The Hell of Good Intentions

by Stephen M. Walt

  17. See Cindy Boren, “Report: At Least 50 Teams Were Paid by Department of Defense for Patriotic Displays,” The Washington Post, November 15, 2015; and John McCain and Jeff Flake, Tackling Paid Patriotism: A Joint Oversight Report, at www.mccain.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/12de6dcb-d8d8-4a58-8795-562297f948c1/tackling-paid-patriotism-oversight-report.pdf.

  18. Walter Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy (New York: Henry Holt, 1915), p. 51.

  19. Until very recently, anyone who questioned the U.S. embargo on Cuba or called for a sustained rapprochement with Iran was likely to be treated as a pariah as well.

  20. A good example of this kind of misrepresentation is Richard Haass’s op-ed “The Isolationist Temptation,” The Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2016.

  21. See Stephen M. Walt, “Give Peace a Chance,” Foreign Policy, October 10, 2015, at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/02/give-peace-a-chance-president-republican-democrat-clinton/.

  22. See Leslie H. Gelb with Jeanne Paloma-Zelmati, “Mission Not Accomplished,” Democracy 13 (Summer 2009).

  23. Between 2009 and 2013 McCain and Graham were the two most frequent guests on Meet the Press, Face the Nation, This Week, Fox News Sunday, and State of the Union, appearing ninety-seven and eighty-five times respectively. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and Rogers were the fifth and sixth most frequent guests. The only frequent guest who consistently represented a noninterventionist perspective was The Nation editor Katrina vanden Heuvel, but she appeared a mere twenty-two times. See David Leonhardt, “The Upshot: Sunday Talk Show Guests,” at www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/05/upshot/05up-sundayguests.html?_r=0. See also: Derek Willis, “Congressional Conservatives Tip Scales to the Right on the Sunday Shows,” at www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/upshot/congressional-conservatives-tip-scales-to-the-right-on-the-sunday-shows.html; and Steve Benen, “The Great 2013 Sunday Show Race,” December 30, 2013, at www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/the-great-2013-sunday-show-race.

  24. It is revealing, for example, when a trio of New York Times columnists—Roger Cohen, David Brooks, and former managing editor Bill Keller—take to the op-ed pages to warn of the perils of isolationism, and the contributing writer Sam Tanenhaus hosts a video on the Times website comparing critics of U.S. intervention today to such isolationists as Charles Lindbergh and the antiwar presidential candidate George McGovern. See Bill Keller, “Our New Isolationism,” The New York Times, September 8, 2013; Roger Cohen, “An Anchorless World,” The New York Times, September 12, 2013; David Brooks, “The Leaderless Doctrine,” The New York Times, March 10, 2014; and “Think Back: America and Isolationism,” at www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000002448238/think-back-america-and-isolationism.html.

  25. See Patrick Porter, “Why U.S. Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the Foreign Policy Establishment,” International Security 42, no. 4 (Spring 2018). Porter’s discussion of this point is based on Elliott Negin, “News Media Coverage of the Defense Budget,” in Leon V. Sigal, ed., The Changing Dynamics of U.S. Defense Spending (London: Praeger, 1999).

  26. Michael Glennon, National Security and Double Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 93.

  27. David Barstow, “Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand,” The New York Times, April 20, 2008, and idem, “One Man’s Military-Industrial Complex,” The New York Times, November 30, 2008. See also Lee Fang, “Who’s Paying the Pro-War Pundits?” The Nation, September 12, 2014.

  28. There is good evidence that embedded reporters portray the military more favorably than non-embedded reporters do, subtly reinforcing public support for military campaigns that may or may not be going as planned. See Michael Pfau, Elaine M. Wittenberg, Carolyn Jackson, Phil Mehringer, Rob Lanier, Michael Hatfield, and Kristina Brockman, “Embedding Journalists in Military Combat Units: How Embedding Alters Television News Stories,” Mass Communication and Society 8, no. 3 (2005); and Michael Pfau, Michel Haigh, Mitchell Gettle, Michael Donnelly, Gregory Scott, Dana Warr, and Elaine Wittenberg, “Embedding Journalists in Military Combat Units: Impact on Newspaper Story Frames and Tone,” Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 81, no. 1 (Spring 2004).

  29. See Paul Farhi, “At the Times, A Scoop Deferred,” The Washington Post, December 17, 2005; David Folkenflik, “New York Times’ Editor: Losing Snowden Scoop ‘Really Painful,’” NPR Online, June 5, 2014, at www.npr.org/2014/06/05/319233332/new-york-times-editor-losing-snowden-scoop-really-painful.

  30. Prominent examples include James Risen, Ken Silverstein, Glenn Greenwald, Jane Mayer, Jeremy Scahill, and Dana Priest.

  31. See Thompson, “Exaggerating American Vulnerability”; and Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). On this general phenomenon, see Peter Scoblic, Us vs. Them: How a Half-Century of Conservatism Has Undermined America’s Security (New York: Viking, 2008); Christopher Preble and John Mueller, eds., A Dangerous World?: Threat Perception and U.S. National Security (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2014); and Trevor Thrall and Jane Cramer, eds., American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11 (New York: Routledge, 2009). “Threat-mongering” is also discussed in Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie; and Schuessler, Deceit on the Road to War.

  32. See Samuel Wells, “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC-68 and the Soviet Threat,” International Security 4, no. 2 (1979).

  33. The phrase was that of Richard Nixon, who justified the invasion of Cambodia in 1970 by saying, “If, when the chips are down, the world’s most powerful nation, the United States of America, acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.”

  34. NSC-68 (“U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security”), reprinted in John Lewis Gaddis and Thomas Etzold, eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 404; also pp. 389, 414, and 434. I discuss balancing and bandwagoning at length in The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), especially chap. 5.

  35. See Max Fisher, “The Credibility Trap,” Vox.com, at www.vox.com/2016/4/29/11431808/credibility-foreign-policy-war.

  36. To be precise, Obama said that he would not strike Syria without congressional authorization. Prior to the vote, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) warned that a “vote against the resolution … would be catastrophic, because it would undermine the credibility of the United States of America and of the President of the United States.” See Zeke J. Miller, “McCain: Vote Against Syria Strike Would Be ‘Catastrophic,’” Time, September 2, 2013, at http://swampland.time.com/2013/09/02/mccain-blocking-syria-strike-would-be-catastrophic/.

  37. See in particular Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); and Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

  38. The domino theory is perhaps the most obvious example of this type of reasoning: it argued that a single setback (or even a voluntary U.S. withdrawal) might trigger a lengthy cascade of defections and defeat and eventually leave the United States isolated and beleaguered. On its flaws, see Jerome Slater, “The Domino Theory and International Politics: The Case of Vietnam,” Security Studies 3, no. 2 (1993); idem, “Dominos in Central America: Will They Fall? Does It Matter?” International Security 12, no. 2 (Fall 1987).

  39. See Walt, Origins of Alliances, chap. 8.

  40. Nan Tian et al., “Trends in Military Expenditure 2016,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2017), at www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-world-military-expenditure-2016.pdf.

  41. Given prior U.S. actions in the region and its repeated threats to overthrow the clerical regime, it is hardly surprising that Iranian leaders have contemplated acquiring a nuclear deterrent. Iran could not do so as long as the JCPOA remained in force, however, and it would take upward of a year fo
r it to build a nuclear bomb if it tried.

  42. See Stephen M. Walt, “The Islamic Republic of Hysteria,” Foreign Policy (January/February 2018), at http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/the-islamic-republic-of-hysteria-iran-middle-east-trump/; and Michael Wahid Hanna and Dalia Dassa Kaye, “The Limits of Iranian Influence,” Survival 57, no. 5 (September 2015).

  43. See John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Costs and Risks of Homeland Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); idem, Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

  44. “Hagel: ‘ISIS Beyond Anything We’ve Seen, U.S. Must Get Ready,’” Fox News, August 22, 2014, www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/08/22/isis-beyond-anything-that-weve-ever-seen-hagel-says//; “FBI: ISIS Is Biggest Threat to U.S.,” Daily Beast, July 22, 2015, at www.thedailybeast.com/cheats/2015/07/22/fbi-isis-bigger-threat-than-al-qaeda.html.

  45. “Statement by Director Brennan as Prepared for Delivery Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” June 16, 2016, at www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2016-speeches-testimony/statement-by-director-brennan-as-prepared-for-delivery-before-ssci.html.

  46. Since 2014, “ISIS-related” attacks outside its home base have killed roughly two thousand people worldwide, mostly in the Middle East, and only sixty-five in North America. See “ISIS Goes Global: 143 Attacks in 29 Countries Have Killed 2,043,” at www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/index.html. By contrast, there were more than thirty thousand murders in the United States in that same period. On the Islamic State’s limited capabilities, see Stephen M. Walt, “ISIS as a Revolutionary State: New Twist on an Old Story,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 6 (November/December 2015).

  47. See Sam Mullins, “The Road to Orlando: Jihadist-Inspired Violence in the West, 2012–2016,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 6 (2016).

  48. See Kenneth Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random House, 2002). Pollack also wrote several op-eds and made numerous media appearances supporting the invasion. For a critique, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “An Unnecessary War,” Foreign Policy, November–December 2002.

  49. See “Ex-CIA Head: Iran Is Genocidal, Theocratic, Imperialistic, Totalitarian,” June 5, 2105, at www.clarionproject.org/news/join-our-conference-call-iran-james-woolsey; Bret Stephens, “Iran Cannot Be Contained,” Commentary, July 1, 2010; and Michael Rubin, “Can Iran Be Deterred or Contained?” August 5, 2008, at www.aei.org/publication/can-a-nuclear-iran-be-contained-or-deterred/. For a convincing rebuttal, see Matt Duss, “The Martyr State Myth,” Foreign Policy, August 24, 2011, at http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/24/the-martyr-state-myth/.

  50. Bernard Lewis, “August 22,” The Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2006.

  51. For examples, see Walt, Taming American Power, pp. 83–98.

  52. Quoted in Leslie H. Gelb, “In the End, Every President Talks to the Bad Guys,” The Washington Post, April 27, 2008.

  53. For an overview, see Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000).

  54. W. Anthony Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March–April 1994).

  55. See David Frum, The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush (New York: Random House, 2003), pp. 232–33.

  56. See in particular Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism (New York: Vintage, 2008).

  57. See Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, “Post–Cold War US Military Expenditure in the Context of World Spending Trends,” Briefing Memo No. 10, Project on Defense Alternatives (1997), at www.comw.org/pda/bmemo10.htm.

  58. See, for example, Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran,” Foreign Affairs 91, No. 1 (January-February 2012).

  59. During its initial campaign to oust the Taliban and capture Osama bin Laden, for example, the Bush administration preferred to run the war on its own and reject proffered help from NATO. This decision was rooted in the experience of the Kosovo War, when many U.S. commanders felt their ability to prosecute the war was undermined by the need to obtain approval from America’s NATO allies. As one Pentagon official put it in 2002, “The fewer allies you have, the fewer permissions you have to get.” See Elaine Sciolino and Steven Lee Myers, “Bush Says ‘Time Is Running Out’: U.S. Plans to Act Largely Alone,” The New York Times, October 7, 2001.

  60. The situation reverses balance-of-power logic: the more (weak) allies the United States acquires, the more places it has to protect and the more its military requirements grow. Nowhere is this clearer than with NATO’s new Baltic members, who are militarily weak and difficult to defend. The pledge to defend them was undertaken on the assumption that it would never have to be honored. Let us hope so.

  61. See Erich Lichtblau, “FBI Steps Up Use of Stings in ISIS Cases,” The New York Times, June 7, 2016; Glenn Greenwald, “Why Does the FBI Have to Manufacture Its Own Plots If Terrorism and ISIS Are Such Grave Threats?” The Intercept, February 26, 2015; Risa Brooks, “Muslim ‘Homegrown’ Terrorism in the United States,” International Security 36, no. 2 (Fall 2011); John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “How Safe Are We?” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 5 (September/October 2016); and idem, “Misoverestimating ISIS: Comparisons with Al Qaeda,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 4 (August 2016).

  62. In 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned that a cyberattack could “shut down the power grid across large parts of the country,” and other experts warned of a “cyber Pearl Harbor” and other devastating attacks that could damage key civilian infrastructure or inflict a decisive military defeat. See Ted Koppel, “Where Is America’s Cyberdefense Plan?” The Washington Post, December 7, 2015; Nicole Perlroth, “Infrastructure Armageddon,” The New York Times, October 15, 2015; and Richard Clarke and Robert Knake, Cyberwar: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It (New York: Ecco, 2010).

  63. Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum, The Future of Violence: Robots and Germs, Hackers and Drones, Confronting a New Age of Threat (New York: Basic Books, 2015), pp. 6–7.

  64. For a sober and serious analysis of the cyber domain and its impact on world politics, see Lucas Kello, The Virtual Weapon and International Order (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017).

  65. See Scott Shane, “The Fake Americans Russia Created to Influence the Election,” The New York Times, September 7, 2017; Mike Isaac and Daisuke Wakabayashi, “Russian Influence Reached 126 Million Through Facebook Alone,” The New York Times, October 30, 2017.

  66. See Alexis Madrigal, “What Facebook Did to American Democracy (and why it was so hard to see it coming),” The Atlantic, October 12, 2017, at www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/what-facebook-did/542502/.

  67. Paul Pillar, “Russia Had a Lot to Work With: The Crisis in American Democracy,” The National Interest, January 9, 2017, at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/russia-had-plenty-work-the-crisis-american-democracy-18999?page=3.

  68. This incident provided the title for Ronald Suskind’s The One-Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

  69. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), p. 72.

  70. See Chase Madar, “The Anti-Warrior,” The American Conservative, March 18, 2014.

  71. Steven Erlanger, “Saudi Prince Criticizes Obama Administration, Citing Indecision in Mideast,” The New York Times, December 15, 2013.

  72. As one Japanese defense expert put it, “The Obama administration is not doing such a good job maintaining its credibility … [Obama’s blurred “red line” in Syria showed] “a lack of commitment, determination, coherence and consistency … If you are a superpower symbolism is very important.” See John Lash, “Calling America, from Asia,” Star-Tribune, April 18, 2014, at www.startribune.com/opinio
n/commentaries/255827891.html.

  73. He added, “I think the Saudis, the Emirates, the Egyptians, many in that part of the world no longer have confidence in the United States.” See ABC News, “This Week Transcript with Former Vice-President Dick Cheney,” October 27, 2013, at http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/week-transcript-vice-president-dick-cheney/story?id=20687048. Yet all these states continued to rely on U.S. support and protection.

  74. See Haass, “Isolationist Temptation.”

  75. According to the Obama administration’s 2015 National Security Strategy, “there is no shortage of challenges that demand continued American leadership. The potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction … poses a grave risk … [M]ore diffuse networks of al-Qa’ida, ISIL, and affiliated groups threaten U.S. citizens, interests, allies, and partners … Fragile and conflict-affected states incubate and spawn infectious disease, illicit weapons and drug smugglers, and destabilizing refugee flows … The danger of disruptive and even destructive cyber-attack is growing, and the risk of another global economic slowdown remains … These complex times have made clear the power and centrality of America’s indispensable leadership in the world.” See National Security Strategy 2015, pp. 1–2.