Ring of Fire

by Simon Hughes

  ‘When I went to Liverpool, I felt very prepared because I had experienced management at every level, from amateur to international. My time as technical director was very important because it taught me how to step back and look at everything from above. You could not be a coach on the field all of the time. With France, I prepared a game in a ten-day window. As technical director, I learned how to prepare for the next ten years. I realized I had to win trophies very quickly at Liverpool, because that is the demand. But I realized too it was a long-term job. I realized Liverpool needed somebody to oversee everything.’

  Four months after arriving at Anfield, results were not good and the squad was confused by the arrangement in the dugout. While the old players turned to Evans, the new deferred to Houllier. The relationship was dysfunctional and Houllier suggested at a board meeting he would agree to Evans finishing the campaign in sole charge before handing over the reins to Houllier, providing the desire was there.

  ‘It did not work because we had different opinions on how the team should prepare and maybe how players conducted themselves,’ Houllier explains. ‘I was the hard one and Roy was the easier one. We’d put a session on and some players would say, “Roy, I’m staying in the gym . . .” It didn’t work, anyway. It worked at the beginning. But soon it did not. Picking the team was not the main problem.

  ‘I went to speak to the people. I said, “It’s Roy’s team.” If Liverpool still wanted me in the summer, I would come back. But Rick Parry stepped forward and made a point about how the players would feel like they were the rulers if that happened.’

  At this point, the influence of Tom Saunders, the conduit between the boardroom and Melwood, was significant.

  ‘He was fantastic,’ Houllier says. ‘If you ask Phil Thompson, he will tell you. Tom was always supportive, always there having a nice word – a lot of wisdom. During one board meeting, he stood up and said, “Mr Houllier, we recognize we are not yet the best team in the world. But we have trust in you. We are patient people. Do what you have to do – do what is good for the club. We will support you.” I left that meeting knowing I could now do what was necessary to change Liverpool – and with the confidence to see it through.’

  Houllier takes his time to outline the task he faced.

  ‘The role of the Liverpool manager was threefold. The number-one mission: get results, get trophies. Rick Parry, I asked him, “What do you want me to achieve?” He told me Liverpool had a silverware tradition and that must be upheld.

  ‘The second thing, I would say, was to leave a legacy. When I left, I don’t think anyone could argue [that he’d not achieved that]. Some managers don’t think like this. Sam Allardyce, for instance, he buys, he buys, he buys. You have [Youri] Djorkaeff and so on. Players are [aged] 34–35. Then he leaves and what happens? Nothing is left. We signed players for the long term: Hyypiä, Henchoz, Hamann. We used young British players. I think the best way is to leave behind a way of thinking and put the club one step forward, where everybody contributes. Because of your style, your management and your personality, you can leave an imprint on the club. We improved Anfield, we built a different Melwood and, as David Moores said, we took Liverpool into the twenty-first century. The players we had were not all old at the same time.

  ‘Then the last mission is to make your players progress. I would say Carragher progressed. I would say Murphy became a better player. I had to put him on loan at Crewe to learn a different way and come back with different values. Michael [Owen] became Ballon d’Or. Hyypiä – nobody knew him before. And Heskey, nobody believed in him but I did. If he had had more belief in himself, he could have achieved more. Sometimes you do not succeed absolutely with everybody. Robbie [Fowler] had some good times and bad times. When I look back, I think we did OK. Six trophies in five years is pretty healthy.’

  When Houllier arrived at Liverpool as joint manager with Roy Evans in the summer of 1998, he describes the squad as ‘talented but underachieving’, with a defence that was ‘a bit too weak’.

  ‘We had a good striking force with Robbie, Michael Owen and Steve McManaman, although I knew quickly that Steve was going to leave us for Real Madrid,’ he says.

  The problems at Liverpool were deeper than anyone on the outside really appreciated. This was a dressing room led by Paul Ince, who called himself the ‘Guv’nor’. When Houllier quickly arrived at the conclusion that Ince should be sold, he received a call from Alex Ferguson – who had made the same decision at Manchester United three years earlier. Ferguson told Houllier it would prove to be one of his best judgements as Liverpool manager.

  ‘It is a very difficult decision to get rid of the captain,’ Houllier insists. ‘In the long term, it proved to be an important call. Why? When I got rid of Paul Ince, then Steven Gerrard, Michael Owen, Jamie Carragher, Danny Murphy and David Thompson, they all blossomed. Paul was a huge player and a fantastic player. I liked him a lot. He was captain of the national team and captain of Liverpool. Why did I get rid of him? Because I felt the other younger players needed to be able to breathe. Paul was the organizer of the social occasions. There were parties, not just ones arranged by him. I wanted this to stop and for the players to focus.’

  It was clear that Ince’s time at Liverpool was at an end a few days after a defeat to Manchester United in the FA Cup following two late goals. Liverpool had led from the third minute when Michael Owen scored. It was two months into Houllier’s reign as sole manager and Liverpool had defended as well as they had done in an away game in the years before to hold on to the lead. In the seventy-first minute, Ince signalled that he needed to be substituted.

  ‘We were close to knocking United out,’ Houllier remembers. ‘It would have been a huge result for us. They eventually went on to win the treble, so historically we know how important these moments are. Paul said he had a strain. He walked off the pitch. I thought, Wait – you’re captain of Liverpool. You are 1–0 up at Old Trafford against your former club. If the captain of Liverpool leaves in that sort of game, he only goes straight to hospital. A few days later, Paul was training again.’

  At a team meeting, Ince told Houllier in front of the rest of the group that training needed to be more focused on attacking. Houllier saw this as a challenge to his authority. It was true that Liverpool had struggled for goals in the months since he became manager but defensively the team were conceding fewer. Houllier considered this more important.

  ‘I implemented training sessions aimed at helping the tactical relationships between defence, midfield and attack. That was my coaching. But in the five-a-sides, I’d stand back and watch what was happening. I kept all of the results from the five-a-side matches, knowing which players had won and which players had not. Paul enjoyed the five-a-side matches. But he was not winning. So when Paul was unhappy about the amount of attacking work, I reminded him in front of the group that in the sixty or so five-a-side matches that had taken place in the months before, he’d only been on the winning team something like five times. And that was the end of the discussion.’

  Houllier liked the characteristics of English players, however. ‘First, they fight harder,’ he says. ‘They really have a great desire for their team, their club. They are very competitive.

  ‘Second, they are loyal: loyal to their manager, loyal to their teammates. They are straightforward. They tell you the truth and they don’t cheat. They have a huge respect for the hierarchy: the boss is the boss.’

  Yet at Liverpool, the players had too much power and when the power is with the players, Houllier believes there is also unrealistic expectation.

  ‘The pressure comes from the discrepancy between the team’s potential and what they can really do. When I came to the club, I had Babb, Harkness, McAteer . . . you name them. We bought Hamann, Henchoz, Hyypiä. For the cohesion of the team and the club, you need to stay together for a minimum of three years. I was given that opportunity. I arrived in 1998 and in 2001 we won five trophies.’

  Jamie Carragher says
Houllier possessed an English attitude when it came to the way he wanted Liverpool to play. Houllier stresses, though, that he did not want to change too much, too soon.

  ‘I am not a great believer in revolution despite the fact I am French! I prefer slight reforms, convincing people to change. I did this with Carra and Danny Murphy particularly. They had a wild side. They listened. Both of them took the right turn, learning from the senior international foreign players like Hyypiä, who was very important. Jamie Redknapp was also a good player but was injured. There were a few problems with Robbie Fowler and I wish I’d known him two or three years before, when he was at his peak.’

  Houllier says he ‘reached’ for the young local players he thought had the mentality to deal with the pressures of being a footballer in the twenty-first century. He explains, for example, that he gave Fowler and David Thompson ‘many chances to get it right’. Eventually, though, both were sold.

  He speaks about Jamie Carragher like an adopted son.

  ‘Jamie was clever in reading the game and learning from his experiences, both good and bad. He played in several positions: central-midfield then left-back and right-back. Maybe he wanted to play in one position but he never let that desire get in the way of his performances. He was patient with himself and patient with me. We had Henchoz and Hyypiä in central-defence and that is, of course, the position where Carra ended up. But I explained to him from the beginning that I saw him as a player who would evolve and find himself. In France, we had [Patrick] Battiston and [Maxime] Bossis, and Carra was like them. They started their careers at full-back and eventually became the main centre-back. The experience in the early years gave them a different perspective of the game. They were faced with different situations. I would say that to be a full-back you need to be a better player than a centre-back in possession of the ball. Carra never got the credit he deserved for his football ability. He was an excellent passer of the ball and rarely gave it away. I remember many games and many goals where he was there at the start of the build-up.

  ‘Carra is a highly competitive person. In terms of wanting to win, he was Luis Fernández. Sometimes you get players with talent but they do not get as far in their careers because of a lackadaisical attitude. Carra probably had less talent than some. But it was his attitude that determined his life. Talent is nothing without professionalism: doing things the right way and managing details.

  ‘That was a big challenge for me generally. Convincing players that talent is one thing, but the way they work and practise will help them blossom. I personally believe Carra is the best example of this: maybe not so talented but so determined, so engaged, so competitive, so hard working and team-thinking.

  ‘His fear drove him on. Some players have a fear of not being up to the task but they are able to turn it into a positive. Don’t get me wrong, Carra was very confident and I liked that. Michael Owen was the same. Stevie – he was a bit afraid at the beginning but quickly became confident. In fact, the manager can often be the confidence builder and breaker for the player. But only the player can internalize the balance. It’s very difficult to find someone who can mix fear and confidence as well as humility and ambition. Above everything, if you fail to prepare – well, you know the Scout saying. It is one of life’s truths.’

  He had not even heard of Steven Gerrard when he arrived at Liverpool but within a few weeks of Roy Evans’ departure, Houllier rewarded his ‘aggressive’ performances in the youth sides with a first-team debut.

  ‘Every manager has his own philosophy. I liked to use wide players but those with experience of playing in-field. I realized the team needed to be more solid. Central-midfielders understand the demands of each position because they are in the middle of everything that happens. They receive the ball from the goalkeeper, the central-defender or the full-back and then release it wide, forwards or backwards again. So they have a better tactical appreciation of each position.

  ‘I was looking for somebody to play on the right. Steve Heighway said to me, “Maybe I have an answer to your problems.” He said I should go to the academy to watch a youth game. The game was against Blackburn, I think. I had seen the player in a practice match at Melwood but you can only tell in the real games when the competition is fierce. After five minutes, I knew that the player would not fit. His name was Richie Partridge. But in the middle of the park there was this guy shouting at others, tackling hard and passing the ball fiercely long and short. He was quick and he could read the game. He was really making an impact. So I asked who he was and they told me he was an under-18. He was just helping out because there had been injuries. So I said, “Maybe I’ll stay.” In the second half it was the same. He was ruling the place, controlling the pace of the game, you know? He had not long turned eighteen and was nearly two years behind most players. At the end of the game, I spoke to him. “What is your name?” I asked. He told me he was Steven Gerrard. I said, “Tomorrow you train with the professionals at Melwood.” He was a bit nervous and told me a programme had already been set up for him at the academy the following day. “No, Steven, you are with us now.”

  ‘The next morning, there was a challenge to be won in midfield during a training session. Steven Gerrard beat Paul Ince. I said to Patrice, “This boy is ready.”’

  Gerrard’s body was not yet accustomed to the demands of professionalism, however.

  ‘Mentally, he was one of the strongest boys I have ever known. But he wasn’t able to train because he was injured a lot. They couldn’t find the cause and this frustrated me. If you can’t train, you cannot prepare for the job. You have to be able to respond to seventy games a season. I had this in mind for Steven because his potential was massive. But the injuries, the strains – they would not stop.’

  Houllier organized for Gerrard to be treated by a team of external physiotherapists in France.

  ‘The biggest problem was, some people did not believe in him because of the injuries. This is the truth. There was a feeling at Liverpool before that if you suffered from injuries, you would not become a player. But I realized his potential. He excited me. Stevie’s body was growing, growing and growing. He needed time. And I gave him time.’

  Before Houllier settled on the cheaper option of Sami Hyypiä and Stéphane Henchoz, he wanted to install a young British pairing at centre-back.

  ‘Sol Campbell was one idea and Rio Ferdinand was outstanding too. I liked Ferdinand a lot. He was a very modern defender, able to build possession from his touch. He was a defender too and sometimes people forget that. But I had £12 million to spend and I needed to reconstruct the defence with that money. Ferdinand was the first one I thought of. He was eighteen years old. And the price was £12.5 million. I needed two [centre-halves], not one.

  ‘It is thanks to Peter Robinson that I found Hyypiä at Willem II. He had a friend who worked for a TV crew covering European football. A lot of times, he was in Holland. He told Peter there was a good centre-back. My initial reaction was to tell Peter that if there was a good centre-back, Ajax, PSV Eindhoven or Feyenoord would have taken him. I was reluctant. It was only because I could not find what I wanted that I went to see this player. After fifteen minutes, I knew I would take him. I could see that he could defend and play; he passed the ball very confidently. I could not believe that nobody else had signed Hyypiä.

  ‘Henchoz was at Blackburn. Roy Hodgson is a friend of mine and he was their manager. I went to Blackburn and every time I liked him [Henchoz]. He was stubborn and always seemed to be in the right place. In the end, Hyypiä cost around £2 million and Henchoz was £3.5 million. We had money left to buy Hamann. And this was the base of the team for the next few years.’

  Houllier used the history of Liverpool as a bargaining tool with higher-profile targets.

  ‘Liverpool is known for two reasons: the Beatles and the football club. It has a special resonance in peoples’ minds. It represents magic. Liverpool remains a big hit in terms of its culture, its history and personality, as well as the w
armth of the town. We managed to sign Markus Babbel and lots of clubs wanted to sign him. The competition was fierce. I convinced Babbel that in a short period of time, we would win trophies. I convinced him that winning trophies at Liverpool would mean more than it might at other clubs because when you win something for Liverpool, the people, they remember you for ever.’

  Financially, he felt backed by the club’s board ‘up to a certain level’.

  ‘We were not as rich as the others,’ he says. ‘But I realized Liverpool never had been. The idea always was to buy young players and develop them. I think John Arne Riise was a good example of this. We bought him for a small fee, had his best years – under Benítez as well – then the club sold him to Roma for a higher fee. This was our game. Other clubs could afford mistakes and it would not matter too much. When we made a mistake – and there were some – it mattered more.’

  Liverpool were widely considered to be a flaky team under Roy Evans. Two years into Houllier’s reign, the reputation shifted. Liverpool became obdurate and horrible to play against.

  ‘When you are a manager, you should always ask yourself: what is going to hurt your opponents?’ Houllier says. ‘I knew Roma, for example, could hurt us because they were a very good team. You try to stop that. But you also know they have weaknesses in areas where we are strong. I thought about the weaknesses and flaws of every team we played against and sometimes our team selection would reflect that. This idea was new to Liverpool, because previously it had been the same team week in, week out. It took people time to understand that rotation was needed. We achieved some great results this way: a 0–0 in Barcelona, for example, where Emile played on the left and Michael up front on his own. We were criticized for being defensive after the game and I could not believe it. It made me even more determined to win the second leg, which we did 1–0 [thanks to a Gary McAllister penalty]. People remember the second leg because of the atmosphere inside Anfield. But for me, the impact of the first leg was more important. It said to Barcelona, “This Liverpool team will not concede goals, even in the Nou Camp.” Psychologically, it was damaging for them and brilliant for us.’