The Cockleshell Raid--Bordeaux 1942

by Ken Ford

  Hasler was given permission to speak to the planners at the Combined Operations HQ in Richmond Terrace in London to discuss the possibility of raising a specific boom patrol boat unit. To add strength to his case, he also suggested that the unit could act in concert with the Royal Navy, helping to secure the effectiveness of the defence booms already in position guarding Portsmouth Harbour. There was some initial resistance to the raising of yet another specialized unit, but the interest already being shown in the idea of explosive motor boats ensured that the proposal would be seriously considered at the highest level of COHQ nonetheless.

  On 12 May 1942 the commandant of CODC, LtCol H. Langley, presented a proposal to the Chief of Combined Operations (CCO), Lord Louis Mountbatten, for the formation of the Royal Marine Harbour Patrol Detachment. Langley explained that the main disadvantage with the BPB was the difficulty it would have negotiating boom defences, for the craft’s design made it doubtful whether it could pass over any form of surface obstruction in darkness without some assistance. He proposed to overcome this difficulty with canoes (‘cockles’ as they were known in the navy) that would be developed to work in conjunction with the BPBs. The BPBs would approach the objective together with the cockles who would then perform the following functions:

  (a) clear a passage through the surface obstructions using explosive cutters or, preferably, some as yet undetermined silent method

  (b) take station by the gap and exhibit some form of screened leading light until the BPBs had passed through

  (c) follow up the BPBs for the remainder of their approach with the object of picking up their drivers once they had ‘baled out’.

  Two commandos attempt to secure a Bren gun in the bows of a flimsy Folbot as it is rocked by the swirling surf. This type of collapsible canoe was the forerunner of the more sturdy cockles later used by the RMBPD. (Royal Marines Museum Collection)

  Smoke flares could also be used at this stage to give some concealment. In order to achieve the close liaison necessary, Langley explained, it was evident that the crews of both the BPBs and the cockles should be trained as a single unit, with its men interchangeable between the two tasks. The crews of both craft could also operate completely independently if required. The entire unit would be under the control of CO, since its main function was bound up with combined operations and raiding.

  Langley made it clear that the unit should comprise entirely of Royal Marines. He gave several reasons for this point of view, explaining that the execution of such an attack is a typical Royal Marine role, calling for close cooperation with the Royal Navy. Its participants would need ability in commando-type fighting and they would have to have a good deal of ‘sea sense’. The success of the operation would rest entirely on the individual morale of the men concerned and it was felt that this could be best achieved by starting with a strong foundation of esprit de corps such as that found in the Royal Marines. In addition, all officers and men in the unit would be carefully selected from volunteers. Langley, with Maj Hasler’s support, had put together a soundly argued and compelling proposal.

  On 20 May, Mountbatten agreed and approved the proposition. He gave the go-ahead for the unit to be formed under the title The Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment (RMBPD), with Maj Hasler as the officer commanding. The authorized detachment would consist of a commanding officer of major rank, a second-in-command with the rank of captain, and two sections each with a lieutenant, a sergeant, two corporals and ten marines. In addition, there would be a four-man Administration Section (sergeant, orderly, storeman and driver) and a Maintenance Section made up of attached naval personnel. This gave a total Royal Marine complement of 34 men.

  Soon afterwards a circular was issued and sent around various Royal Marine units calling for volunteers for hazardous duties. It explained that the work would consist of offensive operations of a ‘commando’ type, calling for exceptional individual qualities. The virtues required by all officers and men were clearly laid out in the circular: each man needed to be eager to engage the enemy, indifferent to his own personal safety, intelligent, nimble, free from strong family ties or dependants, able to swim and of good physique with excellent eyesight. It was not essential to have any previous knowledge of the sea or small boats, although such knowledge would be an advantage.

  The process of interviewing likely candidates for the unit soon began. Hasler had already found a suitable contender as his second-in-command, Capt J. D. ‘Jock’ Stewart, who had served with him in the Royal Marines Fortress Unit in Norway. Stewart was then serving with the Second Major Naval Base Defence Organisation (MNBDO II) a formation held in readiness to organize the defence of any captured naval harbours abroad and was eager to join a unit that looked like it would soon see action. Hasler’s two chosen section commanders, Lt J. W Mackinnon and Lt W. A. Pritchard-Gordon, were enthusiastic young officers not long out of training. The bulk of the RMBPD were recruited from volunteers of the Plymouth Division. Hasler selected two sergeants, three corporals and 28 marines as being suitable. They were formed into a squad and put through a course of parade training, swimming, PE and initiative exercises. During this period a few dropped out and some replacements were added to the original group. At the end of the course 23 marines were finally selected to join the unit. This number was three in excess of establishment, but it was proposed to weed out the surplus during future training. On 23 July they moved to their new headquarters in Southsea.

  Hasler’s RMBPD was located in two Nissen huts alongside the old Victorian Lumps Fort. The site was on the promenade of the seaside resort, just yards from the beach right opposite the Eastern Boom, which stretched across the Solent from the fort to Seaview on the Isle of Wight. Throughout its six-mile, dog-legged course the boom’s posts and underwater obstacles restricted seagoing traffic entering the Solent. A few hundred yards to the east was the Royal Marine Barracks at Eastney. Two miles to the west, the Royal Navy’s major dockyard at Portsmouth dominated the scene.

  The men were billeted in nearby private residences. They had been given the same privileges as commandos and would receive the six shillings and eight pence per day for their accommodation and subsistence. Such an arrangement gave the men a degree of independence, but also required them to show great responsibility. They were expected to be self-reliant and not to abuse the privilege of being free from service life when off duty. They were given this commando allowance in recognition of the fact that their training and work would consist of many night exercises, with unconventional hours for eating and sleeping. As their training progressed it would also be necessary for them to frequently change their locations. Another major factor was that the small unit had no personnel for non-operational administrative duties – no cooks, guards or anyone to do fatigues. The officers would likewise live away from normal messes and barracks, located in a private apartment overlooking Southsea Boating Lake.

  OPERATION FRANKTON OFFICERS

  Maj H. G. ‘Blondie’ Hasler

  Herbert George ‘Blondie’ Hasler was born in Dublin on 27 February 1914. His father was a Warrant Officer in the Royal Army Medical Corps who was drowned when his ship was torpedoed en route to Salonika in 1917. From an early age Hasler became involved in working with small craft, sailing boats and canoes and these craft remained his main interest for the rest of his life. Blondie Hasler was commissioned into the Royal Marines in 1932. His early military career saw him serve with the Mobile Naval Base Unit in Egypt in 1935/36. He was promoted to captain just before war broke out and served as Fleet Landing Officer at Scapa Flow. He later took part in Anglo/French operations at Narvik in Norway where he was awarded the OBE and the Croix de Guerre as well as being Mentioned in Dispatches. After Operation Frankton he continued with the development of small craft for military purposes. Post-war he achieved great recognition for his work in the field of yachting, most notably for his development work in self-steeringgear. He died in 1987.

  Lt J. W. Mackinnon

  Jack Mackinnon w
as born in Oban in Argyllshire on 15 July 1921 and later lived in Glasgow with his parents. He joined the Royal Marines after working in an office before the war. He served in the ranks for almost two years before earning his commission in early 1942. Mackinnon passed out of officer training school almost at the top of his intake and was quickly brought to the notice of Blondie Hasler when he was looking for fit young officers to join his new unit. Operation Frankton was to be Mackinnon’s first action.

  Prior to the arrival of the main body, one sergeant, two corporals and three marines, previously selected at Plymouth by Hasler, moved to Southsea to become qualified trainers. Maj Hasler had discovered that there were no instructors available for small boat work other than him, so he began the task of training these men to become trainers. For three weeks he put the marines and his officers through a stiff programme of sea training as well as learning how to handle canoes, assault boats, RAF dinghies and many other craft, in all weathers, during daylight hours as well as at night.

  Dolphin Court, overlooking the boating lake at Southsea. Maj Hasler and his officers of the RMBPD were housed in the first-floor apartment on the extreme right of the building. The boating lake had itself some small claim to fame during the early part of the war, for initial development work to deal with the then new threat of German magnetic mines was carried out on the lake in rowing boats by men from the mine warfare section of HMS Vernon. (Ken Ford)

  The ground beside the old Victorian coast defences of Lumps Fort at Southsea. In this area the RMBPD was housed in Nissen huts just a few yards from the beach. The base was right opposite the Eastern Boom defences that guarded the anchorage of the Solent and the entrance to the Royal Navy’s premier dockyard at Portsmouth. The remains of this boom can still be seen today marching out across the Solent to the Isle of Wight. (Ken Ford)

  When the bulk of his unit arrived Hasler still continued to be fully engaged in helping the men and the instructors obtain proficiency in seamanship, small-arms fire, handling explosives, swimming (including breaststroke, freestyle, surface diving and lifesaving) as well as general physical training. The major was insistent that the men obtain improved muscle development, particularly in the arms. Good physical condition was paramount; the unit was on course to be the fittest in the whole corps.

  Hasler’s system was to demonstrate the correct method in all things, then allow the class to carry out his lesson before commentating on their performance. He dictated notes on all aspects of this training, which were subsequently used as instructors’ handbooks, as much of what was being taught lay outside that contained in the normal navy and army textbooks. In time Hasler handed all of his training work over to his officers and the instructors so that he could concentrate on his role as commander. Each week all ranks were given a personal report pointing out their strengths and weaknesses. Throughout this specialized training it was never forgotten that all of them belonged to the Royal Marines. The regular non-commissioned officers (NCOs) ensured that parade-ground behaviour and the long-established demeanour of the corps were maintained throughout.

  The RMBPD had primarily been raised to train on the explosive motor boat and to develop methods of using this type of craft to attack enemy ships. The development of a British-designed craft was underway with Vosper Shipbuilders, and Hasler continued to monitor its progress at the same time as he was schooling his fledgling unit in the black arts of clandestine operations. Various ideas for deploying the BPB were considered, including the possibility of dropping it from an aircraft close to its target. Such development work took a considerable amount of time to evolve and it became clear that the new weapon would not be available to be used operationally for a long while. In the meantime Hasler continued with his idea of using canoes in an offensive role. Indeed, much of the training undertaken by the unit revolved around the use of these cockles.

  The Cockle Mk I originally used by the RMBPD had several limitations as it was somewhat fragile and prone to develop leaks. Hasler was fully aware of these faults and had been working on a replacement for some time. The major felt that covert operations in enemy territory needed a craft of more robust construction with certain features added for this particular function. Across the Solent at Cowes on the Isle of Wight the aircraft manufacturer Saunders Rowe (SARO) had experience in fabric and plywood design in their SARO Laminated Woods subsidiary. It was to this company, and in particular their works manager Fred Goatley, that Maj Hasler turned regarding the building of a new type of cockle.

  Hasler needed a strong two-man canoe with a rigid bottom that could be dragged across rough ground such as a shingle beach without tearing out its underside. It had to be capable of carrying a 150lb load, handling rough water and staying afloat when swamped. As it was likely to need transporting to its operational area by stealth, its beam or width had to be sufficiently narrow to allow it to pass through the forward torpedo hatch of a submarine. The craft would also need to lie low in the water with a slender silhouette.

  Maj Hasler and Capt Stewart use single paddles to ‘walk’ a Cockle Mk II down the beach and into the water. This method of launching the canoe demonstrates the sturdy construction of the craft and the success of the wooden runners along its keel, which enable the cockle to be manhandled across rough ground. (Royal Marines Museum Collection)

  While Hasler and his team trained together and bonded into an efficient unit, the problem of the German blockade runners was still causing great concern within the corridors of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. The Minister, Lord Selborne, wrote to the Prime Minister’s Office on 9 May, followed up by another letter on 22 June, pleading for something to be done regarding the enemy seaborne traffic. Six weeks later, on 5 August, an even more urgent minute was dispatched to the Prime Minister. Lord Selborne was gravely concerned with the scale of traffic between Germany and Japan and the effect their exchange of goods and services was having upon the war potential of the two Axis powers. ‘Hardly a day passes,’ wrote the minister, ‘without my seeing convincing proof of the determination of both countries to execute their programme. Now Italy, too, is planning to resuscitate her starved war industries with raw materials from the Far East. The importance of this traffic is no less today than when I wrote my previous minutes. If immediate action could be taken it should not be too late.’ Once again the problem was passed over to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and once again the difficulties in dealing with the dilemma were considered by the various services, before being put aside yet again. The problem also settled on the desks of the planners at Combined Operations. The mission had already been given the title Operation Frankton, but no clear method had been devised as to how it could be solved. In the planning department, LtCol Horton continued to ponder long and hard as to how the enemy blockade runners could be eliminated by the light forces of Combined Operations.

  PLANNING AND TRAINING

  In addition to the training already discussed, the War Diary of RMBPD shows that they also received instruction in navigation, including tides and winds, and their effect on small craft, chart reading, the use of a compass as well as an understanding of compass deviations and magnetic variations. This training was first put into practice on 10 August, when No. 1 Section attempted to reach the Isle of Wight in canoes during rough weather. The attempt failed, as high winds and rough seas swamped the three boats. The crews managed to climb out of their craft and swim to the boom to await rescue, and a passing boat from HMS Dolphin patrol later picked them up. Fortunately all three canoes were salvaged later that day. The experience showed that the group still had much to learn, and training continued daily to hone the skills required for clandestine offensive action.

  Two months into the life of the unit the Cockle Mk II was available in prototype form and put through a tough testing regime. By then all the men had been trained in various techniques associated with stealth operations and were at a peak of physical fitness. The RMBPD had become an elite unit, full of confidence in its own abilities. There was sti
ll no sign of the explosive motor boats being ready for deployment, so work continued on sharpening their operational skills in other small craft, most notably canoes. At this stage there was still some way to go before all men were up to speed on navigation and seamanship, but they were gradually perfecting all the other attributes of a close-knit fighting team.

  On 18 September Maj Hasler was passing through London and had the chance to drop into COHQ in Richmond Terrace. He met with Col Robert Neville, the Chief Planning Coordinator. Hasler informed Neville that his team was making such good progress that they were almost ready to undertake an operation. Neville was reportedly surprised that the unit was ready after such a short time and, although it was probably premature at this stage, allowed Hasler to view a few files outlining possible raids then under consideration. Hasler studied the proposals but did not consider any of them suitable for the particular skills of his unit.

  A few days later Col Neville informed his senior planner, LtCol Horton, about Hasler’s visit and the work he was doing on creating a team suitable for small craft operations. Horton realized that perhaps Hasler’s team could provide the solution to the blockade busters. On 21 September Hasler returned to COHQ to be given the news that there was an operation under consideration that might interest him. Hasler was given the file on Operation Frankton and asked to try to put together a workable plan to undertake the mission.

  Two crewmen from the RMBPD exercising in a Cockle Mk II off Lumps Fort at Southsea. One of the Nissen huts that formed the unit’s base and the steps leading to the beach can be seen in the mid-background. (Royal Marines Museum Collection)