Lives of the Eminent Philosophers

by Pamela Mensch

  71 Of this school some say that Homer was the founder, since on the same subjects, more than anyone, he gives now one answer, now another, and never affirms any answer categorically. Then, too, the sayings of the Seven Sages are said to be skeptical, for example, “Nothing in excess,” and “A pledge is a curse,” which means that anyone who reposes his trust firmly and confidently invites his own ruin. Moreover, both Archilochus132 and Euripides, they say, were of a skeptical turn of mind, for Archilochus says,

  Man’s soul, Glaucus, son of Leptines,

  Resembles nothing so much as a day sent by Zeus.

  And Euripides:

  Why in the world do they say that wretched mortals

  Have minds? In fact, we depend on you,

  And we do whatever you happen to wish.133

  72 Furthermore they find Xenophanes, Zeno of Elea, and Democritus134 to be Skeptics, Xenophanes in the passage where he says:

  Plain truth no man has seen or will ever know.

  Cutting the Card Quickly, by Harold Edgerton, 1960 or 1964.

  And Zeno abolishes motion when he says, “That which moves, moves neither where it is, nor where it is not.” And Democritus rejects qualities, saying, “By convention, cold and hot; in reality, atoms and void”; and “In reality, men know nothing; for truth is in an abyss.” And Plato, according to them, leaves truth “to the gods and the children of gods,” and pursues only the “probable explanation.”135 And Euripides says:

  73

  Who knows if to die is to live,

  And what men believe to be life is death?

  And also Empedocles:136

  These things, then, are not to be seen by men,

  Or heard, or grasped by the mind.

  And earlier:

  Each man trusts only his own experience.

  And even Heraclitus: “Let us not hazard guesses about the most important matters.” And Hippocrates, in turn, declares his views in an ambiguous and suitably human manner. And earlier, Homer:

  Glib is the tongue of mortals, and abounding in tales;

  And:

  The field of words is wide in all directions;

  And:

  Whatever word you speak, such could you also hear;137

  where he is speaking of the equal force of opposing arguments.

  74 The Skeptics, then, devoted themselves to overturning all the dogmas of the schools, while they themselves affirmed nothing dogmatically; and although they would put forward and interpret the dogmas of the other schools, they themselves determined nothing, not even this. And consequently they even rejected not determining, for example by saying “We determine nothing” (since otherwise they would have been determining something); instead, they say “we bring forward these assertions in order to demonstrate our freedom from rashness, just as we could have done had we assented to them.” Accordingly, by means of the phrase “We determine nothing,” they demonstrated their state of equilibrium. This is likewise indicated by their other expressions: “Not more (one thing than another),” “For every assertion there is an opposing assertion,” and the like.

  75 But the phrase “Not more (one thing than another)” can also be taken positively, as meaning that certain things are similar—for example, “The pirate is no worse than the liar.” But the Skeptics mean this not positively but negatively, as when one who seeks to reject a proposition says, “Scylla had no more existence than Chimaera.”138 And the expression “more than” is sometimes used in a comparative sense, as when we say, “Honey is more sweet than grapes”; sometimes also in a sense at the same time positive and negative, as when we say, “Virtue helps more than it harms”; for here we mean that virtue helps, and that it does not harm.

  Askos (flask with a handle over the top), c. 300 BC, Greek. The askos itself is in the shape of a Scylla, the snakelike body of which lends its form to the handle on top. On the body, a dog chases a hare, with the head of a woman above.

  76,77 But the Skeptics even reject the phrase “Not more (one thing than another).” For just as providence is no more existent than nonexistent,139 so “Not more (one thing than another)” is no more existent than not. Thus, as Timon says in his Python, the statement implies “Affirm nothing, but suspend judgment.” The other statement, “For every assertion …” also induces suspension of judgment. For when facts conflict and the arguments on either side possess equal force, ignorance of the truth necessarily follows. But even for this assertion there is an opposing assertion, since after destroying other ideas it turns around and destroys itself, like purgatives, which begin by evacuating certain substances and are then themselves evacuated and destroyed. To this the dogmatic philosophers reply that <…> does not abolish assertion, but reinforces it.

  The Skeptics were therefore using words merely as aids, since it was not possible to refute a proposition without using its words; just as we are in the habit of saying that space does not exist, and yet we are forced to speak of “space,” not dogmatically, but for the purposes of demonstration; and just as we say that nothing happens by necessity, and yet are forced to speak of “necessity.”140 This was the sort of interpretation they would offer: though things appear to be “such and such,” they are not such by nature, but only by appearance. And they used to say that they were investigating not what one thinks, since what one thinks is clear, but what our thoughts can reach by means of sensation.

  78,79 The Pyrrhonian discourse is a report about phenomena or about thoughts of any kind, a report in which all things are confronted with one another, and are shown, when they are compared, to be full of irregularity and confusion, as Aenesidemus says in his Outline of Pyrrhonism. As for the contradictions that come to light in their researches, the Skeptics would begin by revealing the modes according to which things gain credence, and then by the same modes they would demolish our belief in the object in question. For they hold that those things gain credence that our senses are agreed upon and that never or rarely change, as well as things that are habitual or are determined by law and those that give pleasure and arouse admiration. Thus they demonstrated, on the basis of that which is contrary to what is persuasive to us, that the probabilities are equal on each side.

  The perplexities that they have identified, and that concern the agreements between appearances or conceptions, are divided into ten modes in which the objects in question appear to vary. They propose the following ten modes.

  80 The first concerns the differences between living creatures with respect to what gives them pleasure and pain, and what is harmful and beneficial to them. In light of this, one concludes that they do not receive the same impressions from the same things, and that this sort of conflict leads to suspension of judgment. For some living creatures are generated without intercourse, for example, those that live in fire,141 and the Arabian phoenix, and worms; others by intercourse, such as human beings and the rest. Some are constituted in one way, others in another, and this is why they also differ in their senses: hawks, for example, having the keenest eyesight, and dogs having the keenest sense of smell. It is reasonable, therefore, that if the eyes of animals differ, their visual impressions will differ as well. Accordingly, to a goat, olive vines are edible, but to man they are bitter; and hemlock is nourishing to quail, but to man it is fatal; and a pig will eat manure, but a horse will not.

  81 The second mode concerns the various natures of men and their idiosyncrasies. Demophon, at any rate, Alexander’s majordomo, would get warm in the shade and shiver in the sun. And Andron of Argos, as Aristotle says, journeyed across the Libyan desert without water.142 And one man has a passion for medicine, another for farming, and another for commerce. And the same things harm some men and benefit others. Hence one must suspend judgment.

  Relief head of a Persian, Greek, c. 330–300 BC. The head scarf tied around the neck and pulled over the chin identifies this figure as Persian.

  The third mode concerns the differences between the sensory channels. An apple, at any rate, seems yellow to the
eye, sweet to our sense of taste, and fragrant to our sense of smell. The same shape appears different when reflected by different mirrors. It follows, therefore, that an appearance is no more “such and such” than something else.

  82 The fourth mode concerns conditions and variations in general; for example, health and disease, sleep and waking, joy and grief, youth and old age, courage and fear, want and satiety, hate and love, heat and cold, as well as breathing freely and having the respiratory passages obstructed. The impressions received appear to vary as the subject’s condition varies. Even the condition of madmen is not contrary to nature. For why should their state be so more than ours? We ourselves, after all, see the sun as stationary. And Theon of Tithorea,143 the Stoic, when he went to bed, used to walk in his sleep, while Pericles’ slave did the same on the housetop.144

  83,84 The fifth mode concerns ways of life, customs, mythological beliefs, covenants between peoples, and dogmatic assumptions. This mode encompasses notions about what is beautiful and ugly, true and false, good and bad, about the gods, and about the creation and destruction of all phenomena. In any case, the same thing is regarded by some as just and by others as unjust, or as good by some and as bad by others. For the Persians do not think it inappropriate for a man to sleep with his daughter; the Greeks deem it unlawful. The Massagetae,145 as Eudoxus146 says in the first book of his Voyage Around the World, share their wives; the Greeks do not. The Cilicians147 used to delight in piracy; the Greeks did not. Different people believe in different gods; some believe in providence, others do not. The Egyptians embalm their dead, the Romans burn them, and the Paeonians148 cast them into lakes. Hence the suspension of judgment with regard to what is true.

  85 The sixth mode concerns mixtures and combinations, by virtue of which nothing appears purely by itself, but always in combination with air, light, moisture, solidity, heat, cold, motion, exhalations, and other forces. Purple, at any rate, reveals different hues in sunlight, moonlight, and lamplight. And our own complexion does not appear the same at noon and at sunset. And a rock that takes two men to raise in the air is easily moved about in water (either because, though heavy, it is made light by the water, or, though light, it is made heavy by the air). We are ignorant of its intrinsic character, as we are of the oil in an unguent.

  86 The seventh mode concerns distances, positions of various types, places, and the things that occupy places. In this mode, things that are thought to be large appear small, square things round, flat things bumpy, straight things bent, and pale things colorful. The sun, at any rate, owing to its distance, appears small; and the mountains, when seen from afar, appear misty and smooth; seen from nearby, they appear jagged. Moreover, the sun has a certain appearance at its rising, another at the zenith. The same body has one appearance in the woods, another in open country. The image also varies according to how it is placed, and a dove’s neck according to how it is turned. Since, therefore, one cannot observe these things apart from places and positions, their nature remains unknown.

  Sextus Empiricus (left) and Pyrrho of Elis (right), from the series “Seismoscopes,” by Rafael Lozano-Hemmer, 2009.

  The eighth mode concerns the quantities of things, for example, heat, cold, swiftness, slowness, paleness, or variety of color. In any case, wine taken in moderation imparts strength, taken in excess it causes weakness. The same holds true with food and other such things.

  87 The ninth mode concerns that which is continual, strange, or rare. Earthquakes, at any rate, are not astonishing to those among whom they regularly occur; nor is one astonished by the sun, since it is seen every day. Favorinus makes this ninth the eighth, while Sextus149 and Aenesidemus make it the tenth. But the tenth is made the eighth by Sextus, the ninth by Favorinus.

  88 The tenth mode is based on the comparison of one thing with another—for example, light with heavy, strong with weak, greater with less, and up with down. At any rate, that which is on the right is not on the right by nature, but is conceived to be so in light of its position with respect to something else; in any case, if the latter thing is moved, the former is no longer on the right. Likewise “father” and “brother” are relative terms, and “day” is relative to “sun,” and all things are relative to the mind. Relative terms are therefore unknowable in and of themselves. These, then, are the ten modes.

  89 Agrippa150 and his school introduce five additional modes; these are concerned, respectively, with disagreement, infinite regress, relativity, hypothesis, and reciprocity. The mode concerned with disagreement demonstrates that any inquiry one pursues, whether in philosophy or in everyday intercourse, abounds in conflicts and confusion. The mode concerned with infinite regress does not permit the thing one is trying to prove to be firmly established, given that one thing derives its credibility from another, and so on ad infinitum. The mode concerned with relativity says that a thing can never be understood in and of itself, but only in relation to something else. Hence all things are unknowable. The mode concerned with hypothesis arises when people think that one must assume the primary things to be intrinsically credible, rather than postulating them. This is futile, since someone will adopt the opposite hypothesis. The mode concerned with reciprocity arises whenever that which should confirm the thing one is seeking to prove has to derive credibility from the latter—for example, if someone seeking to prove that pores exist, given that emanations occur, should take their existence as proof that there are emanations.151

  90,91 They rejected all demonstration, criterion,152 sign,153 cause, motion, learning, coming into being, and the idea that anything is good or bad by nature. All demonstration, they say, is built on things that are either already proved or indemonstrable. Accordingly, if from things already proved, those things will need some proof, and so on ad infinitum; if from things indemonstrable, then whether all or some or only a single one of the steps are doubtful, the whole is indemonstrable. And if anyone thinks, they say, that there are things that require no demonstration, their judgment is quite outlandish, since they do not understand that the first thing one needs is a demonstration that the things on which one’s argument depends carry conviction themselves. Nor should we conclude that the elements are four from the fact that there are four elements. Furthermore, if particular demonstrations are not to be trusted, then demonstration in general is also not to be trusted. And in order that we may know that an argument is a demonstration, we require a criterion; but in order that we may know that it is a criterion, we require a demonstration. Hence both are incomprehensible, since each is referred to the other. How, then, could we grasp the things that are uncertain, if the demonstration is unknown to us? For we are seeking to determine not that things appear to be “such and such,” but that they actually are so.

  92 They declared that the dogmatic philosophers are fools. For that which is inferred from a hypothesis does not have the value of an investigation, but of an assumption. And with the dogmatic method of reasoning, one could also argue on behalf of impossibilities. They used to say that those who think that we should not, when judging of the truth, take circumstantial considerations into account or legislate on the basis of what conforms with nature, made themselves the measure of all things, and did not see that all phenomena are a function of circumstances and conditions. In any case, we must affirm either that all things are true or that all things are false. If certain things are true, how are we to discern them? Not by the senses, in the case of sensory phenomena, since to the senses all phenomena appear to be on an equal footing; or by the mind, for the same reason. But beyond these faculties, one can discern no other that could help us to judge.

  93 Anyone therefore, they say, who would be convinced about anything sensible or intelligible must first set in order the prevailing opinions about it; for some have rejected some views, while others have rejected others. But things must be judged either by the sensible or by the intelligible. And both are controversial. It is therefore impossible to pass judgment on opinions about things either sensible
or intelligible. And if, by reason of the conflict in our thoughts, we must disbelieve them all, the standard by which it is assumed that all things are precisely determined will be destroyed, and we will therefore consider every statement equally valid. Furthermore, they say, the person who shares our inquiry into a phenomenon is either to be trusted or not. If he is trusted he will have nothing to say to the man to whom it appears to be the opposite. For just as our fellow inquirer, when he describes what appears to him, is to be trusted, so is his opponent. If he is not to be trusted, he will be disbelieved when he describes what appears to him.

  Pyrrho, from an edition of Petrarch’s Il Libro degli Homini Famosi, printed by Felix Antiquarius and Innocens Ziletus at Pogliano, Italy, in 1476.

  94 We should not suppose that what is convincing is true. For the same thing does not convince everyone, nor does it convince the same people consistently. Persuasiveness also depends on external circumstances: on the good reputation of the speaker, on his soundness as a thinker or his wiliness, on the familiarity or pleasantness of his subject.

  They also rejected the criterion by this sort of reasoning: The criterion has either been critically determined or not. If it has not, it is untrustworthy and does not determine truth and falsehood. If it has, it will become one of the particular things determined by a criterion, with the result that the very same thing determines and is determined, and the determined criterion will have to be determined by another, and that one by another, and so on ad infinitum.