Lives of the Eminent Philosophers

by Pamela Mensch

  Even if for the one day he swallows his wrath,

  Yet he nurses resentment until he satisfies it.

  Temper is anger at an early stage.

  Pleasure is an irrational elation at obtaining what seems to be desirable. Under it are ranged enchantment, spite, delight, and rapture. Enchantment is pleasure that charms the ear; spite is pleasure at another’s misfortunes; delight (terpsis) is, as it were, a turning (trepsis), a propensity of the soul to slackness; and rapture is a dissolving of virtue.

  115 And just as there are said to be certain infirmities in the body, like gout and arthritis, so too in the soul there are love of fame, love of pleasure, and the like. For an infirmity is a disease accompanied by weakness, and disease is a notion about something that seems very desirable. And just as in the body there are certain predispositions to disease, such as colds and diarrhea, so too in the soul there are bad tendencies, such as resentment, sentimentality, quarrelsomeness, and the like.

  116 There are also three good states of feeling, namely joy, caution, and wishing. They say that joy is the opposite of pleasure, being a rational elation; and caution the opposite of fear, being a rational avoidance. For the wise man will never feel fear, though he will be cautious. They say that wishing is the opposite of desire, being a rational yearning. And just as under the primary passions are grouped subordinate ones, so too with the good states of feeling. Under wishing are grouped kindness, goodwill, affection, and warmth; under caution, respect and purity; and under joy, delight, merriment, and cheerfulness.

  117 They say that the wise man is free of passion because he is not disposed to it. But the base man is also “free of passion” in the sense that he is callous and uncompromising. And the wise man is free of vanity, for he is equally indifferent to good and bad reputation. But there is another kind of freedom from vanity, namely heedlessness, which characterizes the base man. And they say that all good men are austere because they neither engage in social relations for the sake of pleasure nor tolerate those who do. The term “austere” is also applied to another type of man, in the same sense that wine is said to be austere when it is used medicinally,100 and not at all for the pleasure of drinking.

  118 The good aim genuinely and vigilantly for their own improvement by making a practice of concealing base things and bringing to light whatever is good. They are unpretentious, for they have stripped pretense from their voice and appearance. They are not overly busy, for they avoid doing anything that is contrary to duty. They will drink in moderation, but will never get drunk. Nor will they go crazy; nevertheless, they will sometimes, because of melancholy or delirium, experience strange impressions, not of things rationally desirable but contrary to nature. The wise man will not be afflicted by grief, since grief is an irrational contraction of the soul, as Apollodorus says in his Ethics.

  119 The good are also divine, for they have in themselves a kind of divinity. The base man, on the other hand, is godless. Yet “godless” has two senses: in one, it denotes the man who speaks against god, in the other, the man who scorns the divine altogether. In the latter sense the word does not apply to every base man. The good are also god-fearing, for they are conversant with the customs that concern the gods, and piety is knowledge of how to serve the gods. Moreover, they will sacrifice to the gods; and they keep themselves pure by avoiding offenses against the gods. And the gods approve of them, for they are pious and just with regard to the divine. And only the wise are priests, since they have engaged in the study of sacrifices, shrines, purifications, and all the other matters pertaining to the gods.

  120 They hold that parents and brothers should be honored in the second place after the gods. They say that affection for one’s children is natural to the good and unnatural to the base.

  121 They believe that all mistakes are equal, as Chrysippus says in the fourth book of his Ethical Researches, as do Persaeus and Zeno. For if one truth is not more true than another, then neither is one falsehood more false than another. So one deceit is no more deceitful than another, and no mistake more mistaken than another. For just as the man who is one hundred stades from Canopus101 and the man who is one stade away are both not in Canopus, so too one whose mistake is greater and one whose mistake is lesser are both not on the right path. But Heraclides of Tarsus,102 the follower of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus hold that mistakes are not equal.

  They say that the wise man will take part in politics if nothing prevents him, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his work On Ways of Life, since he will restrain vice and promote virtue. And he will marry, as Zeno says in the Republic, and beget children. Furthermore, the wise man will not hold mere opinions, that is, he will assent to nothing that is false. And he will live like a Cynic, since the Cynic way of life is a shortcut to virtue, as Apollodorus says in his Ethics. And he will even taste human flesh under stress of circumstances.

  122,123 He alone is a free man, whereas the base are slaves. For freedom is the power to act independently, and servitude is the deprivation of one’s power to do so. There is another form of slavery that consists in subordination, and a third that implies both possession of the slave and his subordination; its correlative is despotism, which is also base. They hold that the wise are not only free, but are also kings, kingship being authority that is not held accountable, which only the wise are qualified to wield, as Chrysippus says in his work On Zeno’s Proper Use of Terms. For he says that the ruler must be knowledgeable about what is good and bad, and no base man understands these things. Similarly, only the wise are fit to be magistrates, judges, and orators, whereas none of the base are. Furthermore, the wise are infallible, since they are not likely to make mistakes. They cause no harm, for they harm neither others nor themselves. They are not merciful, nor do they forgive anyone; for they do not mitigate the penalties imposed by the laws, since leniency and pity and even fairness itself are the vapidity of a soul that would substitute kindness for punishment. Nor do they consider punishments too severe.

  What is more, the wise man does not marvel at things that seem incredible, like Charon’s103 vapor-filled caverns, ebbs of the tide, hot springs, and eruptions of fire. They hold that the good man will not live in solitude, for he is suited by nature for society and for action. He will also submit to training for the sake of physical endurance.

  Grotesque heads of a slave, Greek, 323–150 BC.

  124 The wise man, they say, will pray and ask for good things from the gods, as Posidonius says in the first book of his work On Duties and Hecaton in the third book of his work On Paradoxes. They hold that friendship exists only among the good, by reason of their similarity. They say that friendship is a sharing of all that pertains to life, since we treat our friends as we treat ourselves. They hold that the friend is desirable for his own sake, and that having many friends is a good thing. Among the base, on the other hand, there is no friendship, nor does any base man have a friend. They also hold that all foolish men are insane, given that they are not prudent and do everything under the influence of the madness that is the equivalent of folly.

  125 The wise man does everything well, just as we say that Ismenias104 plays all the flute tunes well. And everything belongs to the wise, since the law has granted them an all-encompassing authority. On the other hand, certain things are said to belong to the base, in the same way that things are said to belong to the unjust man; in one sense we say that things belong to the city, in another sense to those who use them.

  126 They say that the virtues follow one from another, and that the possessor of one is the possessor of all. For their underlying principles are shared, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his work On Virtues, Apollodorus in Natural Philosophy of the Ancient School, and Hecaton in the third book of his work On Virtues. The virtuous man possesses both the theory and practice of what should be done. There are things that must be done and chosen and endured and abided by and distributed, and consequently if one does some things by choosing, and some by enduring,
and some by distributing, and some by standing firm, then he is wise and brave and just and temperate. Each of the virtues has its own particular province, as, for example, courage is concerned with what should be endured, prudence with what should be done or not be done and with what falls under neither category. Similarly, each of the other virtues is concerned with its own proper sphere. Good counsel and understanding follow from prudence; discipline and orderliness from temperance; impartiality and fairness from justice; and constancy and vigor from courage.

  127 They hold that there is nothing in between virtue and vice, whereas the Peripatetics say that between virtue and vice there is moral progress. For according to the Stoics, just as a piece of wood must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust (not more just or more unjust), and likewise with the other virtues. And Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, whereas Cleanthes says that it cannot be lost, the former maintaining that it can be lost as a result of drunkenness and melancholy, the latter that it cannot, owing to the virtuous person’s firm cognitions. And virtue is worth choosing for its own sake. We are ashamed, at any rate, of our bad conduct, as if we knew that only the honorable is good.

  128 They hold that virtue is sufficient for happiness, as Zeno says, and Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Virtues and Hecaton in the second book of his work On Goods. “For if magnanimity by itself,” he says, “can make us superior to everything, though it is only one part of virtue, then virtue too is sufficient for happiness, in that it despises all things that seem troublesome.” Yet Panaetius and Posidonius say that virtue is not self-sufficient, claiming that strength, health, and material resources are also needed.

  129 They maintain that virtue is in use constantly, as Cleanthes says. For virtue cannot be lost, and the good man always makes use of a mind that is in perfect condition. They say that justice is natural and not conventional, as are the law and right reason, as Chrysippus says in his work On the Honorable. They think that disagreement is not a reason for abandoning philosophy, since by that argument one would abandon life altogether, as Posidonius says in his Exhortations. Chrysippus even holds that the standard educational curriculum105 is useful.

  The Testament of Eudamidas, by Nicolas Poussin, 1644–1648. According to Lucian, the story of two citizens of Corinth who assumed responsibility for Eudamidas’s mother and daughter after his death (as stipulated in his will) provided an exemplary model of Stoic friendship.

  What is more, they believe that there is no justice between us and the other animals, because of our dissimilarity, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his work On Justice, and Posidonius in the first book of his work On Duty.

  130 The wise man will fall in love with the young men who by their appearance reveal their natural aptitude for virtue, as Zeno says in the Republic, Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Ways of Life, and Apollodorus in his Ethics. Love is an impulse to form a relationship on account of physical attractiveness, and it aims not at intercourse but at friendship. They say that Thrasonides,106 at any rate, though he had his mistress in his power, abstained from her because she hated him. Therefore love aims at friendship, as Chrysippus says in his work On Love, and is not reprehensible. They say that youthful beauty is the flower of virtue.

  Of the three kinds of life—the contemplative, the practical, and the rational—they say that the third is to be chosen; for the rational animal was purposely made by nature for contemplation and action. They say that the wise man will, for a good reason, end his own life, both on behalf of his country and on behalf of his friends, or if he is suffering unbearable pain, mutilation, or incurable disease.

  131 They hold that wives should be held in common among the wise, so that anyone might have intercourse with any woman, as Zeno says in the Republic and Chrysippus in On the Republic, as well as Diogenes the Cynic and Plato. We will show a father’s love to all children equally and the jealousy occasioned by adultery will be eliminated. The best form of government is a combination of democracy, monarchy, and aristocracy.

  Such are the statements they make in their ethical doctrines, and there are many more, together with their appropriate proofs. Let this suffice as our summary and elementary account.

  132 They divide their account of nature into the following topics: bodies, principles, elements, gods, limits, place, and void. This is a division into species. The generic division is into three topics: the universe, the elements, and causation.

  133 The topic concerned with the universe they divide into two parts; for in one branch of it the mathematicians also share, when they ask questions about the fixed stars and the planets—for example, whether the sun is as large as it appears, and likewise the moon, and about rotational motion, and similar questions. But there is another branch of the study of the universe that belongs exclusively to the natural philosophers, the one in which they investigate what the substance of the universe is, whether the world was created or is uncreated, whether it is animate or not, whether it is destructible or indestructible, whether it is governed by providence, and so forth. The topic concerned with causation also has two branches. In one of its branches medical inquiries have a share, the one in which they investigate the ruling principle of the soul, psychological processes, seeds, and the like. The second part is also claimed by the scientists, the one in which they investigate how we see, what causes the image in the mirror, and the origin of clouds, thunder, rainbows, haloes, comets, and the like.

  Stoic, by Mia Bergeron, 2015. Oil, 30.5 × 30.5 cm.

  134 They hold that there are two principles of the universe: the active and the passive. The passive principle is unqualified substance, namely matter, while the active principle is the reasoning power in it, namely god. For the latter, being eternal, fabricates every single thing throughout the entirety of matter. This doctrine is posited by Zeno of Citium in his work On Substance, Cleanthes in his work On Atoms, Chrysippus near the end of the first book of his Natural Philosophy, Archedemus in his work On Elements, and Posidonius in the second book of his Account of Nature. They say that there is a difference between principles and elements; for the former are neither generated nor destroyed, whereas the elements are destroyed in the conflagration.107 What is more, the principles are bodies and without form, whereas the elements are endowed with form.

  135 Body, says Apollodorus in his Physics, is that which extends in three dimensions: length, breadth, and depth. This is also called solid body. A surface is the limit of a body, or that which has only length and breadth, but no depth. This, as Posidonius says in the third book of his work On Celestial Phenomena, exists both conceptually and in reality. A line is the limit of a surface, or length without breadth, or that which has only length. A point is the limit of a line and is the smallest mark.

  136 God, Intellect, Fate, and Zeus are one thing, though called by many different names. In the beginning, then, being by himself, god turned all of substance through air into water; and just as the sperm is contained in the seminal fluid, so god, being the seminal principle of the universe, remains in the moist substance and adapts matter to himself for the generation of the things that are to come. He then generates the four elements: fire, water, air, and earth. Zeno discusses them in his work On the Universe, as do Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics and Archedemus in his work On Elements.

  137 An element is that from which generated things are first generated and into which they are finally resolved. The four elements together constitute unqualified substance, that is, matter. Fire is the hot element, water the moist, air the cold, and earth the dry. Yet that last part is also present in the air. Uppermost is the fire called “aether,” in which is produced first the sphere of the fixed stars and then the sphere of the planets; after this is the air, then the water, and, as the foundation for everything, the earth, which is at the center of all things.

  138 They use the term “cosmos” in three senses: of god himself, whose proper quality is derived from the whole o
f substance; he is indestructible and ungenerated, since he is the craftsman of the world’s orderly arrangement, at set periods takes all substance back into himself, and generates it again from himself. They also speak of the world-order itself as a cosmos. And in a third sense, the cosmos is that which is composed of both. In addition the cosmos is the proper quality of the universe’s substance, as Posidonius says in his treatise Celestial Phenomena, a system constituted by heaven and earth and the natures in them, or one that is made up of gods, human beings, and the things that come into being for their sake. Heaven is the outermost periphery in which the totality of the divine is located.

  The Philosophers, by Wolfgang Lettl, 1987.

  139 The cosmos is governed by mind and providence (as Chrysippus says in the fifth book of his work On Providence and Posidonius in the third book of his work On Gods), since mind pervades every part of it, just as the soul does in us. But it pervades some parts more than others. For it is present in some parts as a cohesive force, as is the case in our bones and sinews, but in others as intelligence, as in the ruling part. In this way the entire cosmos too, a living being endowed with a soul and reason, has aether as its ruling part, as Antipater of Tyre says in the eighth book of his work On the Cosmos. Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Providence and Posidonius in his work On Gods say that heaven is the ruling part of the cosmos, while Cleanthes says it is the sun. Yet Chrysippus, in the same work, gives a rather different account, saying that it is the purest part of the aether, which they call the primary god that passes as it were perceptibly through the beings in the air and also through all creatures and plants, and through the earth itself as a cohesive principle.