Winds of Destruction

by Peter John Hornby Petter-Bowyer

  General Walls and his COMOPS staff attended a number of presentations at SAS HQ. These were made around large-scale models of the two targets. The operational proposals frightened those who listened because they were madly daring and very dangerous. Both proposals involved relatively straightforward air attacks that were to be followed with vertical envelopment by paratroopers and heli-borne forces. This was considered absolutely essential to ensure maximum results and to seriously disrupt ZANLA.

  From the outset COMOPS totally rejected any idea of attacking Tembue due to its great distance from Rhodesia; but there was a softening towards the strike plan for Chimoio. Eventually, after many persuasive presentations and much lost time, the operational plans for both Chimoio and Tembue were approved. By then it was late October 1977 when Chimoio’s numbers had risen to 11,000. Tembue was still reported to contain 4,000.

  The task that Norman and his planning colleague Major Brian Robinson had on their hands was a daunting one. It was one thing to make operational proposals, but quite another to reduce them to the finest details that were so necessary to ensure effective execution.

  The onset of the rainy season in November made it imperative that the attacks went in before large numbers of CTs launched into Rhodesia to take advantage of good bush cover with abundant food supplies. Had the attack been approved earlier any threat of bad weather affecting plans would not have been a factor, but now it was a critical issue and accurate weather forecasting was essential.

  For some time a fundi in Salisbury had been providing the Air Force with weather information that he alone could receive indirectly from space satellites, using his own homemade equipment. Due to international sanctions Rhodesia was unable, officially that is, to receive satellite imagery of the weather patterns affecting southern Africa. How this man managed to tap into the Intelstat transmissions from Europe escapes me.

  Cloud cover images were beamed down in digital form to the Intelstat receiver in Europe. Eight hours later, having been processed into usable form, the information was transmitted to a network of official receiver stations that subscribed to the service. Surreptitious interception of these signals in Salisbury obviously cost nothing but the data acquired had to be processed in a special way to get a printout resembling a photograph of cloud formations over southern Africa, as seen by the satellite. At around 10:00 every day this cloud-map arrived at Air HQ.

  The cloud-maps were important to us because reports from weather stations to the north of Rhodesia were completely unreliable. Although the images we received were rather poor by modern standards, they were sufficient to warn of any major weather fronts that might affect operational planning. Nevertheless, they could not be relied upon to forecast localised orographic and thermal cloud situations that might afect long-range operations.

  With the best will in the world, and using every available strike aircraft, the Air Force could not hope to produce the meaningful kill and serious wound rates we needed, because Chimoio was made up of so many camps spread over a vast area. There was no alternative but to use the very best available fighting soldiers to assault the targets immediately after a maximum-effort jet-strike.

  Chimoio lay over ninety kilometres from the Rhodesian border and Tembue was almost three times that distance. However, Norman and Brian agreed that these distances favoured them in that they were both convinced neither ZANLA nor FRELIMO would seriously expect a combined air and ground attack so far from Rhodesia’s border. Until now, all combined external operations had occurred very close to the border.

  The Selous Scouts’ attack on Nyadzonya Base in August 1976 had quite obviously taught ZANLA not to concentrate its forces, which is why Chimoio Base comprised so many small camps widely spread; and to a lesser extent this also applied to Tembue. Though the wide spread of targets compounded planning difficulties, it did not alter the planners’ view that ZANLA felt perfectly safe from anything but air attack, particularly with FRELIMO’s main base at Chimoio (previously Vila Pery) being so close by.

  Planning the air attacks was simple enough and the selection of troops was obvious; the SAS and RLI would be used. But any idea of employing a mobile column to get a large ground force to either target was a non-starter as surprise would be impossible to achieve. Interference from FRELIMO would certainly occur early and involve heavy fighting most of the way to target, thereby giving ZANLA all the time in the world to vacate their bases. It was clear therefore that the ground force had to go in by air and be recovered the same way.

  Our total airlift capacity was very small, which meant that very few troops would be taking on overwhelming enemy numbers, particularly at Chimoio. Only total surprise could turn ZANLA’s numerical advantage to SAS and RLI favour, providing ongoing close-air support was available.

  The general military principle of attacking an enemy with a force three times larger was a pipe dream. Even if every soldier in Rhodesia was made available, this could not be achieved. It had to be accepted that, at Chimoio, the troops would be outnumbered by at least fifty to one but OC SAS was not put off by these impossible odds, providing total surprise could be achieved.

  Any idea of aircraft returning to Rhodesia for second-wave troops was discounted since this would take too long to have any meaningful effect on the ground in the critical first hour of fighting. In any case the trooper helicopters would first have to refuel inside Mozambique as soon as they had deposited the first wave of troops, thereby adding to the delay in getting back to Rhodesia for a second lift. If such troops were used it would also multiply post-operation recovery difficulties.

  To meet all requirements in what would surely be a full day of fighting, fuel and ammunition reserves would have to be available close to the battle sites at Chimoio and Tembue. Norman named these positions ‘admin bases’ into which a small force of protection troops, with all fuel and reserve ammunition, would have to be delivered by parachute at the same time that troops were landing in the target areas. No such luxury as a medical team could be considered. An Air Force officer would have to be at the Admin Base to co-ordinate all activities in and out of there.

  There was no way of pre-judging the level or consequence of aircraft and troop losses that might occur in each battle or, heaven forbid, if an admin base was overrun. To cater for such unforeseen situations, and because every participating soldier would have to be airlifted back to Rhodesia, it was essential to retain a sizeable reserve of trooper helicopters as close to the action as safely possible. There were only thirty-two helicopters available. One would have to be specially prepared as a command helicopter with every radio frequency needed to control both air and ground actions. Another would be dedicated to the Admin Base commander, who would also carry all radio spares.

  This left thirty helicopters; ten would carry troops to target, ten would take offensive action as K-Cars and the remaining ten would be held in reserve with back-up spares. The reserve helicopters would participate in the recovery of troops at the conclusion of operations.

  Six Dakotas were available to deliver 145 SAS and RLI paratroopers, and another forty RLI could be carried to target in the ten trooper helicopters. Assuming that at least 1,000 ZANLA had been neutralised during the opening air strikes, just 185 men on the ground would face at least 10,000 armed ZANLA at Chimoio. Although assigned to their own specific targets, the ten K-Cars, carrying double loads of 20mm ammunition, could be called upon to assist troops where necessary. A civilian DC7 aircraft, flown by its owner Captain Jack Malloch, was made available to parachute-in the admin area protection troops, ammunition and fuel.

  Norman Walsh planned to fly the command helicopter himself to control all air activity. Sitting with him would be Brian Robinson as overall commander of ground forces. Their helicopter would give them freedom to move about the target area to direct the ground battle or stand off if anti-air action made this impossible.

  A specially equipped Dakota carrying General Peter Walls, Peter McLurg and a small staff would cruise around a
t height near the border to keep in touch with the command helicopter and provide immediate communications with COMOPS, Thornhill, New Sarum and the reserve helicopters.

  Following their opening strikes, all jets would rush home to rearm and remain at immediate airborne or ground readiness to take on difficult enemy positions as they arose. This might include FRELIMO forces with tanks, should they choose to become involved.

  Put very simply—that was the plan.

  Op Dingo briefing

  OPERATION DINGO WAS THE CODENAME given to the attacks on Chimoio and Tembue. Phase One was to be the attack against Chimoio on 23 November 1977. On completion, all helicopters were to move to Mtoko with their contingent of troops and the paratrooper element was to position at New Sarum preparatory to launching the long-range Phase Two attack against Tembue on 25 November.

  I knew everything concerning Norman’s airstrike plans because he had involved me in formulating them; but that was all I knew. He had not mentioned the use of ground forces until, at short notice, I learned that I was to be the Admin Base commander for both operations and was to attend a two-phase briefing at New Sarum on Tuesday 22 November. The reason Norman Walsh selected me for the Admin Base task was to give me opportunity to inspect the areas of jet-strikes so that I could analyse the effectiveness of our locally made weapons in live target situations.

  One of 3 Squadron’s hangars had been cleared and grandstands from the station sports field had been erected around a large-scale model of Chimoio Base. Present for the briefing were all the service commanders, senior staff officers from COMOPS and all active participants from the Air Force and Army. I remember the noise and excitement levels being incredible. Absolute silence fell when Captain Scotty McCormack of the SAS took centre stage to commence his target intelligence briefing on Chimoio. Having done this so many times for COMOPS, Scotty needed no notes for his excellent, smooth-flowing presentation. Much of what he had to say was new to me, even though I had known about Chimoio for months.

  To assist in the briefing and to facilitate easy target identification during the operation itself, a single photograph of the entire Chimoio complex of camps was handed to every participant. This photograph incorporated grid lines bearing alphabetic letters for the vertical lines and numerical numbering for the lateral ones. The same grid was overlaid on the target model.

  Norman Walsh followed Scotty and commenced the air briefing by saying H-hour for Chimoio was 23:07:45 Bravo. He then outlined the operational sequence with specific timings before giving a detailed briefing to each participating squadron.

  He revealed that he had arranged for a DC8 jet-liner to over-fly Chimoio at H-hour minus ten minutes in the hopes that this would have every CT diving for cover. He expected that, by the time the lead Hunter struck, ZANLA CTs would have realised that they had over-reacted to a passing civilian airliner and would be mustering for the regular 08:00 parade.

  Using a long pointer and giving grid references directly from the target model, Norman indicated old farm buildings on the western side of the main concentration of camps. These were the headquarters and living quarters of ZANLA’s top commanders, Josiah Tongogara and Rex Nhongo. The first pair of Hunters, delivering Golf bombs against these HQ buildings, would initiate the air action spot on H-hour. Their Golf bomb detonations would act as confirming markers for a formation of four Canberras closing in from the west at low level to strike twenty seconds later. Smoke and dust from the Golf bombs would assist the lead bomber to ensure that the formation was correctly aligned with its targets commencing from the western edge of the HQ complex and stretching eastward.

  Front-gun, Frantan and rocket attacks by Hunters and Vampires would follow the Canberras, striking against targets Norman indicated in sequence of attacks. At this time, the Dakotas would already be making their final run, three down the western flank of the main concentration of camps and three along the southern flank to drop the assaulting SAS and RLI paratrooper force in a single pass at H-hour plus two minutes.

  Because of the noise factor, particularly over the flat terrain around Chimoio, the helicopters would be coming in well behind the quiet Dakotas. This meant that the paratroopers would already be on the ground before the command helicopter and K-Cars reached them at H-hour plus seven minutes. However, Hunter and Vampire strikes would still be in progress for much of this intervening time. Flying on the north side of the K-Cars would be ten trooper helicopters to place RLI in a stop-line along the north side of Chimoio Base.

  With troops north, west and south of the primary targets, four K-Cars were assigned to ‘close the gap’ by operating along a line across open fields commencing at camps in the southeast all the way up to the left flank of the RLI stop-line. The other six K-Cars would take on satellite camps lying west of the main target and to the rear of the assault troops.

  A single helicopter assigned to the Admin Base, carrying spare radios and me, was to break away from the trooper helicopters and land in the assigned Admin Base area. My first job was to direct the DC7 for its deliveries of the Admin Base protection troops, fuel and ammunition. Thereafter I had to oversee all activity including refuelling, repairs and casevacs for helicopters moving to and from the target that was a little under ten kilometres away.

  The command Dakota carrying General Walls and his staff had all the equipment needed to communicate with the command helicopter on VHF and COMOPS via HF and teleprinters. This aircraft was to rove at height, up and down the Rhodesian border. Peter McLurg would provide the link through which Norman could bring in reserve helicopters waiting at Lake Alexander or jets from New Sarum and Thornhill.

  To keep security as tight as possible, helicopters positioning at Lake Alexander, which lay twenty-five kilometres north of Umtali, were to fly from New Sarum and Grand Reef during the early hours, refuel and be ready for lift-off by no later than H-hour minus 90 minutes. Lift-off from Lake Alexander would be at H-hour minus one hour five minutes. Norman then gave details of how the DC7, Dakotas and jet aircraft were to launch from New Sarum and jets from Thornhill. Included were details of the ten reserve helicopters that would move from Grand Reef to Lake Alexander once the main force was clear.

  Recovery of everyone back to Grand Reef, except for an SAS stay-behind force of ninety-seven men, had to be completed before nightfall. For this, all helicopters from the reserve pool at Lake Alexander would be called forward to assist the GCars and K-Cars already in the op area.

  To be recovered were forty-eight RLI assault troops with parachutes, forty RLI troops of the northern stop-line, the admin area protection troops with parachutes, me and as many cargo parachutes as possible. No fuel drums, whether full or empty, would be recovered or destroyed.

  The SAS stay-behind troops remaining in the target overnight were to be uplifted early next morning. Details for this recovery would be given at a separate briefing at Grand Reef. Norman concluded his briefing with details on VHF channels along with general and emergency procedures.

  As commander of ground forces, Major Brian Robinson made his briefing in his usual crisp, clear manner aided by the target model, many charts and signals network diagrams. His in-depth briefing on all troop movements, all cross-referenced to Norman’s briefing, completed the entire operational presentation. An operational order issued with maps and target photos assisted operators to follow the briefings and fully comprehend their tasks.

  When these presentations ended and all questions had been answered, there was a noisy tea break in the Parachute Training School hangar before everyone reassembled for the briefing on Tembue. The venue and set-up for this briefing remained the same as for Chimoio, except that the centrepiece was now the Tembue target model, suitably marked with the same grid markings that appeared on photographs of the target.

  The briefing followed the same format as for Chimoio but only took half as long to complete because radio networks and basic procedures remained unaltered. On completion, General Walls gave a short address before everyone rushed
off to prepare for an early-morning start.

  Chimoio attack

  FLIGHT LIEUTENANT BILL SYKES WAS assigned to take me to the Admin Base. Our helicopter, together with twenty-one others, lifted from the 7 Squadron helicopter pad and headed for Lake Alexander. Different routes were used so as not to draw attention to unusually large numbers of helicopters heading for a single destination on the eastern border. The remaining ten helicopters were to move up later from Grand Reef.

  Rough ground sloping up from Lake Alexander rose to a foresters’ road running parallel to and some 300 metres on the south side of the water’s edge. Full fuel drums had been laid out along this road during the night. This was not an ideal site because the helicopters were stretched out in a long line which necessitated quite a long walk for some crews to attend a final briefing which ended just as trucks rolled in with forty RLI soldiers.

  OC 7 Squadron, Squadron Leader Harold Griffiths, who had to lead the formation of twenty-two helicopters, showed some concern because the weather was not as clear as had been forecast. Lake Alexander lay in high ground on the lee side of the higher range of mountains that formed the border between Rhodesia and the low ground of Mozambique. A moist air mass flowing from Mozambique was being forced to rise over the mountains, creating a continuous line of cumulus cloud whose base was at ground level along the borderline itself. Mountain-flying experience had shown that it was usually possible to remain visual under such cloud formation by following steep-sided river valleys and Griff had selected such a valley to break through into Mozambique.

  When the time came to move, Griff led the way, heading for the valley but found his way blocked and had to turn about. Helicopters flying the loop caused by this diversion presented an impressive sight but timing was such a critical issue that the delay immediately became cause for concern. Fortunately, when he was heading north for a second valley, Griff spotted Mozambican ground to his right under a very small lift in the cloud base. This allowed all the helicopters to pass through before dense cloud reformed at ground level behind the last helicopter. All helicopters then descended to the low ground, initially over abandoned Portuguese farmlands for the run to target. With helicopters all around and flying low over exquisite countryside, it was hard to fully comprehend the fact that we were on a deadly mission with all hell about to break loose. Halfway to target I was surprised to see the DC7 cruise past on our port side looking quite splendid against the African backdrop. Almost immediately it turned to commence continuous orbits to stay behind the formation of helicopters.