Winds of Destruction

by Peter John Hornby Petter-Bowyer

  It was already clear that there was going to be a need for 4 Squadron to undertake accurate marking of targets for jet-strikes. 37mm Sneb rockets provided the best option to cater for adequate standoff range, accuracy and reasonable cost. However, we needed to introduce highly visible smoke into these small rockets to clearly show their points of impact. To achieve this, the armourers produced aluminium extension-tubes filled with white phosphorus. These were screw-threaded to fit between the rocket motors and their high-explosive heads. It was pleasing to find that the accuracy of these extended rockets was better than standard ones and that the increased weight only required a small sight adjustment to cater for increased gravity drop.

  Delivery of 37mm Sneb rockets from Provosts was well tried but an attack profile had to be developed for the Trojan. John Blythe-Wood and I flew together to develop a profile that would allow a steep delivery from 2,000 feet without over-stressing the airframe during recovery from the dive. I discounted medium dive angles because it would mean having to pass too low over hostile targets.

  John Blythe-Wood.

  It took only one flight to find a suitable profile. Keeping the target visible just to the left of the flight line, we ran up until the target was almost at right angles to the aircraft. At this point the nose was pitched up to around forty degrees, followed by a full aileron port roll through 180 degrees, assisted with plenty of rudder. This allowed the nose to pitch down into a sixty-degree dive commencing at low speed. Minor corrections brought the collemateur sight onto the target and immediately a pair of Sneb rockets was fired. Quite unlike the powerful whooosh of 60-pound rockets, Snebs went away with a sharp crack. Accuracy was excellent and recovery from the dive was gentle. Having tested this method of marking targets a few times, John taught the profile to all the squadron’s pilots.

  To give very close armed-support to the Army in bush-warfare conditions, we needed to develop slick, uncomplicated procedures that soldiers under stress could use to bring a pilot’s attention to the precise position of any target he was required to strike.

  FAC (Forward Air Controller) training for Army officers learning how to direct heavy jet-strikes in conditions of conventional warfare had done wonders in bringing the Air Force and Army close together. We now had the opportunity to build on this by introducing different techniques required in bush warfare. For this GAC (Ground to Air Control) was introduced.

  For GAC we needed to have a thorough understanding of each other’s situations and difficulties. When flight trials started, Army officers flew in the strike aircraft (Provosts and Trojans) to experience and appreciate air perspectives and pilots joined Army on the ground for the same purpose. At Kutanga Range aircraft could land after each GAC run. This facilitated quick debriefing, re-planning and switching of personnel. Procedures and techniques were modified and improved until GAC procedures were considered ready for operations.

  On the ground the commander of an Army callsign would have a good idea of an enemy force’s disposition and where one or more air strikes needed to be placed. Generally he would also know the air weapon best suited considering the enemy’s situation and how close his troops would be to the strike. Guns and Frantans could be used as close as thirty metres but bombs and rockets needed more than 100 metres separation to cater for potential errors and shrapnel effect. A pilot had to know with certainty the disposition of the entire callsign calling for support—we called this the FLOT (Front Line Own Troops). He also needed to know the nature of support required to be certain of selecting the correct weapon switches, the direction of attack, enemy distance from FLOT, and the precise position he had to strike. FLOT was seldom a straight line so only the extremities of troops nearest the enemy were marked. This could be done in a number of ways. The simplest of these was an unfolded map placed upside down on the ground but this usually delayed the air strike because a pilot might not see the small white markers in heavy bush conditions until he was directly above the callsign.

  The preferred method of marking was by smoke grenades, yellow and white were best, which could be used as soon as the callsign could clearly see or hear the approaching aircraft. Too often in operations, heavy ground fire made this difficult so an initial indication of a callsign’s position might need a single highly visible white phosphorus grenade. It was then up to the pilot to call for FLOT markers when he was close enough for his attack.

  FLOT markers provided a pilot the reference line for his attack direction. As soon as he had FLOT he would position to attack along that line. At ‘perch’ (start of attack dive) the pilot would call “Mark target”, whereupon the ground commander fired a red flare which he attempted to place in the centre of the intended strike point.

  By the time the flare reached ground the attacking aircraft was usually established in its attack-dive. The callsign commander would then give quick corrections. He would either call “On target”, if the flare had landed where he intended or give corrections ADD or DROP, LEFT or RIGHT with appropriate distances. Typically this might be, “To my marker, Drop 20—left 10”. Add and Drop, Left and Right corrections all related to the aircraft attack-line. This meant that the GAC soldier on the ground had to adopt the pilot’s perspective to bring about the corrections he wanted.

  We perfected procedures and ran many successful courses for all RLI, RAR and Territorial Army platoon commanders and senior NCOs. Inter-service and personal relationships that developed between the bush squadrons (ourselves and helicopters) and the Army’s fighting soldiers proved to be of immense importance in operations.

  When our GAC procedures were eventually used in hot operations, marking FLOT became impossible during high-stress running firefights, but pilots were able to adapt by attacking at ninety degrees to a single marker flare and responding to the usual corrections.

  4 Squadron was doing well, morale was high and training had become interesting. We flew many first-light and last-light GAC strikes and also made first-run attacks on targets marked by airborne FAC using 37mm Sneb rockets. Realising it may be necessary to call in a number of aircraft from different locations to link up for combined first-light strikes, we ran exercises in which three or four aircraft met before dawn at a prearranged position well away from target.

  Meeting in the dark required height separation initially and cautious manoeuvring to come into formation on the navigation lights of the assigned strike leader. There was something magical about those early morning flights when the progressive brightening of the sky revealed the black shapes of Provosts, or Trojans, flying together in loose formation.

  First light for callsigns on the ground occurred as much as twenty minutes before pilots’ visual contact with ground was good enough to safely make diving attacks. Only by flying with us did Army officers appreciate our problem. In consequence, any ground force needing close air support at dawn always had to endure an agonisingly long wait beyond ‘soldiers’ first light for ‘pilots’ first light.

  To reduce training costs, live strikes were made using one machine-gun or just a pair of 37mm Sneb rockets. The low-cost Kaylite sand-and-powder BUBS were always used in place of Frantans.

  Jungle Lane

  THERE WAS NEED FOR ALL squadron personnel to be reasonably well prepared for self-defence if downed amongst the enemy and to be able to assist in the defence of airfields. Every pilot and technician underwent weapons training on rifle ranges and all had to be proficient with both rifle and pistol.

  Whereas the Army always received maximum Air Force assistance in preparing for FAC, GAC and helicopter-trooping, the same could not be said of the Army when we sought professional assistance to prepare aircrew in ground-fighting techniques. Fortunately we had one or two ex-Army men ourselves, so 4 Squadron was given the necessary training by Warrant Officer Barney Barnes. One Army exercise he put us through was known as the ‘Jungle Lane’.

  Jungle Lane was designed to develop snap reaction and accurate shooting whilst under high physical and mental stress. Preparation for th
is involved setting up a number of hidden pop-up ‘hostile’ targets along a difficult twisting bush course known only to the man who prepared it and conducted the training runs.

  Barney Barnes took one pilot or technician at a time with FN rifle and three magazines of live ammunition to run the course. He followed close behind bellowing instructions on which way to move or firing his FN to signify when to dive for cover. Man-sized targets, standing, crouching or lying, popped up when Barney pulled on hidden strings. The man running Jungle Lane had to fire two shots from the hip immediately a target appeared but without losing forward momentum. Targets could appear as far back as forty-five degrees, which meant having to cast around for them but still avoiding obstructions along the way.

  I hated Jungle Lane with a passion. Barney Barnes, on the other hand, revelled in my breathless agony. Being a smoker did little to help me run in deep sand along a dry river-course with Barney’s live rounds sending spurts of sand and rock splinters flying left and right about me. The steepest banks were the points he selected to change from riverine to bush and vice versa whilst he trotted gently along level high ground.

  Having passed the first five targets and diving for cover I felt my legs would carry me no further. My mouth tasted of blood and my lungs were close to bursting. Twice I received a verbal blast for not counting how many rounds I had fired when I was about to move on without changing magazines. When fifteen or so targets had gone by Barney declared the run completed. We then backtracked the course to count hits on the targets. It took me the entire route back to recover my breath but I was always pleased to have seen every target and equalled the results of the best of my men. Nevertheless, those Jungle Lane runs made me decide that, if I was downed, I would go into cover and let the bloody enemy do the running.

  Jungle Lane and all other ground-combat training had me wondering what attracted men to a career in infantry. I knew they had to be barmy to enjoy filth, sweat, breathlessness, leopard-crawling and diving for cover at full running speed with heavy kit and weapon impeding a gentle touch-down. I never came to any conclusion on the issue but found it interesting that soldiers wondered what madness made a pilot operate in full view of the enemy with no place to hide.

  ‘October Revolution’

  THE PRESIDENT OF THE OFFICERS’ Mess Committee at Thornhill, Squadron Leader Ralph Parry, was the station’s Senior Technical Officer. It was unusual to have a non-flying PMC, but there he was sitting at the centre position of the top table for a dining-in night in October.

  Bad habits imported from RAF Aden dining-in nights broke loose on this particular occasion when Rich Brand set off a very loud cracker that filled the room with strong-smelling smoke. The PMC rose to his feet and called for order, whereupon another cracker went off. Infuriated by this, Ralph Parry returned to his feet and in an uncertain manner threatened to expel the culprit if the incident was repeated. Following a much bigger bang with more dense smoke, the perplexed PMC rose to his feet yet again and ordered the culprit to leave the room. Since he did not know who the culprit was, he became even more perplexed when twelve of us rose as one and departed from the dining-room.

  When we were outside laughing our heads off at the way our gentle PMC had handled misbehaviour, Tol Janeke invited everyone to his home to continue the evening there. Where all the beer came from remains a mystery but I remember Tol attiring everyone with his wife’s prized lampshades as headdress over mess kit. A very merry party ensued.

  Some of the wives, including Tol’s wife June, pitched up from a gathering they had been to and went behind the neighbour’s hedge to watch their rowdy men partying in the house. The position they chose to lie in the shadows was not a good one. Cyril White, coming out of the light into darkness, failed to see the girls on the other side of the section of hedge into which he relieved his bladder. Mildly splattered, the girls backed off but managed to suppress their mirth until Cyril let loose a very loud fart.

  Many parties were held in many places, most to be forgotten. But this night, nicknamed the ‘October Revolution’, was an impromptu affair that remains clear in my memory.

  Operation Sable

  IN SPITE OF ALL THE assurances given by the Department of Internal Affairs (which we nicknamed Infernal Affairs) it was obvious that they had no clue of what was actually happening in the remote places of northeast Rhodesia. The intimate contact that existed back in the days of horse and bicycle patrols, when every tribal kraal, big and small, was visited regularly, had been progressively lost with the advent of motor vehicles. The same might be said of the Police but for their ‘ground coverage’ men and agents who continued to make Peter Stanton and his colleagues our best source of ‘people intelligence’.

  From information gleaned after the SAS attack on Matimbe base, it was clear that ZANLA had reached the Rhodesian population earlier than expected. This brought about increased military activity in the northeast, including RLI and RAR deployments along the border inside Rhodesia with SAS working inside Mozambique.

  4 Squadron positioned a Trojan and four Provosts to support RLI and SAS sited at a small remote airfield called Nyamasoto and were joined there by four of 7 Squadron’s helicopters. The RLI and RAR were cross-graining along the border to try and pick up terrorist transit points whilst the SAS conducted over-border reconnaissance. A Joint Operations Centre, JOC Sable, was established at Nyamasoto Airfield for SAS and RLI ops whilst RAR operated out of Mtoko.

  Nyamasoto airstrip.

  The Nyamasoto airstrip was little more than an opening in the bush with no buildings or amenities besides tents and flysheets. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Rich, ex British SAS and previous OC of ‘C’ Squadron (Rhodesian) SAS, was then CO of the RLI and based with his soldiers at Nyamasoto.

  Immediately 4 Squadron arrived, I suggested that I should go over border to build up an intelligence picture of the ground. Initial reaction from Peter Rich was negative. He felt that I would upset ZANLA and make the Army’s task more difficult. However this officer with a fast penetrating wit eventually gave in to my nagging and agreed to “give this newfangled air recce a try”. Within an hour on my first flight, I picked up a temporary base in a small break in a line of low hills, fairly close to a main path. Initially I was concerned this might be a path network created by wild pigs either side of heavily treed and broken rock cover. However, a strong link to the main pathway did not fit with anything but men, so I called for troops to be brought in by helicopters. Peter Rich sounded distinctly sceptical but he agreed to respond.

  Although I was quite certain that this was a base without structures, I had no way of knowing if it was occupied. Nevertheless I did not wish to give any terrorist the impression of being too interested in the spot so continued to orbit getting progressively farther away. When four helicopters checked in with me, I cut across country to pick them up to ensure we arrived at the base at the same time. Immediately we got there the helicopters landed all their troops in long grass south of the base. I watched the troops shake out into an echelon formation then move directly towards the gap in the hill line.

  I was greatly relieved when contact was made with terrorists who had gone to ground inside the base area. From Nyamasoto, Peter Rich called, “Bloody marvellous, I owe you a beer.” Had he taken my information more seriously, the advice to split the troop deployment either side of the gap would have disallowed escape of most of the terrorists who broke northward. Final results were fair with seven killed, two escaped wounded and three captured out of a group of twenty-four ZANLA. This was one of a number of groups that had come from Zambia through Tete carrying supplies, now hidden in Rhodesia. We had caught these terrorists on their way back to Zambia in what was no more than a regular resting spot on water along their route to and from Rhodesia. Personal equipment that had been abandoned by terrorists was booby-trapped with phosphorus grenades, accounting for another terrorist two weeks after this action.

  Back at Nyamasoto, Peter Rich apologised for not having taken me serious
ly because he did not believe it was possible to locate terrorists from the air. I told him there was no need for any apology because my squadron was still on a pretty steep learning curve.

  I do not know if it was our three captures or an SB agent within ZANLA that led Peter Stanton to ZANLA’s bush ‘post box’; a lone hollow tree inside Rhodesia in which instructions were lodged for ZANLA’s group commanders. Not only was Peter able to record the latest instructions found in the ‘post box’, these led him to a huge arms cache, which included landmines, on the side of a prominent hill not far from the post box. Here Peter unearthed weapons in such numbers that he was astounded so much communist equipment could have come into the country unreported by the locals and undetectedby police ‘ground coverage’. Obviously, indoctrination of the local people was already well advanced!

  My plan to continue putting together all available visual recce information along the border was temporarily interrupted by a call to assist the SAS. Callsign 21 reported being pinned down inside Mozambique by enemy fire coming from a high ridge overlooking their flat exposed position. There was no way the callsign could advance or retreat from where individuals lay in the best cover available. I raced to the Provost and flew directly to the given map reference. This particular Provost was different from the others in that it had a trial-fit of four .303 Browning machine-guns, two in each wing, instead of the standard pair. The four guns had received limited testing so this call gave opportunity to see how they would fare on their first live target. It happened also to be my first-ever live attack in a light fixed-wing aircraft.

  The target description was so well structured that I knew where to lay down fire whilst still some distance out. I told callsign 21 that I would commence firing at long range and asked him to give me corrections on fall of shot that he should pick up easily from dust and tracer rounds. As soon as I started firing I received his call, “On target”. So I laced the appropriate section of the ridge-line, then stood off to await developments.