First Person

by Vladimir Putin

  So you don’t like his reports?

  Can I please finish? He was working for the bandits. So, when the militants said they were ready to release several of our soldiers in exchange for him, our people asked him, “Do you want to be exchanged?” And he said, “Yes.”

  And in exchange we were offered three of our soldiers who were under death threats if we didn’t rescue them. These were our soldiers. They were fighting for Russia. If we didn’t get them back, they would be shot. But the bandits wouldn’t do anything to Babitsky because they thought of him as one of their own.

  And then they told us: if you give us back Babitsky, then as soon as he gets to our camp in the mountains, we’ll let go another two POWs. And they did release them. So, in sum, it was one of Babitsky versus five of our soldiers. It would have been worth exchanging him for just one Russian soldier.

  So now he’s a hero of Russia?

  Or a traitor? It’s not good to collaborate with bandits and to write that they are cutting off the heads of our soldiers in order to portray the whole horror of war. And the fact that they were cutting off peoples’ heads alive before the start of hostilities, and the fact that they took the hundred hostages for criminal motives in order to get ransom—how do you account for that? Babitsky was justifying the decapitation of people.

  What he said exactly was . . .

  I have read it. He went there. He went in. And he came out carrying maps of routes that showed how to skirt around our checkpoints. What authority did he have to stick his nose in there without official accreditation?

  Then perhaps he should have been brought to Moscow to sort the whole matter out here?

  He was arrested and an investigation was started. He said: “I don’t trust you. I trust the Chechens. They asked that I be handed over to them, so hand me over.” And our people said to him, “The hell with you.”

  And what if it is all untrue?

  You may ask me some other time to tell you the truth about the war. What really happens to people when they fight on the side of the enemy . . .

  Journalists don’t fight.

  What Babitsky did is much more dangerous than firing a machine gun.

  And what about freedom of expression?

  We interpret freedom of expression in different ways. If you mean direct complicity in crimes, I will never agree with that. Let us repeat the sentence about decapitation.

  Please, you can speak your mind, but you have no right to determine his fate.

  We didn’t stick him in there. He went himself.

  Are you sure?

  That’s the truth. What I say is confirmed by his own words and what you say isn’t confirmed by anything.

  And the tape, where you can see quite clearly just how much he wants to go there . . . 29They took a Russian journalist and gave him to God knows who.

  He’s not a Russian journalist.

  He’s a Russian citizen.

  Well, you say he’s a Russian citizen. Then let him behave according to the laws of his own country, if he wants those same laws to be applied to him.

  Still, it isn’t clear, under what law could you hand him over?

  He asked for it himself.

  And if he had asked for you to execute him, would you?

  That’s impossible. That is prohibited by the internal regulations. I’ll tell you this. It’s senseless to execute him, but getting five of our soldiers for him—I think that’s quite acceptable.

  Bring back Babitsky.

  We can’t bring him back. We will hunt for him and turn him over to the courts. I don’t know if this case has any prospect of coming to trial. I’m not certain about that. But he’ll have to be interrogated.

  What’s wrong with our relationship with NATO?

  We don’t feel like we’re full-fledged participants in the process. If we were granted full-fledged participation in decision-making, then things wouldn’t be so terrible.

  The situation with Yugoslavia illustrates that decisions can be made without Russia.

  That’s just the point! We don’t need those kinds of relations.

  You were secretary of the Security Council, when the events in Yugoslavia began. Was the president or the prime minister interested in your opinion?

  The president decided these matters directly with the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry.

  But if you had been in Primakov’s place, would you have turned the plane around over the Atlantic? 30

  Possibly. Primakov was in a very difficult position. Yes, he could have flown to Washington and used his visit as a tribunal to express Russia’s position. But the Americans could have turned such a visit around for their own purposes. They could have interpreted the arrival of the Russian prime minister as a sign that Russia agreed with their proposed option for resolving the Yugoslav problem.

  Their means of resolving the problem in Yugoslavia was predetermined after the fall of the USSR.

  Then why these demonstrations, if a weakened Russia could not do anything?

  That’s not true. Even in its current state, there’s a lot that Russia can do. We should have analyzed the situation earlier—before the bombing of Yugoslavia—to see how we could have influence our partners’ decision. We could have worked more actively with the countries that did not agree with the turn of events.

  Since we’re talking about cooperation with Europe, let’s return to Chechnya for a minute. Can you imagine allowing a peacekeeping force into Chechnya?

  That’s out of the question. If we were to recognize that Chechnya is an independent state, then yes, it would be possible. Then Chechnya could decide to bring any peacekeeping forces it wanted.

  They said that Kosovo would remain within Yugoslavia, and yet they brought in the troops.

  That’s why we are not agreeing to any options like Kosovo. Nothing analogous to the Kosovo events is possible. And it will never be possible. Everything that the NATO allies actually achieved in Kosovo directly contradicted the goals that NATO had established for itself.

  You say, “We are not agreeing.” Have they really made such offers?

  Let’s say that we are being offered mediators to help resolve the Chechen conflict. We don’t need any mediators. That is the first step toward internationalizing the conflict—first come the mediators, then someone else, then observers, then military observers, and then a limited contingent of troops. And away we go. . . .

  But what about OSCE observers?

  In Chechnya? After military operations are completed and the bandit formations are totally defeated. They will be allowed in when we tell them, and where we consider it expedient.

  With that kind of approach, it looks like integration into Europe isn’t on the horizon.

  It depends on what kind of Europe you mean. Let’s analyze it: Yes, the world has changed, and Europe, too, has changed—that’s no secret. The UN Charter was signed with a different array of world powers in mind. We were the main victors after World War II.

  But now, alas, we have become weaker, and the UN Charter remains in effect. Not everybody likes that. They are trying to change it or supplant it—for example, with decisions from NATO. We must not agree to that.

  Many have forgotten, by the way, that when NATO was created at the end of the 1940s, the Soviet Union indicated its intention to enter this bloc. But we weren’t let in. In response, together with the countries of Eastern Europe, we formed the Warsaw Pact, which no longer exists. The Pact was a direct response to the formation of the NATO alliance.

  So should we reconsider joining NATO?

  We can consider it, but not at this moment. It’s a question of what kind of NATO we’re talking about. If we’re talking about the NATO that acted in Kosovo in direct violation of UN decisions, that’s not even of theoretical interest for us to discuss. If we’re talking about a serious transformation of this bloc into a political organization prepared to have constructive interactions with Russia, then there is a topic for discussion.

&nbs
p; In sum, I don’t see any reason why cooperation between Russia and NATO shouldn’t develop further; but I repeat that it will happen only if Russia is treated as an equal partner.

  In any case, even when you are making suppositions, you have to think of the long term. There are a lot of problems—political, economic, military. For example, any bloc—and NATO is no exception—sets weapons standards that substantially affect the interests of the defense industry.

  But what do the members of NATO think about this?

  I think they fear the destruction of NATO from within. I understand them perfectly well. We are too powerful a dominant theme. There is one single power—the USA. Say a second one appears, albeit one not as powerful as the first. Yet the balance of power could be ruined. The founding fathers of NATO fear that their organization would change drastically. From our perspective, it would change for the better, and from theirs, possibly for the worse.

  Still, it doesn’t make sense. It seems as though Russia criticized NATO because we weren’t allowed into the Yugoslavia resolution process as full-fledged partners. But what if we had been allowed in?

  Well, that’s just the point. If we had been allowed in, that decision never would have been made. We never would have agreed to that type of interference in the internal affairs of another country. That sort of behavior simply cannot be justified, even for so-called humanitarian reasons. I believe that the operation itself was a major mistake in international relations and a violation of the founding principles of international law.

  And the invasion of Hungary by Warsaw Pact troops in 1956, and of Czechoslovakia in 1968? Were they major mistakes ?

  You forget that we used force in Germany in 1953, too. In my view, these were major mistakes. And the Russophobia that we see in Eastern Europe today is the fruit of those mistakes.

  But look: We began talking about Russia’s relationship with Europe, and we have narrowed it down to our relations with NATO. Even with the North Atlantic orientation of today’s European policy, we cannot forget that NATO and Europe are not one and the same thing. And I’ve already said that Russia is a country of European culture—not NATO culture.

  We’re always hearing that Russia has grown weak, and that a whole slew of problems are ensuing from that weakness, both at home and abroad. Your thesis is that Russia’s statehood must be restored—a strong state is needed. That’s understandable. Does that mean that state property also has to be restored?

  No, of course not. But we have to have state property on a limited scale, where it is necessary. For example, in the defense industry.

  Does that mean that the private sector should be expanded?

  First, we need to guarantee property rights. I believe that one of the main purposes of the state is to create rules—universal rules—in the form of laws, instructions, and regulations. And secondly, to comply with these rules, and guarantee their compliance.

  But we’ve already had lots of these instructions and rules, regulations, and laws, and where have they gotten us?

  You’re right. And that is why the people do not trust the government. Look at all the types of laws that have been passed in the social sphere—for example, free transportation for members of the military. They may have passed the law, but in reality, the military pays for transportation. There are lots of other examples. In order to change this situation, the government will have to take some unpopular measures.

  What unpopular measures?

  We will have to review all the social guarantees that the state has taken upon itself in recent years and that are completely unfounded and not backed up. We have no choice.

  Can you be more specific? Maybe you could use the example of free rides for military personnel?

  Sure. Wouldn’t it be better to raise the salaries of some citizens, including military people? If you gave them just a little bit more money, they could pay their own fares and wouldn’t be put in such a humiliating position. But if the government does say that it will compensate those citizens—for example, for their fares—then it must do so.

  I’m sure the leftist opposition will jump on me, saying that people are losing their benefits and that this is a blow against the helpless working people, who already have it so hard. But a government that doesn’t fulfill its obligations is not a government. And that’s why there’s such a lack of trust in the government now.

  So you are entering into a deal with the leftists because you’ll need them when you have to make some unpopular decisions? Is that why you needed Seleznev as speaker of the House?

  I need them? On the contrary, I told both Seleznev and Zyuganov to find a fresh face, even if it’s a person from their own camp.

  But a Communist! You really wound up with a fresh face, didn’t you! . . .

  Listen, there has always been cooperation with the Communists in our Duma. Not a single law passes without support from the Communists. It seems to me that there is more than one way to deal with the Communists. They have every opportunity to become a modern parliamentary party in the European sense of the word. We have very many parties, groups, grouplets, and associations without any real social base. And then there are the Communists—the only large-scale, really big party with a strong social base, albeit one infested with ideological “roaches.”

  Name the “roaches” for us.

  For example, the demands to confiscate and nationalize property.

  That’s not going to happen?

  That’s definitely not going to happen. We will not have another major tragedy. And we will not have a partnership with the Communists while they maintain that position. If some sort of unlawful actions in previous years were established and proven in court, that would be another matter. But nationalization and confiscation of property for their own sakes, without a judicial procedure is a catastrophe. If for no other reason than because they would clear the way for arbitrary rule.

  Communists can either change their programmatic goals and become a major left-wing party of the European type, or they can take the other path and lose their social base through natural attrition. If they choose the latter, they will gradually exit the political stage.

  They themselves hardly believe that.

  As surprising as it may sound, their leaders do understand. And they are prepared to change their ways. But right now they can’t do it—they’re afraid that their constituency will feel betrayed. And on that score, it’s pretty important not to miss the moment—when and to what extent they can change internally.

  For many people, “strong authority” is associated with dictatorship.

  I prefer another phrase—not “strong,” but “effective” authority.

  You can call it what you like. But how will that authority become effective? How will it enforce the rules it establishes?

  The courts must work—as must the law enforcement agencies and the courts of arbitration. The role of these agencies has changed, and we refuse to understand that. Their role has begun to correspond to what is written in the law. Why don’t we pay judges and law enforcement agents the money that they deserve? Because Soviet ideology governs our consciousness to this day. Remember how we used to think: “Well, a court, what’s that? Nothing special. The district Party committee is the body that makes all the decisions. It’s important. But what do the judges do? They will do what they are told.”

  To this day, people think that judges are not important, and that they shouldn’t be paid more than the average civil servant.

  Or take the notary publics. In the French system, if a notary public stamps a document, it is ironclad law. If a notary public makes a mistake, he is obliged to pay compensation. Two mistakes, and he is ruined.

  Our society must understand that a minority—a certain category of people—must be paid very well by the state, so that they can secure the interests of the majority. When will we finally begin to understand this? Our people aren’t stupid. It’s just that it hasn’t been explained the right way.

  But
the role of the courts has been explained. They’ve been explaining it for ten years! But until the courts change for the better, the attitudes toward them won’t change either. How else can you explain it?

  More persistently. Without that, nothing will change. And we have to raise judges’ salaries.

  Now, the governors are hardly going to line up behind your ideas about “effective” authority and the governability of the state. They’re all going to be afraid that you will cut off their independence.

  I think that we have to preserve both local self-government and a system of election for governors. But all of these connections have to be more balanced. While preserving the system of electing governors, for instance, we should consider applying sanctions against them. To remove them from office, for example.

  That is, elect some and remove others.

  We can develop systems to link them more closely to the center. They cannot have complete independence.