by Ken Ford
Royal Marines inspect the large amount of kit required for a raid. This picture, showing men from the RMBPD, was taken at Southsea post-Operation Frankton. The canoe in the rear is a later three-man cockle. (Royal Marines Museum Collection)
After two days of preparation and briefing, the cockles set out in darkness for their long journey to the ships tied up in the basins at Deptford. The exercise was not a success; right from the start things began to go wrong. Navigation was poor and the canoes soon lost sight of each other, meandering off course and into the open sea. After five nights the craft all arrived at Blackwall some three miles short of their objective, where the exercise was abandoned. All the men were exhausted and almost incapable of carrying on. Every canoe had been spotted on their way up the river and challenged at least twice. With the exercise an abject failure, the men of No. 1 Section were demoralized. On 15 November they were back at Southsea while Hasler attended a post-mortem on the failed operation at COHQ.
Four days later the whole team returned to Scotland together with the cockles ready to continue with the training programme. Hasler knew that he had only 11 days to iron out the causes of the failures identified during Operation Blanket. The rest of his team, including Lt Mackinnon, remained oblivious to the fact that they would be embarking on an operational sortie in a short amount of time.
One of the main reasons for the failure of Operation Blanket was navigation. The crews were not sufficiently skilled in calculating positions during periods of severe limitations. It took special expertise to keep station in a small canoe and plot a course while low in the water, in complete darkness, at the mercy of running tides and in appalling weather. This capability now had to be improved and all of No. 1 Section received special tuition from the Navigating Officer of HMS Forth.
After the exhaustions of the exercise up the River Thames, physical fitness was back on the agenda with route marches over the nearby hills, as well as weapons handling and stealth technique training. There was also further familiarization with the placing of limpet mines and the drills required to fuse them. Arming this explosive device required complete concentration and the team practised the method by numbered stages until all could accomplish the task blindfolded. Hasler was well aware that he was pushing the men hard, especially when they were still in the dark regarding the planned operation.
After a week back in Scotland Hasler decided to grant the men a break from the pressurized rounds of training. He called them together and announced that they all had shore leave for one night, to use and abuse as they thought fit. There was just one proviso: they all had to be ready and fit for duty in the morning.
THE RAID
The submarine that had been allocated by 3rd Submarine Flotilla for Operation Frankton, HMS Tuna, berthed alongside the support ship HMS Forth on 25 November. Hasler and his team could now familiarize themselves with the crew and the vessel that would take them to France.
HMS Tuna was commanded by Lt Richard Raikes. She was a T-Class submarine with the pennant number N94. The vessel had been launched on 10 May 1940 and had been commanded by Lt Raikes since 24 August 1942. The submarine had a number of kills to its credit during two years of patrols: the German merchant ship Tirrana (ex Norwegian), the German Ostmark and the French tug Chaissiron had all been sunk by Tuna. Earlier that year, on 10 March, Raikes, then in command of the patrolling S-Class submarine HMS Seawolf, had sighted the German battleship Tirpitz. Though his submarine was too far away to engage Tirpitz, his enemy-locating report enabled the carrier Victorious to attack the enemy capital ship with her Albacore torpedo-bombers.
Lt Raikes received his final operational orders for Frankton on 26 November, detailing the timings and objectives of the raid. HMS Tuna would sail on 30 November for a normal patrol in the Bay of Biscay with Hasler’s party. Tuna was ordered to attack at all times if any enemy forces were encountered. If such an attack were to prejudice the successful implementation of Frankton, then the operation should be considered cancelled.
It was essential that the raid be conducted at a time of ‘no moon’. During this period the first possible night was 5/6 December and the last possible night was 12/13 December. Raikes was ordered to disembark the Royal Marine party with their canoes off the mouth of the River Gironde at a position just south of the minefield laid by the RAF. The actual night chosen would depend on a number of factors, the most important of which was the state of the weather. It was also vital to release the cockles so that they would enter the Gironde during a period of slack water. It would be impossible for the canoes to be paddled into the mouth of the river against an ebb tide.
HMS Tuna (Pennant No. N94) lying inside the submarine HMS Tigris (Pennant No. N63) at Holy Loch. Both submarines are tied up next to their supply ship HMS Forth readying themselves for their next operational voyages. HMS Tigris was later stationed in the Mediterranean where she was sunk in February 1943 by the German submarine chaser UJ2210. (IWM A6586)
During the last few days of November 1942, time was spent by the men of No. 1 Section finalizing their training and preparing for an operation. The method of stowing cockles inside the submarine and disembarking them through the forward hatch was now practised in HMS Tuna. The compasses in the canoes were checked for deviation, while the cockles were fully loaded with their complete stores and sets of limpet mines. The marines familiarized themselves with the stowage of these stores and equipment inside the cockles so that even in the dark they could locate any item that they needed. Further practice also took place on the fusing and setting of limpet mines until this could be done quickly and confidently, almost without thought. In addition the cockles received their final coat of camouflage paint, a scheme of dark-green and black irregular patterns and shapes.
The six canoes had been given names beginning with ‘C’ and organized into two divisions. Division A contained Catfish with Maj Hasler and Marine Sparks, Crayfish crewed by Cpl Laver and Marine Mills, and Conger with Corporal Sheard and Marine Moffat. Division B comprised Cuttlefish containing Lt Mackinnon and Marine Conway, Coalfish with Sgt Wallace and Marine Ewart, and finally Cachalot with Marine Ellery and Marine Fisher.
By this time Lt Mackinnon was well aware that an operation was imminent, although he had no knowledge of where the target was or what was involved. The men had also heard rumours that something was in the air and as the date for departure drew near it became increasingly obvious. The final clue was the order to sew on to the sleeves of their clothing their badges of rank: the Royal Marine shoulder flashes and Commando badge showing an anchor, a rifle and a set of wings.
The Sea Voyage
On the morning of 30 November, Maj Hasler and his team of 13 men – Marine Norman Colley was embarked with the rest of No. 1 Section as a ‘spare man’ should anyone have to drop out – all boarded HMS Tuna and settled into their quarters. At 1030 hours the submarine slipped away from its parent ship HMS Forth and eased out of Holy Loch into the River Clyde. Once clear of the river the submarine turned to starboard and made for the Inchmarnock exercise area between the Isle of Arran and the mainland. Here in sheltered waters Lt Raikes stopped his submarine and allowed the crews to practise embarking the cockles. Two separate hoists were made with all of the fully loaded canoes. Finally, one more swinging of each boat’s compasses was made to take account of the metal from the stowed limpet mines and other metal stores. From this exercise Raikes was able to determine that it would be likely that the whole operation of disembarking the cockles would take just under an hour to complete while at sea without damage to the canoes.
That evening as the submarine motored south Hasler called all his men together and finally gave them details of the raid they were to undertake. When it was revealed that the target was German shipping tied up in the port of Bordeaux 60 miles from the sea, they immediately recognized its similarity to Operation Blanket in the Thames some weeks previously. They agreed that it was a task well within their means to accomplish successfully. Maj Hasler also gave an
overview of the operation using maps and aerial photographs. The only aspect of the forthcoming operation that dampened their enthusiasm was the planned overland escape via Spain. The thought of travelling hundreds of miles through territory occupied by any number of people hostile to their cause, not to mention the enemy soldiers in control of the region, unsurprisingly caused some disquiet. Each man was to be issued with a bag containing escape equipment including a compass and some local currency but Hasler stressed that each crew must move in pairs independently of the others. Two men together would be less conspicuous; any more and the party would attract notice from the locals as well as the security forces. Arrangements for their escape had been made with the French Resistance, with each two-man crew having to make their way approximately 100 miles north to the small town of Ruffec, where a lookout from the Resistance would be waiting for their arrival. The men would then be handed over to the established escape organization that ran across the country to the Spanish border, organized by the enigmatic ‘Marie-Claire’.
A Cockle Mk I being manoeuvred down the torpedo hatch of a submarine. One of the most important parameters of the newer Cockle Mk II that Hasler helped to design was that it had to be able to pass through this hatch unhindered. During the operation, the canoe manned by Marines Ellery and Fisher snagged on some protrusion while coming through the hatch and was damaged to such an extent that it could not take part in the attack. (IWM MH 227515)
To add to their concerns none of the men, with the exception of Hasler, spoke French. Naturally Hasler offered the men the opportunity to drop out but it was always unlikely that anyone would take him up on the offer after such intensive training.
Over the coming days of voyage, Hasler went into further detail with every man to ensure that they were familiar with every aspect of the operation. From leaving the submarine until inside the estuary, the two divisions would move as one group, with A Division leading in an arrowhead formation followed by B Division, also in an arrowhead. Once inside the river Hasler would determine which side of the waterway would be taken for the first lying-up place. At some point after this he would also give final instructions to the CO of B Division (Lt Mackinnon), who would then proceed independently with his three canoes for the rest of the operation. Hasler stressed that if any canoe became separated from its party, then it was to carry on with the mission – alone, if necessary. Furthermore, if any cockle got into difficulties that would compromise the operation then it was to be scuttled and its crew left to make their own escape.
Lt Richard Raikes, commander of the submarine HMS Tuna. The 30-year-old Raikes had previously commanded the submarine HMS Seawolf before taking over HMS Tuna and was later attached to the staff of the RAF Coastal Command. At the end of the war Raikes took part in Operation Deadlight, the scuttling of over 100 captured German U-boats in the waters to the north of Ireland. (IWM A14400)
Hasler made it clear that the primary objective of the raid was to attack the largest of the merchant ships found in the harbour. The secondary objectives were to attack tankers and any lesser merchant targets of opportunity. Once the canoes had arrived in the port, the crews were to attack the enemy ships in three areas: Bordeaux west bank, Bordeaux east bank and Bassens North and South, which were located just downstream from the main harbour. To ensure that there was no duplication of effort, one boat from each division was to attack in each of these areas, with A Division’s cockles placing their limpets on the upstream side of enemy ships, while the crews of B Division attached their mines to the downstream sides.
There were a few notes of caution for the men. If the submarine was surprised on the surface by the enemy during the embarkation process and its commander thought it necessary to dive, those cockles already launched would continue with the operation independently. In view of the possible danger, Maj Hasler’s canoe was the first to be floated clear, followed by Lt Mackinnon’s and then those of the NCOs. Hasler outlined the enemy forces that might be encountered: two armed trawlers patrolling the estuary; coast defences either side of the mouth of the river; searchlight batteries on the coast and alongside German flak batteries; up to six minesweepers and escort vessels based at Le Verdon; and a number of lighter motor craft moving up and down the river. There might also be the chance of U-boats moving to and from their base at Bordeaux. Wherever possible the canoes were to move inshore of the buoyed channel mid-river where most of this traffic was likely to be encountered.
Finally there was also the danger of observation from the air as there were three German airfields in the locality, at Hourtain, Bordeaux and Royan. During daylight hours, it was imperative that the crews remained motionless and their boats were well camouflaged. As HMS Tuna journeyed south, the RMBPD pored over charts and aerial photographs of the Gironde and the final approaches to Bordeaux up the River Garonne. Colour-coded maps were distributed, which showed which stretches of the river were likely to pose a risk from enemy forces and which were expected to be safe. Some simple instructions in the basics of the French language were taught by Hasler to give the men a chance of making contact with the civilian population. The intricacies of the Number 3 code used by downed airmen and POW escapees were also explained. This imaginative method of sending signals back to England via the French Resistance would let the authorities at home know of the success or otherwise of the raid and inform them who was alive and free in occupied territory.
During the afternoon of Sunday 6 December Lt Raikes brought HMS Tuna to the area south of the Gironde estuary and surfaced to periscope depth. He knew at least that he was clear of both the minefield sown by the RAF and those of the enemy, but he had to get a visual fix to establish his exact position before releasing Hasler’s party. The sky was overcast and the sea was smooth with just a slight swell. Raikes was concerned that his periscope would leave a long trail across the flat calm of the ocean, which would be easily spotted by fishing vessels and other craft in the area, but he was compelled to creep up the coast to search the shoreline for some identifiable features that would help determine his exact position.
The land was completely devoid of anything that Raikes could recognize; all that was visible was a featureless line of pine trees and sand dunes, occasionally broken by a small village with a nondescript church spire. His vessel could be close to the minefields or miles to the south, it was impossible to tell. After some time creeping along the coast Raikes realized that he was risking the operation, as every minute he motored northwards brought him closer to the minefields. He dived below periscope depth and eased his vessel out to sea. The operation would have to be delayed by 24 hours and he would have to try again later that night to get a fix by the stars. He later explained his predicament in his after-action report: ‘The night of the 6/7 proved impossible, as I was completely unable to establish my position with sufficient certainty and it was imperative to be dead accurate. This was unfortunate as conditions were quite perfect, a nice mist coming down immediately after dark.’
Just before dawn on the 7th, the submarine surfaced and Raikes was able to get a good star fix on his position. He dived again and began working his vessel slowly north so that by 1345 hours he was able to get an accurate visual fix. There were a number of fishing boats in the area and Raikes used his periscope sparingly to avoid his presence being reported to the enemy. There was also a danger from above: ‘Air activity by ME 110s, ME 109s, JU 88s and Dornier 18s throughout the day was intense,’ he was later to write. ‘The surface was oily calm with a long swell.’ It looked as though all would be well for the release of the canoes that night and Hasler was given the good news.
Just after nightfall, at 1800 hours, a German armed trawler was spotted patrolling along a line north-west to south-east, right through the intended position for disembarkation. Raikes decided to release the cockles a little closer to the shore, nearer the RAF’s minefield than he had originally intended. He was now confident that his position would be ‘dead accurate’. Hasler was delighted with the new site fo
r disembarkation as it was closer to the shore and nearer the mouth of the estuary. But Raikes still had some doubts about his decision: ‘I don’t think those mines could have been laid in a more embarrassing position,’ he later recorded, ‘as they seemed to interfere with every possible plan of action from the very start. This plan quite evidently required extreme accuracy in navigation even allowing for the touching faith of the authorities in the accuracy of the positions given by the RAF – a faith which I did not share.’
At 1917 hours, Raikes brought his submarine to the surface in position 45° 22’ N – 1° 14’W, around four miles off the coast. He swept the horizon through a cold clear night to look for danger and saw that the enemy trawler was four miles further away out to sea. He was confident that his submarine was invisible to it, a dark outline against the dark shore. Everything else was clear, the sea a flat calm. Raikes called Hasler up to the conning tower and gave him the good news: disembarkation could proceed as planned. Raikes asked the Royal Marine officer, ‘Are you happy to go?’ ‘Yes,’ replied Hasler. They shook hands and wished each other luck. There was no turning back now.
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
1 Placing rod for limpet mines (collapsed and extended)
2 Fuse box for limpet mines
3 Limpet mine
4 Magnetic hand-hold
5 Two-part paddle (connected)
6 Magnetic compass
7 Cockle MK II
One of the raiders from the Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment dressed and equipped for the raid. Underneath his external clothing he wears normal battledress. His all–weather anorak jacket is designed with an elasticated waist to fit over the circular opening in the cockle to make the cockpit watertight. His waders and boots are welded together in one piece to make them waterproof. The items shown around him were for the offensive part of the mission. Also carried in the canoe during the raid were sufficient supplies of water and food as well as maps, photographs and escape equipment.
