One False Step

by Richard Tongue

Army Ordinance Satellite Program, Paul S. Satterfield, David S. Akens, United States Army, 1958

  Building a Strategic Air Force, Walton S. Moody, Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995

  Countdown to Decision, John B. Medaris, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960

  History of the Jupiter Missile System, James M. Grimwood and Francis Strowd, Army Ordinance Missile Command, 1962

  History of the Redstone Missile System, John W. Bullard, Army Missile Command, 1965

  Project Horizon, Volume I: Summary and Supporting Considerations, United States Army, 1959

  Project Horizon, Volume II: Technical Considerations and Plans, United States Army, 1959

  Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story of America's Space Espionage, Philip Taubman, Simon & Schuster, 2003

  Stages to Saturn, Roger E. Bilstein, University Press of Florida, 2003

  The First Space Race, Matt Bille and Erika Lishock, Texas A&M University Press, 2004

  The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor/Jupiter Controversy, Michael H. Armacost, Columbia University Press, 1969

  The Vanguard Satellite Launching System: An Engineering Summary, B. Klaurans, The Martin Company, 1960

  The Viking Rocket Story, Milton W. Rosen, Faber and Faber, 1955

  This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury, Loyd S. Swenson, James M. Grimwood and Charles C. Alexander, NASA, 1966

  Vanguard: A History, Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, NASA, 1970

  Chapter 2: Two Men To The Moon

   During the first decade of manned space exploration, NASA operated three manned programs. Mercury came first, and was an extremely limited capsule. Its goal was to prove that man could survive in space; this it accomplished in a series of six manned flights, with Gordon Cooper setting the Mercury endurance record with the final flight. Whilst there was some limited control of the craft afforded the pilot, it was extremely restricted; even so, its provision proved vital.

   The limited potential of Mercury was known from the start; it was never considered for long-term operations. As a result, the more advanced Apollo project was initiated in 1960, a year before Kennedy's famous 'end of the decade' speech; at the time, its goals were rather less grand, concentrating on advanced Earth-orbital operations, with the goal of circumlunar flights in the 1970s. On this schedule, the United States might, if funding had been maintained, put a man on the moon at some time during the Carter administration.

   When John F. Kennedy through down the gauntlet to the world, and specifically to NASA, a more rapid pace of operations was required. Apollo would be the spacecraft designed to carry men to the moon, but this would delay its introduction to service. The Apollo CSM would be one of the most – if not the most – complicated pieces of equipment ever constructed, a project matched by the titanic booster that was required to put it on the moon.

   Even though at the time a rather simpler mission profile was adopted than the one finally selected – direct-ascent, which did not require any complicated rendezvous and docking manoeuvres to be perfected – it was still recognised that a lot more needed to be known about spaceflight, and that this could not wait for the arrival of the Apollo capsule. So, “Mercury Mark II”, was born.

   This project would serve to fill the gap between Mercury and Apollo, and provide additional information on operating in outer space. Techniques and systems that would be used in Apollo could be tested, and a team of trained astronauts produced to lead later operations. It was not long before the cumbersome and increasingly inaccurate, “Mercury Mark II” was dropped in favour of a name that reflected the design intention of the capsule, to carry two men into orbit – Gemini. The project was announced on December 7th, 1961 – it would take three years to come to fruition.

   One of the first changes to the lunar program to affect Gemini was the adoption of a new landing profile, Lunar Orbital Rendezvous (LOR). Unlike Direct-Ascent, only a small portion of the spacecraft complex would land on the moon, far reducing the amount of propellant provided. This technique reduced the size of the booster required to put Apollo on the moon, but also meant that the complicated process of rendezvous and docking would need to be perfected, and this would be the ultimate goal of Gemini – and after its conclusion, would perhaps become what Gemini is best remembered for.

   As well as this important task, Gemini would test the ability of astronauts to function over extended periods, setting a series of new endurance records for American astronauts and proving that the length of mission currently under consideration for Apollo was feasible. A wide range of scientific tests were also planned, but the primary goal of Gemini was simple – prove the techniques required for Apollo.

   Just as the Mercury was launched on an Atlas ICBM, the Gemini would also use an Air Force missile to reach space – the larger Titan ICBM, capable of throwing a larger load into orbit. Twelve flights were planned, and though initially eleven of them were to be manned, ten manned flights were ultimately authorised, preceded by a pair of unmanned test shots. The Gemini 1 and 2 flights were satisfactory, and man-rated the capsule. (Indeed, the Gemini 2 capsule was later used again – it would later be sent into space by the USAF as part of the testing for their Manned Orbiting Laboratory spacecraft, again unmanned.)

   The first manned Gemini, Gemini 3, launched on March 23, 1965, on a short test-flight to prove that the Gemini worked in manned orbital flight; this was a complete success, and was followed shortly thereafter by another breakthrough flight on Gemini 4, when Ed White made the first American spacewalk – this flight also set a new American duration record, with the crew spending three days in space.

   The earliest stages of the Gemini program were designed to test the human element of the equation, setting further duration records on Gemini 5 and Gemini 7, of eight- and fourteen-days respectively. The Gemini was not notorious for its comfort on long-duration missions, but these two flights did prove that man could live and work in space over the length of time required to put a man on the moon and return him to the Earth.

   The second half of Project Gemini was dominated by the development of the key techniques of rendezvous and docking. The first mission that was meant to be a docking test was Gemini 6, but the target vehicle, an Atlas-Agena, failed and instead, the flight plan was hurriedly changed to a rendezvous with Gemini 7, the first true rendezvous of two manned spacecraft.

   Gemini 8 was the next attempt, and this too went awry; the commander of the spacecraft, none other than Neil Armstrong, managed to dock with the target successfully, but the craft then malfunctioned, sending the docked complex into a violent series of spins. Though he was able to bring the craft under some sort of control, so much fuel was used that an immediate return to Earth was required – but he had completed the first manned docking of two spacecraft.

   The remaining four Gemini missions were almost anticlimaxes in comparison. Each of them consisted of one rendezvous and docking, and new spacewalk procedures were tested and demonstrated. Gemini 11 set an altitude record, with the Agena firing to push the Gemini into a higher 850-mile orbit. By any estimation, the Gemini was a successful spacecraft, accomplishing all of its planned objectives and placing the United States firmly on the road that would lead it to the moon on Apollo, giving NASA a technological maturity that it had lacked before.

   There were many who thought, however, that the Gemini might have more potential than it was being afforded by its place in NASA's lunar plan. As early as 1961, in the early days of vehicle design, there was some discussion that the Gemini could go beyond Earth orbit, and could venture as far as the moon – years earlier than with Project Apollo.

   The plan originated with the final planning for 'Mercury Mark II', and would rely on the use of a second vehicle to propel the Gemini to the moon. This was intended as the climax of an intended prolonged Gemini development program; under the original plan submitted to NASA, there would be fourteen manned flights, rather than ten. The final fou
r flights would dock with a Centaur, instead of the Agena. The Centaur, like the Agena, was an upper stage that could be fitted to an Atlas rocket, and used as a docking target for the Gemini spacecraft – but the Centaur had far greater thrust than the Agena.

   The first two flights would in many ways resemble Gemini 11, and would simply see the Gemini boosted to a high altitude – though 80,000 miles above the Earth, instead of the 850 miles that Gemini 11 rose to. These would provide a test of deep-space operations, sending the spacecraft a third of the way to the Moon, and preparing for the final two flights – which would send the Gemini spacecraft around the Moon on a lunar flyby, again using the Centaur for the final boost. (This mission profile had many similarities to the Soviet Zond series of missions.) It was estimated that these circumlunar missions could be flown as early as 1965.

   NASA received two plans for Gemini operations. The first, as described, had fourteen manned missions, but the second streamlined that down to just nine, including one unmanned mission to begin with. The docking and rendezvous techniques that in reality were the goals of six of the last seven Gemini spacecraft would be condensed down into just two missions, to be followed by the four missions that concluded the longer program. Not only would this be a cheaper program, but it was thought that the first of the missions on this schedule might be flown in 1964.

   These proposals made some sense at the time. Apollo was still being projected as a 'direct-ascent' craft, designed as one complete spacecraft, all of which would land on the moon. This would limit its suitability for other operations – using the Gemini for the first circumlunar missions could be sensible. Another key advantage was cost; adding these missions to the roster of Gemini missions, even with the increased development costs, would have proven substantially cheaper than Apollo. However, it had one major flaw in the minds of the senior NASA management – it would weaken the case for Apollo.

   Apollo had been promulgated from the first as the lunar-landing spacecraft. A lot of care was being taken to associate 'Apollo' with the moon; proposals to send the cheaper Gemini to the moon years earlier would have resulted in a lot of questions being asked in relation to the necessity to develop Apollo at all, a spacecraft that all admitted would have superior capabilities to the more primitive Gemini.

   When the plans were submitted again, all mentions that the Gemini might orbit the moon were omitted, with only a vague suggestion that, “if a spacecraft such as the Centaur were used as the docking target, the spacecraft would then have a large velocity potential for more extensive investigations.” The door was left open for a potential flight if the opportunity allowed, but it was retained for in-house studies. Apollo remained supreme.

   The suggestion of using Gemini for lunar flights continued, however. The Gemini Project Manager, Jim Chamberlin, suggested that instead of simply flying around the moon, the Gemini could be used to make a landing on it. This would not use the Titan as a launcher, but would utilise the Saturn launcher being developed for the Apollo program, and would use the lunar-orbital rendezvous technique to land a man on the moon. This plan fitted into the accelerated Gemini program schedule that had been outlined. Gemini 13 and Gemini 14 would have flown the circumlunar mission as previously described, with Gemini 15 going into orbit around the moon. Gemini 16 – in January 1966 – would have landed a man on the moon.

   As an interesting footnote, this was one of the first times that lunar-orbit rendezvous was suggested as the method of landing on the moon, as opposed to the direct-ascent and earth-orbital-rendezvous plans under consideration for Apollo. Although this would be the method eventually adopted for Apollo, it still failed to convince NASA management as an option for Gemini. Were Gemini to be used for the lunar landing, it would have made the funding for Apollo harder to obtain; the mission was simply to land a man on the moon, with no set requirement as to how, and no mention of any sort of scientific program.

   Finally, in order to get the Mercury Mark II project approved, the final submitted development plan excluded any mention of the moon, stripping it down to twelve flights, ten of which would be manned, all of which would be used to support plans for Apollo operations. Even the deep-space sorties were removed from the manifest. There was still some risk at this time that 'Mercury Mark II' might have been skipped in favour of a stripped-down Apollo, known at the time as 'Apollo A'; the final twelve-flight proposal led to its acceptance as the interim program.

   This was far from being the death of Gemini as a lunar-landing vehicle. In 1962, while the discussion over the method of landing on the moon was taking place, a series of studies were commissioned on the best methods of reaching the moon at a realistic cost within the deadline imposed by President Kennedy; as part of a 'Direct Apollo' study, the idea of using Gemini to land on the moon was resurrected.

   Rather than employing any form of rendezvous, this would have used a Saturn booster to land a modified Gemini capsule on the moon itself, equipped with a landing stage to permit it to drop two astronauts onto the moon. (To get a good idea of what this configuration would have looked like, the Robert Altman movie Countdown uses a similar design for its 'Pilgrim' lander.) This design was never more than an in-house design study, but it proved that such a concept was feasible given the capacities of the Gemini system.

   Two years would pass before the idea of using Gemini for lunar applications returned. By 1964, Gemini was beginning its series of missions, and already proving a popular spacecraft. While in Mercury the astronaut was barely more than a passenger, despite some attempts to provide a measure of control, Gemini by contrast was flown, and was already proving itself capable of complicated manoeuvres; it was well on the way to becoming a proven spacecraft.

   This was not the case with Apollo. Apollo was facing a series of delays, and plans to fly on the Saturn I booster had been cancelled, leaving an extended gap before any missions could be flown. For at least two years, only Gemini would be available for manned missions, and some discussions over the possibility of sending Gemini to the moon resumed. McDonnell began an extended study of the concept, despite Wernher Von Braun suggesting that the only reason for a Gemini to be sent around the moon would be, “a possible project to salvage this country's prestige if the manned lunar goal proves impossible.”

   The conclusion was that such a flight was certainly within the limits of possibility. The designs for a 14-day Gemini were suitable with some modifications; the key problem would be the heat shield, which would require significant strengthening to cope with the increased translunar velocities. The profile suggested that a Saturn IB launcher with a hydrogen third-stage would be required for a single-launch flight to the moon. Other options were suggested; a Titan III launcher could be used to place the lunar Gemini into orbit, and another launcher could place a vehicle such as the Centaur in position to boost the Gemini into the translunar trajectory. The possibility of using on-orbit refuelling was also suggested – two Titan III launchers would be used, the first to fly the Gemini, the other to provide the additional fuel required.

   Realistically, a dual-launch option would have been required; the whole point of the study was due to delays to the Apollo, and they were partly caused by delays to the Saturn family of launchers. The Titan had the virtue of being available for flight (though admittedly it could have led to conflicts with the Air Force, whose launcher it was). The 1964 plans for a translunar Gemini were essentially the same as the plans outlined in 1961; the basic design philosophies had not changed.

   Neither had the reason for the original rejection. Von Braun's reaction was typical of the attitudes within NASA. Apollo was the prestige project, and although Gemini was ongoing, Apollo was where the majority of attention and funding was focused; the prestige of the agency was certainly still tied up with Apollo, and so once again, the idea of a lunar project was stillborn.

   There was still one last resurgence of the Lunar Gemini proposal, in 1965. This would use the codename, 'Large Ea
rth Orbit' to camouflage an attempt to have a lunar flyby mission authorised. While in training for Gemini 5, astronaut Pete Conrad learned of the original lunar proposals for Gemini, and attempted to have them reinstated for a later Gemini mission he hoped to fly, utilising the Gemini-Centaur combination. The request got as far as Congress, and some interest was evinced in that body for such a flight, leading to inquiries of NASA management.

   As a response to the proposal, NASA Administrator James Webb wrote to influential Congressmen Olin Teague, the chairman of the NASA oversight committee, stating that, “if additional funds were available, I believe that it would be in the national interest to use those on the Apollo program.” He even conceded that it was possible that the Soviet Union would reach the moon first on a flyby mission, but was still extremely reluctant to use an alternate program that might beat Apollo.

   As with all the other lunar Gemini proposals, this one was dropped in order to avoid any distractions from Apollo; the only remnant was the high-altitude flight, taking Gemini 11 – commanded by Pete Conrad – to a new record altitude; he managed to sell NASA on this mission with the benefits of higher-altitude photography than had been possible before by manned craft.

   While there were no serious proposals for sending the Gemini spacecraft to the moon after 1965, a few more in-house studies did take place; there was some discussion of using the Gemini spacecraft as a potential landing vehicle to provide a rescue capability for a stranded Apollo lander. Similar studies suggested the use of the Gemini capsule in a logistic role. Both faltered on the illogic of developing two lunar landing systems when by then, the Apollo landing system was well-developed.

   The studies commissioned between 1961-65 did prove definitively that a Lunar Gemini project was feasible. The reality of the situation was that those who rejected the plan were quite correct – it would have adversely affected the work taking place on Apollo. If a cheaper lunar alternative existed, especially one that promised to get America to the moon earlier than the more expensive Apollo, then enormous pressure would have been imposed on the NASA Administration to adopt the plan.