India's War

by Srinath Raghavan

  This was an ironic conclusion; for until a couple of years before, the central problem of the Indian army was its lack of mechanization. The battles in the east, however, had shown that ‘modern’ warfare did not automatically mean mechanized warfare. The Burma campaign necessitated a hybrid organization as well as a range of operational concepts and tactical skills. Thus, following the Delhi conference, Wavell decided to introduce a new type of formation: the Indian light division. This formation would be given only a light scale of motor vehicles – mainly jeeps and smaller four-wheel drive lorries – and would depend largely on pack mule transport companies. The structure of the light division would also differ from that of the standard infantry division, even if the number of troops remained roughly similar. It would comprise a divisional headquarters – with a support battalion, equipped with troop carriers and medium machine guns, intended to function as ‘shock troops’ – and only two brigades. Each of the brigades, however, would have three infantry battalions and a reconnaissance battalion. The latter would consist of two jeep companies and two mounted (‘lorried’) infantry companies. The divisional artillery would include two fully kitted-out mountain regiments, one mechanized field regiment and a mixed light anti-aircraft and anti-tank regiment.

  So designed, the light division was expected to combine maximum mobility on and off the roads with firepower – a combination that was essential to blunt Japanese attempts at encirclement. The 17th and 39th Divisions were selected for conversion to the new model. Simultaneously, the levels of mechanization of the 7th, 20th and 23rd Divisions were curtailed and some animal transport injected into them. These mixed formations came to be known as ‘animal and mechanical transport’ (A&MT) divisions. Subsequently, the 26th Division was also converted into an A&MT division. The remaining Indian divisions – the 14th, 19th, 25th and 34th – as well as the three British divisions in India (the 2nd, 5th and 70th) were left intact.

  In mid-1943, further organizational changes were introduced drawing on the experience of the botched Arakan operation. There would now be three types of divisions: A&MT with higher scale motor vehicles (the 19th and 25th Indian Divisions); A&MT with lower scale motor vehicles (the 5th, 7th and 20th Indian Divisions)*; and the light divisions (the 17th and 39th). The infantry battalions in both types of A&MT divisions would be divested of all vehicles except the minimum required for carrying essential fighting equipment – effectively anything less mobile than a four-wheel drive 15-cwt truck. The fighting strength of the infantry battalions in the light divisions was increased by about 160 men, which added a platoon to each of the four rifle companies. The mobility of these units was enhanced by allowing them thirty-one jeeps – increased from ten.3

  Initially, these changes did not go down very well with the army. Units that were de-mechanized reported ‘disappointment at the withdrawal of vehicles and the equipment and the relegation to roles less technical and less attractive’. A lorried Indian infantry battalion that was shorn of its vehicles and sent into a frontier defence role noted that the men had ‘accepted the change philosophically’ and ‘morale remains good but by no means as enthusiastic as it was a month ago’.4 Some Indian officers – particularly KCIOs – also resented being transferred out of mechanized units to infantry battalions; a move that they perceived as discriminatory.5 While these concerns were ironed out, GHQ India had more trouble coping with the multiple divisional structures and requirements. Indeed, the operations of 1944 would point to the need for further streamlining of the structure of the Indian divisions.

  Divesting the infantry divisions of motor vehicles was easy; not so their replacement with animal transport. At the outbreak of war, the Royal Indian Army Service Corps (RIASC) had thirty-six companies of mules and four of camels. The bulk of these were deployed in the Middle East and North Africa. From mid-1942, the RIASC went on an accelerated drive for expansion, and by 1944 it counted no fewer than 102 animal transport companies – an overwhelming majority of which were deployed in the India–Burma theatre. The expansion was, however, hampered by a host of problems. The most important was the lack of trained personnel to work the animals. Finding suitable animals, too, proved tricky. Prior to the war, mules were imported from Argentina and bred in remount depots. This was no longer possible. Although the breeds available in the domestic market were inferior, the RIASC was forced to make do with them. To augment animal transport, the army imported donkeys from South Africa. The RIASC also raised an experimental pack bullock transport company. So successful was this attempt that twenty-six such companies were created by 1944. The bullock companies were used in the rear areas, so freeing up the mule companies for deployment with the forward formations. The success with bullocks led to the raising of buffalo companies for similar roles.6

  The most spectacular unit, however, was the ‘Experimental Elephant Transport Company’. This was formed from the elephants that had escaped from Burma as well as those loaned by civilian firms in Assam. The RIASC soon realized that the elephants were not economical for use as transport. While they were capable of lugging huge loads, they also required enormous quantities of fodder. In consequence, they were used for engineering works instead: moving timber, building bridges over streams and log roads over swampy areas. After a brief tug of war, the elephant company was handed over to the Corps of Engineers.

  This period also saw a major expansion in the Long Range Penetration (LRP) special forces groups under the command of General Orde Wingate. Even as the first ‘Chindit’ expedition was underway with the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, Wavell had raised another LRP force: the 111th Indian Infantry Brigade. The hype and publicity generated by the Chindit expedition made Wingate rather more expansive in his plans. Following the Quebec Conference of 1943, where he sat at Churchill’s elbow, Wingate was allowed to form six LRP brigades. Much against the wishes of the India Command and Slim, the 70th British Division was broken up to accommodate Wingate’s grandiose designs. The meagre combat outcomes would be entirely disproportionate to the investment.

  In tandem with the organizational changes, the India Command began addressing other weaknesses that had been cast into harsh relief by the fight against the Japanese. On 16 May 1943, Wavell told the chief the of general staff in Delhi that they must quickly assimilate the lessons of Arakan. Towards this end, he set up a committee ‘to examine and report on the present standard of readiness for war of British and Indian infantry battalions in India, and to make recommendations for their improvement’. The Infantry Committee, chaired by the deputy chief of the general staff, Major General Roland Richardson, along with four more two-star and two one-star officers, convened at the end of May. The committee’s diagnoses and recommendations led to series of significant and far-reaching reforms.7

  The nub of the problem, the committee argued, was the hasty and excessive expansion of the army in India. In particular, infantry units had been raised in a lackadaisical fashion. The adage that ‘any man can be an infantry man’ had long been outdated. The India Command had been oblivious to the fact that infantry had become a technical arm needing special skills. The low status and pay of the infantry had immediately to be redressed. Indian infantry battalions should also be given first claim in the selection of officer cadets and recruits.

  Second, the practice of milking existing units to raise new ones had resulted in a haemorrhage of experienced officers, VCOs and NCOs and so blunted the combat capabilities of the Indian battalions. The committee identified the absence of pre-war regular officers with five to eight years’ service as a serious handicap. It had led to a sharp slackening in the standards of leadership and discipline, tactics and morale. At least three such officers, the committee insisted, were required in every fighting unit to teach the trade to the Indian and British ECOs as well as the troops.

  Third, the standard of basic fighting skills, fitness and discipline of the newly joined recruits in battalions was alarmingly low. The committee cuttingly observed that the recruits that had fo
ught in Arakan were no more than a ‘mob of partially trained village youth’. This stemmed from the fact that the regimental training centres were overburdened and underprepared to impart quality training to recruits. Some of these centres catered for up to fifteen battalions of a regiment. What was more, battalions of every regiment were organized and equipped differently and were deployed variously for desert and jungle warfare. The centres were chronically short of experienced training officers and NCOs: the front-line battalions being rightly chary of sparing their best. In consequence, the recruits churned out by the regimental centres were ‘jack of all trades and master of none’.

  The committee recommended increasing the training period of recruits to eleven months. Nine of these would be spent picking up basic infantry skills at regimental centres, while the last two months would involve specialized jungle warfare training in a designated ‘training division’. Two training divisions would be established and would also enable the training of all British and African infantry soldiers that arrived in India. The absence of a formalized and functional training regime, the committee observed, was ‘the most urgent problem facing us, and one which requires prompt and energetic action’.8

  The implementation of the Infantry Committee’s incisive and far-reaching recommendations was left to Auchinleck, who took over as commander-in-chief the following month. With his long association with and insight into the Indian army, Auchinleck was perfectly cut out for the job. By the time Mountbatten was appointed supreme commander of SEAC, Auchinleck had ensured that experienced Indian army officers were running the show. Eastern Command was renamed the Fourteenth Army and General Slim was appointed as the army commander. Commanders who had fought in North and East Africa as well as the Middle East were brought into the Burma theatre. For instance, Frank Messervy and Peter Rees – both with chequered records – were given another crack at commanding front-line formations: the 7th and 19th Indian Divisions respectively. Major General Temple Gurdon was appointed director of military training and tasked with overseeing the reform of training and army doctrine. Major General Reginald Savory, who had commanded the 23rd Indian Division, took over as Inspector of Infantry. ‘I spent most of my time’, Savory recalled, ‘not only visiting the training establishments, but also infantry units throughout India. I also made regular trips to the front, so as to acquaint myself with the conditions at the time and apply the lessons learnt.’9

  Indeed, training was Auchinleck’s top priority. As he wrote to the CIGS in mid-September, ‘I hope that all divisions will be trained and ready by the end of this year [1943]. I can assure you that I shall not allow any formation to go into battle until it is adequately trained.’10 The 14th and 39th Indian Divisions were identified as training divisions, plucked out of their operational areas and located in the suitable terrain of Chhindwara and Saharanpur in central India.

  The course for new soldiers and officers was divided into two parts. The first month was spent in a ‘base camp’ where they learnt the basic skills of operating in the jungle: movement in day and night, elementary navigation, minor tactics, field craft, and preparation of slit trenches. During the next month, the men moved into the jungle with their training companies and practised more advanced techniques: patrolling, infiltration, concealment, construction of larger defensive positions, personal hygiene and weapon maintenance. The course ended with a three-day jungle exercise involving ‘enemy’ troops.11 Thereafter, the soldiers were sent to reinforcement camps where they continued to train until they were called up by their units.

  Formations, too, began to take training seriously. Messervy, for instance, circulated a series of operational notes in his division outlining weaknesses observed during exercises, especially in patrolling, concealment and preparation of defences. The commander of the 20th Indian Division, Major General Douglas Gracey, was another proponent of continuous training and feedback. The battle-hardened 5th Indian Division reached India in the summer of 1943 after its stint in the Middle East. The entire division, including its commander, Major General Harold Briggs, attended lectures and trained for jungle warfare and animal management. The training instructions were clear: ‘This division has now to train for operations of a character different to which it has been accustomed and to train quickly.’12

  The revamped training system was not as smooth as it sounds. Both the training divisions were dogged by the shortage of experienced officers. Most of the trainers themselves had only a hazy idea of the realities of fighting in the jungle. In fact, many of them had to undergo a crash course in jungle warfare before they could pretend to teach others. The unfamiliarity with the terrain also lent an air of artificiality to the efforts of the training divisions. To come up to speed on jungle craft and lore, the training divisions resorted to an interesting expedient. They sought the services of India’s best-known big-game hunter: Jim Corbett. The sixty-eight-year-old ‘Carpet Sahib’ was a legendary figure in the hills of Kumaon and beyond. The author of best-selling books – especially Man-eaters of Kumaon and The Man-eating Leopard of Rudraprayag – had been associated with the army earlier. During the Great War, he had raised a Kumaoni labour levy of 500 men and commanded them on the Western Front. With the onset of the Second World War, he had served on the district Soldiers’ Board, helping out with recruitment. Now, with the honorary rank of a lieutenant colonel, Corbett became an instructor in jungle craft.

  Corbett spent time with both the training divisions and travelled to other formations across India as well. His principal contribution was to allay concerns among the troops that the jungle was an alien environment – as much an enemy as the Japanese. Using slides, illustrations and short films, Corbett lectured on a range of themes relating to survival in the jungle: animal and human tracking; edible and inedible plants; brewing tea with herbs and wild honey; identifying snakes and bird calls. The troops were evidently taken by the genial old man and his tales of the jungle. As one of his students put it, he seemed a cross between ‘a magician and a master-detective’. Man-eaters of Kumaon became required reading in the training divisions. It was also translated into Roman Urdu by GHQ India, so that officers could read it out to soldiers.13

  That said, racy accounts of shikar (hunting) would have scarcely sufficed to prepare the troops to fight the Japanese. Rather more important were the training instructions and pamphlets, memoranda and circulars that flowed among formations and units. Yet this profusion of paper carried the risk of confusing as much as clarifying. As the Infantry Committee had noted,

  many doctrines exist, all of them fundamentally different and all of them being put into effect in different parts of India. They would stress the urgent need for GHQ to control the Pandits, who produce such doctrines, so that the training of the recruit and the trained soldier can follow one accepted doctrine.14

  In order to streamline the doctrine, the fourth edition of The Jungle Book was published in September 1943. This training pamphlet was considerably revised to take into account the lessons of all operations against the Japanese, including the recent ones in Arakan.15

  An updated edition of Instructors’ Handbook on Fieldcraft and Battle Drill was issued, along with Battle Drill for Thick Jungle. Both these pamphlets helped convert doctrinal principles into tactical practice. Simultaneously, units and formations were being educated about the tactics adopted by the Japanese and ways of countering them. The operation in Donbaik, for example, had underscored the defensive strength of the Japanese bunker system. After a careful examination of this experience, various training outfits organized lecture-demonstrations of techniques to be adopted in attacking the bunkers. Training companies would carry out in slow motion the various phases of the attack and the operation would be dissected in the subsequent discussion. The use of light tanks in a ‘bunker busting’ role was also carefully examined. The evolving doctrine realized the mistakes made earlier – use of tanks in small numbers and lack of all-arms training – and sought to rectify them. Similar efforts were made
to disseminate doctrine on dealing with Japanese offensive tactics: infiltration, encirclement and the use of roadblocks. The solution lit upon by the Indian army was the use of ‘boxes’: compact and strong all-round defensive positions, which if necessary could be supplied by air. Ironically, the idea of a ‘box’ had been discredited in the Western Desert, particularly after the first battle of Alamein. In the Burma campaign, though, it would prove rather more successful.16

  Fighting an experienced opponent in the jungle called for not only intense training but a high level of physical fitness. By 1943, though, the physical standards of recruits to the Indian army had sharply plummeted. Given the widespread scarcity of food across most parts of India – including famine in some – it is hardly surprising that recruits were malnourished and afflicted with nutritional diseases such as anaemia. Special feeding was required to bring them up to the minimum acceptable operational standard. Indeed, the availability of good quality food was a major incentive for joining the army.

  In the initial months of the war, the army rigidly adhered to the physical standards laid down in the Recruiting Regulations of 1939. The men recruited during this period were not prone to malnutrition. They needed no more than the normal peacetime scale of rations to fight well in the Middle East. With the surge in expansion from 1941, the army realized that recruits of the peacetime standards were unavailable in adequate numbers. So physical standards had to be relaxed. Even these standards proved difficult to maintain, leading to a further lowering of them in June 1942.