Simon Bolivar

by John Lynch

  Alexandre Pétion, the mulatto president of Haiti, and a notable fighter for the independence of the former French colony, an independence triggered by violent slave revolution, welcomed Bolívar on 2 January 1816 and immediately raised his spirits. He gave his visitor heartening moral support for the expedition he was preparing and substantial material help in the form of six thousand rifles, munitions, supplies, naval transport and a sizeable sum of money. All this in return only for the promise that the Liberator would proclaim the abolition of slavery in the territory he liberated in Venezuela.16 With the backing of a consortium of foreign merchants, and especially of loans from the English merchant Robert Sutherland, Bolívar assembled other refugees from Cartagena and prepared to renew the struggle.

  The Caudillos

  During Bolívar’s absence from the mainland the revolution had not died. Resistance was kept alive by a number of bands under leaders who were to become indispensable to the patriot war effort: Pedro Zaraza in the upper llanos, José Antonio Páez in the western llanos, Manuel Cedeño in Caicara, José Tadeo Monagas in Cumaná, Jesús Berreto and Andrés Rojas in Maturín. These were the caudillos of the revolution, warlords whose power derived from access to land, men and resources, and whose armed bands were held together by the bond of patron and client, and propelled by the promise of constant booty.17 The bands rose from the ruins of the second republic. The surviving patriots fled to the plains, jungles and forests of the east to escape royalist retribution. They then regrouped under a leader of their choice, partly for self–preservation, partly for the revolutionary cause.18 For a guerrilla to surrender or to be captured was to walk into execution. In this sense resistance was the only option left. Groups converged and coalesced, until they found a supercaudillo. Armed with púas (lances), and taking their horses and cattle from the llanos of Barcelona and Cumaná, the guerrillas fought successfully against regular forces, attacking communications, ambushing detachments, harassing towns and then disappearing. They pinned down royalist forces in a number of different places and forced the Spaniards to maintain immobile garrisons.19

  The guerrillas not only fought the royalists but also competed with each other. Leader rivalry in Venezuela obstructed operations, as caudillos struggled with each other for that supremacy that only military success and the ability to attract recruits could bring. No caudillo wanted to submit to another: each fought to remain independent, in a state of nature without a common power. Out of this internal war emerged the most powerful leaders: Monagas, Zaraza, Cedeño, Piar. This was in the east. Leadership in the western llanos demanded supreme physical talents, and it was this challenge that brought Páez to the fore:

  To command these men and dominate the situation was needed a particular superiority and talent in using the lance with both hands, to fight on wild horses and to break them in during actual battle, to swim and to fight while swimming in swollen rivers, to lasso and kill wild beasts simply to get food, in short, to have the ability to dominate and overcome a thousand and more dangers which threaten in these conditions.20

  Bolívar, too, possessed extraordinary natural talents, fortitude and endurance, and learned to compete with the caudillos on their own terms. His record of active service was in no way inferior to theirs. He conquered nature as well as men, overcoming the immense distances of America in marches which were as memorable as the battles. His severity was notorious and no one doubted his implacability. Yet Bolívar was never a caudillo, reliant on personal power alone. He always sought to institutionalize the revolution and to lead it to a political conclusion. The solution he favoured was a large nation state with a strong central government, totally dissimilar to the federal form of government and the decentralization of power preferred by the caudillos. Bolívar never possessed a true regional power base. The east had its own oligarchy, its own caudillos, who regarded themselves as allies rather than subordinates. The Apure was dominated by a number of great proprietors and then by Páez. Bolívar felt most at home in Caracas and the centre–north. There he had friends, followers and officers who had fought under him in New Granada, in the Campaña Admirable, and in other actions in central Venezuela. Bolívar could give orders to Urdaneta, Ribas and Campo as to trusted officers, assign them to one division or another, to this front or that. Professional officers had no problems with Bolívar: they saluted him for his culture, his character, his courage. It was the caudillos who challenged his leadership, jealous of their space. Moreover, from 1814 central Venezuela was occupied by the royal army, and Bolívar, who did not control the capital, had to assemble his power by a mixture of military and political success.

  Few of the caudillos followed this example. The years 1813–17 were a time of trial for the revolution, when war on the enemy without was frustrated by the war of caudillos within. Yet the caudillos conformed to prevailing conditions more closely than did Bolívar, who lacked the resources they commanded. In the absence of a national army personal leadership was bound to be decisive, and without national objectives the structure of insurgency was inevitably informal. Anarchic and divisive though they were, the caudillos maintained a revolutionary presence during Bolívar’s absence. As José de Austria observed: ‘While they did not advance, neither could they be totally destroyed.’21 Guerrilla warfare was the appropriate method, given the resources available, the nature of the war and the strength of the enemy. It was the counter–insurgency mounted by General Morillo that brought the caudillos out of their lairs, for it directly attacked the lives, property and vital interests of themselves and other Venezuelan leaders, and made war the only hope of security, ‘caught as they were in the desperate alternative of dying or fighting’.22 And so the rural guerrillas were mobilized again, not as a social or political force, but as military units under strong leaders who offered them booty.

  Meanwhile in Haiti, where he was planning his new invasion into Venezuela, Bolívar had to resolve the question of leadership. A group of major caudillos was persuaded to recognize his authority for the expedition and until a congress could be held. The vote of the assembly was reinforced in the initial phase of the expedition at Margarita, whose caudillo, Arismendi, was a supporter of Bolívar’s national authority, backed by Brión, paymaster and shipper. In a second assembly, held in the presence of Mariño, Piar and other caudillos, the leadership of Bolívar was confirmed, and a unanimous vote was given against the division of Venezuela into east and west: ‘that the Republic of Venezuela shall be one and indivisible, that His Excellency, President and Captain–General Simón Bolívar is elected and recognized as its Supreme Head, and His Excellency General Santiago Mariño as his second–in–command’.23 At the same time Bolívar agreed to legitimize the guerrilla chiefs by giving them rank and status in his army; the senior caudillos were made generals and colonels, and the others were given appropriate rank.

  These rituals had only limited significance. One of the reasons why Bolívar did not dominate the caudillos was that he did not dominate the battlefield. To invade the mainland he thought he would need two thousand men and fourteen warships, but this was pure optimism. The first expedition from Haiti (31 March–17 July 1816) was strong in words but weak in resources, packed with officers and their women, and short on soldiers, some of whom were supplied by Pétion. The Caribbean was a large sea for small sailing vessels, which had to proceed carefully to avoid Spanish patrols, though the chief reason this fleet took a month to reach Margarita was Bolívar’s insistence on going back for Josefina, her mother and sister when he heard that they had arrived at Aux Cayes. Reunited with his lover, Bolívar ignored the gawping and gossip among crew and soldiers. On Brión’s advice he approached Margarita from the east via the Lesser Antilles, where his force might find a refuge or a base as necessary and liaise with the eastern resistance movements. In a brief and successful engagement with Spanish vessels Bolívar wisely stood back from the fray and left the fighting to his men.

  He thought better of launching an invasion at Carúpano and even
tually opted for Ocumare, east of Puerto Cabello, which he reached on 5 July, landing without Spanish resistance. He promptly issued a proclamation in which he made two statements, more important for their ideals than their effects, one to reconcile Spaniards to the revolution, the other to fulfil his obligation to Pétion. For his part, the war to the death had ended and Spaniards who surrendered would be pardoned. Moreover, he declared, in keeping with the demands of natural justice and policy, the slaves were now free, a freedom which he reported to Pétion as giving true meaning to the campaign for independence in South America.24

  The military operation, however, went badly. Faulty intelligence, ineptitude of subordinates and failure of his forces to rendezvous promptly opened a gap between Soublette’s unit which had struck inland and those who had remained at the port, leaving Soublette isolated and Bolívar, deceived by a treacherous aide, exposed to capture. The senior military agreed that a force should advance to the Aragua valleys but without Bolívar, who should embark and withdraw. Scenes of utter disorder were enacted during re–embarkation, setting the seal on a travesty of an invasion. There was a suspicion that Bolívar had been distracted by his mistress, whom he had brought along with him. He had to make yet another of his ignominious escapes by sea; after a hard voyage he reached Güiria on 16 August, dropping off Pepita and her family at St Thomas on the way. Although his commanders on the spot, Briceño Méndez, Soublette and Salom, loyal Bolivarians all, went out of their way to defend Bolívar’s action and the patriots continued to fight well in the hinterland of Barcelona, his prestige was wounded by this new catastrophe at the hands of the Spaniards. Years later Ocumare was still on his mind and explained not as dereliction of duty but as a mistake of his subordinates and an escape from his enemies. But he was now actually weaker than the caudillos, some of whom had at least secured a foothold in the east.25

  Mariño and Bermúdez, backed by troops of their own, were determined to deal with Bolívar, whom they called a deserter and traitor and regarded as inexpert in the art of war. A proclamation was published in Güiria (23 August 1816) deposing Bolívar and appointing Mariño as supreme chief, with Bermúdez second–in–command, the former in o’Leary’s eyes a man devoted to ‘licence and anarchy’, the latter ‘an uncultivated, rough and unstable’ character.26 The army split and civil war threatened the ranks of insurgency. The caudillos wanted to take Bolívar into custody and he barely escaped with his life, fleeing from Güiria to Haiti. The humiliation he suffered in 1816 owed something to his military errors, though he still had the backing of his own officers, including the tough warrior Arismendi and Gregor MacGregor, a Scottish adventurer highly rated by the patriot side, while in Haiti Pétion assured him of his moral and material support, and Sutherland continued to fund him. His Caribbean odyssey continued.

  The war in these years, 1816–17, presented the Liberator with a serious strategic test, one that he did not immediately pass. The success of the Admirable Campaign, fought in classic style against a scattered enemy, had led him to underestimate the military problems he faced. At this point in the revolution it was impossible to win on the northern coast of Venezuela: it was too well defended as the royalist’s richest and most fortified sector of the country. But he had still not learned this lesson or accepted the need for developing another front. As o’Leary writes, ‘The fondness of Bolívar for Caracas, or the exaggerated idea he had of the patriotism of its inhabitants and the resources it could offer to whoever occupied it, caused many errors in his military career.’27

  In the second invasion from Haiti, Bolívar landed at Barcelona on 31 December 1816 and inaugurated what he called ‘the third period of the republic’. But the third period began more or less as the first two had ended, and his initial plan was to assemble an army to attack, not Guayana, where the enemy was exposed, but the royalist forces blocking the way to Caracas. He thus made himself utterly dependent upon the caudillos, who were already operating separately in various parts of the east. He wrote to one caudillo after another, calling on each to assemble around him in a great proyecto de reunión. He wrote to Piar, who had already marched on Guayana, instructing him to bring in his forces: ‘small divisions cannot achieve great objectives. The dispersion of our army, far from helping us, can destroy the Republic.’28 He wrote to Mariño, Zaraza, Cedeño and Monagas, ordering, requesting, appealing for unity and obedience. But the caudillos did not suddenly change their ways; they stayed out, pursuing their separate objectives. The great army was an illusion, and Bolívar abandoned his hopes of occupying Caracas; he could not even hold Barcelona. He had to make his way to Guayana, still without an army of his own, still without a caudillo power base, the victim not only of his strategic predilections but of guerrilla anarchy.

  Confrontation with Piar

  The march into Guayana proved to be not a retreat but a decisive departure – to base the revolution deep in the hinterland, among the great plains of the Orinoco, impenetrable in the vastness, wide rivers and malarial swamps, a great barrier against defeat, a springboard for attack, and a source of wealth in their rich reserves of livestock. Now Bolívar was the master strategist. This was not an impromptu move, following in the tracks of Piar. The idea had been at the back of his mind since 1816; looking for a foothold on the mainland after leaving Haiti, he projected an expedition to Guayana but the idea was shelved through lack of resources and collaborators.29 The delta of the Orinoco was four hundred miles across, splaying out channels up the river that only experienced pilots could navigate. Along its banks, through lush vegetation and tall trees bound to each other by the bejuco and festooned with brilliantly coloured flowers, could be seen still the ruins of villages devastated by Boves, in a region now open to republican gunboats and soldiers. To command Guayana made economic sense for the revolution, enabling Bolívar to gain substantial credit from his merchant friend Sutherland, who saw the advantage of exporting livestock from a guaranteed supply and an Orinoco dominated by patriot squadrons and privateers. This was an argument Bolívar employed to sell his authority to Páez, who had asked him why the llaneros of the Apure should transfer their allegiance from the caudillo they knew to the patria they had never heard of. Advantages were waiting:

  The occupation of Guayana has improved our affairs. The possession of this important province has given us a great reputation and enhanced our standing to an extraordinary degree with foreigners, especially with the English, lords of the islands adjacent to this continent, who no sooner have they heard of the triumph of our arms than they have appeared with their vessels laden with merchandise and goods of all kinds. Several English merchants have come to conclude contracts with the government for rifles, gunpowder, shot, uniforms, and all kinds of war material, in exchange for the produce of our country, and some have already been signed.30

  In this and following messages Bolívar gave his new ally a lesson in the achievements of the revolution, liberally mixed with flattery designed to keep Páez in line, news of the fate of dissident caudillos, volumes on infantry tactics along with some weapons, and in return asked Páez to send him 2,500 mules ‘immediately, immediately, immediately’, and a month later ‘get them here as quickly as possible’.31 Bolívar believed in wearing people down with words.

  The Liberator crossed the wide Orinoco in a small canoe on the night of 30 April 1817 near Angostura and reached Piar’s camp on 2 May, just ahead of his senior commanders, Arismendi, Bermúdez, Valdés, Zaraza and Soublette. Piar was now promoted to general but was challenged rather than appeased. He quickly made clear his independence, interpreting Bolívar’s orders as he willed and making a point of killing Spanish prisoners. The war for Guayana was merciless. The first major target of Piar had been Angostura, 250 miles upriver from the sea, a handsome colonial town of whitewashed buildings and pleasant promenades on the left bank of the Orinoco, built on an elevated peninsular jutting into the river. But Angostura was too well defended.

  He then attacked the missions of the Caroní River,
a territory actively evangelized by Spanish Capuchins since 1724 and now the most cultivated part of Guayana, ‘a model of good order and paternal government’, a prime resource of the royalists and a subsistence for the patriot troops.32 In early February 1817 this oasis of peace and prosperity, twenty–nine pueblos administered by Catalan missionaries, was caught in the crossfire between the two sides when it was invaded and occupied by Piar’s troops with little resistance from the royalists. The friars were accused of having taken part in the defence of royalist Guayana against the patriot invaders. This was true in the sense that they had provided armed Indians, horses and supplies to the royal army; as Spanish nationals, subjects of the king of Spain, their benefactor, and surrounded by royalist forces, they could hardly do otherwise. But they were non–combatants and not personally involved. Of the forty–one priests in the Caroní missions, seven took flight, fourteen died in captivity and, on 7 May 1817, twenty captives were executed by machete and lance and their bodies burned.33 The two republican officers directly responsible for the killings, allegedly misinterpreting an order from Bolívar who had denounced the friars as royalists, were never punished and the outrage was left to cast a shadow over the leadership of the Liberator. Piar himself disapproved of the atrocity; he had held the friars in his power from February to May, time in which to kill them had he wished. Bolívar arrived in Angostura on 2 May and was nominally in charge, though not yet fully in control. He considered the atrocity the work of ‘madmen of the army … cruel savages’. Father José Félix Blanco, his administrator of the missions, declared that ‘General Bolívar had nothing to do with the event’.34 Someone at headquarters had authorized Colonel Jacinto Lara to take action, and it was he who had given the order to Captain Juan de Dios Monzón. o’Leary describes the outrage as a deplorable mistake, but Lara was on the staff of Bolívar and continued there, protected and promoted for his services to the Liberator.35