Winds of Destruction

by Peter John Hornby Petter-Bowyer

  Why these vital changes in plan had failed to pass from Air HQ (the tasking agency in all air matters) to the Canberra boys I cannot say. They got airborne on the night of 10 April and, working to their original Air Task, proceeded to target fully expecting Schulie to ignite the outer flare at 19:00.

  Ted Brent received no response to his calls to Schulie and no ignition of the inner flare occurred when he transmitted the RAMS coded signal. Though agitated by this turn of events, Ted could not avoid taking his formation directly over the target and drawing heavy fire from Mulungushi’s AA guns. He was blissfully unaware of Schulie’s close-in recce as he brought the formation around for the run onto a target whose specific location was readily identifiable from the source of tracer streams that continued to rake the sky.

  Mulungushi barrack lines top left. ZIPRA HQ, stores and senior accommodation lie either side of the small sports field – bottom right. X marks, so far as I can recall, are positions of Russian tanks.

  On the ground close to target, Schulie and his mate experienced a mixture of angry disbelief and fear when the changing position of the Canberras sound made it obvious that the jets were coming around again for a visual strike. All they could do was lie flat and pray until bomblets passed over them and detonated too close for comfort. ZIPRA on the other hand had been given so much warning that the casualties they sustained that night were low. According to intercepted Zambian radio traffic, only three ZIPRA were killed and twenty were wounded.

  The Canberras returned to the same target at 08:30 the next day in hopes that senior ZIPRA officers would be doing their usual thing of visiting the base following a night attack. As it turned out this did not happen because, unbeknown to COMOPS at the time, all the CT brass was tied up in some special meeting in the Mulungushi Hall at Lusaka’s International Conference Centre.

  That same afternoon at 17:30, Canberras and Hunters struck a ZIPRA training base known as Shilende Camp. After this attack, a Zambian Army unit’s communiqué to Army HQ in Lusaka reported having found 134 ZIPRA dead and over 200 wounded. Two days later, 13 April 1979, Nkomo was reported to be home for the night and the SAS assassination team was unleashed from its waiting position on the waters of Lake Kariba.

  As usual during all our special ops, Brian Robinson and I remained in COMOPS with the duty staff through the whole night. We sat chatting and drank endless cups of coffee whilst awaiting codewords relayed from Lieutenant-Colonel Garth Barrett (SAS had changed from ‘squadron’ to ‘regiment’, hence the OC’s rank). Garth was with Wing Commander Peter McLurg in the Command Dak flying over uninhabited ground inside Zambia. The codewords would let us know the progress of the vehicle-borne force during its route to Lusaka and back.

  Apart from the Command Dakota, there was nothing the Air Force could do to assist the SAS during the night. Nevertheless, Hunters at Thornhill and helicopters at Kariba would be waiting at immediate readiness before dawn in case the SAS had need of them. Two of the Hunters were armed with Sidewinder missiles to take on Zambian Air Force fighters posing any threat during the SAS exfiltration phase.

  Because SAS had chosen to conduct a vehicle-borne operation using their own specialist Sabre Land Rovers, it gave opportunity to increase the force level and objectives for the foray into Lusaka where a number of worthwhile ZIPRA targets existed.

  Serious consideration was given to including a team to release the Selous Scouts agent from Lusaka Prison; but this highly emotive issue, was dropped for two reasons. Firstly, if the rescue attempt failed and Zambians were killed—a real possibility—the agent would be identified for what he was and he would be left to pay a horrible price. Secondly, it would divert effort away from our main objective, which was to counter ZIPRA’s invasion plans.

  Final selection was made for two additional targets. One was Zambia’s National Stores in which ZIPRA had amassed large quantities of war matériel alongside that of the Zambian Army. The second was Liberation Centre, the joint HQ for co-operative planning by senior officers of ZIPRA, South African ANC and SWAPO (South West African Peoples Organisation).

  With the advent of landmines, SAS specialist Sabres (modified long-wheel-base, four-wheel-drive Land Rovers) had been withdrawn from active service—but they were just the vehicles for this operation. Seven Sabres and the three assault teams were waiting on the vehicle transport vessel Sea Lion. Then the signal came through to move from their starting point out on Kariba Dam’s deep waters where they had been waiting well away from prying eyes.

  The force made an uneventful landing on the Zambian shore just before darkness fell and set off through rough country on an old disused road. Numerous difficulties were encountered in navigating at night along this indistinct track. Negotiating muddy rivulets with steep approaches made the going tough. One of these muddy ravines caused the loss of one vehicle through engine failure. The consequence of this was that critical equipment on the stricken Sabre forced National Stores to be dropped from the target list.

  Because of its difficulties, the convoy was running late when it turned onto the main tar road to Kafue Bridge and Lusaka. The bridge was considered to be the greatest threat point of the entire mission. But, as it happened, the large Zambian Army protection force that was expected to be there simply did not exist, much to the relief of all concerned, and the convoy continued on to Lusaka without incident.

  Whereas the attack on Nkomo’s home was scheduled for 02:00 it went in almost one hour late. Odd hiccups occurred in breaking through Nkomo’s elaborate security ring but these made no difference to the ultimate outcome. Following the elimination of moderate resistance by ZIPRA security guards and the destruction of the house, a thorough search failed to find the unmistakable fat body of Joshua Nkomo.

  Considering the efficiency and completeness of the attack, there was great disappointment, even anger, for the SAS operators and the staff at COMOPS. But it was clear to us in COMOPS that Nkomo had been tipped off. The big question was, ‘by whom?’. This issue will be dealt with later. But one thing needs to be said for the benefit of many people who believe that Ken Flower, Director of Central Intelligence, was the mole who gave early warning to Britain and CT leaders. In the case of Nkomo this was not possible. He was in COMOPS the whole time from launch to return of the SAS group. At no stage did he use a telephone of any signalling equipment. I have to say that I have always considered Ken’s number two in CIO to be the more likely culprit.

  Not far away the team assigned to Liberation Centre put in its attack the moment they heard firing from Nkomo’s house. Having completed their noisy work and set explosive charges to blow Liberation Centre’s offices, armoury and many vehicles sky high, the team was preparing to depart when a ZIPRA vehicle came charging towards the SAS men. The vehicle was hit by a hail of bullets but careened on down the street and away into the night. The SAS did not know it at the time but they had come very close to killing ZIPRA’s second commander, Lookout Masuku. I will give Masuku’s account of this incident later.

  The two task teams then linked up and the convoy travelled back to the rough bush track without incident. Behind them the President of Zambia was red-faced over such a commotion in peaceful Lusaka because it had disturbed the sleep of 300 guests engaged in the OAU Conference he was hosting.

  Long after sunrise, the mission commander called for a helicopter to collect three soldiers who had been wounded during the attack on Nkomo’s house. This was to save them the agony of a very bumpy ride down the final tortuous stretch of track to the lake. By midday, the force was back on Sea Lion and the exhausted expedition commander was debriefing us in the COMOPS Op Room by mid-afternoon.

  Nkomo’s house, after the attack.

  Joshua Nkomo.

  The next day I was surprised to find General Walls, Air Marshal McLaren and Brian Robinson laughing their heads off in the passageway next to Mick’s office. I took this to be normal because Brian was usually very humorous. He saw me and beckoned me to come over to share the joke. No wonder t
here was such mirth. Brian had brought the news that Nkomo had told reporters he had been at home when the SAS attacked but managed to escape through his toilet window. Anyone hearing or reading this had to be amused by the thought of the enormously fat Nkomo going through an incredibly small window—but the same picture painted in Brian’s words caused us long-forgotten laughter pains.

  Kazungula ferry

  AT THE SAME TIME THAT the SAS force was moving towards Lusaka, a smaller SAS team was engaged in another clandestine operation. This was at the point where the borders of Rhodesia, Zambia and Botswana meet at Kazungula. The target was the Kazungula ferry owned by Zambia and serving as a vital road link to Botswana across the Zambezi River. For Zambia, it was one of only two active links to Botswana and South Africa, the other being the Victoria Falls rail and road bridge.

  Despite Rhodesia’s repeated warnings to both Botswana and Zambia not to allow the ferry to be used for any activity aimed against Rhodesia, ZIPRA was known to be using it freely. Whereas neither Botswana nor Zambia openly sanctioned ZIPRA’s use of the ferry (in fact these two countries forbade it) there was clear proof that ZIPRA was employing clandestine methods to move large amounts of men and equipment into Botswana via Kazungula.

  Sneaking men and matériel onto the ferry for the easy road route to Francistown was a much quicker and safer option than walking the long, slow and dangerous overland routes through northern Matabeleland. From Francistown it was a simple enough matter to move to any location in Botswana to launch small forces across the ill-defined border with Rhodesia. JOC Tangent in Bulawayo had repeatedly urged COMOPS to take any action that would put an end to this state of affairs.

  COMOPS had been giving consideration to destroying the Kazungula ferry long before Ian Smith warned neighbouring countries, following the Viscount disaster, that they must face the consequences of supporting ZIPRA and ZANLA. In fact a Danish airline that had been flying ZAPU recruits from Botswana to Zambia took the Rhodesian threat to intercept and shoot down its aircraft seriously. The flights ceased immediately; but the ferry remained available.

  Whereas it had been considered a simple enough task for SAS specialists to destroy the ferry, the economic consequences of disrupting the route had been assessed as too damaging to South Africa, Botswana, Malawi and Zaire. This all changed when ZIPRA shot down the second Viscount and its invasion plans had become known.

  The SAS team moved to the border fence with Botswana after dark. Part of the force eased its way to the ferry’s landing point on the Botswanan shore where it submerged a large explosive charge directly under the position the ferry would dock. The charge was then rigged for a command detonation by radio when the ferry was docked above it.

  Well before sunrise on 13 April 1979, all members of the team were hiding next to the border fence inside Rhodesia to wait for the critical moment. Flying out of hearing distance, a Lynx stood by as back-up to the ground party, just in case the ground party’s radio transmission failed to activate the explosive charge. For technical reasons the ferry did not cross the river at its scheduled time of 08:00. It remained on the Zambian bank of the Zambezi for another two agonising hours before setting off for the Botswanan bank where many vehicles and people awaited its arrival.

  Considering that there were people to be dropped off on the south bank and others waiting to get onto the ferry, the SAS had a very small time-window in which to blow the ferry when it was empty. This they achieved with a perfectly timed vertical thrust that broke the huge ferry in two.

  It was only when the Selous Scouts objected strongly to COMOPS for having destroyed the ferry that I learned how important it had been to undercover agents moving to and from Zambia. Obviously General Walls and others knew this, but ZIPRA’s invasion plans took priority and the ‘need to know’ principle had been strictly applied.

  This eventful week rounded off on 21 April when the country went to the polls to vote for its first black government. For some reason, Josiah Tongogara had instructed ZANLA not to interfere with voters and, for the most part, his instruction was heeded. ZIPRA tried to interfere but with limited success and an amazing turnout of 63% of voters occurred. Six weeks later Bishop Abel Muzorewa became the first black prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

  Cheetahs

  AIR COMMODORE NORMAN WALSH HAD made a secret visit to the Middle East, probably in late 1978, to arrange for the purchase of second-hand Bell 205 helicopters. This helicopter had given excellent service to the Americans in Vietnam where it was known as the ‘Huey’.

  Seven of these machines arrived at New Sarum in a somewhat dilapidated state. However, our ever-brilliant technical staff stripped the machines completely, removing many kilograms of sand in the process, and in no time had them spick and span and performing well. This was a particularly noteworthy achievement considering that Warrant Officer Johnny Green and his team had no technical manuals from which to work.

  Air HQ gave the Bell 205 helicopter the name ‘Cheetah’ and all seven aircraft passed to No 8 Squadron. Although the Cheetahs were sometimes used on Fireforce work, in which they could carry two Alouettes-worth of troops, they became almost exclusively earmarked to support increasing levels of external operations.

  Opportunity was taken during the earliest Cheetah test fights to conduct para-trooping trials. Though these were entirely successful, Dakotas continued to be a more cost-effective method of deploying paratroopers on over-border tasks.

  Uncomfortable times in COMOPS

  FOR SOME TIME IT HAD been clear that ZAPU and ZANU were receiving forewarning of some of our cross-border operations. It was also clear that the warnings were being given very close to the times of attack. Nkomo’s absence from his home was the last straw. We later learned that the warning had reached him from someone in CIO at about the time the attack force was crossing the Kafue Bridge. Nkomo apparently called for a doubling of the guard before he and his wife moved away to the safety of President Kaunda’s State House. He seemed untroubled by leaving his staff to a fate he failed to warn them about.

  Probably prompted by Ron Reid-Daly’s opinions, General Walls made it known that he suspected there was a mole in COMOPS. We were all stunned by this accusation, each considering it a personal affront. The entire staff became very angry that such an opinion existed, never mind that it had been aired in an unnecessarily brazen manner. This occurred immediately after Brigadier Peter Rich was posted in to replace General Barnard as Director General Operations. In discussions with Peter Rich, the COMOPS staff suggested that he should ask General Walls to exclude anyone but COMOPS and the operators from any knowledge of the timings of impending externals. General Walls accepted the idea.

  Although CIO and appropriate agencies were always kept in the picture on what was being planned, selected operations were launched earlier than these agencies expected. Every time this was done, we gained maximum surprise because no forewarning to the enemy had been possible via the unknown mole; and General Walls’ trust in his staff was restored.

  Unrelated to the mole issue, COMOPS had acquired such a bad reputation amongst Army officers that this made being a member of COMOPS staff distinctly uncomfortable. However with Brigadier Peter Rich as DG OPS, the situation soon changed because COMOPS directives, instructions and queries were all processed through the correct military HQ channels. By mid-year many old tensions had fallen away and co-operation improved noticeably.

  When I first joined COMOPS, General Barnard had made some snide remarks about the Air Force taking time off work to suit themselves whilst the Army slogged on. Initially I was perplexed because this could not possibly apply to Norman Walsh, Griff, Dag, Terence or me who regularly worked long hours, seven days a week. Then it dawned on me that his remarks had been aimed at Mick McLaren who played golf every Wednesday afternoon.

  Mick McLaren seemed to me to have become a very secluded man who worked quietly in his office on specific tasks and only appeared amongst the planning staff for special operations’ br
iefings. He attended all the NATJOC meetings chaired by General Walls where he showed irritation over general ramblings and recurring deferrals on matters that needed urgent resolution.

  Just before lunch one Wednesday, I was alone with the air marshal in his office when he told me that Wednesday afternoon golf was essential to keep him sane in a job where, in spite of his position as Deputy Commander of COMOPS, he was neither fish nor fowl. He lacked the authority and job satisfaction that he had enjoyed as Air Force Commander.

  It was obvious to COMOPS staff that Mick’s disposition has changed radically and his frustration ceased whenever, in the absence of General Walls, he was in charge. On these occasions he played no golf and was to be seen everywhere in COMOPS. His style of dealing with staff was friendly but forceful, and his chairing of NAT JOC meetings was completely opposite to that of General Walls.

  Invariably Mick was faced with long lists of matters that had been repeatedly deferred; a situation he could not abide. I attended a few of his NATJOC meetings to give briefings on various matters and witnessed the marked difference in atmosphere to meetings chaired by General Walls. In his strong South African accent, Mick opened one meeting by pointing out that the only establishment represented at NATJOC with no outstanding items was the Air Force. He insisted that this had to be equalled by all establishments before the next meeting.