Winds of Destruction

by Peter John Hornby Petter-Bowyer

  Seldom did a day go by when 7 Squadron did not have to re-plan for unexpected issues such as wounded aircrew and aircraft damage. There was always a need for some immediate remedial action to be taken. For Griff and his senior men there was such high stress at base that they looked forward to their own field deployments that, though loaded with periods of extreme tension and danger, afforded them some degree of respite.

  The jet and transport squadrons were regular-sized units and their personnel for the most part were base-bound, so they did not suffer the high stresses of the bush squadrons. Like 7 Squadron, 4 Squadron’s crews spent most of their time in the operational areas but their problems were of a different nature. 4 Squadron’s greatest difficulty was the never-ending loss of experienced pilots and technicians to meet increasing needs for helicopter crews. With each crop of brand-new pilots off training, 4 Squadron had virtually no chance of providing adequate guidance to youngsters by seasoned operators. In fact, 4 Squadron was sometimes so short of aircrew that retired officers, unkindly referred to as ‘retread pilots’, were re-called to duty to make up numbers in the field. The retired officers I remember operating Lynx included Group Captain Charles Paxton, Wing Commander John Mussell, Squadron Leader Mike Saunders, Flight Lieutenant Dickie Dives and even Squadron Leader Ted Brent was borrowed from 5 Squadron for a while. Flight Lieutenant Don Northcroft (Sword of Honour student of No 19 PTC) who was a bright gentle-natured man had returned to farming was another of the retread pilots until a gang of CTs gunned him down whilst he was inspecting his lands.

  It was at about this time that the members of my training course, 10 SSU, came together for a re-union party. Unfortunately Gordon and Faith Wright chose not to attend, whereas Ian and Helena Ferguson took the trouble to leave their farming business and drive seven hours to be with us. It was a very happy occasion in spite of all the troubles that surrounded us.

  Ian and Helena Ferguson, Dave and Val Thorne, Ian and Priscilla Law, Keith and Sue Corrans, Murray and Muriel Hofmeyr, Bill and Maureen Galloway, John and Jill Barnes and Peter and Beryl PB.

  SO Plans

  IN MARCH 1976, I WAS promoted to the rank of wing commander in the Air Staff post of Staff Officer Planning. Air Marshal Mick McLaren as Commander of the Air Force altered the terms of reference for this post to allow me to assume responsibility for all Air Force projects and to commence the weapons development work I had been pressing for over the years.

  So Plans was the only post in the Air Force that allowed the incumbent officer direct access to the Commander without the approval of DG Ops and the Chief of Air Staff. Though this was very useful, I never once used the privilege without first advising Air Vice-Marshal Frank Mussell or Air Commodore Chris Dams about the project details I needed to discuss with the Commander. I will discuss the project work shortly because it was delayed a while.

  In June I was pulled away from my post to assist 4 Squadron, yet again, with recce training. I was very put out by this as I had spent more than fourteen months in the field during my eighteen months as Ops I in Air Staff. Fortunately Cocky Benecke was made available to cut down on training time and advantage was taken of my presence at Mount Darwin to allow OC FAF 4 to take some well-earned leave.

  Recce pilots training June 1976: From left: (First individual—see note below), OC 4 Sqn Dag Jones leaning on prop boss, PB, Francois du Toit (downed by FRELIMO—Allouette), ‘Starry’ Stevens (downed by FRELIMO—Lynx), Cocky Benecke, Flt Cdr 4 Sqn John Bennie. The first individual in this photo confuses me. It looks like Brian Murdoch, but he was killed in December 1974. Note— Lynx not yet fitted with guns and mortar net over revetments (to be discussed later).

  This period of training was for the new OC 4 Squadron and some of his pilots. It was also my first experience in teaching from the rear seat so that I could see ground on Dag Jones’s side of the aircraft. During our second sortie on 11 June 1976 we were aerial-tracking a strong trail that led us to a brand-new CT camp. We immediately called for a depleted Fireforce of K-Car plus two G-Cars. Being passenger caused me to see the action from a new perspective that turned out to be very useful for reasons still clear in my mind.

  Firstly, I had not seen a fresh base for a long time. Secondly I could see that, as in many actions past, there were insufficient troops immediately available to Kip Donald, the RLI Fireforce commander. I knew there were plenty of troops available at Mount Darwin and that a Dakota, then available on the ground at FAF 4, could have brought them across at the same time that the helicopters arrived; but none of these troops was para-trained.

  The third point of importance came from my direct observation of Frantan effects at the moment of ignition. All of my many Frantan attacks had been from Provosts whose wings disallowed observation of weapon effects at the moment of impact. Now I saw one Frantan spew flaming gel at forty-five degrees to flight line thereby missing two CT’s I saw so clearly. The second Frantan did a similar action but actually killed one CT that I had not seen at all. I realise immediately that steel construction and the container’s impact orientation were the reasons for haphazard distribution of flame. I vowed to myself that I would do something about producing highly frangible units that were both stable and aimable.

  The CTs had chosen a site in thick but narrow riverine bush with open grasslands all around, except at one end where a sparsely wooded ridge met up with the bush. In the dry season, the CTs would only have had the ridge as an escape route but, because of late rains in 1976, the grass was still high and green and severely impeded the forward-visibility to the soldiers on the ground. With too few troops, Kipper Donald forced the pace of his troops, resulting in the wounding of one of his men in the first contact before the responsible CT was dispatched.

  In this action, as with so many others, it was obvious that there was need for more troops to be immediately available in the vital period. With limited helicopter availability, this could only be achieved if Fireforces included paratroopers in an accompanying Dakota. In this particular contact, Kipper Donald could have used paratroopers the moment the CTs’ presence had been confirmed. This would have prevented six CTs crawling away through the long grass. When I took the idea of a para-trooping Dakota with each Fireforce to Air HQ, Group Captain Norman Walsh told me that, having been approached with the same idea by Army HQ, he was actively attending to the matter. In fact the RLI had already commenced paratrooper training. This was good news indeed.

  Alouettes trooping.

  Operation Sand

  IN A TOP-SECRET EXCHANGE (Operation Sand), Rhodesian Air Force instructors, technicians and students were attached to the South African Air Force. This was necessary because our ageing Vampires could not keep up with the production of new pilots. Flying training on Impala jets was conducted at Langebaan Air Base and later in Durban. This was a quid pro quo exchange for our training needs and for operational experience needed by SAAF helicopter crews. At the time we also manned one entire SAAF Mirage lll squadron in another top-secret arrangement.

  Flt Lt Ricky Culpan.

  Although I was aware of this and had met some of the personnel during my many visits to CSIR in Pretoria, it is surprising how little I knew about the reasons and objectives involved. They might even have been preparing for the on-take of Mirages by our own Air Force but no questions were asked and no information was given.‘Top Secret’ meant exactly what it implied and to this day I do not know the answers. But, from one senior SAAF officer I later learned something that really intrigued me. Unfortunately the Rhodesian jet pilot involved in this story died in an air accident before I could verify what I now record.

  It was Flight Lieutenant Ricky Culpan who was very disappointed by Mirage III air-to-air gunnery results. Ricky was not content to accept that such a sophisticated aircraft could be equipped with an air-to-air aiming system that gave excellent pilots very poor results. To cut a long story short, I understand that he came to the conclusion that an essential component of information was missing and had to be introdu
ced into the software of the gunsight’s computer system. This was the precise angle between the gun-line and the airflow that, in the case of this delta-wing fighter, varied more than in conventional fighter designs. The actual airflow angle had to be provided by an externally mounted vane.

  How Ricky got through the ‘red-tape’ at SAAF HQ I do not know, but permission appears to have been given to fit this sensor vane on a Mirage III airframe and link it to the sighting computer. An acquaintance of Ricky’s, who I was told was a fundi in computer software, upgraded the gunsight’s computer programme by integrating the sensor vane’s input. This resulted in a manyfold improvement in air-to-air gunnery results.

  By recording this story I hope one day to receive confirmation of it because it places my one-time neighbour in Thornhill Married Quarters, Ricky Culpan, on a higher level of imagination and determination than I thought he possessed.

  Diverse personalities and different situations

  BY MID-1976 ALL THE FIREFORCES were engaged daily in a variety of actions against ZANLA. Some actions were very successful and others drew blanks. There were so many individuals involved, and the actions so widespread and diverse in nature, that it is impossible to give a chronological sequence of events or provide a concise picture of the happenings in each area. By this time ZANLA had extended operations from the northeast all the way down the eastern side of Rhodesia to the South African border.

  I have taken a very small sample of events during 1976 in each area and have focused on three individuals having different ranks and operational functions. One was a commander on the ground, one flew helicopters and one flew Lynx.

  My selected individuals are Tol Janeke, Mike Borlace and Cocky Benecke. The first two individuals might not have been first choice for many but almost every Rhodesian serviceman would have selected Cocky.

  All helicopter aircrew were top-line operators; too many to mention personally. However, one pilot’s name kept coming to the fore and would remain there for some time. Many of the helicopter technician-gunners loved to fly with him whilst others considered him too bloody dangerous. Nevertheless, Flight Lieutenant Mike Borlace, who has already featured in other actions described in this book, recorded his seventh ASR as K-Car pilot in the Op Thrasher area at the beginning of June. His gunner was Sergeant Henry Jarvie, a clown when occasion permitted, who was deadly serious in his duties.

  Due to the decision to have two Fireforces, one at Grand Reef and the other at Chipinga, Mike had only two troopers carrying eight soldiers, plus a supporting Lynx. He was called upon to take on a group of CTs reported to be resting by a small stream. The soldiers were inexperienced in Fireforce operations and did not have their own officer airborne; not that this mattered because K-Car pilots had so often proven that their abilities were equal to the best of RLI commanders.

  Air Lieutenant Chris Dickinson (M8 Black Lead) had Sergeant Phil Tubbs as his gunner. Air Lieutenant Atkinson (V8 Black 2) and his gunner Sergeant Griffen, were both OpPolo men. Air Sub-Lieutenant Ray Bolton (M4) flew the Lynx. In his ASR Mike used # in lieu of the usual c/s and # Sparrow 1 was a tracker callsign.

  Mike’s ASR reads:

  As there was no airborne army commander, Black section & Stops 1 & 2 were briefed by K-Car pilot on the basis of the information received from the informant. It appeared from a study of the map that there were two likely escape routes from the indicated area; accordingly it was decided to run in low-level along the Mupudzi River and into the target area from the NNW, Black 2 being briefed to deploy # Stop 1 in the areas VP504545 and Black Lead in the area VP507533 with no further direction from K-Car.

  We ran in as briefed with K-Car two minutes ahead of Black section pulling up to orbit the target area at 1508B. On our second orbit we observed in the area VP508537 a group estimated as 20 terrorists, armed and dressed in a semi-uniform garb generally blue or black trousers & a green top shirt.

  Sgt Jarvie was visual with the target(s) & was briefed to fire at targets of his own choosing. Very accurate fire was brought to bear and the ters were seen to start moving around at high speed in great confusion.

  The group broke into two parts, the majority breaking along the river line to the south & a smaller group along the river line to the NNW.

  I instructed Black section to engage the northern group & continued engaging the main group with K-Car. Sgt. Jarvie was bringing very accurate fire to bear & several characters were being knocked down.

  # Stop 2 were warned that business was coming their way & when they were visual with the ters were able to bring fire to bear that caused the ters to go to ground. As things were stabilising I sent Black 2 for reinforcing sticks & Black Lead for ammunition. Conversation with # Stop 2 resulted in them marking a target for K-Car. A further series of brief but final contacts ensued.

  # Stop 2 were reinforced with # Stop 3 & # Stop 4 were deployed in the area VP 504525. # Stop 1 was instructed to start sweeping south towards the original contact area. They soon encountered ters who were trying to ease their way northwards & a brief contact ensued before K-Car became visual with the ters & engaged them which resulted in a couple more characters falling down.

  At this stage K-Car was out of ammunition, but M4, previously requested, was running into the area.

  Before moving # Stops 2,3 & 4, I wanted a couple of areas softened & directed M4 in a series of strikes, using Frantan in two South to North attacks onto a bush area in the river line at VP506534, a Sneb rocket attack East to West into bush area in the river line at VP505533 and a Sneb rocket attack North to south into bush area in the river line at VP505532.

  Airborne control was handed over to Black Lead whilst K-Car departed to refuel & rearm.

  At 1710B, before K-Car returned, Black 2 was directed to recover bodies adjacent to # Stop 1’s position at VP505539 and was shot at by ters who were also adjacent, resulting in a gunshot wound to the gunner & extensive damage to the aircraft which exited the area to our refuelling point nearby from where it will be recovered by road. As Black Lead had the picture of the scene airborne control of M4 was left to him to direct two Frantan strikes delivered south to North on the area VP 505539 before K-Car resumed airborne control. Before the strikes were delivered, # Stop 1 had been removed to a safe position & FLOT indicated to M4 by orange smoke.

  As conditions were now becoming fairly dark M4 was dispatched home, a quick ammunition supply for the ground troops was arranged, # Stops 1,2,3, & 4 were joined up in the area VP 506538 & told to arrange ambush positions, & # Sparrow 1 were deployed in the original contact area & told to ambush there for the night. Sweeping operations will commence at first light tomorrow.

  Please note that trying to operate a ‘fire force’ of two troopers is probably going to cause severe casualties to security forces before long.

  Thirteen CTs were killed in this action, two of which were accounted for by the ground troops. Had there been more soldiers available to Borlace in the opening minutes the CTs would have fared even worse than they did. Notice that Mike said CTs were wearing “a green top shirt”. Under that would have been more shirts to facilitate change of visual appearance and identification.

  This photo of Mike Borlace was taken at his investiture for the Silver Cross of Rhodesia, awarded him for bravery in a number of actions.

  A week later, Mike Borlace, flying K-Car with Henry Jarvie, ran into heavy fire. This occurred in an action that was so close to the Mozambican border that at times the Fireforce, and a pair of Hunters which came to assist, had fire brought to bear on them by FRELIMO forces firing from a store across the border.

  Part of Mike’s ASR reads,

  We came under substantial automatic small arms fire which unfortunately smashed the sight glass of the 20mm cannon. K-Car pilot was visual with the ters who were running towards thick bush to the East. Without sighting information it was difficult for the gunner to bring the gun to bear, but several accurate bursts were delivered and one ter was seen to drop and stay down.

 
; Wing Commander Roy Morris, as OC Air Detatchment Thrasher, revealed what Mike did not record in his pilot’s report. Part of Roy’s report reads, Flt Lt Borlace’s performance is to be commended. Although wounded in the left leg above the knee, at the very beginning of this action, he continued in the K-Car and directed Lynx and Hunter strikes with a great deal of efficiency. His dedication to duty is unquestionably praiseworthy. It took OC Air Det. Thrasher to finally go to RUDA and extricate Flt. Lt. Borlace from the damaged K-Car and organised Air Lt. Dickinson to take command.

  Eighteen months had elapsed since I left 4 Squadron; yet only Cocky Benecke remained when Dag Jones took over command from Cyril White. Although he clearly deserved a posting to helicopters, as had occurred with all of his PTC colleagues, Cocky had been left on 4 Squadron because his unique talents were best suited to fixed-wing operations. Funnily enough Cocky was pleased with this. Because of the relatively low cost of flying light strike aircraft, Cocky felt he could pursue his talent and his desire for action just as far as his passion drove him. Again I say, “What a change in attitude from those days when I struggled to get him interested in recce.”

  The number of Fireforce successes directly attributable to 4 Squadron recce pilots, especially Cocky Benecke, was astounding. In spite of its limited strength in machines and operationally seasoned men, 4 Squadron was the most cost-effective military unit in Rhodesia. This statement in no way detracts from the undeniable potency of our squadrons, the SAS, Selous Scouts, RLI or any other unit. It simply conveys the undeniable fact that a small complement of pilots, ably supported by an equally small group of dedicated technicians, induced and participated effectively in more actions, pro rata, than any other Rhodesian unit.