Lives of the Eminent Philosophers
Page 40
two hundred prohibits the building of temples, law courts, and gymnasia in cities. As for money, he writes as follows: “We do not think money should be created, either for exchange or for traveling abroad.” He also commands men and women to wear the same clothes and to keep no part of the body entirely hidden.
34 That the Republic is the work of Zeno is confirmed by Chrysippus in his work On the Republic. Zeno dealt with erotic matters at the beginning of his work entitled On the Art of Love, and writes similar things in his Talks. Such are the criticisms of him found not only in Cassius but also in the work of the orator Isidorus of Pergamon. Isidorus also says that the passages of which the Stoics disapproved were excised from his works by Athenodorus the Stoic,59 who was in charge of the library at Pergamon. These passages were restored when Athenodorus was detected and in danger of prosecution. So much concerning the passages of his work that were rejected as spurious.
35 There have been eight men named Zeno: the first was the Eleatic philosopher, of whom we will speak later;60 the second our present subject; the third a Rhodian who wrote a local history
36 Of Zeno’s many students, the following were renowned: Persaeus, son of Demetrius, of Citium, whom some say was Zeno’s friend, others his servant, one of those sent to him by Antigonus to act as his scribe; he had served as tutor to Antigonus’ son Halcyoneus. One day, when Antigonus wished to test Persaeus, he arranged for false news to be reported to him that his estate had been despoiled by enemies; and when Persaeus’ face fell, Antigonus said, “Don’t you see that wealth is not an indifferent?”62
The books attributed to him include:
On Monarchy
The Spartan Constitution
On Marriage
On Impiety
Thyestes
On Love Affairs
Exhortations
Talks
Anecdotes, four books
Memoirs
Against Plato’s “Laws,” seven books
37,38 Ariston,63 son of Miltiades, of Chios, who introduced the idea of indifference. Herillus of Chalcedon, who made knowledge the end. Dionysius, who converted to the doctrine of pleasure; for owing to his severe ophthalmia, he hesitated to say that pain was a matter of indifference. He was a native of Heraclea. Sphaerus of Bosporus. Cleanthes, son of Phanias, of Assos, who succeeded Zeno as head of the school. Zeno used to compare Cleanthes to hard wax tablets, which, though difficult to write on, retain what is written. Sphaerus became Cleanthes’ student after Zeno’s death; we will speak of him in the life of Cleanthes. The following men, according to Hippobotus, were also students of Zeno: Philonides of Thebes, Callippus of Corinth, Posidonius of Alexandria, Athenodorus of Soli, and Zeno of Sidon.
I have decided to include in the life of Zeno a general account of all the Stoic doctrines, since he was the school’s founder. I have given a list of his many works, in which he has spoken as has no other Stoic. His doctrines in general are as follows. Let a summary account suffice, in accordance with our usual practice.
39 They say that philosophical doctrine has three parts: the physical, the ethical, and the logical. Zeno of Citium was the first to divide it this way in his work On Reason; Chrysippus did the same in the first book of his work On Reason and in the first book of his Physics, as did Apollodorus Ephelus64 in the first books of his Introductions to the Doctrines, Eudromus65 in his Elements of Ethics, Diogenes of Babylon,66 and Posidonius.67
40 These parts Apollodorus calls “topics”; Chrysippus and Eudromus call them “species”; others call them “genera.” They compare philosophy to an animal, likening logic to the bones and sinews, ethics to the fleshier parts, and physics to the soul. Or again, they liken it to an egg: the outer parts are logic, the next parts are ethics, and the inmost parts are physics; or to a fertile field, of which logic is the surrounding fence, ethics the fruit, and physics the land or the trees. Or to a city that is well fortified and governed according to reason.
No part is separate from another, as some of the Stoics say; instead, the parts are blended together. And they used to teach them in combination. Others present logic first, physics second, and ethics third. Among these are Zeno in his work On Reason, as well as Chrysippus, Archedemus,68 and Eudromus.
41 For Diogenes of Ptolmais69 begins with ethics, Apollodorus puts ethics second, and Panaetius70 and Posidonius begin with physics, as Phanias, a student of Posidonius, says in the first book of his work Lectures of Posidonius. Cleanthes says that there are six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, and theology. But others, like Zeno of Tarsus,71 say that these are not parts of philosophical discourse, but of philosophy itself. Some say that the logical part is divided into two branches: rhetoric and dialectic.72 And some add a part concerned with definitions and another that deals with canons and criteria.73 But others eliminate the part concerned with definitions.
42 They use the branch that deals with canons and criteria as a means of discovering the truth; for it is in that branch that they work out the differences between the impressions. They also use the part that deals with definitions as a means of recognizing the truth; for it is by means of general notions that things are apprehended. Rhetoric they regard as a knowledge of how to speak well in an expository manner, and dialectic as the knowledge of how to discourse correctly in speeches conducted by question and answer; hence they define it as the science of the true, the false, and that which is neither true nor false.
43 They hold that rhetoric itself has three divisions: the deliberative, the forensic, and the panegyrical. It is divided into invention, phraseology, arrangement, and delivery. A rhetorical speech is divided into introduction, exposition, replies to opponents, and conclusion.
44 Dialectic falls under two headings: what is signified and what is uttered. What is signified falls under these headings: impressions and the various things to which they give rise, the sayables that subsist from them consisting of propositions and other complete sayables, predicates and similar terms, active and passive, genera and species, as well as arguments, modes, syllogisms,74 and sophisms due either to the subject matter or to what is uttered. These include Liar arguments, Truth-teller arguments, Denier arguments, Sorites arguments, related arguments (whether defective, insoluble, or valid), and Veiled Man arguments, Horned arguments, Nobody arguments, and Reaper arguments.75
Dialectic also includes the above-mentioned topic of utterance, which encompasses written language and the parts of speech, and deals with solecisms, barbarisms, poetical speech, ambiguities, euphony, music, and, according to some writers, definitions, divisions, and expressions.
45 They say that the study of syllogisms is highly useful, since it reveals what is demonstrable, and this contributes much to the correcting of doctrines, their orderly arrangement, and their retention in memory; it also indicates scientific comprehension.
An argument is itself a framework made up of premises and a conclusion. A syllogism is an argument that derives its conclusion from these elements. Demonstration is an argument that infers things less well apprehended from things better apprehended.
46 An impression is an imprint on the soul, its name appropriately borrowed from the imprints made in wax by a seal ring. Some impressions involve comprehension, others do not. The comprehending impression, which they say is the criterion of reality, is that which arises from an existing object and is imprinted and stamped in accordance with it. The uncomprehending impression is that which does not arise from an existing object, or, if it does, does not accord with it; it is
neither clear nor distinct.
47 Dialectic, they say, is indispensable and itself a virtue that encompasses other particular virtues. Freedom from rash judgment is the knowledge of when to give and withhold assent. Circumspection is a mental firmness with regard to the merely probable, so that one is not taken in by it. Irrefutability is strength in argument that prevents one from being brought over to the opposite side. Earnestness is a disposition to refer impressions to right reason. They say that knowledge itself is either an unerring comprehension or a disposition in the reception of impressions that cannot be altered by argument. They say that without the study of dialectic the wise man will not be infallible in argument. For by means of it he will distinguish between truth and falsehood, and he will discern what is merely plausible and ambiguous. Without it, he will not be able to pose questions and give answers in a methodical manner.
Dialectic and Rhetoric, by Giovanni Pisano, detail from the cathedral pulpit, Pisa, 1302–1310.
48 Rashness in judging affects what actually happens, and consequently those who are not well trained in handling impressions tend to be disorderly and thoughtless. In no other way will the wise man show himself to be acute and quick-witted and generally adept in argument. For the same person will be able to converse well and to argue well and to speak to the point about the subject under discussion and to reply to questions; and these are the skills of a man versed in dialectic.
This then, in summary, is their logical teaching. And in order to give it in detail as well, let me now discuss the doctrines covered in their introductory handbook. Here I quote what Diocles of Magnesia says in his Compendium of the Philosophers:
49 The Stoics like to place first their account of impression and sense perception, given that the criterion by which the truth of things is known is classed as an impression, and given that the account of assent and that of apprehension and thought, while it precedes the rest, cannot be formulated apart from impression. For impression arises first; then thought, which is capable of discourse, articulates the subject’s response to the impression.
50 There is a difference between an impression and a figment. For a figment is the sort of fanciful thought that occurs in sleep, whereas an impression is the imprinting of something on the soul, that is, an alteration, as Chrysippus maintains in the second book of his work On the Soul. For the imprint should not be taken to be like that of a seal ring, since it is impossible for there to be many such imprints at the same time in the same place. The impression meant is that which comes from an existing object and is imprinted, molded, and stamped in conformity with the existing object, such as could not come from an object that did not exist.
51 According to them some impressions are sensory and others are not. The sensory are those apprehended through one or more sense organs; the nonsensory are those apprehended through thought, as is the case with incorporeal things and everything else that is apprehended by reason. Among sensory impressions, some arise from existing objects and are accompanied by yielding and assent. But some are illusions that arise “as if” from existing objects.
52 Among the impressions, some are rational and others nonrational. Those of rational creatures are rational; those of nonrational creatures are nonrational. The rational impressions are processes of thought, while the nonrational have no name. And some impressions are technical,76 others nontechnical. An image, at any rate, is viewed differently by a specialist and by a layman.
53 According to the Stoics, the term “sensation” refers to (1) the breath that extends from the ruling part77 to the senses, (2) apprehension by means of the senses, and (3) the equipment of the sense organs, which in certain persons is impaired. The activity of these organs is also called sensation. According to the Stoics it is by sense that we grasp white and black and rough and smooth, whereas it is by reason that we grasp the conclusions reached by demonstration, for example the existence of the gods and their providence. For some concepts are conceived by direct contact, some by resemblance, some by analogy, some by transposition, some by composition, and some by opposition.
Iron ring, late fourth or early third century BC, Greek.
It is by direct contact that we conceive of sensory objects; by resemblance we conceive of things that are recognized from something related, like Socrates from a picture of him; by analogy we conceive of things sometimes by enlargement, as in the case of Tityus78 and the Cyclops,79 sometimes by diminution, as in the case of the Pygmy.80 And it is by analogy that the notion of the center of the earth arises, on the basis of smaller spheres. By transposition we conceive of things like eyes on the chest. By composition we conceive of the Hippocentaur.81 By opposition we conceive of death. Some things are also conceived of by deduction,82 like sayables and place. The concept of something just and good arises by nature. And concepts may arise from deprivation, for example the handless man. Such are their doctrines about impression, sensation, and thought.
54 The criterion of truth, they say, is the comprehending impression, that is, the impression arising from an existing object, as Chrysippus says in the twelfth book of his Physics, as do Antipater83 and Apollodorus. Boethus,84 on the other hand, admits additional criteria, namely intellect, sense perception, desire, and scientific knowledge. Chrysippus, contradicting himself in the first book of his work On Reason, says that sense perception and preconception are the criteria. (Preconception is an innate grasp of universals.) Some of the older Stoics admit right reason as a criterion, as Posidonius says in his work On the Criterion.
55 In their theory of dialectic, most of them agree in taking voice as their starting point. Voice is a striking of the air, or the proper object of the sense of hearing,85 as Diogenes of Babylon says in his handbook On Voice. The voice of an animal is a striking of air that arises from an impulse, whereas the voice of a human being is articulate and, as Diogenes says, issues from thought; it reaches maturity at the age of fourteen. And according to the Stoics voice is a body, as Archedemus says in his work On Voice, as do Diogenes and Antipater, as well as Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics. For everything that acts is a body; and voice acts when it reaches those who hear it from those who utter it.
56 According to the Stoics, as Diogenes says, speech is vocal sound that can be committed to writing, for example, “day.” An assertion is a meaningful use of voice that issues from thought, for example, “It is day.” And dialect is speech that is stamped as belonging to the Greek world as distinct from other nations, or it is a variety peculiar to a particular region, that is to say, it has a certain linguistic quality. For example, one uses thalatta in Attic or hemere in Ionic.86
57 The elements of speech are the twenty-four letters. But “letter” refers to three things: the phonetic element, the written character, and its name—for example, alpha. Seven of the letters are vowels—alpha, epsilon, eta, iota, omicron, upsilon, and omega; and there are six mutes—beta, gamma, delta, kappa, pi, and tau. Voice and speech differ in that voice includes mere noise, but speech must be articulate.
There are five parts of speech, as Diogenes says in his work On Voice, as does Chrysippus: proper name, common noun, verb, conjunction, and article. Antipater, in his treatise On Speech and Meaning, also includes the adverb.
58 A common noun, according to Diogenes, is a part of speech that signifies a common quality, like “man,” “horse.” A proper name is a part of speech that indicates a quality particular to an individual, like “Diogenes,” “Socrates.” A verb is a part of speech that signifies an uncompounded predicate, as Diogenes says, or, as others define it, an indeclinable element of speech signifying that which can be linked to one or more subjects, for example, “(I) write,” or “(I) speak.” A conjunction is an
indeclinable part of speech that coordinates the parts of speech. An article is a declinable part of speech that distinguishes the genders and numbers of nouns, like ho, he, to, hoi, hai, ta.88
59 There are five virtues of speech: pure Greek, clarity, conciseness, propriety, and distinction. Pure Greek is diction that is flawless grammatically and free of vulgar usage. Clarity is a style that presents what is thought in an intelligible way; conciseness a style that encompasses precisely what is necessary for elucidating the subject matter. Propriety lies in a style appropriate to the content; distinction is a style that avoids banality. Among vices of style, barbarism is speech that violates the common usage of distinguished Greeks, while in a solecism what is signified is incongruous.
60 A poetical phrase, as Posidonius says in his elementary treatise On Style, is one that possesses meter and rhythm and purposely avoids prose. An example of a rhythmical phrase is:
Mightiest earth and Zeus’ sky.
And if such poetical phraseology conveys meaning and includes a representation of matters divine and human, it is poetry.
A definition, as Antipater says in the first book of his work On Definitions, is an assertion corresponding precisely to its object, or, as Chrysippus says in his work On Definitions, a rendering of what is distinctive. An outline is an assertion that introduces a topic in summary form, or that conveys the force of a term’s meaning more simply than a definition does. A genus is a comprehensive class of several inseparable objects of thought, like “animal”; for this term includes all particular animals.