The secret of Israel’s Power

by Uzi Eilam

  With all of this in mind I asked Freier and the diplomatic team to prepare a draft Israeli declaration to be read before the United Nations stating that Israel supported the establishment of a region free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Of course, the declaration was to be conditional upon an end to the state of war in the region, in which Israel was threatened by its neighboring countries. The one-page draft declaration was formulated by Freier in an intelligent, sophisticated, and clear manner. We knew that Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir was about to leave for New York to take part in the UN General Assembly. With the help of David Kimchi, director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, we managed to meet with Shamir and present him with the draft. The foreign minister was not, however, amenable to the idea, nor was he willing to listen to any explanations or efforts to persuade him otherwise. “What’s been so bad about the situation so far?” asked Shamir. “Why introduce an element that can only result in pressure on us?”

  With president Chaim Herzog at the nuclear research center in Dimona

  We returned from the meeting disappointed with Shamir, but we did not give up the idea of a declaration in favor of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. By the time I had my weekly meeting with the prime minister, Shamir had already flown to New York and was in the midst of discussions at the UN General Assembly. Understanding that we had nothing to lose, I decided to raise the issue with Begin. During our meetings Begin typically sat behind his desk while I sat across from him with his military secretary by my side. This time, however, our meeting took place in the sitting area of the prime minister’s office, which meant that on that day Begin was more relaxed and open than usual. I had one hour with the prime minister, and I used it to discuss the subject of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. I began by first briefing him on the UN decision of 1974, the Treaty of Tlatelolco regarding a nuclear-free South America, and two additional agreements that were in the pipeline: one relating to the South Pacific and the other relating to Southeast Asia.

  “What’s the situation in Europe,” asked the Prime Minister, “and what about our region?”

  “In Europe,” I explained, “all the countries have signed the NPT and are therefore not in need of another treaty. I have come to speak with you regarding the Middle East.” The draft declaration I had proposed to the foreign minister was in front of Begin, and I explained the advantages we believed would result from making such a statement before the General Assembly. I also told him that I had failed to convince Shamir to present the declaration.

  With Shimon Peres at Dimona

  I could see the expression on Begin’s face through his black-framed glasses, and I knew that he was convinced. I answered two more questions regarding the statement’s emphasis on the new situation that would need to emerge in the region in order for Israel to sign the treaty. There was a long silence as I anxiously awaited the prime minister’s response. “Froike,” Begin finally said decisively to Brigadier General Poran, his military secretary, “have them put me through to the foreign minister at the UN.” In no time Shamir was on the line, and without giving him an opportunity to explain his position, Begin told him to read the statement we had drafted at the IAEC regarding the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East before the General Assembly. I never imagined that, 30 years later, this statement would still be serving to reduce pressure on Israel, which is the exact opposite of the outcome Shamir feared.

  Menachem Begin recognized the importance of building nuclear power plants in Israel. He would periodically inquire into the work underway to select a site and the possibility of purchasing nuclear reactors for the production of electricity from the US or France. One day while I was in my office focused on work issues, Poran called from the PM’s office. “The prime minister would like to speak with you,” he said (he always made sure to refer to Begin as “the prime minister”), and without missing a beat Begin was on the line.

  “Uzi,” he said, in an enthusiastic and celebratory tone (he had already gotten used to calling me by my first name), “I just finished talking to Mr. Mitterand, the President of France, and we agreed that France would give us two nuclear reactors for electricity production. I want you to fly to France tomorrow and to start taking care of it.” I tried to explain that such a trip needed to be prepared and that we needed to coordinate with the relevant authorities in France, but Begin was unwilling to hear of a delay. “No,” said the prime minister, “I spoke with President Mitterand, and we have no time to lose.”

  I promised Begin that we would begin working on the issue as an urgent priority, and we immediately established contact with the President’s Office in Paris, the French Foreign Ministry, the CEA (the Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives [the Atomic and Alternative Energies Commission]), and, perhaps most importantly, Framatom, the French nuclear reactor manufacturer itself, which could exert pressure on the various bodies of the French state administration. I flew to France as head of a joint-team of the IAEC and the Israel Electric Corporation, and Framatom assumed responsibility for hosting us. As a result of the advantageous combination of the green light from the Palais de l’Elysées and Framatom’s financial interest in marketing its reactors, we were given red carpet treatment. Upon arrival we immediately began a marathon of technical briefings; visits to power plants built and operated by Électricité de France (EDF), the French national electric company; and an impressive visit to Creusot Loire, the giant steel factory that manufactured the huge tanks in which the nuclear reactor cores were installed. As a former engineer I walked mesmerized up and down the company’s modern production lines, which worked safely and efficiently with steel sheets weighing thousands of pounds. The close attention paid to the quality of the steel processing and the welding that formed the parts of the tanks into one integrated complex was unparalleled. For me, the strong smell of the welding electrodes and the cutting of metal had an intoxicating effect.

  Late in the day, when we finally concluded our visit to the metal factory, we were placed in the able hands of the officials of EDF. It was already dark, and we had a great distance to cover before reaching the nuclear electricity plant in the wine district of Bordeaux.

  The centuries-old architecture that integrated so harmoniously into the beautiful city of Saint-Émilion served as a fascinating appetizer before our visit to the power plant site. The Blayais nuclear center east of the city of Bordeaux has been operating without incident for almost 30 years with four power reactors, each with a capacity of 900 megawatts. At the time of our visit one of the reactors had been shut down for maintenance, which enabled us to enter areas that were inaccessible during normal periods of operation. The French built their power reactors with the same style with which they built their cars, their electrical appliances, their houses, and even their military aircrafts and weapons systems. They were efficient and well-designed from an engineering standpoint, but they also possessed one more quality — elegance and a sophisticated appearance. With great pride the site managers showed us the plans for the reactors and their turbine systems. They placed particular emphasis on the safety control and oversight system, and claimed that French nuclear electricity plants were the safest in the world.

  To answer our question about how they went about addressing the surrounding population’s concerns regarding the risk of nuclear accident and the release of radiation into the area, they brought us to the visitors’ center, which, even at midday on weekdays, was filled with adult visitors, families, and youth. The attractive visitors’ center introduced guests to the processes taking place within the power plant and the reactor in language that could be understood by all. Blayais personnel emphasized that the center did not limit itself to on-site exhibits and media campaigns. Recognizing the importance of local opinion, Blayais had a program that included support for social, educational, and cultural activities for residents of the area. The managers of EDF and of the plant itself i
nsisted that it was in their best interest to invest large sums of money in such activities in order to persuade local residents to support the continued operation of the reactors. It was true, they explained, that such activities could not completely prevent demonstrations and protests, and that violent and destructive demonstrations had in fact taken place near a number of power reactors in France over the previous two decades. Still, they maintained, the majority of participants in the protests were members of various environmental groups and came from outside the local area.

  With no intention of discrediting the environmental activist community as a whole, I can say that on many occasions I have seen people who opposed nuclear energy displaying varying levels of ignorance on the subject while making overwhelmingly superficial arguments against the construction of nuclear power plants. Some try to conceal their ignorance about the operation and safety measures of nuclear power plants with harsh words and the use of slogans. Nonetheless, France is an excellent example of a country that has adhered to a clear policy — in this case, the policy of becoming non-dependent on oil-based fuel — and successfully implemented it in both theory and practice.

  But not even France, whose president and government enjoy significant political power and have the ability to make decisions and convince the public, could move forward in the face of massive public opposition. This was the fate of an innovative and interesting project by which France hoped to develop and begin operating a different type of power reactor than the ones already in existence: the fast breeder reactor. This kind of reactor was referred to as “fast” because the neutrons emitted from the fissionable material in its fuel moved more quickly than those in pressurized water reactors or boiling water reactors. The small development model of this type of reactor that was developed by the French Atomic and Alternative Energies Commission (CEA) was known as the Phoenix, while the large industrial reactor was known as the Super Phoenix. We were intrigued by the idea of fast breeder reactors.

  The plutonium economy was based on the idea of using the considerable radiation emitted within the nuclear power reactor to make full use of the plutonium produced in the irradiated fuel. According to the calculations of French nuclear experts, this process creates more plutonium than necessary to fuel the reactor itself. In this way, the French scientists concluded, they could produce plutonium fuel for new reactors that would begin operating in the future.

  I also visited the Creys-Malville facility, where the fast breeder reactor was built. There I learned about the achievements and technological breakthroughs of the project, as well as its failures and the concerns it raised. The heart of the power plant — the reactor — was as beautiful as a modern statue. The tank in which the nuclear process took place resembled an onion standing on its head, and the cooling pipes that brought water to and from the tank was also a breathtaking work of environmental sculpture. But cooling was also the Achilles’ heel of the Super Phoenix, as the plans called for using liquid sodium, which had a corrosive effect on the piping.

  Problems also existed outside the plant in the realm of public opposition. In July 1977, sixty thousand demonstrators marched toward the Creys-Malville reactor in protest. Ultimately, it was not the corrosion caused by the liquid sodium that shut down the world’s largest fast breeder reactor but rather socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin’s political obligation to the Green Party in his government. In 1996 the plant was closed for maintenance purposes, never again to resume operations.

  Menachem Begin never saw the construction of a nuclear power plant in Israel, and Israeli supporters of nuclear energy also continue to wait. Shimon Peres, who in 1984 became prime minister in rotation with Likud party leader Yitzhak Shamir, also did not abandon the issue of nuclear power plants. It was François Mitterand’s first term as president of France, and Peres hoped that their similar views regarding socialism and their memories of the golden age of French–Israeli relations would help facilitate French provision of nuclear power plant to Israel. However, although the technical background for the purchase of a power plant from France was already in place, political views proved to be a tough nut to crack.

  Before leaving on an official visit to Paris, the city he loved so much, Peres asked me to join the small team that was travelling with him. The French, who knew so well how to honor their guests, housed us in a hospitality palace on Balzac Street not far from the Arc de Triomphe at the end of the Champs-Élysées. Battalions of security guards, waiters, and helpers of all kinds were assigned to the delegation.

  French government ministers came to pay their respects to the Israeli prime minister, and we had a particularly friendly meeting with the leaders of the local Jewish community. Prime Minister Peres was in seventh heaven. The issue of the reactors was raised during the talks with Mitterand, and despite past differences over the bombing of the OSIRAK nuclear reactor in Iraq some three years earlier, we were given a green light — albeit a blinking one — to proceed. The French nuclear industry still had high manufacturing capabilities, even without enough buyers for their products, and the terms they offered were extremely worthwhile from a financial perspective. Ultimately, however, after months of waiting with the feeling that we were about to begin the process, Mitterand was forced to adopt the position of the French Foreign Ministry at Quai d’Orsay: that France would be unable to supply us with the nuclear power plants it produced.

  When it comes to nuclear power plants in Israel, I still have the feeling that the country missed a great opportunity. The steep increases in oil prices and the global warming stemming from the greenhouse gas effect strengthen my view that Israel should again begin working toward the establishment of nuclear power plants. Today, the US, Britain, and of course Japan, China, and India have adopted a policy of accelerated construction of nuclear power plants for electricity production. There is no reason why the location selected in the northern Negev should not become the site of four power plants, which together would be capable of supplying 50 percent of Israel’s electricity needs.

  The Bombing of the Osirak Nuclear Reactor — Information, Assessment, Decision

  By the early 1970s, after the Ba’ath party had established itself in power, Iraq had already started to acquire nuclear weapons in an institutional and systematic way. The Iraqis tied to purchase a graphite gas reactor for plutonium production from France, as well as a chemical facility for separating plutonium from uranium after its irradiation in the reactor. Even the most pro-Iraqi elements in France were unable to accede to such a direct and transparent request.

  The moment I began working at the IAEC, I became privy to concerns regarding the possibility of Iraqi advancement toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The manner in which the Israeli establishment dealt with the situation was typical of a dynamic that is widespread in Israeli governance today, by which each involved agency strives to do the work itself. The IAEC was a good example. Its nuclear research centers possessed first-rate scientific and technological knowledge, and it seemed logical to make use of this knowledge to improve our understanding of Iraqi moves in the nuclear arena. The IDF’s Intelligence Branch also monitored progress, with its units responsible for acquiring and analyzing intelligence data to formulate an intelligence assessment of the threats facing the country. An important aspect of Israel’s efforts to chart the military build-up of Arab countries was an awareness of the possibility of an Arab country acquiring nuclear capabilities. Beginning in the mid-1970s, after India demonstrated its ability to operate a nuclear facility in 1974 and after Pakistan joined the race with its own substantial nuclear activity, Israel increasingly focused on gathering intelligence information and analyzing the threat posed by an Arab country’s development of a nuclear weapon. I thought it only fitting that our scientists play their part in deciphering Iraqi advances toward the acquisition of nuclear capabilities.

  We learned that Iraq’s nuclear activity began in 1959. Its first step was to sign a nuclear coopera
tion agreement with the Soviet Union, followed by the construction of a Soviet research reactor in Iraq in 1963. By the late 1970s the Iraqi nuclear complex at al-Tawita near Baghdad already had two nuclear reactors: a Russian reactor with a capacity of two megawatts and a French reactor, known as Isis, with a one megawatt capacity. Both reactors were genuine research reactors that could not be used to develop military nuclear capabilities, although the work and the research carried out in both of them certainly provided scientists and engineers with significant knowledge and experience.

  When Jacques Chirac became Prime Minister of France in 1974 the nuclear relationship between France and Iraq was upgraded. Chirac was responsible for an agreement by which France undertook to provide Iraq with two Osiris material test reactors for research purposes. Such reactors could help countries with advanced research capabilities test the effect of radiation on the materials being used to build nuclear power plants. The French called the reactors they had committed to build at the al-Tawita site near Baghdad Osirak 1 and Osirak 2, while the Iraqis preferred the name Tammuz, in reference to the Arabic month during which the Ba’th Party rose to power in the country. In 1979, when Saddam Hussein emerged as the sole ruler of Iraq, construction of Tammuz 1 was already in its advanced stages, as were the laboratories France had undertook to build near the reactor. The question of fuel for the reactor was particularly troubling, as Osiris reactors required the use of 93% enriched uranium, which is military grade. Another issue that raised concerns had to do with the number of Iraqi students that had been sent to American universities to study mathematics, physics, and the nuclear sciences.

  According to Chirac’s agreement with Iraq, France was supposed to supply Iraq with 80 kilograms of uranium 235 as fuel for the Osirak reactor. This quantity of fissionable material was sufficient for the production of two nuclear bombs per year. One possibility was that the French would undertake the development of 20% enriched fissionable fuel material known as Caramel and use it to start the reactor, but there was no evidence that the Iraqis had agreed to wait for this to take place. The scientists of the IAEC regarded the uranium track as the one that posed real danger. At the same time, work on the plutonium track also came to light, as the Iraqis set to the task of processing plutonium with the assistance of Italian experts. The Italians were working on planning and building the nuclear laboratories for the al-Tawita complex, including the processing of radioactive isotopes and materials that had been irradiated in an active nuclear reactor. Italian experts were engaged in planning and constructing a laboratory for the production of fuel with a production potential of twenty-five tons of nuclear fuel per year. The Italians also supplied the engineering knowledge needed to facilitate the separation of plutonium from fuel irradiated in the reactor, which could potentially yield approximately 10 kilograms of plutonium per year, assuming that the process were in fact used for producing plutonium from such a quantity of fuel.