3 THE GOP BATTLE AGAINST MULTICULTURALISM
1. “Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech,” Time, June 16, 2015, http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. This national web survey of 800 likely Republican voters was conducted by Democracy Corps & Greenberg Quinlan Rosner on February 11–16, 2016, using a voter file sample. Likely voters were determined based on whether they voted in 2012 or had registered since and stated intention of voting in 2016. Data is among those who identify as Republicans or independents who lean Republican and vote in Republican primaries or caucuses. Margin of error for the full sample is +/-3.47 percentage points at 95 percent confidence. The five categories of Republicans are mutually exclusive categories determined by respondents’ responses on ideology, religion, frequency of service attendance, strength of Tea Party support, and favorability toward the Tea Party. To ensure that the web survey accurately reflects the national Republican Party, the typologies were weighted to the average for each type from Democracy Corps’s last three national surveys.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Moderates (31 percent) consist of: (a) liberals/moderates who are neither observant Catholics, nor Tea Party supporters, nor very favorable toward the Tea Party, (b) conservatives who are neither Evangelical Republicans nor observant Catholics and do not attend religious services more than once a week who are neither Tea Party supporters nor strongly favorable toward the Tea Party. Evangelicals (30 percent) consist of Evangelical Christians who are not moderates (see above). Tea Party (17 percent) consist of strong Tea Party supporters or those very favorable toward the Tea Party who are: (a) not moderates or Evangelicals (see above); (b) liberals/moderates who are not Evangelicals and are very favorable toward the Tea Party or somewhat strong Tea Party supporters. Observant Catholics (14 percent) consist of observant Catholics or Catholics who attend services more than once a week who are not moderate, Evangelical, or Tea Party (see above). Establishment (8 percent) consists of those who are not moderate, Evangelical, Tea Party, or observant Catholic (see above).
15. Democracy Corps survey of 800 likely Republican voters, February 2016.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Drew Magary, “What the Duck?,” GQ, January 2014, https://www.gq.com/story/duck-dynasty-phil-robertson, accessed September 16, 2018.
19. TMZ, “Phil Robertson Publicly Bashed Gays for Years, A&E Knew All About It,” December 19, 2013, http://www.tmz.com/2013/12/19/phil-robertson-2010-sermon-homosexuality-gays-homophobia-a-and-e/, accessed September 16, 2018.
20. Politico, “Full Text: Donald Trump 2016 RNC Draft Speech Transcript,” July 21, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Brett LoGiurato, “The Most Vicious Ad of the 2012 Campaign Blames Mitt Romney for the Death of a Steel Worker’s Wife,” Business Insider, August 7, 2012, https://www.businessinsider.com/priorities-usa-romney-ad-cancer-death-gst-steel-bain-capital-2012-8, accessed September 18, 2018.
30. Hillary Rodham Clinton, What Happened (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), Kindle location 5747–5756.
31. Ibid.
32. Jim Abrams, “Obama Signs 3 Trade Deals, Biggest Since NAFTA,” NBC News, October 21, 2011, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44989775/ns/politics-white_house/t/obama-signs-trade-deals-biggest-nafta/, accessed September 16, 2018.
33. Mutz, “Status Threat,” figure 1, p. 5.
34. Rosa DeLauro, The Least Among Us: Waging the Battle for the Vulnerable (New York: The New Press, 2017), Kindle location 3013.
35. Ibid.
36. Donald Trump speech in Grand Rapids, Michigan, November 8, 2016, https://www.c-span.org/video/?418209-1/donald-trump-makes-final-campaign-stop-grand-rapids-michigan&start=1343; Donald Trump speech in Raleigh, North Carolina, November 7, 2016, https://www.c-span.org/video/?418210-1/donald-trump-campaigns-raleigh-north-carolina, accessed September 17, 2018.
37. Democracy Corps national survey on behalf of Public Citizen that took place October 21–24, 2016. Respondents who voted in the 2012 election or had registered since were selected from the national voter file. Likely voters were determined based on stated intention of voting the next month. Margin of error for the full sample is +/-3.27 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level. Of the 900 respondents, 65 percent were interviewed via cell phone to accurately sample the American electorate.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., with data added on this question from a Democracy Corps survey done on behalf of Public Citizen, October 2017.
40. Donald Trump speech in Franklin, Tennessee, October 3, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=B7Qy3k_WMbM.
41. Jenna Johnson, “Trump Calls for ‘Complete and Total Shutdown of Muslims Entering the United States,’” The Washington Post, December 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-entering-the-united-states/?utm_term=.caf83d445190, accessed September 17, 2018.
42. John Sides, “Race, Religion and Immigration: How the Debate over American Identity Shaped the Election and What It Means for a Trump Presidency,” June 2017, https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publications/2016-elections/race-religion-immigration-2016, pp. 7–11.
43. Democracy Corps National Web Survey of 800 2016 Trump Voters and GOP Base Voters. This web survey took place December 2–5, 2016, among eight hundred voters from 2016 who voted for Trump or non-Trump voters who identify as Republicans or independents who lean Republican and vote in Republican primaries or caucuses. Margin of error for the full sample is +/-3.47 percentage points at 95 percent confidence. Margin of error will be higher among subgroups.
44. Ibid.
45. Mutz, “Status Threat,” pp. 5–8.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., figure 1, p. 5.
48. U.S. Census Bureau, “California 2000: Census 200 Profile,” August 2002, https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kprof00-ca.pdf, accessed January 18, 2019.
49. Joel Kotkin, “The Golden State Won’t Glitter for Republicans,” City Journal, November 2, 2018, https://www.city-journal.org/california-republican-party, accessed January 18, 2019.
50. Jane Coaston, “How California Conservatives Became the Intellectual Engine of Trumpism,” Vox.com, November 13, 2018, https://www.vox.com/2018/11/19/17841946/trump-conservatism-california-gop-shapiro-midterms-2018, accessed January 17, 2019.
51. Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, and Hal Roberts, Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization in American Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
52. Ibid., Kindle locations 6369–6370.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Joshua Green, Devil’s Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and the Nationalist Uprising (New York: Penguin Press, 2017); Bob Woodward, Fear: Trump in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018).
58. Jeff Zeleny and Kevin Liptak, “Trump Warns Evangelicals of ‘Violence’ If GOP Loses in the Midterms,” CNN, August 28, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/28/politics/trump-evangelicals-midterms/index.html, accessed September 18, 2018.
59. John T. Jost, “The End of the End of Ideology,” American Psychologist 61, no. 7 (October 2006): 655, 661–62.
60. Peter Rentfrow, John Jost, Samuel Gosling, and Jeffrey Potter, “Statewide Differences in Personality Predict Voting Patterns in 1996–2004 U.S. Presidential Elections�
�� in John Jost, Aaron Kay, and Hulda Thorisdottir, eds., Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Kindle locations 4570–77.
61. Rentfrow et al., “Statewide Differences in Personality,” Kindle location 4305.
62. Pew Research Center, “The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider,” October 5, 2017, http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/1-partisan-divides-over-political-values-widen/, accessed September 12, 2018.
63. Amber Phillips, “Is Split-Ticket Voting Officially Dead?” The Washington Post, November 17, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/17/is-split-ticket-voting-officially-dead/?utm_term=.3a609616b88c, accessed September 12, 2018.
64. Pew Research Center, “The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider,” accessed September 17, 2018.
65. Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 277.
66. Ibid., p. 268.
67. Ibid., p. 267.
4 THE TEA PARTY–TRUMP DECADE
1. Nicol Rae, “The Return of Conservative Populism; The Rise of the Tea Party and Its Impact on American Politics“(2011), APSA Annual Meeting Paper; Jamie Carson and Stephen Pettigrew, “Strategic Politicians, Partisan Roll Calls, and the Tea Party: Evaluating the 2010 Midterm Elections,” Electoral Studies 32 (1), p. 35; Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right (New York: Doubleday, 2016), Kindle location 5073.
2. Jonathan Chait, “Anarchists of the House,” New York Magazine, July 21, 2013, http://nymag.com/news/features/republican-congress-2013-7/, accessed October 2, 2018.
3. Thomas Mann and Norm Ornstein, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism (New York: Perseus, 2012), Kindle location 120.
4. Vanessa Williamson and Theda Skocpol, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 159–61; Devin Burghart and Leonard Zeskind, “Tea Party Nationalism: A Critical Examination of the Tea Party Movement and the Size, Scope, and Focus of Its National Factions,” Institute for Research and Education of Human Rights (2010), p. 8.
5. John C. Berg, “President Obama, the Tea Party Movement, and the Crisis of the American Political System,” (April 29, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1879523 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1879523, pp. 3–4.
6. Burghart and Zeskind, “Tea Party Nationalism,” p. 16.
7. Williamson and Skocpol, The Tea Party and the Remaking, p. 60.
8. Williamson and Skocpol, The Tea Party and the Remaking, pp. 37–38; Burghart and Zeskind, “Tea Party Nationalism,” p. 17; Mayer, Dark Money, Kindle location 3420.
9. Andrew J. Perrin, Stephen J. Tepper, Neal Caren, and Sally Morris, “Political and Cultural Dimensions of Tea Party Support, 2009–2012,” The Sociological Quarterly, August 26, 2014; Andreas Madestam, Daniel Shoag, Stan Veuger, et al., “Do Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement” (October 2013). Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(4):1633–1685, DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjt021; Michael Bailey, Jonathan Mummolo, and Hans Noel, “Tea Party Influence: A Story of Activists and Elites,” American Politics Research (January 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739254 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2739254, June 25, 2012; Burghart and Zeskind, “Tea Party Nationalism,” p. 9.
10. Burghart and Zeskind, “Tea Party Nationalism,” pp. 8, 51.
11. Williamson and Skocpol, The Tea Party and the Remaking, p. 29.
12. Burghart and Zeskind, “Tea Party Nationalism,” p. 17; Mayer, Dark Money, Kindle location 3471.
13. Williamson and Skocpol, The Tea Party and the Remaking, pp. 37–38.
14. Mayer, Dark Money, Kindle location 3733.
15. Willamson and Skocpol, The Tea Party and the Remaking, p. 78.
16. Burghart and Zeskind, “Tea Party Nationalism,” p. 51.
17. Ibid., pp. 6–8, 44.
18. See Mayer, Dark Money, Kindle locations 197–245.
19. Ibid., Kindle location 90.
20. Ibid., Kindle locations 409–448.
21. Ben Smith, “Health Reform Foes Plan Obama’s ‘Waterloo,’” Politico, July 17, 2009, https://www.politico.com/blogs/ben-smith/2009/07/health-reform-foes-plan-obamas-waterloo-019961, accessed October 18, 2018.
22. Rae, The Return of Conservative Populism, p. 10.
23. Ibid., pp. 17–18.
24. Justice Anthony Kennedy opinion in re: Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
25. Mayer, Dark Money, Kindle locations 5104, 4719.
26. Williamson and Skocpol, The Tea Party and the Remaking, pp. 169–71, 155–60.
27. Carson and Pettigrew, “Strategic Politicians,” p. 34.
28. Emily Ekins, “The Character and Economic Morality of the Tea Party,” University of California Los Angeles, January 2011, SSRN-id1902394.pdf, accessed October 18, 2018.
29. Alan Abramowitz, “Partisan Polarization and the Rise of the Tea Party Movement (2011),” APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1903153, p. 22; Ekins, “The Character.”
30. Kevin Arceneaux and Stephen P. Nicholson, “Who Wants to Have a Tea Party? The Who, What, and Why of the Tea Party Movement,” Political Science, November 2012, http://faculty2.ucmerced.edu/snicholson/Tea_Party.pdf, pp. 703–705; Ronald Rapoport, Meredith Dost, Ani-Rae Lovell, and Walter J. Stone, “Republican Factionalism and Tea Party Activists,” Midwest Political Science Association Conference, April 11–14, 2013, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.673.3378&rep=rep1&type=pdf, accessed October 19, 2018.
31. Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel, “Tea Party Influence,” pp. 23, 39.
32. Alan S. Blinder, After the Music Stopped: the Financial Crisis, the Response, and the Work Ahead (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), p.11.
33. Ibid., p. 321.
34. Ibid., pp. 171–74; Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 57–60.
35. Blinder, After the Music Stopped, pp. 92–97, Blyth, Austerity, p. 8.
36. Paul Krugman, End This Depression Now! (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2017), pp. 16–17.
37. Blinder, After the Music Stopped, p. 391, Krugman, End, p. 120.
38. Blinder, After the Music Stopped, p. 391.
39. Ibid, p. 8.
40. Stan Greenberg, James Carville, et al., “Despite Macro Economic Growth, ‘Real Economy’ Declines for Real People,” Democracy Corps, March 30, 2010, http://www.democracycorps.com/wp-content/files/EconomyTrackingFINAL.pdf, accessed October 9, 2018.
41. Krugman, End, p. 39; Paul Krugman, “How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?,” The New York Times Magazine, September 2, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html, accessed October 9, 2018.
42. Krugman, End, pp. 130–31.
43. Ibid., pp. 106, 195; Blyth, Austerity, pp. 4, 10.
44. Blyth, Austerity, pp. ix–4.
45. Krugman, End, p. 189.
46. Ibid., p. 188.
47. Krugman, End, p. 2.
48. Blinder, After the Music Stopped, pp. 10–11.
49. Krugman, End, p. 125.
50. Blinder, After the Music Stopped, pp. 359–360 and Krugman, End, pp. 192–3.
51. Robert Draper, When the Tea Party Came to Town: Inside the U.S. House of Representatives’ Most Combative, Dysfunctional, and Infuriating Term in Modern History (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012), p. 126.
52. Ibid., p. 127.
53. Ibid., pp. 272–76.
54. Ibid., p. 276.
55. Ibid., pp. 252–57.
56. Ibid., pp. 247–51.
57. Ibid., pp. 251–54.
58. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and U.S. Office of Management and B
udget, “Federal Net Outlays as Percent of Gross Domestic Product” [FYONGDA188S], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYONGDA188S, October 9, 2018.
59. “Slide Show: The State Budget Crisis and the Economy,” Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, http://www.cbpp.org/slideshows/?fa=stateFiscalCrisis, December 19, 2011, slide 5; David Callahan, “89,000 Government Workers Have Been Laid Off Since September,” Demos, January 4, 2013; Heidi Shierholz, “Six Years from Its Beginning, the Great Recession’s Shadow Looms over the Labor Market,” Economic Policy Institute, January 9, 2014; Gordon Lafer, “The Legislative Attack on American Wages and Labor Standards, 2011–2012,” Economic Policy Institute, October 31, 2013.
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