by Ken Ford
One by one the cockles were brought out of the submarine through the forward hatch and lined up on deck. The last to come up was Hasler’s canoe, Catfish, which was placed underneath the submarine’s deck guns so as to be first on the hoist and first into the water. Final preparations were made to the cockles, buoyancy bags inflated and the last of the stores loaded. During the process a major problem was discovered. The fabric of Cachalot was torn as it came through the hatch and the subsequent damage made it impossible for the boat to continue with the raid. With a heavy heart Hasler informed Marines Ellery and Fisher that they would be left behind. Operation Frankton had suffered its first casualty, reducing the raiding party to just five canoes.
A few miles to the north-east, just north of Pointe de la Négade, the German radar station W310 at Soulac-sur-Mer was monitoring the approaches to the Gironde estuary and beyond. As HMS Tuna surfaced, her sudden appearance was immediately spotted by enemy RDF operators and her presence reported to Kapitän zur See Max Gebauner, German Sea Defence Commandant Gascony. Gebauner was at that very moment at his headquarters in Royan just across the mouth of the river, dining with German Naval Commander-in-Chief Western France, Admiral Johannes Bachmann. The admiral was in Royan prior to inspecting four of Gebauner’s Chasseur-type submarine-chasers the next day, which were then lying at anchor across the estuary off Le Verdon. When news of the British submarine’s appearance was given to Gebauner, he ordered the coast defences batteries to be alerted and for all searchlight batteries to switch on their lights and sweep the area of the sea off the coast. All Hasler’s boats were out on the upper deck of the submarine by 1945 hours. Raikes trimmed down his vessel to ease the launching process and the cockles began to be lowered gently into the sea complete with their crews and all stores. Just as Hasler’s craft was suspended in the slings ready to be swung out, a searchlight on the coast near Pointe de la Négade came on and began sweeping across the still waters. Then another burst into life and then another until all the enemy’s lights on that stretch of the coast were fully illuminated. Raikes was still confident that the trimmed-down silhouette of his submarine could not be seen, but the sweeping lights gave a keener sense of urgency to the disembarkation process. A short while later Raikes was told by his lookout that it seemed as though the armed trawler had been informed by the shore battery that something was afoot and was now closing on the submarine.
The crew of the QF 4-inch gun onboard HMS Tuna during a training session. It was this gun that was used as a hoist to lift the fully loaded cockles into the sea during Operation Frankton. (IWM D12466)
Lt Bull, the deck officer controlling the launching of the cockles, remained outwardly unperturbed as he quietly and efficiently continued organizing the lowering of each boat into the water. After 25 minutes the torturous process was complete. Maj Hasler brought all of his canoes into formation, waved goodbye to the conning tower and made for the shore. Lt Raikes watched as the small craft were swallowed up by the dark night. ‘At 2020 hours I waved “au revoir” to a magnificent bunch of black faced villains with whom it has been a real pleasure to work, and, withdrew to the south and west,’ wrote the submarine’s commander in his report. The five cockles were on their own.
The Journey Upriver
Maj Hasler led his five cockles in formation through a calm sea towards the mouth of the Gironde. There was still some 10 miles to negotiate before they entered the river. The clear December night had brought the temperature down to near freezing, but regular paddle strokes gradually warmed up the marines and loosened muscles that had stiffened in the cramped conditions of the submarines. Hasler steered the group to a point two miles west of Pointe de la Négade and after three and a half hours of paddling, with five-minute rests each hour, at 2350 hours the cockles passed over some turbulence caused by the shallows of the Banc des Olives. The steep rollers caused by the ground swell had been marked on their navigation maps and were negotiated without any problems.
Once clear of the shallows, Hasler moved his little fleet nearer to land and proceeded northwards closer to the shore. ‘We followed the line of the coast, now clearly visible about a mile and a half away,’ wrote the major in his after-action report. ‘Shortly afterwards the sound of broken water ahead indicated a tidal race. This came as an unpleasant surprise, not having been apparent from the chart or the Sailing Directions. Owing to the strength of the stream there was no chance of avoiding the race, which proved to be quite severe for such small craft.’
A natural occurrence formed when a fast-moving tide passes through a constriction such as a narrow channel, the tidal race produced a stretch of broken water with strong swirling undercurrents and waves 4–5ft high. The Cockle Mk II was well able to weather this provided it crested each wave and the cockpit cover was securely fastened, but the men had not been trained to tackle this sort of unexpected obstacle. There was nothing for it but to plod ahead through the maelstrom, using the paddles to keep the boat head on into the waves.
Hasler’s canoe was first through the disturbance to emerge into calmer water. He kept station waiting for the others to catch up. One by one they reported through and gathered around his craft. A quick head count found that Coalfish containing Sgt Wallace and Marine Ewart was missing. The canoes spread out to look for it but there was no sign of the cockle on the now still water. Hasler reasoned that since both men and the boat had buoyancy equipment, it was possible that the craft had not capsized but had turned further inshore when they found themselves separated from the group. Hasler knew nothing more could be done to find the missing cockle. He called all the boats back into formation and once again set course for the Gironde estuary. Operation Frankton was now down to just four canoes.
Coalfish had indeed survived the tidal race, but Sgt Wallace and Marine Ewart’s craft was now well out of position and close to shore. The two marines had lost direction and were confused, but they carried on with the operation, continuing as best they could towards the Gironde estuary. Sometime later that night their canoe was swept inshore and swamped, most likely by another tidal race. The two men were tipped into the sea and had to swim for shore, making landfall in an exhausted and dispirited state near Pointe de Grave. Hasler and the remaining cockles had meanwhile paddled on towards the estuary of the Gironde. A short while after being hit by the first tidal race they were hit again. Another rush of broken water, even stronger than the first, loomed up out of the night and plunged the canoes into another swirling nightmare. Great walls of water crashed over the boats and it took all the muscle power available to each man to try to keep the prow of his craft head on to the running sea. Within a few minutes the leading cockle was through. As Hasler emerged on the far side he took a roll call and found that Conger had capsized, throwing Cpl Sheard and Marine Moffat into the icy water. The buoyancy bags kept the cockle afloat, but despite the best efforts of the men in the other canoes it proved impossible to bale out the flooded craft.
The Cockles and their Crews
Catfish Maj Hasler and Marine Sparks Target: Bordeaux West Bank
Cuttlefish Lt Mackinnon and Marine Conway Target: Bordeaux West Bank
Crayfish Cpl Laver and Marine Mills Target: Bordeaux East Bank
Coalfish Sgt Wallace and Marine Ewart Target: Bordeaux East Bank
Conger Cpl Sheard and Marine Moffat Target: Bassens North and South
Cachalot Marine Fisher and Marine Ellery Target: Bassens North and South
KEY
Route of cockles from launching point to Bordeaux
Withdrawal route after the attack
DAILY HIDES AND LANDING PLACES
1 1st Day: 0730–2330 hours, 8 December
2 2nd Day: 0645–1845 hours, 9 December
3 2nd Day: 2045 hours, 9 December–0200 hours, 10 December
4 3rd Day: 0730–1900 hours, 10 December
5 4th Day: 2300 hours, 10 December–2115 hours, 11 December
6 5th Day: 0600 hours, 12 December – the start of the overland esc
ape
EVENTS
1 Pointe de Grave lighthouse
2 German inshore naval base at LeVer-don-sur-Mer
3 Launching point from HMS Tuna (2022 hours, 7 December)
4 First tidal race
5 Second tidal race
6 Third tidal race
THE LOSS OF THE COCKLES
1 Coalfish – Wallace and Ewart lost
2 Conger – Sheard and Moffat lost
3 Cuttlefish – Mackinnon and Conway separated
4 Cuttlefish – Mackinnon and Conway’s cockle sunk off Bec d’Ambès
THE APPROACH: THE COCKLES’ ROUTE UP THE RIVER GARONNE
8–12 DECEMBER 1942
At 2020 hours on 7th December 1942, the submarine HMS Tuna launched five small cockles onto a hostile sea off the French coast. So began an epic journey for their Royal Marine crews which led them up the Gironde and Garonne Rivers towards their target. The operation involved five long days of cramped hiding places and five exhausting nights of paddling before they reached their goal and finally confronted the German blockade busters moored along the supposedly safe quays at Bordeaux.
An original Cockle Mk II, now preserved in the Combined Military Services Museum at Maldon in Essex. The canoe on display has been identified as being one from the batch constructed by SARO for use by the RMBPD and recent research shows that it is most likely the cockle Cachalot, which was damaged while being passed through the hatch onboard HMS Tuna during the raid. (Courtesy of Richard Wooldridge, Combined Military Services Museum)
Hasler now had a serious problem. The men in the water could not be taken aboard any of the other craft and they were already suffering the effects of the cold sea. The major knew that they were likely to die of exposure if they were left in the water for too long. He later described what happened next: ‘An effort was made to tow the two swimmers somewhat further inshore. During this proceeding the tide had carried the party round the Pointe de Grave, more than a quarter mile off shore, and through a third, but less violent, tide race. The lighthouse on the point had been switched on at full strength and lit up the scene quite brilliantly for a time.’ Fortunately, although bathed periodically in its dazzling white beam of the light, they were not seen by the enemy.
They were now just inside the estuary and the task of towing the men through the water was slowing down the whole enterprise. Hasler felt that he had done all he could; it was now time to let them go. He explained the situation to the two unfortunate marines, wished them good luck and told them to make for the shore, believing that the tide would carry them close to the mole at Le Verdon.
Once adrift from the main party, the tide did indeed carry the two men towards the shore, but they both succumbed to exposure before reaching it. Their lifeless bodies swirled around in the eddying currents and were eventually swept back out to sea on the next tide. Days later the body of Marine Moffat was found on a beach 50 miles to the north at Sables d’Olonne. No trace of Cpl Sheard was ever found. Operation Frankton was now down to just three canoes.
The site of Maj Hasler’s first daytime hide at Pointe dux Oiseaux on the left bank of the River Gironde. The exit of the small creek that leads up to the fishing village of St Vivian can be seen on the right. The state of the tides shows the three-quarters of a mile of sandy mud over which the canoes had to be dragged on the second night of the raid. (Ken Ford)
The setbacks had compromised Hasler’s timetable and he now knew that there was not enough time to make it across the river to his preferred route along the east bank that night. Worse still, the tide had carried them close into the western shore and was taking them dangerously near the tiny port of Le Verdon. Ahead he could see the long mole jutting out into the river and knew that it was probably guarded by sentries. Hasler now struggled in the fast-flowing tide to bring the three remaining craft away from the mole, and as he did so he was surprised to see the shapes of several much larger naval vessels anchored in a line ahead of him. The party had almost run into Kapitän zur See Max Gebauner’s four inshore vessels, which were lined up ready for inspection that day by Admiral Bachmann.
Hasler called his three canoes together and pointed out the problems. They would have to pass between the German warships and the mole, all of which could well have lookouts scanning the river. He proposed that they should go through this defile singly, separated by several hundred yards, using only single paddles and keeping as low a profile as possible. Catfish would lead the way, followed by Crayfish and then Lt Mackinnon’s Cuttlefish.
The first two cockles negotiated the danger zone without incident, joining together once they were clear of the threat. There was some activity on one of the German ships as Hasler’s canoe passed through and for a short moment a signal lamp began winking out a message to the shore, but nothing untoward happened to make them think they had been spotted. Further upstream the two craft paused for the third boat to meet up with them. They waited and waited, but there was no sign of Cuttlefish. It looked as though Mackinnon’s boat had lost formation and passed the other two craft further out on the river. While they waited they thought they heard a shout and it was later suggested that a shot had been fired, but there was no sign of alarm on the river, which led Hasler to believe that Lt Mackinnon had been seen. He was sure that the young lieutenant was somewhere out on the river and would proceed with the operation alone. Hasler’s group was now down to just two cockles.
Once clear of Le Verdon, the four Royal Marines set course down the west bank, keeping a careful check on the time to ensure that the two canoes reached their initial hide, wherever it might be, well before daylight. Their first attempt to land at around 0630 hours resulted in failure. As they approached the shore their way was barred by a shingle bank topped by a line of stakes. The next attempt some time later was more successful. A small promontory jutted out into the Gironde and, on the small patch of sand that formed the beach, the tired, wet cold raiders eased their aching bodies out of their cramped cockles and collapsed from sheer exhaustion. They had paddled their way over 23 nautical miles that night and endured the rough seas of three tide races. They deserved their rest that cold December morning.
KOMMANDOBEFEHL: HITLER’S ‘KILL COMMANDOS’ ORDER
In October 1942 Hitler issued his notorious order for the execution of all British special forces personnel captured during raids. He was acting in response to reports reaching him that during a commando attack on the island of Sark, five German prisoners had been bound and killed by the raiders. Further reports later informed him that during the Dieppe raid in August 1942, Canadians had also tied the hands of a number of Germans who were later found dead. It was later thought that the Germans had been tied up as prisoners and had been killed by cross-fire during the raids and not shot out of hand by the raiders themselves. Nonetheless, Hitler was incensed by these reports and decided that this underhand and brutal treatment of German prisoners by what he called ‘saboteurs’ had to be ruthlessly punished. The order was kept as secret as possible, even though it was disseminated down the chain of command, so no written copies were to be kept. It was issued in a limited number of controlled copies, each of which was prefaced with a covering note: ‘After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above authorities must hand this order over to the next highest section which is responsible for its confiscation and destruction.’
The Führer
No. 003830/42g MOST SECRET/OWK/West Führer’s Headquarters, 18.10.1942
1 For some time now our opponents have used methods of warfare, which are contrary to the International Agreement of Geneva. Especially brutal and underhand behaviour is shown by the so-called Commandos who, it has been proved, have been recruited partly from released criminals in enemy countries. Captured orders yield the information that the Commandos are ordered not only to obtain prisoners but also to kill defenceless prisoners the moment they may hinder the execution of their purpose or create any other hindrance. At last orders have been found which definitel
y state that the annihilation of prisoners is required.
2 Consequently it has been declared in an Appendix to the Armed Forces Report that in future Germany will employ the same principle against British sabotage units and those of Britain’s allies. That is, wherever they operate they must be ruthlessly annihilated in battle by German troops.
3 I therefore order:
From now on in all so-called Commando operations in Europe or Africa all enemies attacked by German troops, even if it is apparently a question of soldiers in uniform or shock troops with or without arms, must be annihilated to the last man, in battle or in flight. It makes no difference whether they are landed by sea or air or dropped by parachute for these operations. Even if those particular troops, when discovered, should make attempts to surrender, any pardon is to be refused. Concerning this, the OKW Supreme Command of the Armed Forces must be notified by a detailed report in the Armed Forces communiqué, in each individual case.
4 If individual members of these Commandos should fall into the hands of the Armed Forces in a different way, as agents, saboteurs, etc. – for instance through the police force in countries occupied by us – then they must be immediately handed over to the SD (Security Services). Any custody under military protection, e.g. P.O.W. camps, etc., even if it is only a transitory measure, is strictly prohibited.
