Remembering the Dragon Lady: The U-2 Spy Plane: Memoirs of the Men Who Made the Legend

by Gerald McIlmoyle

  Harry N. Cordes

  (Deceased May 10, 2004)

  Harry prepared the following document prior to his death and it is submitted here by his widow, Rogene.

  The Ranch

  In 1948 General Curtis LeMay was disturbed about the lack of bombing accuracy using radar. At this time we had the first generation atomic bombs with 20 kilotons of explosive force. Two evaluation missions were flown with Dayton, Ohio as the simulated target. The results confirmed both navigation and bombing accuracy problems, enlarged and accentuated by 150 to 200 knot jet stream winds at the bombing altitudes of 25,000 to 30,000 feet. General LeMay called a meeting of lead navigators and radar observers at SAC Headquarters to address the problems. I was assigned to rewrite the Radar Bombing Manual for the APQ 13 Radar System of the B-29 aircraft.

  Colonel Edward Perry, an experienced lead navigator who was known personally by General LeMay, was selected in 1948 to head a study group of radar observers from the 509th Bomb Wing. Colonel Perry was directed to work with the Air Force Intelligence Staff at the Pentagon in the analysis of maps and charts of potential targets in the Soviet Union. The analysis provided the best estimates of the results that could be expected from coordinated radar bombing. As a member of that team, I became well acquainted with Colonel Perry. I had been the radar observer on the B-29 crew that won the SAC and Radar Bombing Competition in 1948 and from that success, Colonel Perry became aware of my capabilities.

  In 1951 Colonel Perry was Commander of a SAC Strategic Evaluation Squadron (SES) that had tested lead crews throughout the Command. By now Colonel Perry and I had become pilots and our crew went through with flying colors even though we were relatively new to the B-50D aircraft. En route to my new assignment at McCoy AFB, Florida in 1954 I visited Colonel Perry at his home in Tampa where he was still Commander of SES. From 1954 to 1956 I flew the B-47 as aircraft commander and flight commander. I amassed almost 1,000 hours of B-47 flight time including deployments to Africa and England. As a Major, I would have been in line for early promotion to Lieutenant Colonel.

  At this time the United States was faced with the growing threat from the Soviet Union and its closed society. The Lockheed Aviation Company approached the CIA with a proposal for a new aircraft that could fly at 70,000 feet for 4,000 miles while taking pictures. The proposed aircraft would be safe from all known defenses. The U-2 project, known as AQUATONE, was established with the CIA in charge despite a bitter battle for control between General LeMay and SAC. CIA won the battle and Richard Bissell was put in charge of the project. General LeMay won the right to name the staff and military personnel who would run the flying part of AQUATONE. There would be a SAC training wing with Colonel Yancy in command at March AFB, California, but with duty at Groom Dry Lake in Nevada, later known as Watertown Strip and still later as Area 51. The mission pilots would be screened and selected by the CIA from SAC F-84 fighter pilots with long-range navigation experience. The flying units would be organized into three squadrons known as Detachments A, B and C.

  Harry N. Cordes, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Strategic Air Command Headquarters, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, October 1970.

  General LeMay selected Colonel McCoy to lead Detachment A, Colonel Perry to lead Detachment B and Colonel Stan Beerli for Detachment C. Each detachment commander was authorized to select their military staffs for operations, flight planning, physiological support and engineering officers. Colonel Perry selected several from his staff at SES plus others he had personally known. I received orders to report to the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group in Washington, D.C. Colonel Perry called me personally telling me a few details of my new assignment.

  In February 1956 I swapped our boat for a 1950 Studebaker and got Rogene and the girls settled in Pine Castle, Florida. It was the first home we owned. I had no clue about where I was ultimately going, how long I would be gone, what sort of job I would have or what airplane I would be flying.

  Washington, DC and Watertown, Nevada, 1956

  When I arrived in Washington, DC, I signed in at Bolling AFB and was given a room in the BOQ. I found the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group in an old WWII building near Fort McNair. It was then that I learned that I was now a member of the CIA.

  Despite my Top Secret Q clearances from Nuclear Weapons training, the CIA insisted I attend orientation classes, physiological tests and interviews and the infamous lie detector exam. I passed all the tests and was admitted to Project AQUATONE. The headquarters for the project was in a super-secure area of the Matomic Building at 1717 H Street in downtown Washington, DC. I met the CIA members of the project who were Director Richard Bissell, Executive Officer James Cunningham and the people who would be in my squadron, Detachment B. Colonel Perry had brought his wife and had rented an apartment. Chet Bohart, Cy Perkins, Don Curtis and I rented apartments at 1600 – 16th Street near the Russian Embassy and next door to the Cairo Hotel. We were within walking distance to the Matomic Building.

  July 1957, Detachment B, TUSLOG, Incirlik, Turkey, Weather Recon Unit in their “uniforms”. Left to right: Harry Cordes, Chet Bohart, Ed Perry, Don Curtis, Unknown pilot, and William Kennedy. Harry was the only U-2 pilot in the group.

  TUSLOG, Detachment B, Incirlik, Turkey. Standing, left to right: Francis Gary Powers, Sammy Snyder, Tom Burkhead, Ed Perry, E.K. Jones, Bill McMurry, Bill Hall. Kneeling, left to right: Chet Bohart, Cy Perkins, Buster Edens, Jim Cherbonnoux, Harry Cordes.

  We studied the U-2 manuals and project documents that had been made up in loose-leaf form. I learned we would be the second U-2 squadron known as Detachment B and following training at Watertown, Nevada we would move to Incirlik Air Base, Adana, Turkey. I would be able to check out and fly the U-2 but only in friendly or neutral air space. The planned overflight missions were operated by ex-Air Force pilots who had resigned their commissions with the promise of future reinstatement depending on conditions at the time. I retained my rank as a Major and was paid by the Air Force. The contract pilots were paid about four times my pay; when deployed, Air Force people were paid $7 per day.

  In preparation for the flying checkout, Perry, Bohart, Perkins and I met with Dave Clark of the Clark Clothing Company in Worcester, Massachusetts. The company measured each of us for our custom-made partial pressure suits. In CIA spy fashion, we met Mr. Clark in a non-descript hotel in Washington.

  To qualify for the U-2 training, we were also required to pass the comprehensive physical examination at Lovelace Clinic in Albuquerque, New Mexico. This was the same physical that astronauts were given and featured in the film The Right Stuff.

  I studied the flight manual for the T-33 aircraft, required as part of the U-2 training. While waiting for the training to begin, I made two trips in a C-47 to Watertown. We had unlimited access to requisition office and flight planning materials we needed in Turkey. We were not fully occupied at that time. I used the break to drive to Pine Castle to visit with Rogene and our daughters.

  Finally we were getting down to business. We were transferred to Watertown (later known as The Ranch) on April 15, 1956. Our mailing address and emergency contact was a post office box in North Hollywood, California. The schedule for military and civilians there was Monday through Friday at The Ranch. We flew either to Burbank, California, or March Field for the weekend. Occasionally we stayed at The Ranch for the weekend when there was required training scheduled. We returned to The Ranch on Monday morning at 8:00 a.m.

  The SAC training unit provided excellent ground school and cockpit checkouts. I checked out quickly and easily in the T-33. The Ranch had a 6,000 foot macadam landing strip and continued for about five miles out over the dry Groom Lake. The runway continuation was marked on the dry lake with Los Angeles and Pasadena traffic markers.

  We met our contract ex-F-84 pilots who were now assigned to Detachment B. At that time Lockheed pilots were still testing the U-2. The birds we used for training were the first five or so handmade by Lockheed; maintenance and support were also provided
by the company.

  Colonel Perry offered his resignation following his physical disqualification from flying the U-2. He felt strongly that the commander should fly the unit's aircraft. In the SAC tradition he felt an obligation to those of us he had brought into this project. So Colonel Perry stayed and was authorized to fly the T-33.

  The T-33 was used in the U-2 training program to simulate the floating tendencies of the U-2 during landing. I flew the T-33 down the landing area, set 55% power, half flaps and tried to keep the aircraft at just a foot or less over the dry lake runway. This was remarkably close to the actual feel of landing the U-2. After passing the T-33 and ground school training phases, I put on my pressure suit for my first U-2 flight. Although the first flight was only to 20,000 feet altitude, we still went through the pre-breathing 100% oxygen procedure. I felt like a celebrity pre-breathing with Lockheed's ace test pilots, Tony Lavier and Ray Goudey. My first flight was thrilling, because of the short takeoff roll of 500 to 1000 feet, the great power in the engine and the almost straight up climb to altitude. I had no problems with landing because the U-2 gear was so similar to the B-47 landing gear. On my next flight I went to 70,000 feet and learned about the small margin between low-speed stall and high-speed buffet – the so-called “coffin corner.”

  My final U-2 checkout flight at The Ranch was a unit simulated overflight mission complete with cameras and designated targets. Takeoff was at night and I was one of the first to use the sextant to measure my rough latitude with Polaris. This mission went west to California, north to Montana, east to the Dakotas, south through Colorado and west back to The Ranch. Total flight time was eight and a half hours. When I landed, I was certified, fully qualified to fly the U-2 and I was the first qualified military pilot in Detachment B. Colonel Perry looked to me as his “alter ego.” I was the most direct interface with the contract pilots, one of whom was Francis Gary Powers.

  Incirlik Air Base, Adana, Turkey

  Our training at The Ranch was completed in August 1956. We then deployed to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey in a C-124. What a long flight that was. We also set up shop while we awaited the arrival of our U-2s via C-124 also. The U-2s were then reassembled by our Lockheed and Pratt & Whitney technicians and readied for flying. Because of my performance at The Ranch, Colonel Perry selected me to perform the first test flight rather than one of the contract pilots. I took the bird to 70,000 feet altitude, shut down the engine and restarted it at 35,000 feet. This became a standard test procedure that I performed on all future test flights and I continued to be the Squadron Test Pilot.

  At about the time we arrived in Turkey the Suez Canal crisis resulted in open warfare between Israel and Egypt. Detachment A in Germany flew a few missions over the Mediterranean area to determine what the British and French were doing. Detachment B received its first mission task from AQUATONE Headquarters in Washington on September 11, 1956. Since the mission was over neutral territory, Colonel Perry selected me as the pilot. The targets were British and French fleets and bases and units in the Mediterranean. It was a six-hour mission and I flew it as briefed until I passed Cyprus on the way home. I was flying at 70,000 feet on autopilot when the engine flamed out. My suit pressurized and I descended to 35,000 feet, restarted the engine and proceeded to Incirlik. A short time later Detachment B was tasked to fly almost daily missions over the battle and sea areas of the ongoing Israeli-Egyptian war. Our pilots could actually observe fighting between tanks, units and aircraft through the U-2 drift sight.

  For the remainder of 1956 and into the spring of 1957 our detachment had only a minimum of mission tasking, a few Soviet penetrations, a number of peripheral intelligence gathering missions and proficiency flying. I flew a four-hour test mission over Turkey with weather sensing package aboard. The whole operation at Incirlik became incredibly boring with only periodic breaks to go to Adana. At times that was off limits. Recreation on base was limited; however, the CIA furnished a boat, motor and water skis for us to use at the nearby reservoir.

  Colonel Perry thought we were over staffed. He decided to send Bohart, Perkins and Don Curtis home. To pass the time, the remaining pilots did a bit of drinking and playing poker.

  In anticipation of future tasks and to relieve some of the boredom Colonel Perry ordered the unit to undergo a simulated deployment exercise in which we packed and cataloged all supplies and equipment we would need at a bare base operations. His foresight was remarkable. In May 1957 we were tasked to move a mobile unit to Lahore, Pakistan, and fly penetrations into the Soviet Union. The preferred base was Peshawar, Pakistan but the runway there was undergoing repairs. Colonel Perry and I moved to a Pakistani air base with weather, maintenance, communications, flight planners and CIA security. We traveled mostly by C-54 through Karachi, but we ferried the U-2 aircraft and a T-33. I used the T-33 to familiarize myself with potential emergency landing sites.

  Our Pakistani Air Force hosts were helpful and cooperative. Detachment B personnel lived in a Lahore hotel that had excellent food and service. The menu offered a choice of English or Pakistani selections, the latter being spicier with curry.

  Frank Powers piloted one of the U-2 ferry flights; his engine flamed out and he made a dead stick landing on a 6,000-foot runway at Lahore. All of the U-2 pilots had made many simulated flameout landings. Powers landed with no damage to his aircraft, further demonstration of his flying skill.

  One of our assignments tasked us to fly out of Lahore. Another covered Tyura Tam Soviet Space and Missile Test Center and recovered to Incirlik. Once we were tasked to fly three missions but we only had two U-2 aircraft. I did the flight plans for all three missions and gave Project Headquarters the option of selection.

  In August 1957 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Air Force General Twining and a contingent of high-ranking officers, including General William Blanchard, came to Incirlik. Colonel Perry and I were acquainted with General Blanchard. General Twining had been personally involved in the fight with CIA for control of the U-2 program. When I returned to Incirlik, I received permission from Project Headquarters to provide a detailed briefing on our operations. General Blanchard remembered me from the 509th Bomb Wing and he and General Twining were complimentary of my briefing.

  Colonel Perry returned to Incirlik and resumed his arguments with Richard Bissell over a number of issues: staffing and lack of meaningful activity, CIA reluctance to turn over photography of Soviet targets to SAC, future project plans and dead ends for military personnel careers. Colonel Perry left Incirlik and the U-2 project in August 1957. I subsequently assumed command when he departed. Richard Bissell didn't trust a Major to command Detachment B and he sent another Major, a Headquarters officer, Major Joe Richmond, to “assist” me. In November 1957, Colonel Stan Beerli arrived from Detachment C in Japan to take over Detachment B. I requested Bissell to return me to the Air Force.

  I met in Washington, DC with Richard Bissell in December 1957. I raised all the objections Colonel Perry had brought up plus an additional one about the project organization. His response was the three squadrons would be “permanently” based and adequate quarters provided for families on or near the bases. Bissell and I went to Adana with a lot of money to locate, lease and refurbish houses for our families. I saw the potential for international incidents with automobiles and wives. I tried to caution him about the danger of project compromise and I suggested a concept of operations similar to SAC's 4080th SRW such as permanent basing at a U.S. Air Force base with detachments sent out on temporary duty. Bissell refused to accept my advice or anyone else's. He thought he knew it all.

  I left Washington in December 1957 with orders for the Air University. I served on the Air Weapons Staff at Maxwell AFB from January to August 1958 when I joined the Command and Staff School.

  Strategic Air Command Headquarters 1959-1965

  When I completed Command and Staff School, I was assigned as an Intelligence Staff Officer to SAC Headquarters, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. As a member of the I
ntelligence Staff, I was cleared for all sources of intelligence including photography taken by the U-2 and controlled by a compartmented system known as TALENT. Spy satellites were just coming into existence. I had access to the SAC U-2 program through the 4080th SRW and my experience of the CIA program. My official assignment was joint duty with the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. I maintained my flight proficiency piloting the T-33. I was selected as one of the first Instructor Pilots (IP) for the T-39 Saberliner. As a T-39 IP, I was required to fly any SAC General Officer scheduled on any trip. My General Officer mentor was Major General Robert N. Smith, DCS (Deputy Chief of Staff) Intelligence at SAC Headquarters. I later held that same job as a Brigadier General. General Smith and I made many trips together and it was a pleasure to fly for him.

  On May 1, 1960 I received all intelligence reports from the CIA, National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency pertaining to the shoot down and capture of Francis Gary Powers. I defended Powers and his conduct based on my past experience with him at Incirlik and Lahore. My immediate boss at SAC was Colonel Keegan who was well known in the intelligence community for his hawkish positions on intelligence issues. Colonel Keegan considered Powers a traitor for talking to the Soviets, for not destroying the U-2 with the detonator switches and for not taking his own life with the lethal needle concealed in a coin. I maintained a file on all intelligence and open source material on Powers including his imprisonment and trial. Later, these files came in handy when Powers was returned to US custody.

  An event occurred in 1961 that had little bearing on my duty at the CIA but confirmed my judgment of Richard Bissell. He had by then been elevated to the position of Deputy Director Plans and Programs for the CIA. Bissell was the main force responsible for the ill-conceived and poorly-executed invasion of Cuba by former Cuban nationals and mercenaries trained and armed by the CIA. This was another example of the arrogance and disregard for the national policy and objectives formed and grown in the CIA under Allen Dulles and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The Cuban invasion as well as Powers’ May Day mission were both undoubtedly compromised and doomed to failure from the start. In both cases details were withheld from the military, other intelligence agencies and national command authorities, including Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. The SAC role in this fiasco was an increased alert status, intelligence gathering against Cuba and development of contingency war plans.