Remembering the Dragon Lady: The U-2 Spy Plane: Memoirs of the Men Who Made the Legend

by Gerald McIlmoyle

  Initially, the U-2 film was sent to the Strategic Air Relocateable Processing Facility (SARPF), a group of specially configured trailers where specialists processed the raw images and several trailers for interpretation. When I arrived in Vietnam, the SARPF was located at Tan Son Nhut. The U-2 film was initially processed by a SAC detachment and then shipped to the US for further analysis at the National Photographic Interpretation Center in Washington, DC. The SARPF was returned to the US in 1967 for refurbishment. When the SARPF left the theater, the imagery then went to the 6470th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron for interpretation and that unit then morphed into the 12th Recon Technical Interpretation Squadron. Primary emphasis was on analysis of imagery from tactical reconnaissance platforms, gun camera film, SR-71 film and the RPVs.

  When I was later assigned to SAC Headquarters, I researched the office responsible for the SARPF. I was surprised to learn the extent of the damage to the unit as a result of weather and corrosive chemicals used in the photo processing. The refurbishment costs exceeded the original development costs.

  The lack of emphasis on the U-2 imagery within the theater resulted in a real cost. In February 1968, most of the interest was focused on the Battle of Khe Sanh and the recapture of Hue. It was then that North Vietnamese Army units using PT-76 tanks overran a Special Forces camp. I was the 7th Air Force command briefer and I recall the furor that ensued regarding the strike and reconnaissance results. We were taken completely by surprise. We were totally unaware that the North Vietnamese were introducing armor into the battle for the South.

  To say General Momyer, Commander of 7th Air Force, was irritated was an understatement. He asked me time and again where the tanks had come from and why we had not known about them. Unfortunately, I was unable to give him an answer. I knew that there had been rumors of armor for several months, but we had been unable to confirm them from the imagery. I subsequently reviewed a great deal of film and was unable to find any evidence of the tanks prior to their introduction at Lang Vei. In 1971 I was assigned to the Air Staff on Project Corona Harvest, an evaluation of air power in SEA. I found a report completed by the NPIC that traced the route of the tanks as they moved down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to Lang Vei. The report, using U-2 imagery, was not distributed outside the Washington, DC intelligence community. I was surprised and then chagrined as I reflected upon the fact that we had the imagery but had failed to use it wisely. The result was the unnecessary loss of American lives.

  During my assignment as briefing officer at SAC Headquarters, I was frequently in front of various staff officers, such as the DCS/Intelligence or DCS/Operations. I had a relatively close working relationship with General Philpott, 7th Air Force Intelligence chief, his successor, General Keegan, “Crazy George,” and other generals at headquarters. I was a friend of Colonel John Craig, the Commander in Chief's (CINC's) Executive Officer, who picked me to write the narratives for several general officer awards. That assignment gave me special access to the CINC's office, but it also resulted in headaches when things were done discreetly. When I went to the Pentagon, I had relationships with the Director of DIA as one of his budget “pukes” and was honored on my last day of service in 1985 when the director, General Williamson, came to my office to express his appreciation and to wish me good luck.

  Following the SEA tour, I was assigned in September 1968 to SAC Headquarters where I became the Collection Requirements Manager for imagery from SAC-operated platforms. It included the SR-71s, RPVs and the U-2s. The 544th Strategic Intelligence Wing operated a “contingency exploitation branch,” a small group tasked with assisting in the development of imagery “boxes.” Imagery boxes were mosaics made from the imagery acquired by the U-2 or other platforms to assess the success of the B-52s in keeping their ordnance within specified “boxes.” This allowed the interpreters to count the number of bomb craters within the box to assess the effectiveness of Arc Light strikes. Arc Light was the project name given to the cells of B-52s operating from Andersen AFB, Guam. There were normally three B-52s within a particular cell. U-2 imagery was regularly used and interpreted to determine the traffic flow south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to detect changes in the routing. This same imagery was used to provide targeting for the B-52 strikes on the truck traffic.

  The same contingency group worked the Olive Harvest imagery in 1973 collected by the U-2 over the strip between Egypt and Israel following the 1973 War of Atonement. The protocol was established by the US State Department with photos from the missions to prove to the Israelis and Egyptians that each side was abiding by the cease-fire agreements.

  The bulk of my time was spent providing a daily listing of requirements objectives to the planners in the Strategic Reconnaissance Center. The listing included the target name, coordinates, priority rated from 1 to 5, requested frequency of coverage. When I started, there were only a few priority targets, but as the war intensified, we faced a listing of over 100 different targets. To discriminate, we used frequency of coverage as a metric. That, too, began to inflate and we had to use other metrics, such as quality of coverage, to provide a sense of real urgency. It was appropriate, I realized, that the target listing we provided was called the Daily Requirements Objectives List, or DROL. If it had been my choice, I would have found another word beginning with “L” to make the title complete.

  There was one event, during the Christmas bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong during 1972 that stood out from all the others. It was the very first time the President had authorized the use of B-52s to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong. The CINCSAC, General Meyer, immediately tasked his recon platforms with assessing the damage his aircraft inflicted. At the same time, we were getting multiple requests from Washington, DC for specific coverage of various targets. The 7th Air Force Commander, General Lavelle, demanded we focus on his targets. Since CINCSAC owned the aircraft, they first satisfied his needs and then the Washington needs. General Lavelle sent a scathing message to CINCSAC demanding better treatment. I was asked to draft a response, not to General Lavelle, but to the Joint Chiefs. I developed a message that clearly demonstrated that our coverage had addressed our Command's needs very successfully as well as those of the Joint Chiefs and the civilian community. Colonel Jerry McIlmoyle signed the message for the CINC since he was the intelligence head of the Strategic Recon Center.

  Perhaps what Jerry did not know was that my Directorate Chief, also a colonel, was furious with me for developing the message. I was astounded by his reaction because I had coordinated it with him, but apparently he assumed that either the CINC or the Deputy Chief of Staff/Intelligence, a general officer, would sign the message. He gave me an hour of his time and a significant piece of his opinion of me, and it was hardly favorable. Fortunately, DCS/I, General Brown had also seen the message as I coordinated it within the Headquarters Staff and the DCS/Operations; they were all pleased with it. I'm not sure what lesson I was to draw from this experience except that it is difficult to please all in a crisis environment.

  I left the Intelligence career field for about six years and served in the 90th Strategic Missile Wing in the Minuteman program. There I ran across Jerry and Patty McIlmoyle again. During that time an injury I sustained in Vietnam changed my physical profile and I was released from Operations to return to the Intelligence field. I attended the Post Graduate Intelligence Course in Washington, DC where I was awarded a Masters in Strategic Intelligence. Subsequently, I was assigned within the Defense Intelligence Agency as a program analyst supporting the General Defense Intelligence Program staff.

  I was tasked with assessing the U-2 portion of the Intelligence budget as a Budget Program Evaluator. The most amazing thing about the U-2 is its durability, from both acquisition and budget perspectives. I doubt that I have the same attachment to the aircraft as its pilots and crew chiefs. However, looking at the U-2 from an Intelligence view, it was one of the most expensive single items in our Intelligence inventory. Despite its mystique, the U-2 is increasingly vulnerable to intercept by th
e world's fighters, a factor that limits its use in a modern environment. For that reason and its increased operational costs, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, decided to cancel the U-2 program. The Air Force argued strongly to retain the program, but the numbers reinforced the decision to cancel the program.

  General Jerome O'Malley, former commander of the 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, home unit of the SR-71 and the U-2, launched his own effort to save the U-2. He visited with friendly members of Congress, briefed them on the value of the program and lobbied for its continuation in the modern Air Force. O'Malley's action resulted in the reversal of the Program Decision Memorandum and his own subsequent reassignment to command the Pacific Air Forces.

  It is interesting to note here that General O'Malley's opposition of the Deputy Secretary of Defense's decision was bold, yet it was supported by various members of Congress. With that said, his career was effectively ended with his reassignment. It was in the tradition of the best leaders willing to risk all to support what he considered to be a valuable program. General O'Malley would be the first to point out that the U-2 served to fly the missions over the “no-fly” zones defined at the end of the First Gulf War. Effectively, he was proven right and the detractors of the U-2 proven wrong.

  Gary (Shorty) Erdman

  Lake Hiawatha, New Jersey

  Wife: Ann

  After graduating from Patterson Central High School in Patterson, New Jersey in 1960, I considered military service as a career option. At 5”2”, I had always been nicknamed “Shorty” but I had tall ideas. Two of my three brothers were in the Navy, but I didn't like the idea of being on ships or submarines. I preferred having the earth beneath my feet. So I approached the Air Force with my own career goal in mind; I told the Air Force recruiter I wanted to become a butcher. The recruiter told me, “You want to be a butcher, we'll make you a butcher.” I realized in a minute the recruiter probably told everybody exactly what they wanted to hear.

  Prior to entering the US Air Force in July 1961, my only photographic experience was with my mother's old Kodak Brownie camera. There really wasn't a lot of skill involved. I was the photographer for family gatherings. I never dreamed photography would become a career for me.

  Once in the Air Force, I realized I would be doing something much different from meat cutting. Actually, I figured out there were no butchers in the Air Force because all meat is pre-cut. I took the placement tests and I was surprised to learn I had a knack for photography.

  Gary Erdmann 1961.

  After basic training, I was assigned to the 4080th SRW at Laughlin AFB, Texas. I trained in all the photographic equipment of that time from 35mm single lens reflex and 16mm movie cameras to studio cameras. When I had all the appropriate security clearances, I was assigned to the photo lab and developed some of the film taken over Cuba by pilots of the U-2. I remember thinking at the time as I saw the missile sites in the completed film, “It looks like we got ‘em.” The resolution of the film was so precise that we could identify considerable detail.

  During this busy time, all of us photo technicians slept in the lab when we were able to catch a couple hours of sleep. Technicians were required to be available immediately for processing the film when it came in with the returning U-2. Most of us in the lab were oblivious to the severity of the crisis because we were confined to the lab without communication of radio, television or newspapers.

  I remember CIA agents always watched over the shoulders of the lab technicians. During much of the Cuban Missile Crisis, developing the film took about eight hours. We made five copies of the film and I know one copy went directly to President Kennedy. I believe other copies were sent to various intelligence units for analysis.

  4080th SRW Photo Lab, Laughlin AFB, Texas August 1962. First row left to right: C. Cook, F. Robinson, R. Dobbleman, E. Branning, Lt G. Baker, Capt R. Duggan, W. Williams, E. MacGil, L. Dillon, J. Lyons. Second row left to right: R. Barfield, B. Burge, B. Brewer, W. Duette, H. Warrick, J. Hendricks, L. Pincombe, L. Ames, H. Reed, H. Wayman, G. Gwilliams, S. Andrews, A. Robertson. Third row left to right: G. Stoddard, G. Erdmann, B. Payne, A. LeDuc, L. Oberlander, B. Davis, C. Davis, G. Garcia, T. Presnell, H. Eaves, C. Hunt, R. Hall. Fourth row left to right: B. Nuckolls, L. Dennison, L. Robertson, D. Techman, T. Lee, E. Hinojosa, L. Small, J. Montano, P. Lindke, G. DelaGarza, B. Casterline, D. Smith, R. Heintzleman.

  4080th SRW Photo Lab, Laughlin AFB, Texas, August 1962. First row, left to right: G. Stoddard, B. Casterline, G. DelaGarza, C. Davis, G. Erdmann, E. Branning, L. Oberlander, B. Nickolls, T. Lee, D. Smith, C. Garcia, J. Montano, A. LeDuc, P. Sharp. Second row left to right: T. Presnell, C. Cook, D. Techman, B. David, L. Dennison, L. Small, Lt G. Baker, Capt R. Duggan, L. Dillon, E. Hinojosa, B. Payne, L. Robertson, C. Hunt, H. Warrick, H. Eaves, K. Bartly. Third row left to right: A. Robertson, J. Lyons, E. MacGil, H. Wayman, R. Dobbleman, W. Williams, L. Pincombe, L. Ames, B. Brewer, B. Burge, F. Robinson, D. Jacob, H. Reed, J. Hendricks, W. Duette, P. Lindke, R. Barfield, S. Andrews, D. Davis.

  4080th SRW Photo Lab. Left to right: Gary Erdmann, Larry Oberland, Everett Owens, Tom Presnell, kneeling: M.K. Bevz.

  4080th SRW Photo Lab. Front row, left to right: G. Hinojosa and wife, P. Brazee, C. Davis, C. Hunt, G. Erdmann, T. Lee, D. Smith, M. Riles, D. Techman, E. Owens. Back row, left to right: T. Presnell, H. Eaves, L. Ames, H. Reed, D. Sharp, L. Pincomb, G. DelaGarza.

  Gary Erdmann 2010.

  My next assignment was also photo related, but with greater risk than I experienced at Laughlin. In late 1964 I was assigned to Tan Son Nhut Air Base, South Vietnam. I flew aboard a C-123 and photographed the area for mapping the extensive tunnel network used by the North Vietnamese. I was so scared that bullets would penetrate the aircraft I sat on my parachute for extra protection.

  I enjoyed my time with the Air Force. Specifically, I liked my service with the 4080th SRW. I met a lot of guys who became as close as brothers with me. Everett Owens was my first roommate at Laughlin. He currently lives in Connecticut and we stay in close touch. Larry Pincombe and George Gwilliams IV were also friends from my 4080th days and we remain in contact now.

  Gerard (Jerry) Fogel

  Sun City West, Arizona

  The early days of the 4080th SRW were filled with power and mysticism, something awesome to behold. Sometimes the mere mention of the organization opened doors otherwise sealed shut.

  While on temporary duty at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana in 1963, I was the Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) of the NEPHO Section when Don Armstrong got sick with some kind of flu bug. We took him to the base hospital for admission and during sign-in, the admitting nurse asked for his medical records. I told her we did not have the records because we were there TDY. Remaining strict in compliance with her procedures, she insisted all incoming patients must have medical records. We were getting into a loud argument when a doctor came by and asked what the problem was. I explained we were trying to get Don admitted for treatment of his illness. His only question was, “What outfit are you with?” When I told the doctor we were with the 4080th he said, “Bring him right on in.”

  Another time at Hickham AFB, Hawaii in 1961, I went to the Hydraulic Shop to get fittings for nitrogen bottles since my gauges would not fit without an adapter. The nitrogen was used to purge the drift sight to remove any air with water vapor to prevent fogging. When I asked the airman in the Hydraulic Shop about a fitting, he wanted some kind of written authority. I requested to speak with his supervisor. The supervisor looked at me strangely and asked what outfit I was with. I told him I was with the 4080th and he said, “Take whatever you need.” When I said I would return the fittings, he told me to keep them.

  We literally took everything we needed to launch the U-2 at the remote site when we went TDY. We took yellow jeeps, a blue staff car used as a chase vehicle, fuel and plenty of spare parts. We understood the base personnel had been briefed not to ask us questions about the U-2 and most importantly, not to take pictures of the b
ird. So there we were going to the BX in our yellow Jeep dressed in fatigues with the 4080th A&E Squadron patch on the right side and the SAC patch on the left side, with an A&E baseball cap on our heads. It seemed everybody we saw looked at us furtively and whispered to each other. Of course, that made us strut a bit more. We were all young guys and so full of ourselves. After all, we were with the U-2 spy plane, the most secret plane in the AF at the time. It was a great time with lots of fond memories.

  In March 1964 I was at Bien Hoa Air Base, Vietnam supporting the NEPHO Shop for the U-2 missions. We were instructed not to take any personal photos of the flight line at the base. A message came from SAC Headquarters back in Omaha, Nebraska.

  The message was that SAC wanted some photos of Bien Hoa to see what kind of facilities we had – where we lived and worked.

  Jim Combs, our Hycon Tech Rep, suggested we take a Perkin Elmer Tracker (70mm, 3 inch focal length camera) and photograph the base. We loaded a tracker in a pickup truck with two 12V batteries and covered it with canvas, leaving only the bubble exposed. Bob Ingram and I sat in the back of the truck and held the tracker on a box. B.C. Fowler and Jim Lobig drove the truck slowly up and down the flight line and all over the base. At one point during the ride, an Air Policeman stared at our glass bubble and rotating prism. He didn't approach the truck with any questions though.

  We returned to the shop and shipped the film directly to SAC Headquarters. The next day, a couple of Air Police came around looking for the truck with the glass bubble. We told them we didn't know what they were talking about.