The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714)

by James Falkner

  Why Louis XIV was so apparently clumsy and unwise in seizing the Barrier Towns, and inevitably giving offence and alarming his neighbours, most obviously the Dutch, is something of a puzzle – the king was not usually so lacking in awareness. Perhaps it was simple folie de grandeur: he was used to getting his own way and doing as he saw fit in the interests of himself, his family and France, and was blind to the offence he was giving to others. In his kingly way, over simply, he could not see this, for his grandson was now King of Spain, and acknowledged as such by William III and others but not by Vienna, and how then could important towns in his grandson’s domains possibly be left in the hands of others, with whom he might soon be at odds if not actual war? The towns were indefensible anyway, if it came to open hostilities: they were a tripwire to alert the Dutch to French aggression, and William was aware of this. He was also aware that Louis XIV was moving to take them into French hands, but kept the information to himself, perhaps not being averse to seeing trouble stirred up in the process.

  Predictable outrage was felt both in The Hague and in London; the interests of England and Holland were, of course to a large degree synonymous at this point, The Dutch were far more in danger of French aggression, but both of the Maritime Powers were shut out of trade with the Spanish Empire, trade that now would go more readily to French merchants and French shipping. Gradually it became plain that the alliance which had held firm against France through the long years of war at the close of the previous century would have to be re-forged. The members of both Houses of Parliament were moved to action and in June authorised William III to seek allies in the worsening atmosphere and the king went to The Hague the following month, using the urbane services of the Earl of Marlborough as England’s ambassador-extraordinary with far-reaching powers in discussions with the States-General to find a united way forward. Matters progressed well enough for the agreement of a Grand Alliance formed between England, Holland and Austria to be signed on 7 September 1701 (see Appendix I for the principal terms of the treaty).4 The support and assistance of Denmark and the German states was sought and gained by subsidiary treaties over the next few months – the reasons for this support varying from stark self-interest, the offer of ready money, adherence to the interests of the emperor, and not least to a lingering and not irrational fear of an overly powerful France.

  The aid of Denmark was secured, in part because of the influence of the Princess Anne’s Danish husband, Prince George, but also because Charles XII of Sweden had been persuaded both to disassociate himself from Louis XIV and his plans, and to cease hostilities with his Scandinavian neighbour.5 In all cases of providing diplomatic, moral and military support, the ability of the main parties in the Grand Alliance, most particularly England and Holland, to pay hard cash for the services of the troops provide by these states was a telling factor. The key issue for George, Elector of Hanover, was, however, the clause in the treaty of the alliance that guaranteed the eventual Protestant succession to the throne in London, while the treaty also acknowledged the Elector of Brandenburg as King in Prussia. The specific details of the Treaty were confidential, but were disclosed to the French king by the Swedish ambassador to Versailles on 10 November.

  There was still a prospect that the problem of Spain could be settled without recourse to renewed conflict, for above all other considerations, Philip V had been generally acknowledged as the new and perfectly legitimate king in Madrid. The vexed question of the partition of the empire remained, however. Matters were greatly aggravated within a week of the treaty signing, when Louis XIV went to St Germaine and stood at the sickbed of his old friend the exiled King James II of England. He emotionally declared that the dying king’s young son, James Edward Stuart (known to history as the Old Pretender), was regarded by France as the rightful heir to the throne in London:

  The King’s servants, imagining he would be private (the room being full of people), began to retire, which his Most Christian Majesty perceiving, said out aloud, ‘Let nobody withdraw,’ and then went on: ‘I am come, sir, to acquaint you, that whenever it shall please God to call Your Majesty out of this world, I will take your family under my protection, and will treat your son the Prince of Wales, in the same manner I have treated you, and will acknowledge him as he then will be King of England.’ Upon which all that were present, as well French as English, burst into tears, not being able in any other way to express that mixture of joy and grief with which they were so surprisingly seized … his Most Christian Majesty was so moved, that he could not refrain from weeping himself.6

  This unwise declaration, contrary to the advice of Louis XIV’s own council, was a gross breach of the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick and an obvious attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of England, Ireland and Scotland. The possibility of invasion and religiously-inspired civil war, of usurpation of the throne in London, was raised and understandably this gaffe caused considerable anger in Parliament and amongst the British people generally when it became known. Louis XIV was true to his word, however, and on the death of James II a few days later, his son was duly proclaimed as King of England, Scotland and Ireland at Versailles and in Madrid. It was argued rather speciously that the declaration had no real meaning or import, and was simply a matter of polite form, rather as kings of England still liked to style themselves as kings of France in an antiquated throwback to the strategic position in mediaeval times and the Hundred Years War. This suggestion placated no-one, as it was known that Louis XIV, always alert to what was best for France, had been working to bring about a Jacobite restoration once William III passed away, should this prove likely to weaken England’s stance over the Spanish Succession.

  Such repeated and quite uncharacteristic diplomatic errors made by Louis XIV served to stir up his opponents to a hitherto unknown degree. All this post-dated the actual creation and signing of the Treaty of Grand Alliance of course, but it served very well to inflame opinion in London against France and in favour of renewed war. Matters were made even worse when it was announced that English manufactured goods would no longer be permitted to be exported to France – economic injury was thus added to the insult of a breach of treaty obligations. ‘It was to wound the Prince of Orange [William III] in the tenderest point, and to invite England and Holland to become allies of the Emperor against France.’7 Diplomatic relations between England and France were for the time being ruptured with the respective ambassadors, Tallard in London and the Earl of Portland in Versailles, being withdrawn. This was unfortunate as Tallard, the shrewd French representative to the Court of St James, had been using his calm diplomatic skills to good effect, and when he left so too did his influence on events.

  Louis XIV could be seen to have played for high stakes and, despite the errors made and antagonism consequently stirred up, had played rather well. His old adversary William III was known to be ailing, and when he died his implacable opposition to France would surely die with him. Holland would perhaps come to terms, now that the States-General had no Barrier to shelter behind if French troops and their Spanish allies swarmed northwards towards the exposed Dutch border, while the Elector of Bavaria would in all likelihood declare for France, in defiance of the emperor in Vienna. Leopold’s attention was on making gains in northern Italy, while simultaneously being distracted by rebellion in Hungary and the ever present, but currently dormant, threat from the Ottoman Turks to the east. This was all a significant misjudgement by the French king, who plainly took no account of the anger caused in London over the matter of the succession, whether it be Protestant or Catholic Jacobite. An additional clause was even added to the Treaty of Grand Alliance, such that hostilities once commenced, should not cease until Louis XIV had acknowledged the validity of the Protestant succession, a key factor now, having previously had no relevance, in the war on which the allies would embark. In addition, an act of attainder was passed by Parliament against the young James Stuart, so that he was in effect to be treated as an outlaw.

  The peace party
in England, the Tories who had held sway since the close of the Nine Years War in 1697 and had overseen the virtual disbandment of the army, were losing ground in parliament. Despite having acknowledged Philip V as king in Madrid, William III was able to mobilise support for a great effort to curb the burgeoning influence of France. In a stirring address to the Houses of Parliament in the autumn of 1701 he declared:

  The owning and setting up of the pretended Prince of Wales for King of England, is not only the highest indignity offered to me and the whole nation, but does so nearly concern every man, who has a regard for the Protestant religion, or the present and future happiness of your country … By the French King placing his grandson on the throne of Spain, he is in a condition to oppress the rest of Europe, unless speedy and effectual measures are taken. Under this pretence he is to become the real master of the whole Spanish Monarchy; he has made it to be entirely depending on France, and disposes of it as of his own dominions; and by that means he has surrounded his neighbours in such a manner, that though the name of peace may be said to continue, yet they are put to the expense and inconveniences of war … It is fit that I should tell you, the eyes of all Europe are upon this Parliament.8

  The appeal was so framed that both the peaceful Protestant succession to the throne, with the avoidance of civil war and religious strife, and the trading interests of England were neatly bound together. Supplies for the rebuilding of the army and navy were promptly voted, and preparations for renewed war were made: the regiments so casually all-but-disbanded four years earlier were re-formed and funds rasied for military operations and the mustering of foreign levies in Germany and Denmark.

  Of particular concern was the likelihood that, once war began, the French would attack Holland before the allies had properly mustered their strength, and by so doing drive the republic out of the conflict while the Austrians were busily engaged in Italy. There, Prince Eugene of Savoy was already campaigning with some success but he could be isolated and defeated if France was also left free to concentrate forces against him. Count Wratislaw, the Austrian ambassador to London, wrote to the emperor on 19 February 1702 that in conversation with John Churchill, Earl of Marlborough:

  He said that the King is greatly perturbed as to the possibility of a French attack in full force on Holland. Further, he wants a vigorous campaign on all sides, the sight of which may maintain the readiness of the republic to continue to bear its heavy burden. The strengthening of Prince Eugene must not be neglected. For from the general point of view it would be less harmful for the king [William III] to lose some battle than for Prince Eugene to be overthrown.9

  Such advice, while sound, was of little use and a decided diffusion of allied effort continued, endangering the allied cause in the Low Countries and in Spain where Philip V was consolidating his position in Madrid. Louis XIV had already made an early start in strengthening his position in the north, by sending troops to occupy the Bishopric of Liège in November 1701, and occupying Bonn in the Bishopric of Cologne; Dutch-held Maastricht was isolated and vulnerable as a result. Joseph-Clement Wittlesbach, the Elector-Bishop of Cologne, had declared his support for France, but his council thought otherwise and called in allied troops to resist French encroachment. The king all the while was rapidly increasing the size and strength of his army, although the practice of raising new regiments to satisfy the hectoring demands of courtiers for places and commands, for themselves and their relatives, meant that established units withered from a lack of recruits and funds with which to find them, while those newly raised were often ill-equipped and poorly trained. St Simon remembered that: ‘The excellence of the [veteran] regiments, the merits of the officer, those who commanded, all were forgotten by Barbezieux [the Minister for War], young and impetuous, whom the King allowed to act as he liked.’10

  William III, staunch opponent of the French king, would not live to fight another war against Louis XIV. He died on 19 March 1702 (N.S.) from the effects of falling from his horse and breaking his collar-bone a little over two weeks earlier. His sister-in-law, Princess Anne, the youngest daughter of the recently-deceased King James II, ascended the throne in London. ‘We have lost a great king,’ it was declared in Parliament in London, but ‘we have got a most gracious Queen.’11 Hopes and expectations in Versailles were high that England’s warlike preparations would falter under the new monarch, but such hopes were soon dashed. The new queen’s principal concerns, stated emphatically at her first meeting of the Privy Council, were to ensure the Protestant succession to the throne, and to limit the power of France – with clear and overt French support for the Jacobite cause the two issues were closely linked. She was to prove to be just as resolute as her late brother-in-law in her opposition to Louis XIV and his ambitions, and the States-General were re-assured that she was just as firm of purpose:

  The Grand Alliance was very sensibly touched by the loss, but found itself so well cemented, that the spirit of William continued to animate it, and [Grand Pensionary] Heinsius, his confidant, perpetuated it, and inspired all the chiefs of the republic, their allies and their generals.12

  The Earl of Marlborough was sent as the Queen’s ambassador-extraordinary back to The Hague, where the French ambassador was making as much mischief as he could and trying to undermine the spirits of the Dutch ministers now that their prince and stadtholder was dead. An offer was made of a separate peace for Holland if the Dutch would abandon the Grand Alliance, but with no hint of a return of their Barrier Towns in the Spanish Netherlands such a suggestion had few attractions. Marlborough’s arrival with the assurances of Queen Anne’s steadfast intent soon settled the frayed nerves of the States-General, and the close and friendly relationship that the earl enjoyed with Antonius Heinsius was a significant help.

  A state of war with France and the French prince in Spain was declared by the parties to the Grand Alliance at 1.00pm on 15 May 1702, the Garter King of Arms making the declaration at the gates of St James’s Palace in London, and simultaneous announcements being made in The Hague and Vienna. The declaration by Queen Anne was based firmly on the terms of the newly agreed Treaty of Grand Alliance, while that of the States-General relied upon the provisions of the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick which allowed for no French aggression or overt threat of such a course against Dutch territory. Most importantly for Holland, the seizure of the Barrier Towns was a stark offence committed by Louis XIV which had to be undone in entirety. ‘That the King of France having cast his eyes upon their provinces, either to make himself master of, or ruin, them, had attacked them, in two bloody wars.’13 Emperor Leopold hardly needed to declare war, of course, as his forces had been busily fighting the French in northern Italy for some time. Leopold did so, however, for the sake of form, referring to the unfulfilled terms of the Treaty of Ryswick, in the name of both himself and also the electors, princes and states of the empire. The news of war was soon conveyed to Louis XIV who ‘took the declaration and in a transport of anger, cast it upon the table’.14 He calmed sufficiently to comment, rather wittily, that as a lady (Queen Anne) had declared war on him, he must be getting old.

  The objectives of the Grand Alliance were on the face of things quite simple, well focussed and rested on one principal and over-riding aim, as outlined by a British minister some time after the war concluded:

  The object of the war, which King William meditated and Queen Anne waged, was a Partition, by which a Prince of the House of Bourbon, already acknowledged by us and the Dutch as King of Spain, was to be left on the throne of that dismembered monarchy. The wisdom of those counsels saw that the peace of Europe might be restored and secured on this footing and the liberties of Europe would be in no danger.15

  How far the allies allowed themselves to stray from this apparently laudable, rational and achievable course will soon be seen.

  A thorny problem for the Maritime Powers, however, was who should command the Anglo-Dutch army when on campaign. Marlborough was appointed to be the captain-general of the troops paid f
or by Queen Anne’s treasury, but Holland would put many more troops into the field and could claim, with some justification, the right to appoint a supreme commander. The queen hoped that her husband, Prince George of Denmark, might take up the command, but the Dutch would have none of that unwise suggestion as he was well-meaning but an ineffective soldier, and the idea was quietly dropped. George, Elector of Hanover, a man of considerable influence within the empire and probably a safe pair of hands, was also briefly considered, while several Dutch generals, men of experience and reputation, aspired to the role, amongst them Henry of Nassau, Count Overkirk and Godert Rede van Ginkel, Earl of Athlone. The financial strength of England, and the major contribution being made to the war effort counted most, and so it was decided that the Earl of Marlborough should take up the appointment and time would show that for the Grand Alliance this was a inspired choice, for it was said, with perfect truth that ‘Between the ages of fifty and sixty he went through his great campaigns at the head of half the armies of Europe.’16

  The forces that were now combining against Louis XIV and his grandson were impressive, as long as they could be induced to work harmoniously together, which remained to be proved. England, Holland and Austria could count on the support, both overt and tacit, of Hanover, Brandenburg (soon to be known as Prussia), Denmark, the Bishoprics of Munster and Wurzburg, and the Electors of the Palatinate, Trier, Mainz and Mecklenburg Schwerin. In addition, most of the other German princes and electors, such as those of Holstein-Gottorp, Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Cassel, while not prepared to go to the length of declaring war on Louis XIV, were very ready to hire out their excellent soldiers to the alliance in return for generous cash subsidies. Amongst the first moves in the war was the forthright ousting by the Elector of Hanover of the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, who at the urging of his younger brother had rashly allied himself to Louis XIV. The cause of the Grand Alliance in northern Germany was strengthened in the process, and the dynastic fortunes of the house of Guelph also. By contrast, Louis XIV could only count as allies Savoy, Bavaria, the Bishopric of Liège, and a rather reluctant Portugal, while Philip V’s Spanish troops were in general ill-equipped and poorly trained. Savoy and Portugal would before long abandon the French cause and join the Grand Alliance, and the active involvement with the Elector of Bavaria would prove to be a very mixed blessing for France.