The Hell of Good Intentions

by Stephen M. Walt

  As we have seen throughout this book, events since the end of the Cold War offer a similar warning. In Europe, open-ended NATO expansion poisoned relations with Russia, helped spark the frozen conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine, and drove Moscow closer to China. In the Middle East, “dual containment” kept thousands of U.S. troops in the Gulf after the 1991 Gulf War, where their presence helped inspire the September 11 attacks. Subsequent U.S. efforts at regime change in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya led to costly debacles as well, and U.S. support for antigovernment forces in Yemen and Syria failed to produce stable, pro-American governments. None of these wars were fought to uphold the balance of power in a vital region; instead, each involved trying to topple an unsavory regime and replace it with one more to America’s liking. None of these efforts were successful. Abandoning offshore balancing after the Cold War has been a recipe for disaster.

  Indeed, imagine how the world might look today had the United States embraced offshore balancing when the Cold War ended. For starters, there would have been no NATO expansion; instead, the United States would have pursued its original idea—the so-called Partnership for Peace—and done more to integrate Russia into a pan-European security framework. With no state threatening to become a hegemon in Europe, the U.S. role in European security would have decreased steadily and Washington could have actively supported Anglo-French efforts to build a common foreign and security policy.

  In fairness, this approach might have prolonged the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s and left leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic in power. That outcome would have been objectionable on moral grounds, but it would not have affected U.S. security or prosperity very much, if at all. Nor should we forget that the Rube Goldberg solutions devised at Dayton in 1995 and after the Kosovo War in 2000 are far from ideal and remain fragile.

  More important, reducing the U.S. role and eschewing NATO expansion would have avoided triggering long-term Russian security fears, thereby removing its incentive to maintain “frozen conflicts” in Georgia, seize Crimea, and destabilize Ukraine. Nor would the United States now be committed to defending weak and vulnerable allies in the Baltic region. The European security environment would likely still be tranquil, and relations with Russia—a declining but still influential regional power—would be much better than they are today.

  In the Persian Gulf, a Clinton administration that embraced offshore balancing would have recognized the folly of dual containment and let Iran and Iraq continue to check each other. If U.S. forces had left Saudi Arabia after the first Gulf War, as offshore balancing would have prescribed, Osama bin Laden might never have decided to attack the “far enemy.” One cannot be sure that 9/11 (or something like it) would not have occurred, but it would have been substantially less likely.

  Needless to say, there would have been no Iraq War had offshore balancing prevailed. Instead of trying to “transform” the region into a sea of pro-American democracies, Washington would have intervened with military force only if Iran or Iraq (or some other state) attacked a U.S. ally or seemed likely to dominate the Gulf. This policy would have saved the United States trillions of dollars and spared the lives of thousands of U.S. soldiers and tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis. Iran’s influence in the region would be substantially less today.

  Moreover, an offshore balancer would have responded more sensibly to Iran’s repeated efforts to pursue some sort of détente with the United States. Tehran reached out to Washington on several occasions after the 1990s but was ultimately spurned each time.16 A hateful buffoon such as Mahmoud Ahmedinejad would have less likely been chosen as Iran’s president, and Iran would probably have agreed to cap its nuclear enrichment capacity earlier and at even lower levels. It is impossible to know for certain if U.S.-Iranian relations would be significantly better today had a different strategy been adopted, but the odds favor it.

  Offshore balancing is not a miracle drug, so it might have failed to overcome the many obstacles to a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. But eschewing the “special relationship” between the United States and Israel in favor of a normal one would have forced Israeli leaders to think more carefully about the long-term consequences of continued settlement growth. A lasting final status agreement might still have proved elusive, but a different U.S. strategy would have made it more likely.

  Offshore balancing would have also left the United States better prepared to deal with a rising China. Instead of being distracted by conflicts in Central Asia and Iraq, U.S. leaders would have devoted more time and attention to managing relations with Beijing and reinforcing America’s Asian alliances. The money squandered in Iraq and Afghanistan would have been available to enhance the U.S. force posture, maintain its technological edge, and invest in key regional partnerships. In retrospect, the failed pursuit of liberal hegemony was one of the greatest gifts Beijing has received in recent decades.

  Finally, and more speculatively, offshore balancing would have been better for the U.S. economy. The United States could have enjoyed a longer and larger “peace dividend,” rebuilt its eroding infrastructure, kept the federal budget balanced, and avoided the burgeoning deficits and easy-money policies that followed 9/11 and fueled the pre-2008 housing bubble and the subsequent financial crisis. Wall Street might have gone off the rails anyway, but a different grand strategy might have made it less likely.

  Counterfactuals such as these cannot be proved, of course, and a strategy of offshore balancing might have produced a few unintended consequences that policymakers would have been forced to address. Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine that it would have performed worse than liberal hegemony did, and there are good reasons to think it would have done substantially better.

  OFFSHORE BALANCING TODAY

  What would offshore balancing look like today? The good news is that a serious challenge to American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere is unlikely and there are presently no potential hegemons in Europe or the Persian Gulf. Now for the bad news: if China’s impressive rise continues, it is likely to seek a dominant position in Asia. The United States should make a major effort to prevent it from succeeding, for Chinese hegemony in Asia would give Beijing the latitude to project power around the world—much as the United States does today—including in the Western Hemisphere. From the standpoint of U.S. national security, it is better if China has to focus its attention and effort closer to home.

  In an ideal world, Washington would rely on local powers to contain China, but that strategy may not work. Not only is China likely to be much more powerful than its neighbors, but these states are located far from each other and do not always get along, making it more difficult for them to maintain an effective balancing coalition. The United States will almost certainly have to coordinate their efforts and may have to throw its considerable weight behind them. In the years ahead, Asia may be the one place where U.S. leadership is indeed “indispensable.”17

  In Europe, the United States should gradually draw down its military presence and turn NATO over to the Europeans. The United States entered both world wars in good part to keep Germany from controlling the continent, but there is no prospect of something similar happening today. Germany and Russia are going to get relatively weaker over time because their populations are gradually declining and becoming considerably older, and no other potential hegemon is in sight. Leaving European security to the local powers could increase the potential for trouble somewhat, but a conflict there, while obviously undesirable, would not lead to one state dominating all of Europe and thus would not pose a serious threat to vital U.S. interests. The United States should use its good offices to help resolve disagreements among the European powers and to encourage them to cooperate on a variety of issues, but there is no compelling strategic need for the United States to spend billions each year (and pledge its own citizens’ lives) to keep the peace there.

  Regarding the Persian Gulf, the United States should return to the strategy that served it well from 1945 to 1993.
No local power is presently able to dominate the region, so the United States can keep most of its forces offshore and over the horizon. U.S. leaders should respect the principle of state sovereignty when dealing with the Middle East and should abandon its misguided efforts at regime change and social engineering. The Middle East will remain unstable for many years to come, and the United States has neither the need nor the ability to resolve the complex conflicts now roiling the region.

  For the present, Washington should also pursue better relations with Iran. It is not in America’s interest for Iran to abandon, or not renew, the current nuclear agreement and to race for the bomb. Iran is more likely to do so if it fears an American attack, which is why Washington should try to mend fences with Tehran in the interim. Moreover, China is likely to want allies in the Gulf in the future, and Iran will probably be at the top of its list.18 The United States has an obvious interest in discouraging Sino-Iranian security cooperation, and that requires détente with Iran. Talking to Tehran is also a good way to remind America’s other Middle East allies that Washington has many options, thereby giving them an incentive to act in ways that will secure U.S. backing if needed.

  Iran has a significantly larger population and greater economic potential than its Persian Gulf neighbors, and it may eventually be in a position to dominate the region.19 If Iran begins to move in this direction, the United States should help the other local powers balance Tehran, calibrating its own efforts and local military presence to the magnitude of the danger.

  Taken together, these steps would allow the United States to reduce its national security expenditures to a percentage of GDP similar to that of the other major powers.20 U.S. policymakers would focus primarily on Asia, curtail spending on counterterrorism, end the Afghanistan war, and cease most of its other overseas interventions. The United States would maintain substantial naval and air assets along with modest but capable ground forces and would spend enough to ensure that its military technology and personnel are the best in the world. It should also be prepared to expand its capabilities should circumstances require. For the foreseeable future, however, the U.S. government could spend more money on urgent domestic needs or leave it in the taxpayers’ pockets.

  BRINGING DIPLOMACY BACK IN

  By design and by necessity, offshore balancing would shift the focus of U.S. foreign policy away from its present emphasis on military power and coercion and back toward diplomacy. Over the past two decades Washington has repeatedly tried to compel weaker powers to do its bidding by issuing threats, imposing sanctions, and, if necessary, unleashing its unmatched armada of drones, Special Forces, cruise missiles, stealthy aircraft, and conventional ground forces. At the same time, the Defense Department’s vastly greater resources allowed it to usurp many functions previously performed by other government agencies.21

  As noted repeatedly in previous chapters, these efforts have mostly failed to achieve the stated objectives. Even so, whenever some new problem arises—a civil war in Syria, fighting in Ukraine, a ballistic missile test by North Korea or Iran, or new Chinese efforts to “reclaim” shoals and reefs in the South China Sea—the reflexive U.S. response is to sell arms to local allies, ramp up economic sanctions, send an aircraft carrier, ship weapons and trainers to indigenous forces, issue threats and warnings, create a “no-fly” zone, or launch air strikes by manned aircraft, cruise missiles, and drones. Foreign policy pundits endlessly debate the merits of these (and other) initiatives, rarely asking what the United States could do to ameliorate or remove the underlying causes of the problem through persuasion and accommodation. Diplomacy has not disappeared entirely from the nation’s foreign policy tool kit, but it routinely takes a back seat to the use of force and coercion.

  Yet as former ambassador and assistant secretary of defense Chas W. Freeman reminds us, “diplomacy is how a nation advances its interests and resolves problems with foreigners with minimal violence.”22 Putting diplomacy first does not eliminate the need for military power, but sees it as the last resort rather than the first, and as a tool of statecraft rather than an end in itself. Prioritizing diplomacy means striving to reach mutually acceptable solutions with others rather than simply dictating to them. A nation that privileges diplomacy empowers its representatives to listen carefully to others, seeks to understand their views even when they are at odds with ours, tries to empathize with others’ perspectives though we do not share them, and searches for creative agreements that can advance our interests along with theirs, ideally making a resort to force unnecessary.23

  Under offshore balancing, diplomacy takes center stage. To implement the strategy successfully, U.S. leaders need a sophisticated understanding of strategic trends and must be familiar with the interests, goals, and likely responses of key regional states. Washington has to spot potential hegemons as they emerge and coordinate responses with the rising power’s local rivals. Far from encouraging isolationism or disengagement, offshore balancing depends first and foremost on intelligent and adroit diplomacy in the service of America’s broader strategic objectives.

  It also places a premium on flexibility. Like Great Britain, the original “offshore balancer,” the United States has “no eternal friends or enemies,” but rather interests that are “eternal and perpetual.”24 Because its overriding goal is to maintain local balances of power in the key regions, the United States must have the agility to shift sides as needed. Flexibility of alignment can also help contain dangerous regional rivalries, as local actors will be less inclined to challenge the status quo if they know that doing so could lead the United States to bring its considerable power to bear against them.

  When there is no potential hegemon in sight, however, Washington should strive to be on cordial terms with as many local states as possible. Cultivating businesslike relations with all states makes it easier to cooperate where interests overlap and would enhance U.S. diplomatic leverage. In short, instead of having “special relationships” with some countries and treating others as pariahs, offshore balancers keep the lines of communication open with everyone.

  Among other benefits, this approach reminds current partners not to take U.S. support for granted, discourages free-riding, and gives both rivals and partners an incentive to compete for Washington’s attention and support. The United States will be very powerful for many years to come, its support is still an enormous asset, and other states will be more attentive to U.S. concerns if they know that Washington has a decent working relationship with them but also with their rivals. Rather than bending over backward to convince local allies that its pledges are 100 percent reliable, the United States would take advantage of its favorable geopolitical position and play “hard to get” instead.

  Ideally, a renewed emphasis on diplomacy would include a major effort to reform and professionalize America’s diplomatic ranks. The United States is the only major power that routinely allows inexperienced amateurs to hold key diplomatic positions and frequently places individuals with little governmental experience in influential foreign policy positions. No president would appoint a wealthy campaign donor to command an armored division or a warship—let alone serve as a regional combatant commander—but roughly a third of U.S. ambassadorial appointments are doled out to campaign contributors rather than to trained professional diplomats, with sometimes embarrassing results.25

  When the Ukraine crisis erupted in 2013, for example, the Russian ambassador in Germany, Vladimir Grinin, was in his fourth ambassadorship in a diplomatic career that began in 1971, including seventeen years in Germany itself. He speaks fluent German and English and is intimately acquainted with key German officials. By contrast, the U.S. ambassador in Berlin, John B. Emerson, was a former entertainment lawyer from Los Angeles who had been a major fundraiser for Barack Obama’s presidential campaigns. He had no prior diplomatic experience and spoke no German. Emerson’s political skills may have been exceptional, but which of these individuals was better prepared to represent his country’s inter
ests and perspective to his German counterparts and to explain their views to his superiors back home?26

  America’s diplomats also suffer from a haphazard personnel system and the lack of a systematic and well-funded program of career development. The U.S. military starts by training many of its officers at the three service academies, and career officers routinely receive additional professional training at one of many staff colleges (such as the Naval War College or the Command and General Staff College) or by earning advanced academic degrees at government expense. This commitment to career-long learning creates more effective military leaders and enhances their connection to other key parts of the foreign policy establishment.

  By comparison, options for professional career development for U.S. diplomats consist mostly of language training undertaken prior to postings abroad. According to former ambassador Charles Ray, a typical military officer might receive a year or more of advanced training on roughly four occasions in a twenty-year career; a typical Foreign Service officer may be lucky to receive a single full year of training over a similar period.27 The heavy reliance on political appointees also limits avenues for experienced Foreign Service officers to rise within the department and leaves fewer senior diplomats available to mentor their junior colleagues.

  These problems are compounded by the peculiar manner in which the United States staffs key positions in the executive branch. When a new president is inaugurated, the transition team must fill several thousand government positions, from cabinet secretaries on down. Hundreds of these posts require Senate confirmation, which often takes months and sometimes more than a year. Some appointees will be serving in government for the first time, and many will remain in their posts for only a year or two. This situation is akin to having Apple, General Electric, or IBM replace their entire senior management team every four years and leaving key positions unfilled for months if not years at a time.