Remembering the Dragon Lady: The U-2 Spy Plane: Memoirs of the Men Who Made the Legend
Page 42
Charlie Kern celebrating 1,000 hours in the U-2.
I was Commander of OL-19 from September to November 1966 at Barksdale AFB, Shreveport, Louisiana. Prior to my stint as commander, I had flown numerous missions over Cuba to ensure compliance with the agreement between the US, Soviet Union and Cuba. When the first “13” arrived, there was immediate controversy with the Line Folks (common term for maintenance personnel) over procedures, installation, removal and storage of the unit. Keep in mind, the highest level of security was required for the system wherever it was installed or stored. Even those of us on location had no idea of its huge significance on such a grand scale. In retrospect, that was probably a good thing. Everyone went about their business as usual – except for Maintenance.
Tech Data AWOL
The maintainers were not about to take responsibility for performing any maintenance on this very expensive gear without Tech Data, the documentation and instructions for service or repair of the equipment. Working on an aircraft without Tech Data went against everything drummed into the technicians by some hard-nose training instructor, including SAC's iron-clad insistence on following the written documentation to the letter.
Finding a solution to satisfy the maintenance dilemma would be a challenge. Our aircraft and pilots were being targeted by Cuban radar. Cockpit information showed that missiles were in guidance mode, indicating SAMs had been launched, when in fact, they may not have been. Oh, Sierra!
The Cuban Missile Crisis was many months behind us, but that didn't alleviate our concern for those being targeted and locked on by the Soviet SAM's fire control radar. When this occurred, a red light the size of a beer bottle cap lit up in the cockpit. Imprinted on the lens of the red light were the letters “OS.” It didn't take long for that to be interpreted as meaning “Oh Sh*t.” Along with the red OS light, a shrieking audible warning sounded in the headset. When a pilot was aware of these two warnings, it was really sweat time. If nothing else happened within a minute, such as a searing, bright flash of light, then everything was good.
Although the trigger wasn't pulled except on a couple of our missions which were near misses, one couldn't count on it not happening again if some enemy renegade on the ground hit the launch button. Truth of the matter was we simply had no way of knowing the intentions of the SAM site commander. It was critical to get the “13” operational. We felt we were flying on borrowed time.
After many messages and phone calls, SAC Headquarters sent the Tech Data to the OL. However, the issue was not resolved before my tour was up and I found myself in another brouhaha with the System 13 and its elusive Tech Data.
System 13 to SEA
After departing OL-19, I returned home to Davis Monthan AFB where the family reunion lasted only a week. One day in late November 1966 I received one of those ominous phone calls with orders to report to the Squadron Operations Office as soon as possible. We never discussed U-2 operational matters by phone due to strict security measures.
The Squadron Commander directed me to collect my gear and prepare to leave for OL-20, Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam. I was replacing Leo Stewart who had punched out of a U-2 in Vietnam. He survived his crash, but the aircraft was a loss. Stewart was the U-2 Operations Officer and had been summoned for an immediate “fireside chat” with the CINCSAC to explain the loss of the million dollar bird. I was ordered to get there immediately.
Rocket attack damage, Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam, summer 1966.
Rocket attack damage, Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam, summer 1966.
Chuck Maultsby, Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam, summer 1966.
Chuck Maultsby and Charlie Kern, Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam, summer 1966.
U-2 Maintenance Office after rocket attack, Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam, Summer 1966.
Rocket attack damage, Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam, summer 1966.
My Return to SEA
It was a long flight to Bien Hoa via Tan Son Nhut Air Base, South Vietnam on a Military Airlift Command DC-8. This was my third SEA TDY. I had plenty of time to think about Stewart's crash. Based on my fresh experience with the System 13, I wondered if the crashed bird had that equipment onboard. Had they received Tech Data for installing it? Had the batteries used for destruction of the “13” been connected? I wondered about a lot of stuff during that long trip, but I had no answers.
Upon arrival at Tan Son Nhut, my choices of transportation to Bien Hoa were an Army chopper, quick and reliable, or the long dusty bus ride. I caught the chopper to take me to Bien Hoa, the wartime home of our now single-aircraft detachment OL-20 we shared with a conglomerate of resident cats and dogs. The major tenant, the US Army Special Forces, which would play a paramount role in future events, was next door to our dusty, crowded patch of earth.
The Story Is Out
Feet on the ground, I went straightaway to the Sferics (spooky stuff) Shop and caught up with the NCOIC. I told him we had some things to discuss and cleared the shop of all but the two of us. I first asked him if the crashed bird had a System 13 onboard. It did. I then asked if they had received all the necessary Tech Data for the “13.” They had not. I asked if the destructor batteries had been connected. After a brief pause, he reached over to the desk with his foot and pulled out the bottom drawer with the toe of his boot. He pointed to the batteries and said they were the ones that should have been in the aircraft.
Rocket attack damage, Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam, summer 1966.
U-2 Maintenance Office after rocket attack, Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam, Summer 1966.
System 13 Goes Missing
Someone had made the critical decision to fly the mission with System 13 onboard, but without the destructor connected. Knowing what little I did about the potential consequences of the “13” falling into enemy hands sent a chill from head to toe. I was dumbfounded and shocked by this egregious lack of security.
The bright spot in all this—following the crash our pilots went with Special Forces troops and blew up the U-2 with satchel charges. All was okay now, right? Quite the contrary, all was not okay. The tail had broken off while the aircraft was in out-of-control flight, and was not with the wings and fuselage when they came to rest in the jungle. The System 13 was mounted on the tail, along with the crippled destruct system.
The tail of U-2 #690 was at least 50 miles north of Bien Hoa Air Base, maybe in the treetops of the jungle canopy or perhaps on the jungle floor. In either case, it was in enemy territory. With these scant facts in hand, I reported to the OL-20 Commander, Col Rafferty. He was deeply engrossed with the other half of OL-20’s world—DC-130s, drone testing and employment—and he had little interest in this problem of the lost System 13. His response to me was, “Go and find it.”
A-303 (MOBILE GUERRILLA FORCE) - OPERATION BLACK BOX 1
OPERATION BLACK BOX - DECEMBER 1966
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing OL-20 (SAC)
APO San Francisco, California 96227
SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation
TO: Colonel Francis J. Kelly
Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group (ABN)
1st Special Forces APO 96227
1. On behalf of the 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Operating Location 20, Strategic Air Command, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to specific members of your command for the invaluable assistance rendered in the recovery of certain electronic equipment of a crashed organizational aircraft. Convey my deepest gratitude to the following members of your command for a job well done.
COMPANY A, 5th S.F.G. APO 96227
LT COL Thomas M. Huddleston, On scene coordinator (ABN)
SGM Richard D. Finn, On scene NCOIC (ABN)
A-303 (MOBILE GUERRILLA FORCE) - OPERATION BLACK BOX 2
281st Aviation Company, APO 96227
1LT Robert J. Reynolds, Helicopter Crew
CW02 Thomas E. McElhinney, Helicopter Crew
P
FC Wilfred P. Paye, Helicopter Crew
SP/5 Charles R. Clark, Helicopter Crew
Detachment A-303,5th S.F.G. APO 96227
CPT James G. Gritz, Ground Search Party
CPT Steven M. Yedinak, Ground Search Party
1LT Charles K. Chilton, Ground Search Party
MSG James C. Howard, Ground Search Party
SSG Dale R. England, Ground Search Party
SFG William A. Kindoll, Ground Search Party
SSG Dennis H. Montgomery, Ground Search Party
SFG George W. Ovsac, Ground Search Party
SSG Dennis H. Montgomery, Ground Search Party
SFC Patrick D. Wagner, Ground Search Party
SGT James C. Donahue, Ground Search Party
SSG Joseph J. Cawzey, Ground Search Party
SFC Lowell T. Glossup, Ground Search Party
This and following page: Citation awarded to members of 5th Special Forces Group for their actions in Operation Black Box. Courtesy of Stephen Sherman, RADIX Press, Houston, TX, www.specialforcesbooks.com.
A-303 (MOBILE GUERRILLA FORCE) - OPERATION BLACK BOX 3
Headquarters, 5th S.F.G., APO 96240
CPT Robert J. Weinfurter, Intelligence Coordinator
B-55,5th S.F.G. APO 96227
MAJ Clarence M. Hooper, MACV Coordinator
19th TASS APO 96227
LT COL James E. Poore, ALO 5th INF DIV (ARVN)
MAJ Joe W. Carr, ALO “A” Company, 5th S.F.G.
CPT Charles L. Pocock, FAC Phuoc Long Sector
2. On 8 October 1966, an aircraft of the Strategic Air Command Operating Location 20 crashed approximately four miles SE of Song Be in Phuoc Long Province. It was subsequently discovered that certain electronic equipment of an extremely sensitive nature was lost during this crash and was very possibly in a position to be compromised. A compromise of this particular instrument would gravely affect US national security. Assistance was sought from the US Army, 5th Special Forces Group to provide an organized search of the area for the lost instrument.
3. The search was to take place in dense and practically impenetrable jungle, deep in Viet Cong held territory. The 5th Special Forces Group immediately responded to this seemingly impossible task. On the fourth day of the search, a patrol that was forced to search by crawling on hands and knees due to the dense jungle, radioed back that they had recovered what appeared to be the
A-303 (MOBILE GUERRILLA FORCE) - OPERATION BLACK BOX 4
missing instrument.
4. A helicopter was dispatched from the 281st Aviation Company to make a positive identification and possible jungle pickup. A Forward Air Controller directed the helicopter crew into the area and the pickup was affected by means of a 100 foot rope lowered from the helicopter into a bomb crater, the only semblance of a clearing in the area. It was determined at that time that it was definitely the missing instrument. The mission then returned to Bien Hoa and the instrument was determined to be uncompromised.
5. On behalf of the Strategic Air Command, I wish to express our deepest gratitude for the efforts of these determined soldiers and airmen that accomplished this seemingly impossible task. Be assured that the security of the free world has been greatly supported by the professional manner in which this job was accomplished.
s/Charles D. Rafferty
t/Charles D. Rafferty, Colonel, US ASF
Commander, Operating Location 20
A True Copy:
J.I. Chavez
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant
With open-ended orders like that, the search began. The first thing was to get a map with the course line having the crash site precisely depicted. From this spot, all calculations would emanate—air and ground speed, altitude, rate of descent, winds aloft. All had to be estimated to give us a vague idea of where the tail might be found and where to begin our search, unless we were lucky enough to spot it in the treetops from photos.
I scheduled a low altitude (10,000 feet) U-2 mission to give us adequate lateral photo coverage of the area with sufficient detail while keeping the aircraft out of range of ground fire. The crash site and aircraft remains had been pinpointed at 55 nautical miles on the 012 degree radial of the Bien Hoa TACAN. That was the only solid information available to us. It was a clue, although not a very good one because the aircraft had been traveling at an out-of-control speed between 300 and 500 knots. One other flimsy clue was the altitude of pilot ejection and separation from the aircraft. It was estimated to be “around” 50,000 feet altitude.
The film from this search mission was delivered to the large Photo Interpretation Center at Tan Son Nhut. I spent the next 48 hours there going through the pictures frame by frame, searching for the tail feathers of #690. All to no avail.
Reporting these results to the Col Rafferty, I was instructed to “forget the whole thing.” I didn't. I couldn't.
Montagnard Cambodian soldiers and Special Forces team assembling for the search for System 13.
Soon after I arrived at Bien Hoa, I had discussed the “13” situation with one of our U-2 Tech Reps, Travis Mason, who had previously been on detachments with the CIA U-2s. A short time later, I met with Mason and shared my slim findings with him. He was as shocked as I was about being told to “forget the whole thing.” Events coasted along for a couple of days while I contemplated my next move.
Montagnard fighter who was a team member searching for System 13.
Special Forces team leader Captain James (Bo) Gritz.
As events unfolded, it became quite clear that I did not need to be concerned about what “Insignificant Me” was going to do about the situation. It was settled quickly and unexpectedly by the arrival of a “How-Goes-It Group” from Davis Monthan who were there to have a look at the drone program. The team consisted of Brig Gen Cole, the division commander, a squadron commander, and several other “horse holders.” I was in the outer administrative office trying my best to be inconspicuous when the next thing I heard was a bellow from Gen Cole, “WHAT???!!!”
The general got SAC Headquarters on the phone, and it was most definitely a oneway conversation interspersed with many “Yes, Sirs.” I figured this was no place for me and beat a hasty retreat. I had heard enough to realize the missing System 13 was the focus of all the attention. The OL commanding officer was getting ripped.
Enter the Special Forces
After the visitors had departed, I expected the worst. I was not disappointed. My new directions were to find the “13” no matter what it took. I immediately called the local Special Forces Commander, LtCol Thomas M. Huddleston, and asked for a meeting with him ASAP. He invited me to his office, and I beat a path to his dusty corner of the base. After relating the whole story to him, including the consequences if the enemy found the “13,” he was inquisitive regarding its purpose which I alluded to only briefly. The Special Forces detachment took on the task and designated their mission, Operation Black Box.
Montagnard soldiers pulling the System 13 from the mud.
The System 13 with bayonet placed across it for reference.
System 13 being pulled onboard the helicopter. Charlie Kern is in the gunner's position.
Special Forces radio gear used by the team searching for the System 13.
Special Forces radio operator.
Special Forces sergeant who was a member of the team searching for the System 13.
Col Huddleston called his staff together, and we discussed what they needed from us. As it turned out, not much, just a map with all calculations on it. They asked for a summary of how we had determined “ground zero,” where the tail had the best chance of coming to earth. The estimated flight data was melded with our knowledge of previous crashes caused by excessive speed, and the aircraft breakup pattern, as all had somewhat similar signatures. For example, the tail usually separates first, before the wings. After our meeting, they told me they would be in touch.
On Sunday night, the Special Forces search party departed from somewher
e in northwest South Vietnam in two C-123s and with approximately 25 Montagnard mercenaries of the 3rd Mobile Strike Force. Col Huddleston checked in with me daily to provide an update after his team leader called from the field. The search party contacted Col Huddleston on the fourth day, a Thursday, and he called me immediately to request identifying information. It was noon when I received the call I had been waiting for. Col Huddleston said he thought they had found the prize. The search team wanted the “13’s” serial number and any other specs that might be used to identify it. He wanted me to go with him on the chopper to bring it home. Of course, I went.