Oswald's Tale

by Norman Mailer

  So be it. This is, after all, a book that depends upon the small revelation of separate points of view. We are, in effect, studying an object (to use the KGB’s word for a person under scrutiny) as he tumbles through the prisms of a kaleidoscope. It is as if by such means we hope to penetrate into the psychology of Lee Harvey Oswald.

  Given the variety of interpretations that surround him, he has continued to exist among us as a barely visible protagonist in a set of opposed scenarios that range from Mark Lane’s—ready to open the case—to Gerald Posner’s—eager to close it. We cannot even begin to list the near-to-numberless practitioners of the art of investigative writing who have been fitting Oswald into one or another species of plot.

  Perhaps it would be more felicitous to ask: What kind of man was Oswald? Can we feel compassion for his troubles, or will we end by seeing him as a disgorgement from the errors of the cosmos, a monster?

  In this regard, it may as well be stated here that in the effort to find his kernel of human reality, certain liberties have been taken. Even as one stains a slide in order to separate the features of its contents more clearly, so Oswald’s letters and writings have been corrected here for spelling and punctuation. Oswald was dyslexic, and his orthography is so bad at times that the man is not revealed but concealed—in the worst of his letters he seems stupid and illiterate. Considering that he was still in his very early twenties, it is, however, not wholly inaccurate to speak of him as a young intellectual. In this regard, it may be worth taking a look at the Appendix, pp. i–xiv in the back matter. That he had no extraordinary reach of mind as an intellectual is also apparent, even with corrected orthography, but since we are giving him every benefit in this direction in order better to perceive the workings of his mind, let us also recognize how prodigiously crippling is dyslexia to a man who would have a good polemical style. Indeed, it is as intimately crippling as arthritic fingers on a violinist. (The Appendix to this book also contains a short essay on the disabilities attendant on dyslexia written by Dr. Howard Rome of the Mayo Clinic for the Warren Commission.)

  It may well take the rest of these pages to decide, all the same, whether such a method of approach—to search for the nature of the man before we decide on the plot—is of use for finding out how Kennedy was shot and why. Until then, we will keep asking who was behind it and which conspiracy was operative. It is virtually not assimilable to our reason that a small lonely man felled a giant in the midst of his limousines, his legions, his throng, and his security. If such a non-entity destroyed the leader of the most powerful nation on earth, then a world of disproportion engulfs us, and we live in a universe that is absurd. So the question reduces itself to some degree: If we should decide that Oswald killed Kennedy by himself, let us at least try to comprehend whether he was an assassin with a vision or a killer without one. We must not only look at Oswald from many points of view—first Russian and soon American—but even try to perceive him through bureaucratic lenses. All too often, that is all we will have. Let us recognize, however, that it makes some difference to our commonweal, each and every time, whether an act of murder is visionless and mindless or is a cry of wrath that rises from a skewed heart maddened by its own vision of injustice.

  We have come at least to the philosophical crux of our inquiry: It would state that the sudden death of a man as large in his possibilities as John Fitzgerald Kennedy is more tolerable if we can perceive his killer as tragic rather than absurd.

  That is because absurdity corrodes our species. The mounting ordure of a post-modern media fling (where everything is equal to everything else) is all the ground we need for such an assertion.

  2

  Correspondence

  On February 13, the American Embassy received a letter from Lee Harvey Oswald whose contents would prove startling to both State Department and KGB officials. Postmarked Minsk, February 5, 1961, it had taken eight days to reach Richard Snyder in Moscow.

  While it is all but impossible that Igor and Stepan had not intercepted such a communication from their prize defector in Minsk, they volunteered no information about what had been their reaction. Given, however, what they have imparted about their attitudes governing this case, they must certainly have decided to wait and study further developments.

  But here is Oswald’s letter:

  Dear Sirs:

  . . . I am . . . asking that you consider my request for the return of my American passport.

  I desire to return to the United States, that is if we could come to some agreement concerning the dropping of any legal proceedings against me. If so, then I would be free to ask the Russian authorities to allow me to leave. If I could show them my American passport, I am of the opinion they would give me an exit visa.

  They have at no time insisted that I take Russian citizenship. I am living here with non-permanent type papers for a foreigner.

  I cannot leave Minsk without permission, therefore I am writing rather than calling in person.

  I hope that in recalling the responsibility I have to America that you remember yours in doing everything you can to help me since I am an American citizen.

  Sincerely,

  /s/ Lee Harvey Oswald1

  In response, the American Embassy in Moscow waited until February 28 and then, by air pouch, asked for an Instruction from the Department of State:

  . . . an invitation from the Embassy may facilitate his traveling to Moscow. The Embassy would as a last resort, if the Department found no objection and provided the Embassy were reasonably sure that Oswald had not committed an expatriating action, return his American passport to him by mail for what help this may be in facilitating his application for a Soviet exit visa.

  The Embassy would like to be informed whether Oswald is subject to prosecution on any grounds should he enter the jurisdiction of the United States and, if so, whether there is any objection in communicating this to him.

  For the Ambassador

  Edward L. Freers

  Minister Counselor2

  Richard Snyder followed this with an answer to Oswald on the same day, February 28:

  Dear Mr. Oswald:

  We have received your recent letter concerning your desire to return to the United States . . .

  Inasmuch as the question of your present American citizenship status can be finally determined only on the basis of a personal interview, we suggest that you plan to appear at the Embassy at your convenience. The consular section of the Embassy is open from 9:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. . . . 3

  It is worth including at this point an exchange between Gerald Ford, of the Warren Commission, and Richard Snyder:

  REPRESENTATIVE FORD. [Your answer] took 15 days to get out of the American Embassy.

  MR. SNYDER. You must remember that in my eyes, as the officer on the spot, Mr. Oswald had no claim to prior action from the Embassy among other cases. And although the consular officer attempts to be as impersonal as he can about these things, as a matter of fact it is very difficult to be entirely impersonal.

  Mr. Oswald had no claim to any unusual attentions of mine, I must say.4

  In turn, Oswald seemed in no rush, either. On March 12, only five days before he would first meet Marina at the Trade Union Palace dance, did he reply to Snyder’s letter of February 28, and we can assume from the tone of his answer that he expects the KGB to also be reading what he writes and so is choosing language that will irritate them as little as possible under the circumstances.

  Dear Sirs,

  In reply to your recent letter, I find it inconvenient to come to Moscow for the sole purpose of an interview.

  In my last letter, I believe I stated that I cannot leave the city of Minsk without permission.

  I believe there exists in the United States also a law in regards to resident foreigners from socialist countries traveling between cities.

  I do not think it would be appropriate for me to request to leave Minsk in order to visit the American Embassy. In any event, the granting of permission is
a long drawn-out affair, and I find that there is a hesitation on the part of local officials to even start the process.

  I have no intention of abusing my position here, and I am sure you would not want me to.

  I see no reason for any preliminary inquiries not to be put in the form of a questionnaire and sent to me. I understand that personal interviews undoubtedly make the work of the Embassy staff lighter than written correspondence, however, in some cases, other means must be employed.

  Sincerely,

  Lee Oswald5

  If Oswald’s last paragraph was, at the least, sardonic, Snyder’s reply on March 24 was dry.

  Dear Mr. Oswald:

  . . . As stated in our previous letter, a final determination of your present American citizenship status can only be made on the basis of a personal interview . . .

  We suggest that you inform us in advance of any intention to visit the Embassy so as to be assured of an appointment without delay. You may, however, drop in at any time during normal office hours. You may wish to present this letter to the authorities in Minsk in connection with an application for permission to travel to Moscow . . . 6

  3

  Bureaucratic Soundings

  Now the State Department is having to contend with technical questions. Just what is Oswald’s status? If he has not renounced his citizenship, then what are the circumstances under which his passport is to be returned? Can it be mailed to Minsk? A serious matter. The document could be intercepted and replaced with a counterfeit passport. Certainly, the KGB labs are as well equipped for that as the CIA and FBI labs.

  In any event, State sends an Instruction on March 27 to the American Embassy in Moscow:

  . . . if you are fully satisfied that [Oswald] has not expatriated himself in any manner, you are authorized to amend his United States passport to be valid for his direct return to the United States and effect its delivery to him by mail under proper safeguards.

  The Department is not in a position to advise Mr. Oswald whether upon his desired return to the United States he may be amenable to prosecution for any possible offenses committed in violation of the laws of the United States or the laws of any of its States . . . 1

  Four days later, on March 31, the bureaucratic security of being “not in a position to advise Mr. Oswald” is obliged to encounter a cogent reason why he should be allowed to come back to the United States. A confidential inter-office memo is sent from one State Department official, named Hickey, to another, named White:

  . . . it is believed that whatever risk might be involved in transmitting the passport by mail . . . would be more than offset by the opportunity provided the United States to obtain information from Mr. Oswald concerning his activities in the Soviet Union. For the best interests of the United States, therefore, and as the possession of a passport might facilitate his obtention of an exit visa it is believed that we should do everything within our power to facilitate Oswald’s entry into the United States.2

  This will become a subtext in much of the correspondence to come. Since each side was ideologically buried under large misrepresentations of the other, both sides were starved for a little real knowledge about conditions in the daily existence of their opponent. The State Department will end with a voluminous file of caveats, precedents, loopholes, directives, waivers, and sanctions, but under them all is another theme: Oswald is useful. The intelligence to be gained from him about Soviet life is a factor powerful enough to take him through some bureaucratic locks and gates. Yet, in the interim, what locks, what gates!

  A letter from Oswald dated only “May 1961” arrives at the Embassy on May 25. If it has taken more than a month for him to reply to Snyder, we can remind ourselves that this period all but covers the first month of his marriage to Marina.

  Dear Sirs,

  In regards to your letter of March 24. I understand the reasons for the necessity of a personal interview at the Embassy, however, I wish to make it clear that I am asking not only for the right to return to the United States, but also for full guarantees that I shall not, under any circumstances, be persecuted for any act pertaining to this case. I made that clear in my first letter, although nothing has been said, even vaguely, concerning this in my correspondence with the Embassy. Unless you honestly think that this condition can be met, I see no reason for a continuance of our correspondence. Instead, I shall endeavor to use my relatives in the United States to see about getting something done in Washington.

  As for coming to Moscow, this would have to be on my own initiative and I do not care to take the risk of getting into an awkward situation unless I think it worthwhile. Also, since my last letter I have gotten married.

  My wife is Russian, born in Leningrad, she has no parents living and is quite willing to leave the Soviet Union with me and live in the United States.

  I would not leave here without my wife so arrangements would have to be made for her to leave at the same time as I do . . .

  So with the extra complication I suggest you do some checking up before advising me further.

  I believe I have spoken frankly in this letter. I hope you do the same in your next letter.

  Sincerely Yours,

  Lee Harvey Oswald3

  We know nothing specifically about the State Department’s reaction to this “extra complication,” but we can certainly suppose that they are feeling Oswald’s presence. Another turn of the screw.

  4

  Return to Moscow

  It is becoming obvious, given the slow pace of his correspondence with Snyder and the non-appearance of his passport by mail, that he will probably have to risk an unauthorized trip to Moscow to visit the American Embassy. But what a gamble!

  In an interrogatory that J. Lee Rankin sent from the Warren Commission to Abram Chayes of the State Department in May 1964, the situation is assessed long after the risk was taken:

  QUESTION 1

  Your file reflects the fact that Lee Harvey Oswald believed that he could not travel from Minsk to Moscow for the purpose of discussing his return to the United States with American officials without first obtaining the permission of Soviet officials in Minsk . . . do you have any information or observations regarding the practicality of such travel by Soviet citizens or persons in Oswald’s status?

  ANSWER

  It is impossible to generalize in this area. We understand from interrogations of former residents in the Soviet Union who were considered “stateless” by Soviet authorities that they were not permitted to leave the town where they resided without permission of the police. In requesting such permission they were required to fill out a questionnaire giving the reason for travel, length of stay, addresses of individuals to be visited, etc.

  Notwithstanding these requirements, we know that at least one “stateless” person often travelled without permission of the authorities and stated that police stationed at railroad stations usually spotchecked the identification papers of every tenth traveler, but that it was an easy matter to avoid such checks. Finally, she stated that persons who were caught evading the registration requirements were returned to their home towns by the police and sentenced to short jail terms and fined. These sentences were more severe for repeated violations.1

  It is a species of Russian roulette. If one traveler in ten is given a spot-check, then the odds are 9 to 1 in Oswald’s favor. Since he has to return to Minsk as well, such odds reduce to 9 to 2. Of course, if there are six chambers in a revolver and only one bullet is placed in the cylinder, the odds are 5 to 1 that you will pull the trigger and still be alive, but it is a fair surmise that if one were to perform such an act, the chance of sudden death, at least as measured by one’s anxiety, would have to seem equal to survival.

  Say as much for the trip to Moscow. All through Marina’s early pregnancy in June and into the onset of summer, Oswald is living with the anxiety that he must dare to take that trip. It can improve neither his mood nor his confidence that the man he will have to face at the Embassy is bound
to be Richard Snyder.

  July

  I decide to take my two-week vacation and travel to Moscow (without police permission) to the American Embassy to see about getting my U.S. passport back and make arrangements for my wife to enter the U.S. with me.

  Earlier, back in the winter of 1960–61, Oswald wanted to visit Moscow on a bus with other factory workers but had been quietly refused. That is, his fellow workers left without discussing their plans with him. “It was our opinion then,” said Igor, “that he should not be one of a group from Horizon radio factory.” Igor could list his reservations: What, after all, did Oswald plan to do in Moscow? Perhaps he had a safe place to visit where he could receive equipment or instructions or make a radio transmission. Maybe he would visit a drop and leave something. Since the KGB in Minsk could hardly afford the disbursement necessary to send proper people to Moscow for surveillance on Oswald and Moscow Center might not be pleased at inroads on their budget, Minsk KGB decided they had to block his trip.

  When Oswald did go to Moscow during his vacation in July of 1961 and visited the American Embassy to discuss returning to America, that raised no suspicions. After all, they knew by now, Igor would point out, that he didn’t like it here, so from a political point of view, there was no reason to keep him. Despite all those favorable conditions Soviet institutions had created for him, he still didn’t want Soviet citizenship. Okay. Let him go to America. KGB would not interfere with his illegal trip to Moscow, since they knew his intentions through his correspondence. If there had been no idea where he was going or with what purpose, they would have taken measures. But Oswald’s goal was evident.