India's War

by Srinath Raghavan

  On 11 November 1941, President Roosevelt had decided that the defence of India was of vital importance to the United States and hence India could directly receive Lend-Lease supplies from America. While welcoming the decision, British officials realized that it was pregnant with difficulties for them. The American proposal to negotiate Lend-Lease supplies directly with the British-Indian mission in Washington was seen as ‘something of a bombshell’, for it threatened to displace Britain’s economic pre-eminence in India. The United States’ economic importance for India was already growing. Indian imports from the US had increased from 9 per cent in 1939–40 to 20 per cent in 1940–41, while over the same period imports from Britain had fallen to 21.2 per cent from 25.2 per cent. Similarly, Indian exports to the US had risen from 12 per cent to 19.6 per cent during these years, while exports to Britain had fallen to 32.3 per cent from 35.5 per cent.32

  British officials were also aware of the Americans’ proclivity for driving a hard commercial bargain. Earlier in the year, while negotiating a treaty of commerce and navigation with the Indian government, the Roosevelt administration had insisted on the inclusion of ‘most-favoured nation’ treatment for exploration of oil and mineral resources (particularly in Balochistan). The Americans also demanded that ‘most-favoured nation’ should be defined to include the United Kingdom. The Indian government pointed out that this would contravene the system of preferential tariffs – lower tariffs for imports – that operated within the British Empire, a system also known as imperial preferences. In the event, the Roosevelt administration forbore from pressing its demand in light of the ‘unsettled world conditions’.33

  With the onset of Lend-Lease, British officials grew concerned that this might become the key with which to open up the system of imperial preferences. These concerns were heightened during the negotiations between Washington and London on a ‘Mutual Aid Agreement’ or ‘Master Agreement’ of Lend-Lease supplies, when the Americans demanded a clause eliminating preferential tariffs. In so doing, Leo Amery believed, the Roosevelt administration demanded nothing less than Britain’s abandonment of the economic unity of its empire as well as assured markets for its exports. London had little option but to cave in and the agreement was concluded in February 1942. Later in the year, when negotiations began for a similar agreement between Washington and India, the Americans pressed for the inclusion of a similar clause. On this occasion, it was the Indian member for commerce in the viceroy’s Executive Council who objected, arguing strenuously that it would be detrimental to India’s fledgling industries. The Roosevelt administration would not relent, however, and the negotiations had to be shelved – though the United States reluctantly agreed to continue with existing arrangements.34

  The fact, however, remained that India’s plans for the expansion of its war effort were heavily reliant on American economic assistance. Indeed by 1944–45, the United States would account for 25.7 per cent of India’s total imports, while Britain would lag behind at 19.8 per cent. None realized this more clearly than the Indian agent-general in Washington, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai. A senior official of the Indian Civil Service, Bajpai had previously served at the League of Nations and had been a member of the viceroy’s Executive Council until 1940. Although he epitomized the ‘Steel Frame’ of the Raj, Bajpai – by his own account – did not regard India under British rule as ‘the best of possible worlds’. Indeed, in private conversations with US officials Bajpai forthrightly disagreed with the stance espoused by Halifax.35 At the same time, he was keen to leverage American assistance for India’s war.

  Soon after Pearl Harbor, Bajpai shared with Berle a report on India’s war effort. The report observed that while India had ‘modernized and expanded’ its ordnance factories, it would continue to rely on Britain and the United States for ‘some key items of supply’. What was more, despite the increased flow of more modern equipment from Britain, ‘the releases have never been and cannot be equalled to India’s needs’. Indeed, these could only be met by a ‘generous flow of help’ from the United States. India was similarly dependent on America for general engineering equipment, especially power generation sets, motor and machine tools, as well as motor vehicles which were entirely procured from the United States. The report also stated that India planned to raise 124 Indian infantry battalions, taking the total strength of the Indian army to 1.5 million.

  Following the meeting with Bajpai, Berle felt that for a considerable time the transportation of cargo from the United States to the Far East would be ‘limited, difficult and dangerous’. In consequence, it was in America’s interest to promote production in the region rather than shipping it from home. In this scheme, India loomed large. If, by providing ‘technical assistance’ alongside supplies, the Indian army could be strengthened, then the United States would achieve ‘considerable economy’ in the war effort, would make ‘more effective use’ of India’s manpower, and would be building up ‘defensive and offensive striking power in a region where it is vitally necessary’. Berle recommended sending to India a suitable representative to survey the possibility of increasing India’s war effort.36

  When nothing happened for a month, Bajpai met Berle and conveyed to him the gravity of the situation in the Far East. While China had put up a splendid resistance, India was more accessible to the Allies and had a highly developed system of internal communications. Underlining India’s potential, Bajpai trotted out a series of figures: 64,000 miles of railways; steel production capacity of over a million tons a year; an industrial base that already produced 85 per cent of the 60,000 items required for the war; and ‘almost unlimited manpower’ for the army, which had already proved its mettle in modern warfare. When Japanese submarines closed the port of Rangoon, Bajpai yet again pressed Berle to consider India’s needs with ‘very great speed’. He also wrote to the viceroy recommending an American technical mission to assess India’s potential and requirements. Berle was sufficiently impressed to write directly to the president, urging him to send a technical mission to India. Should things ‘go badly in Singapore and Burma’, he added, India’s role might be of ‘crucial importance’. On 2 February, President Roosevelt gave his go ahead.37

  Meanwhile, the American mission in New Delhi was reporting the recent Congress resolutions. It was felt that while the Congress leadership – with the exception of Gandhi – was once again open to co-operation, the meaning and significance of the resolutions were difficult to gauge. The fall of Singapore alarmed the State Department. Above all, it brought to the fore the latent yet lingering concerns about the political situation in India. Berle argued that they must ‘immediately get to work’ and the ‘first item on the list ought to be to tackle the Indian problem in a large way’. The technical mission had already been approved by the president, but India’s war effort would not go very far ‘unless the political situation is handled with extreme vigor’. He called for a joint Anglo-American announcement that India would be brought in ‘as a full partner in the United Nations’. In other words, the Atlantic Charter would apply to India. Not only should Churchill make such an announcement, but the viceroy should be directed to convene a ‘constitutional conference’ in India. Even if the Congress did not come in at this stage, its stance would determine whether India co-operated in waging the war, or whether there was ‘more or less passive resistance’, which would be exploited by Japan ‘to the limit’.38

  Interestingly, Berle noted that President Roosevelt had ‘indicated his sympathy’ for the view that Britain must promptly recognize India’s aspiration to ‘a freer existence and a full membership in the British family of nations’. For a host of reasons, the president’s sentiment would be strengthened in the days ahead. To begin with, the American press turned sharply critical of Britain. Renowned columnists such as Walter Lippmann and John Thompson, as well as editorials in a series of newspapers and journals, argued that Britain’s imperial policy must change. The New York Times witheringly observed that countries like India were n
o longer ‘suppliants at the white man’s door. Not all the faded trappings of imperialism, not all the pomp of viceroys … has much meaning for them now.’39

  These feelings were reflected in political debates. The US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee commenced hearings on the situation in the Far East. There was a ‘serious undercurrent of anti-British feeling’ among the senators, who argued that having done ‘so much’ for Britain by Lend-Lease, the United States was well positioned to ‘dictate to England’ political changes in the British Empire. One senator went so far as to declare that ‘Gandhi’s leadership in India became part of America’s military equipment’. India’s contribution could only be secured by accepting ‘Gandhi’s political objective’.40

  The president’s views also seem to have been sharpened by a gloomy letter written to Eleanor Roosevelt by the writer and Nobel Laureate Pearl S. Buck, which the first lady shared with her husband. The letter expressed deep concern at the prospect of the Allies planning a stand against Japan in India. Buck argued that there was a serious rift between Hindus and Muslims in India – ‘fostered by the British divide-and-rule policy’. Jinnah, in particular, was ‘a demagogue of the most dangerous type’. He had no love for his country and was the ‘perfect tool for the Axis’. It was a ‘fallacy’ to think that Indians could defend their country as the Chinese had done. They were ‘so filled with bitterness’ towards the British that there would be ‘revengeful massacres’ on a large scale – massacres in which American soldiers might well be caught up.41

  Finally, the president’s thinking was influenced by intelligence and strategic assessments. The Office of the Coordinator of Information now believed that India ‘might well be the decisive element in the war in southeast Asia’. Arguing that India ‘lights a gleam in the eye of the German and the Japanese’, the assessment concluded that the ‘Allied cause requires that India should now cooperate more vigorously in the war than heretofore’.42

  A worried Roosevelt ordered a detailed report on the military situation from the combined chiefs of staff. On 25 February, the president himself drafted a tough missive to Churchill. After commenting generally on Britain’s attitude towards its colonies – out of date by a decade or two – and contrasting it with America’s enlightened record in the Philippines, Roosevelt wrote that the Indians felt that ‘delay follows delay and therefore that there is no real desire in Britain to recognize a world change which has taken deep root in India as well as in other countries’. There was, he concluded, ‘too much suspicion and dissatisfaction’ in India. In consequence, the resistance to Japan was not whole-hearted.43

  Roosevelt turned the letter over in his mind until late that night. He hesitated to send it because he felt that ‘in a strict sense, it is not our business’. At the same time, India was of ‘great interest’ from the standpoint of conducting the war. Eventually, the president decided against sending the letter to Churchill. Instead he asked his representatives in London, John Winant and Averell Harriman, to send him an assessment of Churchill’s thoughts on India.44 The next morning, the president received a cable on India from an unexpected quarter: President Chiang Kai-shek of China.

  Of all Allied leaders, Chiang Kai-shek had the longest record of resistance to the Japanese. Chiang’s government had been at war with Japan for over two years before the war had erupted in Europe. The Western Allies, however, tended to treat China with condescension, not to say contempt. Chiang’s requests for a seat on Allied committees were serially rebuffed. Yet, by early 1942, Britain and the United States realized that if Chinese resistance collapsed, the over 600,000 Japanese troops currently engaged in China could be deployed to other theatres of the war. At the very least, therefore, they were determined to keep China in the war.45

  Following Japan’s lightning thrusts into South-East Asia, India became vital to the prospects of China’s survival. The Burma Road was a key logistical artery for China. Chiang had already sampled the crippling effect of its closure when the British government had shut it for three months in the summer of 1940 in response to Japanese pressure. In its absence, war materiel had to be airlifted into China over the Himalayan ‘hump’. As Japanese forces were poised to overrun South-East Asia, Chiang – in a curious symmetry of concern – grew anxious to keep India in the war.

  Towards the end of January 1942, Chiang sounded out the British envoy to China, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, if he and his wife could visit Burma and India. In India, he wanted to meet not just the viceroy but Gandhi and Nehru as well. Nehru, in particular, was his friend – and he wished to impress upon the Indian leaders the ‘essential wisdom of cooperating fully’ in the war. Chiang had also wanted his visit to be kept secret, but Linlithgow dismissed this as impractical. The viceroy was keen that Chiang also met Jinnah to avoid creating ‘any impression’ that India’s co-operation depended only on the Congress. For the rest, Linlithgow was sure that he could handle Chiang well and send him home ‘as pleased as Punch’.46

  Churchill, however, was not keen on the visit. ‘We cannot possibly agree’, he cabled Linlithgow, to Chiang acting as an ‘impartial arbiter’ between the government and the Congress. In particular, there was no question of his meeting Nehru: ‘nothing would be more likely to spread pan-Asiatic malaise through all the bazaars of India’. Churchill sent a personal message for Chiang stating that his idea of meeting Gandhi and Nehru, who were in a ‘state at least of passive disobedience to the King Emperor’, required ‘very grave consideration’. In any case, if he saw leaders of the Congress, he would also have to meet Jinnah, who spoke for 80 million Muslims, as well as representatives of the depressed classes and the princes. The Congress, he emphasized, ‘in no way represents the martial races of India who are fighting so well’. When Chiang landed in Calcutta, Clark Kerr, who was accompanying him, informed the viceroy’s office that the Generalissimo’s ‘principal object’ in visiting India was to meet Nehru and Gandhi. He advised against passing on Churchill’s message to Chiang. Any attempt to persuade Chiang otherwise was ‘unlikely to succeed’ and if he was prevented he would feel ‘tricked’. The prime minister could not fathom why, having invited himself over, Chiang should feel ‘tricked’. But he trusted the viceroy to do the needful.47

  Linlithgow found his guests interesting. The viceroy thought that Chiang was ‘an able and determined man’ but ‘entirely Chinese in his mental furniture’. He also depended a great deal on his wife, Soong Mei-ling. Expressing all the condescension of his class, Linlithgow noted that she was ‘a typical product of the American “Co-ed” system, complete with lipstick and “blue-stocking”!’ In the upper reaches of her mind, he suspected, she was ‘a typical American liberal whose enthusiasms are unimpaired by any restraining considerations of a practical kind’. They were an interesting act, noted the viceroy. ‘When they are on a big job she starts with the family trousers firmly fixed on her limbs, but by the final stage of any venture the Generalissimo is invariably discovered to have transferred the pants to his own person.’48

  The viceroy also found that neither Chiang nor his wife had the ‘least notion’ of Indian politics. In fact, Chiang admitted as much and told his host that he was anxious to help. Linlithgow held forth on the various cleavages in Indian politics, and especially the importance of Muslims to India’s war. He ‘exploded the myth’ about India having been dragged kicking and screaming into the war. Chiang was shrewder than Linlithgow assumed. Drawing on his own experience, he told the viceroy that in modern war, ‘the army alone could not produce success’: it was necessary to have a civilian populace ‘willing to endure sacrifices’. Chiang said that if he were the British government, ‘he would offer India a firm promise of Dominion Status’; while if an Indian, he would ask for no more.49

  The Generalissimo had ample opportunity to ply this line with his friend Jawaharlal Nehru. Soon after their arrival, Nehru had made his way to Delhi, and Chiang and his wife spent long evenings with him and his sister, Vijayalakshmi Pandit. Linlithgow cattil
y remarked that Soong Mei-ling had a ‘kittenish weakness for Nehru’s eyelashes’.50 Since his trip to China in 1939, Nehru had remained in contact with Chiang and Soong Mei-ling. He was particularly touched by the gifts he had received from them while in prison. More generally, Nehru was convinced that the fortunes of India and China were braided together by the war and that their futures would also be intertwined.51

  Nehru, however, refused to be swayed by Chiang’s views on Indian politics. After their first meeting, he publicly stated that there would be no change in the Congress’s stance owing to Chiang’s visit. The Generalissimo was ‘one of the topmost leaders of the world’ and the Congress was trying to make him understand its position.52 Chiang came away from the meetings surprised at the ‘extreme nature of their attitude’ and conceded to Linlithgow that he had ‘done his best to persuade Nehru to play up but had failed’.53 Nehru wrote a gracious letter to Chiang that his visit was ‘a very great event for all of us, an event which may well have historic consequences’. He regretted, however, that Chiang had not so far been able to meet Gandhi.54

  Churchill had actively dissuaded the Chinese leader from travelling to Wardha to meet Gandhi. On 12 February, he sent a message for Chiang that such a visit would ‘impede’ their efforts to rally all of India for the war against Japan. It might also have the ‘unintended effect’ of emphasizing ‘communal differences’. His colleagues were not so sure. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden wrote that it was ‘of the utmost importance’ not to cause Chiang offence at this ‘critical juncture’. If things went wrong in Burma, it would be ‘most difficult’ to keep China in the war and Chiang would be their ‘only hope’.55

  In the meantime, Chiang had received a message from Gandhi expressing ‘greatest grief’ that he could not travel to Wardha. Chiang was moved. ‘I have to meet Gandhi’, he told Clark Kerr. Eventually it was arranged that they would meet at Santiniketan, the university established by Tagore near Calcutta. Prior to seeing Gandhi, Chiang managed to meet Jinnah who also happened to be in Calcutta. He found Jinnah ‘dishonest’: ‘the British make use of people like this – but it’s not true that Hindus and Muslims can’t get on’.56