The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714)

by James Falkner

  The fortunes of the French and Bavarian operations on the Rhine and in southern Germany appeared to be prospering, but this was something of an illusion. Villars and the elector had found that they could not work harmoniously together, and Louis XIV had to write to the marshal that he should ‘not be haughty with a man of his birth and rank. You should be firm in important things, but present them frankly and you will gain more influence over his conduct than you can by other means.’29 The two strong-willed men continued to quarrel however, and at last Villars had to be sent to quell an insurrection in the Cevennes region of southern France, and Louis XIV replaced him in command of the French troops in Bavaria with the newly promoted Marshal Ferdinand Marsin. An allied attempt to raise the siege of Landau failed with the heavy defeat of the Prince of Hesse-Cassel by Tallard at Speyerbach in November 1703, and the garrison in the fortress capitulated to the French a few days later. The prospects for the campaign in the coming year seemed very bright in Versailles, with the ability to deploy no fewer than eight field armies – those commanded by Villeroi in the Low Countries, La Feuillaide in Savoy, Villars in the Cevennes, Berwick in Spain, Marsin in Bavaria, Tallard on the upper Rhine, the Grand Prior in Lombardy, and the Duc de Vendôme in northern Italy.30 This was all very comforting, and it remained to be seen what the allies could do to counter such an imposing array.

  On the other side of the tactical hill, the fortunes of the Grand Alliance were seen to be flagging – Philip V had established himself firmly in Madrid, the Dutch, having secured their borders, were reluctant to engage the French in open battle, parliament in London was wearying of the expense and risks of war, French troops occupied much of northern Italy, fortresses along the upper Rhine had been lost and Vienna was far away and under threat. The allies had the advantage on the high seas, but the war would not be won there. So, the initiative in the war appeared to be firmly in the hands of Louis XIV. In fact this was an illusion, for French forces were over-extended, and Marshal Marsin, in particular, was exposed and at the end of long and tenuous lines of supply and communication back through the difficult country of the Black Forest to Alsace. Maintaining the French army in Bavaria, and ensuring its security, would absorb enormous attention and effort, which might well have been better employed elsewhere. The Elector of Bavaria had high hopes and ambitions, and promised much, but his attempts to properly supply his own army, and that of his French allies, proved only partly successful.

  Efforts on the political level to alter the balance of the war continued elsewhere. A key requirement for Portugal to join the Grand Alliance had been that Archduke Charles, and an army 12,000 strong to support his cause, should go to Lisbon. In addition, an Anglo-Dutch cruising squadron should be established in Portuguese waters to guard against any naval attack. Portuguese troops would be paid for and supplied by the Grand Alliance, as originally intended, and it was expected that some 28,000 horse and foot would be able to take the field. The archduke had been proclaimed in Vienna as King Carlos III on 12 September 1703, even though England and Holland had prior to the commencement of the war, each freely acknowledged Philip V. Six weeks later Victor-Amadeus II of Savoy broke with France, despite treaty obligations and his close family ties with the House of Bourbon, and declared for the Grand Alliance. St Simon wrote that:

  The Duke of Savoy had been treacherous to us, and had shown that he was in league with the Emperor. The King had accordingly broken off all relations with him, and sent an army to invade his territory. It need be no cause of surprise, therefore, that the Archduke was recognised by Savoy.31

  This dramatic course of action was taken despite the duke’s daughter, Marie-Adelaide, being married to the Duc de Bourgogne, one day to be heir to the throne of France, and another daughter, Marie-Louisa, being married to Philip V of Spain, both grandsons of the French king. This change of course carried with it high risks, for French fortunes still prospered with substantial numbers of troops in much of Piedmont and Savoy itself under command of La Feuillarde. It could help, however, to divert at least some French attention from the campaign against Vienna. The interests of Savoy as an independent state could also be best served, perhaps, by making sure that French influence in northern Italy was not that firmly established. Victor-Amadeus was happy to accept a subsidy of 800,000 crowns each month from England, but also hoped to profit from the inherent weakness of both France and Austria, in both failing to establish and maintain large numbers of troops in the region as each had other pressing problems elsewhere – for France this was the exposed border with the Low Countries, while for Austria there was the lingering rebellion in Hungary and the ever-present, but for the time being dormant, threat from the Ottomans to the east. There was also a more immediate threat to Vienna, from Marshal Marsin and the elector of course, but that would soon receive attention. Victor-Amadeus undoubtedly had a certain cunning, he judged his chances with care, and the risks he took were measured.

  After some procrastination by the emperor, who understandably was reluctant to expose his youngest son to risk, Charles made his way to England where he arrived at the end of December 1703, before travelling to Windsor to be received by Queen Anne, whose treasury would soon become his de facto paymaster. During the round of agreeable festivities that greeted Charles’ arrival, there was opportunity to discuss joint operations against France by the Duke of Marlborough in the Low Countries, or perhaps through the Moselle valley, and equally importantly the best ways to prosecute an allied advance from Portugal on Madrid. Charles was an agreeable young man and made a very good impression. HMS Royal Katherine was suitably re-equipped to carry the newly-proclaimed king and his entourage to Lisbon, and after some delays with contrary winds she sailed towards the end of February, arriving without mishap at the mouth of the river Tagus on 6 March 1704. Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt, appointed as commander-in-chief of the expedition and regarded as a sound choice with a good knowledge of Spain and the often difficult ways of campaigning in the peninsula, had arrived a few weeks earlier aboard HMS Panther. The Grand Alliance had gained Portugal for the Habsburg cause, with a safe haven in the mouth of the river Tagus for warships to prowl onwards into the Mediterranean. Still, accounts of the outrages committed at Cadiz had altered the general mood, and the threat of Portuguese troops soon invading Spanish soil set all of Castile and much of Aragon, Estramadura and Murcia against the Habsburg cause. It was therefore, a welcome entry in the credit column for the allies that Victor-Amadeus had at last joined the Grand Alliance.

  Count Johann Wentzel Wratislaw, the emperor’s envoy to England, had urged throughout 1703 that the imperial forces deployed on the Danube should be augmented by Vienna’s allies, but his appeals had so far been fruitless. George, the astute Elector of Hanover, had also urged that additional support be provided to secure Vienna from attack; priorities, in particular Marlborough’s plans to seize Antwerp, had, however, been firmly elsewhere for the time being. A corps of twelve Dutch battalions under the very capable command of Lieutenant-General Johan Wigand van Goor had been sent to the upper Rhine, but little else. Goor quarrelled with the obstinate imperial commander in that region, the Margrave of Baden, and this problem came to a head in November 1703 when Goor refused an instruction to supply a garrison for a small fortress as that would entail breaking up his command, contrary to the express orders he had from the States-General. Baden attempted to relieve Goor of his command, a course of action for which he had no authority, and the Dutch in frustration suggested that their general be sent back home to Holland, accompanied by his troops of course. ‘The carrying out of this order would set Marshal Tallard absolutely free to throw a new and large reinforcement into Bavaria.’32 Baden swallowed his pride, and prudently backed down, for such a diminution of bayonet strength would have had dire consequences for the campaign to combat the Elector of Bavaria and his French allies. Coming after the defeat at Speyerbach, it was apparent that the allied effort on the upper Rhine was in real disarray and unless something drastic
was attempted, the whole imperial strategic posture in the war was in danger of collapse.

  Chapter 5

  Adventures in Southern Germany

  ‘The enemy have marched.’1

  The famous march up the Rhine, undertaken by the army commanded by the Duke of Marlborough, is rightly remembered as a notable feat of daring, cool judgement and sound logistics. Early in 1704, a decision could not be forced in the Low Countries, but Vienna was threatened and the imperial armies on the Danube had to be supported, while Marlborough was keen to shake off the restraining hands of his Dutch allies. ‘He saw that the Marshals Villeroi and Boufflers kept themselves close within their Lines in Brabant, and that it was impossible to bring them to a battle.’2 The States-General were, however, highly unlikely to agree to their army being marched off so far southwards, but they could hardly forbid Marlborough from taking Queen Anne’s troops on such a venture; persuasion and some subtle deception was necessary, as is often the case in coalition warfare. Making a virtue of necessity, the plan was hatched between Marlborough and Count Wratislaw and almost kept a secret; in March 1704 Queen Anne gave her consent for the duke to take his troops to southern Germany, ‘a speedy succour’ to confront the French and Bavarian armies threatening Emperor Leopold and Vienna.

  The potential danger to southern Holland once Marlborough went away was real, and this risk had to be finely judged and balanced against the danger to Vienna. Dutch fears and concerns were not imagined or irrelevant, but Marlborough was able to assure the States-General that the French would not be able to ignore his march southwards, and would have to quickly redeploy their own forces to meet the new threat, as yet undefined, that he posed. In this way, the danger to Holland would be diminished and in any case, the Dutch troops commanded by Overkirk would remain in place to assure the safety of their borders. Another consideration was that powerful French armies lay at intervals along the route that Marlborough must take, Bedmar in the Moselle valley and Tallard in Alsace. The preparations for such a shift in emphasis in the war could not be kept entirely hidden, but the actual intention had to remain in some question for as long as possible. Surprise and fast marching were required to keep the initiative in allied hands, and to not allow the French commanders either to recognise what was intended, or move to intervene, perhaps forcing a damaging engagement on the duke’s army while strung out on the march, well away from its supports and depots.

  On 19–21 April 1704, Marlborough crossed from England to The Hague, and announced his intention to go and campaign against the Marquis de Bedmar in the Moselle valley that summer. Still, ‘I would not conceal from you,’ the Duke wrote to a friend in London:

  my resolution of marching with the English, some of our auxiliaries, and what other troops can with safety be spared, up to the Danube, as what may tend most to the advantage of the common cause, the support of the Empire, and the protection of the House of Austria, for which, by particular directions from her Majesty, I am to have all possible regard.3

  The representatives of the province of Zealand, in particular, strongly objected to what was suggested for a summer campaign on the Moselle, let alone anything further away, but the duke’s persuasive arguments at last won the day. Overkirk and Marlborough got along well together, and the fact that the Dutchman at first raised no great objections to what was proposed counted for a lot. With the queen’s permission safely in his pocket, the duke could go whether or not the Dutch approved, and in their hearts they knew it. The States-General, with some reluctance, gave their consent to the enterprise on 4 May, and fifteen days later the 19,000 troops in Queen Anne’s pay began their march southwards from Bedburg.4 The Dutch were not quite as ignorant of what was really intended as is often thought, for Marlborough wrote to the Grand Pensionary, Anthonius Heinsius, on 21 May: ‘You might send us so many troops as might make me succeed against the Elector [of Bavaria] and M. Overkirk be able to undertake whatever you should think best in Flanders.’5 A few days later Coblenz at the confluence of the river Moselle and the Rhine was reached without hindrance, and Marlborough was as arranged joined here by a contingent of Hanoverian and Prussian troops. Captain Robert Parker wrote of the good manner in which the operation was conducted. ‘Surely never was such a march carried on with more order and regularity and with less fatigue both to man and horse.’6

  Map 3: The Duke of Marlborough’s famous march to the Danube in 1704.

  Marshal Villeroi, the French commander in the Low Countries, although aware that plans had been made for a possible allied campaign in the Moselle valley, was puzzled at the speed of Marlborough’s moves. He appealed to Louis XIV for advice on what best to do, as the borders of Holland appeared to have been rashly laid bare in the process. The clear strategic shift in allied operations could not, however, be ignored or discounted and the prompt reply from Versailles was that if the duke marched then the marshal must march also, while leaving a modest force to observe Overkirk and his Dutch troops. ‘The King immediately sent orders to Marshal Villeroi to follow the Duke of Marlborough, with a body of 20,000 troops.’7 As the duke had predicted, Holland remained safe, while Marlborough blithely crossed over to the east bank of the Rhine on 27 May, and the pretence of a Moselle campaign faded away. He could still go and attack Marshal Tallard in Alsace, a perfectly valid option as a French defeat there would further isolate Marsin and his army in Bavaria. Instead, the river Main was crossed on 3 June, and the intention to campaign in Bavaria became plain with new and more secure lines of supply and communication opened into central Germany, well away from the threat of any French interference.

  On 7 June the river Neckar was crossed by Marlborough’s marching soldiers, and the duke now admitted to the States-General that his intention really was to go to the Danube. This was not, as we have seen, news to Heinsius but he seems to have kept it to himself up to that point. The Dutch received the by now not wholly unexpected news with commendable calm and gave permission for the use of van Goor’s Dutch detachment which had campaigned on the upper Rhine since the previous year. With this increment, and Hessian and Danish troops coming to join the campaign, Marlborough could deploy some 40,000 troops, and could outmatch any one of the French columns likely to manoeuvre against him either on the march or on arrival on the banks of the Danube. All this while, Louis XIV’s field commanders had not been idle, and Tallard had already managed to take a re-supply convoy across the passes of the Black Forest to replenish Marsin’s depots and magazines, and had then evaded an attempt by Baron Thungen, the imperial commander in the Lines of Stollhofen, to intercept his safe return to Alsace.

  Marshal Villeroi, at the urging of his king, had hurried after Marlborough on his march up the Rhine, leaving Bedmar in place on the Moselle, and combined forces with Tallard in Alsace early in June. As their opponent’s intention to cross the Swabian Jura hills to campaign in Bavaria became evident, the two marshals faced a dilemma. Marsin could hardly be left without reinforcement, but if they both advanced to try and combine and confront Marlborough they had little confidence in the ability of the Elector of Bavaria to provision a fresh French army. Louis XIV’s perplexity at the unfolding campaign, with his commanders clearly having lost the initiative from the outset and being somewhat at a loss, can be seen when writing to Tallard: ‘You and Marshal Villeroi should come together with a plan to prevent all the forces of the Empire from uniting with the Dutch and the English and falling upon the Elector, who would be unable to resist them.’8 Their perplexity continued, and a fresh appeal was sent to Versailles for advice. Instructions eventually came from the king that Tallard should proceed with his army to join Marsin and the elector on the Danube, while Villeroi remained with his troops to hold Alsace secure and prevent any further allied reinforcements being sent from the Rhine to add to Marlborough’s strength. The king was obliged by bitter experience to look over his shoulder at this point, and instructed Tallard to keep his troops independent of the combined Franco-Bavarian army under Marsin and the elector,
unless the allies should successfully combine their own forces. In that way, it seemed, should Wittelsbach play Louis XIV false, as the King of Portugal and the Duke of Savoy had both recently done, Tallard could manoeuvre to extricate Marsin and his troops from Bavaria with comparative freedom.

  On 10 June 1704, Marlborough for the first time met the President of the Imperial War Council, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and four days later they were joined at Gross Heppach by the Margrave of Baden. Their plan for a joint campaign saw Eugene going to hold the Lines of Stollhofen on the Rhine, to try and prevent any further French reinforcements being sent to Bavaria. Meanwhile, Marlborough and Baden were to combine and force the line of the Danube, to interpose their armies between Vienna and the French and Bavarians. Although the three allied detachments would quite separated, there was little apparent danger that the French would suddenly spring into action and attempt to defeat any one of them while they remained apart. However, poor weather had slowed the marching pace of the allied soldiers, and Marlborough wrote on 19 June that:

  We expect to hear hourly from Prince Louis [Baden], that we may march and join him, but the continued rains we have had for several days will retard our designs. The Elector of Bavaria has repassed the Danube with all his troops, and put his gross baggage into Ulm. The Prussian troops are to join Prince Eugene tomorrow, and then he will have an army of 30,000 men to observe the enemy’s motions on the Rhine. We do not hear that they have yet undertaken anything.9