Winds of Destruction

by Peter John Hornby Petter-Bowyer

  Following the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement in London by Muzorewa, Mugabe, Nkomo and Lord Carrington, the ceasefire came into effect at midnight on 23 December. The next morning, the first of the ZANLA and ZIPRA men trickled into the Assembly Points that had been made ready by CMF teams during the preceding two weeks.

  Even before this I had been in daily contact with ZIPRA and ZANLA commanders and their staffs who were billeted in the Audio-Visual Centre of the University of Rhodesia. From day one I found it easy to communicate with ZIPRA’s Lookout Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa. Both smiled easily and acted in a friendly manner. Their ZIPRA staff members were smart, efficient and courteous. Being the commander of ZIPRA, Masuku dressed in camouflage uniform and wore a Russian officer’s peak cap with no badge or emblem on its red band. Dabengwa wore smart-casual civilian dress.

  ZANLA was very different. It took ages before Rex Nhongo and Josiah Tungamirai opened up to any degree, possibly because they suffered major daily hangovers from heavy drinking. From the moment of our first meeting, Rex pressurised me to arrange for the return of his Toyota Land Cruiser taken by Selous Scouts at New Chimoio. The uniformed ZANLA commanders and men were surly and slovenly. Visits to ZANLA at the Audio-Visual Centre were initially made uncomfortable by particularly mean-looking individuals who delighted in cocking their AK-47 rifles as I passed. Once he got to know me better and having been promised the return of his Land Cruiser, Rex Nhongo put an end to this nonsense.

  Josiah Tongogara.

  On Christmas Day we received news that ZANLA’s top commander, Josiah Tongogara, had been killed in a vehicle accident in Mozambique. He was due to arrive in Rhodesia a few days later, having completed his briefing of all ZANLA forces still in Mozambique. At the time I was unaffected by this news because I thought Tongogara would be no easier to deal with than Nhongo and Tungamirai. I now know I was wrong to think that way.

  Rex Nhongo and Josiah Tungamirai seemed unmoved by the loss of their commander whereas ZIPRA’s hierarchy was visibly shaken and depressed by the news of Tongogara’s death. Masuku told me angrily that this had been no accident—it was nothing more than a deliberate assassination of a powerful military leader by radical members of ZANU’s political wing. Explanation for this was to come later but some time passed before a highly qualified mortician from Doves Morgan Funeral Services in Salisbury was sent to Maputo to view Tongogara’s body. Having done this, Ken Stokes concluded that Tongogara had died as the result of a vehicle accident and that no foul play was involved. You will see shortly why ZIPRA agreed with the vehicle accident aspect, but not with the ‘no foul play’ conclusion.

  Meetings of the Ceasefire Committee were held every Monday and Thursday in a small natty conference room in an outbuilding in the lovely gardens of Government House. General Acland sat at the head of the long table with Brigadier Gurdon at the other end. General Barnard and I were on one side of the table with General Barnard closest to General Acland. ZIPRA and ZANLA sat opposite us. ZANLA’s Rex Nhongo sat closest to General Acland with Tungamirai next to him. Then came Lookout Masuku with Dabengwa sitting nearest to Brigadier Gurdon.

  In this photograph taken at the start of a Ceasefire Committee meeting, Dumiso Dabengwa (left) and Rex Nhongo decided to pose as heads of their military wings whilst Lookout Masuku and Josiah Tungamirai watched from behind the camera. Next are the British Army officers, Brigadier Gurdon and General Acland. Rhodesians are General Barnard and Group Captain PB. The man in the background (left) is Lieutenant-Colonel Parker-Bowles.

  To begin with no staff accompanied General Barnard and me, whereas ZIPRA and ZANLA always had six or more seated and standing behind them. Later we had one intelligence officer and a very good-looking female secretary, Miss Gardener, sitting behind us to record proceedings.

  General John Acland conferred the title ‘general’ on each of the ‘guerrilla’ commanders in an obvious endeavour to give them equal status with himself and General Bert Barnard. In these circumstances I was the most junior man on the committee yet, almost from the start, I became aware of the fact that both ZIPRA and ZANLA looked me in the eye when making any contentious statement or responding to any query concerning cease-fire violations. I found this distinctly uncomfortable as any question from, say, General Acland, would be answered directly at me. Explanation for this took some time in coming.

  Most ceasefire infringements were levelled against ZANLA because, from the very beginning, it was obvious that ZANLA had kept the majority of its forces in the field and sent thousands of mujibas to the Assembly Points under control of a handful of genuine ZANLA juniors. ZANLA managed to fool the British who were only interested in the ‘number of ZANLA soldiers’ inside the APs. However, this situation incensed General Walls and the National JOC, the only Zimbabwe- Rhodesian authority able to challenge the Brits to hold to the rules set out in the Lancaster House Agreement.

  Most ceasefire violations resulted from election campaigning rifts between ZANLA and the Pfumo re Vanhu auxiliaries of Muzorewa and Sitole, whereas a few were undoubtedly generated by Selous Scouts who had kept some men in the field to monitor the extent of ZANLA violations. In the three months preceding elections, only a handful of problems were raised by or against ZIPRA whose forces within the country had moved into the Assembly Points in accordance with the London agreement. We knew however that over 10,000 ZIPRA men had remained in Zambia.

  ZANLA, on the other hand, had withheld some 17,000 men in Mozambique and used the forces in the country to force a Mugabe victory at the polls through viciously applied intimidation on the civilian population together with selective murder. Their line was, “ZANU started the war and only Mugabe can stop it. If Mugabe does not win the elections, the war continues and you will pay for it with your lives”. This was an impelling reason to vote for Mugabe. It was also precisely what we expected from him having known from the start that he would flout any agreement, particularly with Britain.

  Although this was in direct contravention of the London agreement, and in spite of overwhelming evidence to prove it, Lord Soames refused to rule against ZANU’s participation in the elections. Unfortunately General Walls, being a military man, seemed out of his depth in dealing with Soames and a Conservative Government that continued to rely on the manipulations and lies engineered by the British Foreign Office.

  Meeting after meeting Rex Nhongo and Josiah Tungamirai whispered to each other in their Shona vernacular. Most of the whispered communications held up proceedings whilst they conspired to find a way out of every accusation levelled at ZANLA and to conjure up counter-accusations. Both ZANLA men seemed particularly concerned not to be overheard by ZIPRA who would understand what was being said, but they were quite unconcerned about the four whites who they were quite certain could not understand their language. They were wrong! I understood all I heard.

  Some time in late February or early March, I foolishly let loose on Rex Nhongo in his own tongue challenging his past and present whispered lies. This had an electrifying effect on the meeting and obviously tickled the ZIPRA commanders who did nothing to suppress their mirth. Thereafter the whispering ceased, but I continued to be the one to whom every difficult communication was directed.

  The general elections were due to take place over three days commencing 27 March. Thereafter the new government would rely on the military to oversee the integration of all armed forces. It was obvious to me that my liaison tasks between our past enemies and COMOPS could not adequately prepare the ground for such a complex process. I conveyed this opinion to General Walls and suggested that a joint headquarters be established to prepare for integration and the calling-in of arms and equipment. It was a relief to learn that he recognised this need and had already earmarked a recently built wing at Army HQ for the purpose, though the move would not take place until the election results were known.

  Dinner with ZIPRA

  ZIPRA COMMANDERS TOLD ME THEY had no difficulty in opening up to any Rhodesian but they strongly distr
usted ZANLA and the Brits. Both Masuku and Dabengwa said they could not talk to me freely at the Audio-Visual Centre or in the grounds of Government House—the only places we met. So, when I suggested they come to my home for dinner, they immediately agreed. The reason I did not offer dinner at a hotel or restaurant was that I had no funds to meet expenses that I could better afford at my own table.

  The look on Beryl’s face when I told her that the ZIPRA commanders were coming to dinner was one of utter disbelief. When Beryl relayed the news to our Shona housekeepercook Sarah, her eyes widened in horror whereas our N’debele gardener Obert was delighted. Sarah’s fears were calmed and she was asked to provide a three-course meal, including roast beef and Yorkshire pudding, just as she would do for any of our regular friends.

  Accompanying Lookout was his wife Gift and Dumiso came alone. Beryl drank brandy and ginger ale and I had beer even though the three visitors asked for cool drinks. Before and during dinner, Debbie and Paul were with us and the general conversation was very easy-going. The visitors were at pains to greet Sarah and later praise her for an excellent meal.

  Throughout the evening it was very noticeable that Gift kept her right hand covered with the shawl she was wearing, even when eating. After dinner the children had gone off to their rooms when Beryl asked Gift how she felt about being with us. Following a moment of hesitation, Lookout suddenly uncovered Gift’s hand and placed his palm directly on hers. “Look we are whole,” he said raising they hands, “Five fingers.” We knew Lookout had a finger missing on his left hand, but had not realised that Gift hid her hand to cover the loss of a thumb. By showing that her missing thumb and his missing finger were obscured by the presence of the other’s hand, Lookout was handling Gift’s hesitation and expressing in this strange way that all was well. He then told us how he and Gift had lost their digits.

  When he heard explosions during the SAS attack on Nkomo’s home in Lusaka, Lookout awakened his sleeping wife and two children, got them into his car and rushed off to a safe house with his bodyguard in tow. He made the mistake of routing via Liberation Centre just as the SAS force was withdrawing from it. Having driven through a blinding hail of gunfire, Lookout pressed on to a friend’s house close by and only just reached there when his damaged engine seized. The bodyguard was dead, Gift and both children were severely wounded and Lookout had also been hit. The whole family was flown to Moscow where they recovered to health after many weeks of medical attention. The only externally visible signs of the ordeal were the missing thumb and finger.

  A few days after their first meeting, Beryl bumped into Gift who was very distressed because one of her children, who had survived the shooting, had drowned in a private swimming pool in one of Salisbury’s posh suburbs.

  Dumiso carried on with the subject of Nkomo’s house attack to tell how Joshua and his wife left home in a hurry for Kaunda’s palace immediately upon receiving a late-night warning of the impending attack. Whilst on the subject, I asked him about the NSO attack. Dumiso confirmed that he and other senior men had kept well clear of the NSO for fear of a Rhodesian attack, which he thought would only take place at night. He had taken up night-time residence with a girlfriend and returned daily to the NSO no later than 06:00. On the day of the attack, he intended to do the same but his girlfriend said she had dreamed of jets attacking at dawn. She insisted he remain at home for at least two hours to relax with a cup of coffee and listen to the radio. Dumiso obliged.

  As it happened, Hunters attacked FC camp at dawn, but Dumiso did not know this at the time. The first he knew of any hostile activity was when he heard explosions and firing at NSO. He claimed that this was not the only occasion that dreams had saved him from RSF attacks.

  I asked Dumiso and Lookout why, when difficult issues were raised during ceasefire meetings they and the ZANLA commanders always addressed me. The answer was surprising. They said ZIPRA’s reason for doing this was identical to ZANLA’s. Both insisted that the Air Force was superior to the Army. They considered themselves to be on an equal footing with the Army because they used similar equipment and fought on their feet. The Air Force was quite different. In their minds it was this complex high-tech force that had been responsible for the devastation visited upon their own forces. Because of this I was held in highest esteem at the Ceasefire Committee meetings.

  Breaking away from the after dinner chat for a moment— Rex Nhongo had much the same to tell me later. But when I challenged him on the issue and said that the RLI had knocked hell out of his forces, he asked, “When did that happen without Air Force direct support and fire power?”

  I tried again. “What about the SAS, they knocked the socks off you guys?” “Yes”, he said, “but they are Air Force troops!” I told him he was wrong. “Rex, SAS are Army troops.” His reply was typical. “Comrade Group Captain PB, the war is over so you do not have to lie to me any more. You know, and I know, that the SAS are Air Force troops. They live over the runway from Air Force, they are always with Air Force, they wear wings and blue belts, their badge has a helicopter rotor blade (in the illustration it can be seen that this is actually a dagger) and, just like the Air Force pilots, they only attacked my men, never civilians.”

  Returning to the afterdinner chat, Dumiso and Lookout happily answered many questions and I answered theirs. They confirmed ZIPRA’s intention to launch an invasion but this was stymied by the destruction of bridges during Op Dice. Worse still, it removed any hope of joining up with the RSF to bring about the destruction of ZANLA.

  They had a lot to say about the efficiency of Rhodesian-made air weapons and told me they had recently learned that I was the prime mover in developing them. Rather than being annoyed by this they were deeply impressed because, like ZANLA, they had previously believed the weapons were South African products.

  We then came to the matter of ZANLA’s Josiah Tongogara. I asked them why they had been so distressed about the news of his death. The story went back a long way to a time before Tongogara and his DARE had been imprisoned following the death of ZANLA’s Operations Chief, Herbert Chitepo. From those early days right through to Lancaster House, ZIPRA had found Tongogara to be open and scrupulously honest. He was the only ZANU or ZANLA man in whom they had implicit trust.

  During the Lancaster House Conference, Josiah Tongogara made telephonic contact with Lookout and Dumiso from his hotel room. Tongogara said there was urgent need for a serious discussion on proposals he wished to place before them. He offered to meet at any place of ZIPRA’s choice. Dumiso and Lookout said they were happy to meet Josiah at his hotel, in his own room.

  On arrival, they found that Tongogara had Josiah Tungamirai with him. They were not at all happy about this knowing that Tungamirai headed ZANLA’s political commissariat, a communist affliction ZIPRA used but which the seniors of ZIPRA could not abide. Anyway Tongogara seemed unperturbed and, working from notes, he got straight down to business.

  He started off by expressing the hope that the conference would succeed because he was not prepared to see a continuation of war and the loss of more young lives simply to satisfy greedy politicians. He said he feared that either Mugabe or Nkomo, possibly both, would walk out of the conference. If this occurred, he for one wished to take matters out of political hands but he needed help to achieve this. If ZIPRA agreed with his wish to withdraw all forces from contact, it would then be essential to get to General Peter Walls before he left London and draw him into also taking joint action. Tongogara then spelled out a plan that was unconditionally accepted by the ZIPRA commanders.

  For me it was really quite incredible to learn that Josiah Tongogara, the man we took to be our radical archenemy, was a man who really sought peace and stability. Recorded here are the points of agreement he made with ZIPRA—as I recall them.

  First was the matter of setting up a military triumvirate of the RSF, ZIPRA and ZANLA, initially in London. Their joint task would be to bring into immediate effect a disconnection of forces. Tongogara had no difficult
y in accepting that General Walls should head the triumvirate whose headquarters would be established in Salisbury and separated from existing RSF establishments. ZIPRA and ZANLA would order all their forces to move into military camps on home soil at locations agreed by General Walls.

  Under direct control of the military triumvirate, a process of weeding-out and disarming undesirables would be implemented. Those who wished to retire or return to their homes would be free to do so. Thereafter integration of the three forces would commence. Since Tongogara believed this would take at least five years to complete, he expected that many more willing volunteers would leave the ranks during this time.

  Sir Humphrey Gibbs.

  The military triumvirate would impose on ‘Zimbabwe’ a 100-seat interim government of national unity represented in equal part by the parties currently headed by Muzorewa, Smith, Nkomo and Mugabe. Overseeing this government would be an ‘Executive Governor’ who Tongogara believed should be Sir Humphrey Gibbs because he was the only person who would be acceptable to all parties, including the British and African governments.

  Selection of ministers to administer existing civil services was to be established by majority vote for approval by the Governor. Existing RF ministers, if not returned to their positions by popular vote, would be asked to assist new ministers for a period of at least one year.

  A general election would be withheld for five years or be undertaken after the military integration process was complete; whichever was the longer period. No direct British interference or participation would be tolerated. If South Africa objected to the new order, African ports would be used to the mutual benefit of central African states. Mandatory sanctions could be expected to fall away automatically and the South African Government’s stranglehold on the country would no longer be an issue. (I was surprised to learn that Tongogara knew of this.)