Winds of Destruction

by Peter John Hornby Petter-Bowyer

  Strela missiles

  RUSSIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES (NATO codename Grail but better known as Strela) were known to be in FRELIMO’s possession so, late in 1973, I made a request to Air HQ to take steps to protect our aircraft from these ‘heat seeking’ weapons. It was only a matter of time before one of my squadron’s aircraft would be shot down and I was acutely aware that I was the most likely candidate because I was exposed to FRELIMO forces for many hours on end, flying at heights perfectly suited to Strela.

  Apart from myself, I worried about my Provost pilots acting in support of the SAS in FRELIMO-dominated territory, particularly when they conducted strikes on the enemy. The helicopters, though vulnerable at height, always flew just above the trees to give them best protection against all types of enemy fire except when hovering, landing or lifting off.

  Months passed but no action was forthcoming from Air HQ or the technical boffins at CSIR (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research) in South Africa. During a visit to Air HQ I raised the matter again and was told that counter-missile work could not be undertaken, as this had not been catered for in the Air Force budget. Instead I was instructed to include Strela protection in 4 Squadron’s 1975 bids. Being really upset by this standard response, I expressed the view that we would have to lose aircraft and crews to Strela before any action was taken. Unhappily I was proven right.

  Crop-spraying in Tete

  IN JANUARY 1974 I NOTICED that maize crops, which had not been grown in Tete south of the Zambezi for the past two years, were flourishing. This meant ZANLA would be able to feed off the local people who were obviously returning to areas from which they had fled in 1972. Most of these people, then living in small hidden camps, appeared to have come out of the Portuguese aldeamento at Macombe. However, the benefit that would derive to ZANLA from the availability of maize meal was unacceptable and a decision was made to destroy the crops and force the civilians to return to the aldeamento.

  A Cordon Sanitaire was still being constructed along the northeastern borderline where thousands of anti-personnel mines were laid between two electrified fences. Between and either side of these fences, a chemical defoliant had been sprayed to destroy vegetation. The defoliant had worked well on bush but its effectiveness against crops was not known. Nevertheless it was decided to use the same stuff because ample stocks were immediately available.

  Only one civilian crop-sprayer pilot was prepared to take on the job in hostile Tete. I cannot recall the name of the well-built pilot I briefed at Mount Hampden Airport. He calculated the amount of fluid he required and this was positioned at the RAR Tac HQ at Musengezi Mission. I provided top cover and guided the pilot from field to field. Once he saw each field, or complex of fields, he did his own planning and meticulously covered the awkwardly shaped crops whilst I looked on from above.

  On return to Musengezi after his fourth flight to recharge his tanks, he experienced difficulty in keeping his twin-Comanche on the runway. A bullet strike to the aircraft had punctured a main wheel tyre but little other damage had occurred. As soon as a replacement wheel from Salisbury was fitted the pilot got airborne again and we completed the job on 19 January 1974. Fortunately the rain held off long enough for the spray to be absorbed by the maize plants and in five days browning of the crops confirmed that the spray had worked.

  Chris Weinmann joins 4 Squadron

  BECAUSE I SPENT MOST OF my time in the operational areas, I placed great reliance on Rob Tasker and Bruce Collocott to manage the squadron at Thornhill. However, we started experiencing some discipline difficulties amongst a handful of young pilots because Rob and Bruce, though excellent officers, were too gentle in nature to handle them. Another problem I had was that 4 Squadron had no qualified PAI to ensure pilot proficiency in weapons delivery at a time when we most needed this. Until this time we had been reliant on John Blythe-Wood and myself, both unqualified substitutes.

  Air HQ approval was given to my request for Chris Weinmann to replace Bruce Collocott. Flight Lieutenant Chris Weinmann seemed to be the ideal man for our needs because he was a qualified PAI who struck me as being a no-nonsense disciplinarian. Rob Tasker, being the only instructor beside myself, remained essential.

  Chris had flown Trojans when they first arrived in Rhodesia but was then flying Hunters In November 1973 he was posted to 4 Squadron and Bruce went to 3 (Transport) Squadron. Whereas Bruce was openly delighted with his posting Chris secretly hated having to leave the glory of Hunters to step down to slow piston-driven machines. Typically, he put his personal desires aside and settled to his new responsibilities with the determination I had expected from him. As soon as Rob re-familiarised him on Trojans and Provosts, Chris got stuck into improving weapons proficiency amongst all pilots, myself included. Thanks to him, disciplinary difficulties that had existed at junior pilot level ceased.

  Chris Weinmann.

  Night casevacs

  4 SQUADRON PILOTS WERE FACED WITH major problems operating Trojans into remote airstrips at night in response to calls for casevac or urgent re-supply. This was because no facilities existed to clearly demarcate runway boundaries for take-off and landing.

  On grass runways at main and established Forward Airfields, gooseneck flares were placed on the 100-metre markers along one side of the runway. Two flares at start and end of the runway, on the side opposite to the flare line, defined where runway centre-line lay. This assisted pilots to clearly identify the runway and to judge their landing approach angle and hold-off height for touch down.

  A gooseneck flare was something like a squat domestic watering can with carrying handle. A thick wick in the spout was exposed for about four inches outside the spout with the other end lying in raw paraffin inside the can. The wick fitted tightly in the spout to ensure that flame at the lighted end did not transfer to paraffin in the can.

  In remote areas there were no cumbersome gooseneck flares, so a crude system of marking the airstrip was used. Invariably there were Army or Police vehicles at the strips into which 4 Squadron aircraft were called, so we used these as runway markers. Two vehicles were placed on the runway centre line, one at each end of the runway. With head and taillights on, the vehicles faced the direction the ground forces wished a pilot to land. On his approach for landing, a pilot saw the rear lights of both vehicles and the headlights of the first vehicle, when bright enough, helped him judge the round out for landing.

  Though this method was successfully employed it required great skill in judgement and I considered it too dangerous to continue. What was needed was something along the lines of the gooseneck flares to mark an entire runway; so I produced small one-time disposable mini-flares for all ground forces to carry as standard equipment.

  I acquired empty half-pint paint tins with metal bungs and screw caps. Each tin was filled with paraffin and a round wick was inserted into the paraffin through a hole in the metal bung. The screw cap trapped the outside of the wick and sealed in the paraffin until removed for use. Night-landing trials with these mini-flares were successful and eliminated any need for vehicles that were, themselves, hazardous obstructions on any runway.

  Boxes containing twelve filled, sealed and ready-to-use mini-flares and a box of sealed matches were issued to Army and Police with simple instructions on how to lay them out on a 1,000-metre runway. For the most part their introduction into the field made night landings at remote airfields simpler and safer. However, there were two incidents that raised serious questions about some ground forces’ understanding of air operations and their ability to interpret the simplest of instructions. The first was when I was called out late one night to casevac an SAP man from Sipolilo to Salisbury. We were told that the man had suffered a heart attack and was in such a bad state that he had to be taken to Salisbury urgently.

  When I arrived over Sipolilo, the runway flare line was so short it appeared as if I was flying at 30,000 feet, when in fact I was only 1,500 feet above ground. The callsign on the ground had great difficulty speaki
ng understandable English and I could not understand his fast-spoken Afrikaans. Eventually I was able to understand that all the flares had been incorrectly laid between two 100-metre markers instead of one flare on each of the ten 100-metre markers along one side of the runway. After a while the flares were relayed correctly and I made a normal landing. But when I taxiied to waiting vehicles, I was greeted with the sight of the ‘heart attack’ victim walking briskly and unaided to the aircraft.

  The second incident ended in tragedy near the end of my tour with 4 Squadron. During the night of 17 December 1974, Brian Murdoch was called to uplift two Army casualties from Mushumbi Pools airstrip in the Zambezi Valley. The callsign concerned were either unaware of the mini-flares they were carrying as standard equipment or were too lazy to find them. Whatever the case, they used vehicles to mark the runway.

  Brian landed on the wet muddy strip, then turned around and taxiied back to the vehicle over which he had passed on landing. The vehicle that had been at the far end of the runway had, for some reason, been right next to the Trojan during the loading of the casevac. When Brian was ready to take off, this vehicle repositioned but, through ignorance, the driver did not go all the way to the end of the runway. He stopped some 300 metres short of the runway’s end next to a large puddle of water “to make sure the pilot missed it.”

  In the wet conditions that prevailed, a Trojan needed the full length of Mushumbi Pools runway but Brian had no way of knowing the ignorant driver had shortened this. It can only be guessed that Brian was forced to heave the aircraft into the air too early by yanking down full flap; but he did not achieve sufficient height to prevent his nose wheel from striking the vehicle. The low-powered engine was hard-pressed to propel the bulky Trojan at the best of times, but full flap and impact with the vehicle placed Brian, flying on instruments, in a no-win situation. The aircraft was observed to change course to the right before crashing into a riverbed where Brian, Corporal Parker and Lance-Corporal Povey died instantly. Had the callsign used the mini-flares, which we later established they had, this wasteful tragedy would not have occurred.

  Improving tactics

  TEN MONTHS PRIOR TO HIS DEATH, I had instructed Brian Murdoch along with Chris Weinmann on internal and external recce. From this time on I progressively worked through all the squadron pilots, which was both necessary and frustrating. It became clear that only one in fifteen pilots had any hope of succeeding in visual recce work because it required stamina and patience for lengthy flights and, above all, an earnest desire to locate CTs. Too many pilots were quite happy to sit back at base waiting in comfort for calls to action. Such calls came in response to CT actions from RSF men in observation posts on hilltops, from recce pilots and more and more from Selous Scouts pseudo operators, though at the time these were being attributed to normal ops because few people knew of Selous Scouts’ secret penetration into terrorist networks. However, this changed when deployments of pseudo groups was made by helicopters because this brought helicopter crews into direct contact with the pseudo terrorists and exposed their ops areas. To retain the highest degree of secrecy possible, Selous Scouts ‘forts’ were built at Air Force FAFs. From the high security walls of forts, the pseudos were driven in closed vehicles to the end of a runway or a suitable secure area close by for helicopter uplift to their operational area drop-off points.

  It was during recce training with Chris and Brian that we located a ‘live CT camp’, which led to a successful follow-up operation. This was on 15 February when the three of us split up to strike with three fixed-wing aircraft ahead of helicopters bringing in RLI ground troops.

  Every air action involving expenditure of weapons necessitated the submission to Air HQ of an Air Strike Report. ASRs tended to be very matter-of-fact in style so they failed to convey any sense of excitement and fear, nor tell of the hard sweat and toil of troops on the ground.

  The ASR raised for this specific operation is used to illustrate the composition and handwritten contents of ASRs. Excluded from this and all other ASRs in this book are the accompanying technical details and weapon expenditure schedules. The exact words recorded in manuscript by officers in the field and up the chain of command in Air HQ, are reproduced without regard to grammatical errors.

  PILOTS REPORT

  1. As a result of 4 Squadron’s visual recce training a number of terrorist bases and suspected bases were located. A terrorist base a US 468605 appeared to be occupied at 151415B. Lt Col Southey and Flt Lt Bennie were briefed on the situation at 1500 at which time it was decided that immediate action should be taken.

  2. Five helicopters were on hand as well as the recce Trojan that was armed. Two Provosts were called for and flown by pilots Weinmann and Murdoch who were familiar with the target lay out.

  3. The Trojan was flown by OC 4 Squadron at 2000’ agl and 200 yds ahead of the two Provosts. The five helicopters with assault and stop troops followed immediately behind the Provosts. Take off and lift off occurred as planned at 151615B.

  4. All weapons were placed on target points selected at the pre strike briefing.

  5. Due to a shortage of ground troops, ground to the north of the river which formed the northern barrier to terr escape was covered by OC 4 Sqn and east of the camp was patrolled by Air Lt Law and Air Lt Thorne.

  6. Air strike must have severely disrupted the terrorists because the assault troops made contact 4 minutes after strike. At this time it is known that 8 ters were killed and equipment has fallen into troops’ hands.

  7. Reason for success of this exercise was undoubtedly Lt Col Southey’s faith in air recce and his willingness to strike without delay. Army/ Air force co-operation could not have been better.

  (Signed) Squadron Leader P.J.H. Petter-Bowyer

  Comments by OPS CDR., OCFW, Sqn Cdr

  1. a. Trojan 3234 was holed by one bullet. Whether this was during the recce phase or during the attack is not known.

  b. The success of this operation goes to prove that recce can be extremely valuable and thought should be given to the greater use of this role in our present situation; the advantage being that up-to- date information can be gained and if the reaction to this intelligence is swift, results will be achieved.

  c. If the use of air recce (visual) is increased with the view to using this type of quick reaction tactic, ground forces will have to be made available, on a prompt force basis, at either Centenary or Mt. Darwin or both. If this was done, the type of attacks planned for 19th, 20th Feb 74 could have been handled in a similar way using jet effort as the air strike medium. Therefore, the attack would have been on the date the targets were located instead of a week later.

  (Signed) Squadron Leader H.G. Griffiths

  2. (1) No requirement for GAC or FLOT.

  (2) I fully agree with the comments 1 b. above but our ability to meet this requirement is not possible at the present time on a continuous basis. No 4 Squadron has a major problem in training recce pilots and no sooner do they build up to a good standard when postings intervene and thus back to square one. As Ops Cmdr I would dearly love to have a good recce pilot of the calibre of Sqn Ldr Petter-Bowyer on permanent attachment at FAF 3 but the way I see it at the present time it is not possible, but we must work to this aim. The proof lies in the fact that during the period in which Sqn Ldr Petter-Bowyer was training Weinmann and Murdoch, the info gained led to this Air Strike plus 4 other major ter strikes, 3 of which were on occupied camps.

  3) Para 1 c. refers. Ground troops within Rhodesia are available for prompt force type actions and this is how the follow up to this strike was made possible. In respect of the strikes carried out on 21, 22 and 23 and 24, these were all in Mozambique and required regrouping of ground forces. It is appreciated that it has been agreed that jet ops need not be followed up by immediate ground ops but in this respect it was agreed to do so in order to gather intelligence. In three out of four cases intelligence was gained to the benefit of the over-all operation. The delay in mounting attacks does no
t appear to affect the results.

  (4) In respect of this strike it can be considered a first class example of joint planning and what we hope for daily. However, this situation does not present itself often. The base camp was in fact just a resting place and Sqn Ldr Petter-Bowyer is to be congratulated on his powers of observation. The more I have to do with this man the more I am convinced that he has an inborn ability so far as visual recce is concerned which is unequalled in the Force. Added to which is his never failing enthusiasm and strong belief in the concept.

  (5) Results of subsequent follow up Ops accounted for 8 terr and one AFJ killed. Sitreps 46/74 Para Alpha Two (2) and 47/74 Alpha Two (1) refer.

  (Signed) Wing Commander P.D. Cooke

  Comments by SO OPS

  Sqn Ldr Petter-Bowyer has undoubtedly created an awareness in the force that visual recce pays dividends and this is being actively pursued.

  We have been concentrating, possibly too much, on recce outside our borders. JOC commanders must make more use of recce, based on the intelligence picture, in their area of Ops. They have been advised. A strike well executed. Good initiative displayed. Well done strike team.

  (Signed) Wing Commander W.H. Smith

  Comments by DG OPS

  The planning, concept and conduct of this operation gives great satisfaction. We pressed the possibilities of this type of operation for some time and I trust the successes recently achieved has proved the point. Jointry at its best. Our increased allocation of effort should ensure that the essence can be reaped as often as opportunities present themselves. The increased effort should also allow for greater air recce coverage.