzanine elites. Most of the Brahmins have migrated from the rural hinterlands to towns and cities. They either lost lands or sold them in order to keep up with the changing economic pressures. The traditional occupation of priesthood has become economically unviable and socially unprivileged. Other professions such as Ayurvedic doctors have also become unfeasible. A large section of Brahmins (it is estimated up to 13%) in smaller towns have no property and means for proper higher education. They are finding it difficult to get government jobs and often settle for small-time private jobs, and face financial difficulties that we often associate with the so-called lower castes. There are a number of cases of young men working as priests in local temples facing the difficulty of even finding a suitable bride, as parents are not prepared for such matches owing to lower income levels and uncertain futures. Further, young men of such families are ill-prepared to take up manual jobs as they find them demeaning.

  Reverse Stigma?

  The old hierarchies continue to plague them, and they are also victims of ‘reverse stigma’ where doing an odd job is seen as a loss of earlier social status. They often face public ridicule, opening the wedge between the poor economic condition and continued self-claims of higher social status. Many of these families continue to practice the discriminatory caste-practices but now more in the private domain rather than in public.

  For instance, they continue to be essentially vegetarians and believe in its superiority over a non-vegetarian diet. This, they believe, can continue as a cultural practice rather than a discriminatory practice because all other castes too have their own caste-based practices. The moot question is whether practices that symbolized discrimination in the past can acquire the character of a cultural practice. Can they be practised in the private domain without being scrutinized
by public standards?

  There is a late realization among a few that what Brahmins are facing today is a ‘punishment’ for their past deeds. They are socially ‘injured’ and cannot imagine replicating the discrimination they stridently pursued in the past. They realize that the other castes need a share of opportunities and dignity that was denied to them for centuries. Further, they also seem to see the point that it is also not practically possible to discriminate castes that have gained political power and economic advantage over a period of time.

  There is also a loss of respect for ritual status and religious practices in the public domain. Fast-paced development has pushed religion to the backwaters of everyday social life. Other castes seem to be distinctly more united and organized in comparison to the Brahmins who are weak in terms of their capacity to socially and politically mobilize themselves.

  Many of these poor Brahmins now see good education as their only source of a good life. They feel that some kind of financial help and government schemes need to be launched in order to pull them out of their vulnerable economic position. Many, in fact, feel that poor Brahmins today need reservations and scholarships in order to qualify and pursue higher education. The government of Andhra Pradesh has announced a new scheme called ‘Vidya Bharathi’ in order to help Brahmins from poor families and Brahmin Parishad in Telangana.33 Other parties such as the YSR (Congress) have promised fee reimbursement. Even Mayawati was toying with 5% reservation for Brahmins from poorer backgrounds. New social and non-governmental organizations such as the Brahmin Parishad and Dhanwantri have been started in order to pursue welfare activities.34

  When we are witnessing attacks against the Dalits and return of symbols such as the sanctity of the cow as a religious symbol and public lynching by the Gau Rakhshaks, and they are being aggressively pursued symbolizing a counter-revolution, how do we negotiate with the vulnerabilities of the underprivileged sections of the dominant groups? Does it need to be debated as to how this phenomenon is different from the newly emerging elites among the subaltern caste groups? This ongoing fragmentation of social processes while signifying social change and emergent social equality at one level nevertheless raises at another level a set of questions about notions of equality itself.