The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714)

by James Falkner

  I thought fit to impart to you a new joy – I have to see my city of Barcelona entirely delivered from the siege. Never any retreat was made with greater precipitation than that which the enemy have made, having left behind them 140 pieces of brass cannon, and such a prodigious quantity of ammunition and provisions that the same is incredible.5

  Taking advantage of the diversion of French troops to attack Barcelona, Galway and Das Minas with their Anglo-Portuguese and Dutch army had advanced from Campo Mayor in April 1706 to threaten Madrid. As they moved forward they were faced by Marshal Berwick, heavily outnumbered as he was with just 15,000 poorly-equipped Spanish soldiers. After some initial skirmishing, Alcantara was taken by Portuguese troops, having fought off a very hard-driven counter-attack, and after a siege of only four days. In the course of the hand-to-hand fighting both Das Minas and Berwick came close to being captured, both men forced to ride for their lives in opposite directions. Having taken Alcantara, the allies advanced with confidence to Almarez but then hesitated, unsure of Berwick’s movements; Das Minas, so valiant at the fighting for Alcantara, was reluctant to venture forward, and John Methuen wrote in frustration to King Pedro in Lisbon with a protest at the likely consequences of inaction:

  I find myself obliged to represent to your Majesty in the name of the Queen my mistress, that, since it appears now to be in your Majesty’s power by marching immediately towards Madrid, if any other resolution than that be taken the Queen my mistress will look upon it as the loss of the greatest occasion that could be wished.

  Methuen then went on to add a barely-concealed threat to the king, should the Marqués not show a little more spirit:

  If the army shall be otherwise employed this spring, than in marching into Spain towards Madrid, I am commanded to retire the English forces in Portugal to be embarked on the fleet which I expect in the next month, and in that case I am likewise commanded not to continue the payment of the subsidies for the pay of the troops of your Majesty.6

  It was enough, and the army duly moved forward; Placentia was given up, and Ciudad Rodrigo submitted to the allies on 26 May. Encouraged by the news of the raising of the siege of Barcelona, the advance continued to Salamanca on 7 June, where a substantial supply depot was seized. The civic dignitaries arranged a warm welcome, although the locals once again showed little enthusiasm at the presence in their midst of foreign troops.

  Berwick fell back to cover the pass over the Sierras at Guadarama and in this way hoped to shield the approaches to the capital, but on 18 June Galway received the even better news of the crowning triumph for Marlborough at Ramillies, and the allies pressed forward with appropriate determination. A week later Berwick withdrew his army to Madrid; in the meantime, Philip V had returned to the capital to find that after the failure at Barcelona, there was a noticeable lessening of confidence that he could maintain and make good his claim to the throne. On 20 June, the queen took Berwick’s advice to retire to Burgos in Old Castile for her security, with the members of the Privy Council, and Philip joined her there with the worn-out remnants of the army he had taken to try and capture Barcelona. This distinct and humiliating setback for the young king’s cause added to the lustre of the allied victories at Ramillies and Turin, and the prospects for a Habsburg success seemed to be bright, but things were never quite so simple in the peninsula.

  Berwick had, with inadequate resources, conducted a cautious and skilful campaign, in effect a prolonged holding action. He had eluded his opponents as they advanced on Madrid, without giving them the opportunity to force a battle in the open. The marshal wrote afterwards that:

  It took two to make a battle, and that a general should only resort to it when he could do nothing else, because the outcome was always uncertain, and that one should not risk the success of a campaign, of a war, or even less the destiny of a State when one could equally well, by good emplacements and clever manoeuvres, achieve one’s object.7

  For all the appearance of an allied success, he was still in the field, but even after receiving reinforcements from Valencia, Berwick could now field only some 14,000 men after detachments to hold key fortresses. Galway and Das Minas, after the inevitable losses from desertion and sickness during the long and trying march now had command of about the same number of troops. On 24 June Galway reached Nuestra Senora de Ratamal and learning that Berwick had withdrawn northeastwards to Alcala on the river Henares, he sent an advance guard commanded by the Marquis de Villaverde to take possession of Madrid. The allied commanders were delighted to enter the city three days later; their cause appeared to have triumphed, and there was jubilation in Lisbon when the news arrived. ‘The contentment of the land was beyond description and understandably so, for the Portuguese were not made for such things and could not hope for so much.’8 Archduke Charles was proclaimed as King Carlos III of Spain on 2 July, but the people of Madrid were decidedly cool in their response, and were certainly not pleased by the presence of large numbers of Portuguese troops on their streets. However, the dowager Queen, Mariana von Neuberg, widow of Carlos II, sent her acknowledgement from her place of exile in Toledo, and some grandees prudently did the same, although many others left Madrid to stay quietly on their estates until things had settled down.9

  The allied achievement was significant; in three months Galway and Das Minas had manoeuvred Berwick away from Madrid, and inflicted heavy losses in guns (nearly 100 having been abandoned to the advancing allies), stores and equipment on his army. The fortresses of Alcantara and Ciudad Rodrigo had been taken, as had Salamanca and Toledo, with 8,000 Spanish prisoners taken or picked up as deserters. Most significantly, Philip V’s forces had evacuated large areas of Leon, Old Castile and Estremadura, with Madrid now in allied hands. Despite this, there was still little evidence popular enthusiasm for the Austrian claimant and his foreign troops, many of who were Protestant and therefore heretics; detachments were increasingly harried and ambushed wherever they went. Still, many principal towns in Spain could now be counted to be in allied hands, however thin that grasp might have been in the countryside round about. It remained to be seen though, whether the allied commanders having got to Madrid could maintain themselves there.

  Messages were sent to Archduke Charles in Barcelona, urging that he make his way to Madrid without delay, to make the most of what had been achieved before Philip V and his commanders could recover their poise, but there was no immediate response. Berwick meanwhile had fallen back to Guadalajara about thirty-five miles from Madrid, and taken up a good defensive position on the Henares. On 11 July Galway advanced to Alcala, establishing a supply base there, and having learned that Berwick had retired once again, the allied army moved forward. The marshal in the meantime had received reinforcements from among the troops who had returned from the failed Barcelona operation, and could now field over 20,000 troops, half of whom were French, and significantly outmatching those that Galway and Das Minas had under command. Two weeks later the allies advanced to Sopetran but an attempt to seize the French-held bridge over the Henares there failed, with an inconclusive artillery duel the only result. By 30 July, their army had been reduced by sickness, casualties and desertion to no more than about 12,000 troops, and had to fall back, allowing Berwick to regain his position at Guadalajara. Berwick apparently did not fully appreciate the numerical advantage he had, and neither opposing commanders found a promising opportunity to manoeuvre the other out of position, and so were reduced to keeping watch and awaiting developments. The strategic initiative however, which had briefly lain with the allies, was fast slipping away.

  The archduke, meanwhile, was making his way towards Madrid in a rather sedate manner, after a fractious series of meetings with the Earl of Peterborough, whose brusque and rather high-handed manner had already alienated him from Charles’ Austrian advisers. The respective merits of going to Madrid through Valencia or through Aragon were debated at length and valuable time wasted. The earl, for his part, was exasperated at the indecisiveness of the discussion,
with the archduke ‘obstinate in some circumstances beyond expression, where there is nothing but matters of form and pride, but irresolute and changing where there is a matter of difficulty and hazard’.10 It was at last resolved to take the route through Valencia, and at the end of May Peterborough sailed there with a force of 4,500 infantry, followed by 2,000 cavalry taking the overland route through Tortosa.

  Preparations to sustain and re-supply the troops on the march were found to be faulty, and although it had been learned on 4 July that Madrid was in allied hands, it was not until three weeks later that Charles gave firm instructions for an advance. The route actually taken ran through Saragossa and Aragon rather than through Valencia, and so Peterborough’s journey there was a largely wasted effort. The hitherto dispersed allied armies of the archduke and that of Galway and Das Minas met at last on 6 August, well over a month having been wasted since Madrid was taken. Peterbrough had caught up with Charles on the road, but they brought with them a force of just 4,000 troops, in doing so bringing the combined allied army back to its previous force level. Meanwhile news came in that the allies had managed on 8 August to secure Alicante on the Valencian coast, the Bourbon garrison commanded by Colonel Mahony being generously permitted to march out with the honours of war. Allied warships had also secured the Balearic islands of Majorca and Ibiza for the Archduke’s cause, and a successful landing was made at the port of Cartagena on the Murcian coast, which was occupied in collusion with the commander of the Spanish galley fleet, the Count of Santa Cruz, who clearly felt it the right time to change his coat. It was obvious, however, that the fumbling by allied commanders had let slip a wonderful opportunity, for the people of Madrid had risen in support of Philip V once the allied army left to confront Berwick, and in the meantime both Toledo and Salamanca, commanding the roads leading from the Portuguese frontier, had been re-occupied by French and Spanish troops. Salamanca was eventually recovered by the Portuguese general Fonte Arcada who imposed a fine of 50,000 pistoles on the unfortunate citizenry for having welcomed the French troops.

  The allies could not hope to recover Madrid, where the populace had always been unwelcoming, and withdrew to Chinchon on the Tajuna river some twenty miles to the south. Of necessity, the allied lines of supply now had to run south-eastwards to Valencia rather than all the troubled way to Portugal and such fortresses as Ciudad Rodrigo. The recent capture of both Alicante and Cartagena had certainly been fortuitous in enabling this switch in communications. On 14 August Galway, who now uncomfortably had to share the command with both Das Minas and Charles’s favourite general, the Count of Noyelles, encamped near the junction of the Tajuna with the river Xarama, with an army just 4,000 strong. The clear hostility of the local populace had at least, for the time being at least, served to discourage desertion amongst his dispirited troops. By comparison, Berwick could command 26,000 men, and was particularly strong in cavalry; however, he saw no need to fight an outright battle for what might be obtained more cheaply by stealth. The marshal detached General Légal with 3,000 cavalry to attack the allied outposts at Alcala, and the posture of the allied army was disrupted; Berwick had seized the initiative without having to fight very much, and the allies could not without venturing to fight a battle at long odds, bar the road to Madrid. On 4 September 1706 Lieutenant-General de Vallée entered the capital with a strong force of French cavalry, which was warmly welcomed by the residents. A small Austro-Spanish garrison commanded by the Count de las Amajuelas held out gamely for several days in the citadel, before despairing of any hope of relief and submitting. The captured soldiers were ill-treated, and many were sent to serve in the French galleys for their support for Charles, while a huge quantity of abandoned stores fell into de Vallée’s hands.

  Despite internal divisions in the army command, Galway maintained his position at Chinchon, but with any hope of recovering Madrid gone, on 9 September in deteriorating weather the allied army began to withdraw to Valencia. They crossed the Tagus river at Duennas on the few pontoon bridges not abandoned in Madrid, and moving on to Valverde. At Veles a week later, Galway received 1,400 British reinforcements and a substantial and much-needed re-supply of stores and provisions, Berwick shadowed the allied march, not seeking to give battle, but always keeping carefully between his opponents and the road to Madrid. On 25 September, things changed, when Berwick suddenly attempted to intercept the allied line of withdrawal at the Gabriel river, but failed to do so when the allied rearguard showed a brave front backed by artillery. The marshal, apparently abandoning any hope of inflicting serious damage on the retreating army, turned back. The allies made their way into Valencia, just some 12,000 strong, without further interference on 1 October. The troops were sent away to winter quarters after a generally well conducted retreat at the close of what was a very disappointing campaign for the Habsburg claimant to the throne. Still, the archduke summoned the Valencian Cortez, something Philip V had never done, and the assembly promptly voted a large sum of money for his cause. The Earl of Peterborough, tiring of the divided and fractious command in the allied army, had taken himself off to Italy before the withdrawal began and managed to raise, at a high rate of interest, a substantial loan for Charles, without proper authority to do so, but which was very welcome all the same.

  Philip V re-entered Madrid on 4 October, where his welcome reception was warm and genuine, and amply demonstrated by the populace. To no great surprise enquiries were made concerning those grandees who had felt it appropriate to acknowledge the archduke, and a number of those concerned were banished from the capital, but punishment was, on the whole, moderate and intended to both heal divisions and demonstrate the generous and easy self-confident nature of King Philip V. Few actual reprisal were enacted, although ex-Queen Mariana of Neuburg was sent to live quietly in Bayonne where she could make less trouble. The failure of the allied commanders to consolidate their early gains, and the delays and indecision demonstrated, had left Berwick free to regain the initiative. During the autumn months he was able to recover a lot of the ground lost earlier in the campaign, with Cuenca submitting on 10 October after a halfhearted resistance by the isolated Habsburg garrison, and the next day Orihuela being taken by Spanish troops under the command of Luis Belluga, Bishop of Murcia. Berwick entered Elche on 21 October and recaptured Cartagena in November, while the Marques de Bay re-took Alcantara on the Tagus in December. In this methodical way almost all of Castile, Estramadura and Murcia, was once more secured for Philip V by the end of the year.

  The king had, however, not been successful in securing his position in Italy, and Vienna’s hopes in that direction were still very much alive. On 13 March 1707 Emperor Joseph concluded a confidential agreement with France that, in effect, brought active hostilities in Italy to a close. French garrisons were withdrawn from the Milanese region and Mantua, and were as a result able to be deployed elsewhere against Austria’s own allies. The move was self-serving in the extreme for Vienna, and many of these troops were soon making their way accompanied by the Louis XIV’s nephew, the Duc d’Orleans, to bolster the French effort in Spain.

  Galway and Das Minas, having wintered their troops in Valencia and Catalonia, resolved to take the offensive before their opponents could be so substantially reinforced. Their army, now numbering 15,000 troops and comprising Portuguese, English, Dutch, Huguenot and a few hundred German troops, advanced on 10 April on the road towards Yecla where the well-filled storehouses and magazines prepared by Berwick fell into their hands. Thus providentially re-provisioned, Galway then laid siege to the fortress at Villena, from where he learned that Berwick had advanced to take up a position at the small town of Almanza. The likelihood was that he would be joined there by the Duc d’Orleans with more troops, and so Galway resolved to attack the French commander without delay and before such a concentration of forces could be accomplished.

  The allied army moved on the twenty-five miles to Almanza, to confront the 25,000 French and Spanish troops commanded by Berwick. Galway was
outnumbered, but probably not aware of the extent of this, and was naturally concerned that the French commander would be further reinforced if he delayed an engagement. The earl advanced resolutely on 25 April, but had no time to carry out a close reconnaissance, and the forward movement was over-hasty, as the troops had to cross broken ground which upset their dressing, and made proper control hard to maintain. Despite the difficulties, in midafternoon the allied infantry attacked with vigour, but after an initial success were driven back, and a soldier who took part in the advance remembered that:

  Our advanced guard marched up to them very boldly and beat them in a gallant manner, all their out guards. So our army marched up in line of battle, though our men were much spent for they could get no water all the day’s march. So then the armies engaged very brisk and sharp so that at one time it was thought we should have gained the day, for our Foot beat theirs and drove them, but our Horse was much overpowered.11

  Although Galway had astutely interlined his horse and foot to give mutual support, the Portuguese cavalry took alarm at Berwick’s confident counter-moves, and fearing to be outflanked they fled the field leaving the Allied infantry, which had been outnumbered from the start, in a desperate plight. ‘Our cavalry, and particularly the Portuguese gave way without waiting for any charge, abandoning all alone on the plain our infantry.’

  Galway was wounded, as was Das Minas, but the Earl managed to remount his horse to resume direction of the fighting. After a sharp struggle against heavy odds, some 2,000 Dutch and British infantry under command of Major-General Dohna and Brigadier-General Shrimpton were surrounded in a wood, and obliged to surrender to Berwick the next day. Much of the allied baggage and artillery was lost, and the French commander could count no fewer than twenty field guns, 3,000 prisoners and 120 colours and standards, amongst the spoils of his well-deserved victory. The badly-beaten allied army, now reduced to about 6,000 men, fell back in disorder towards Valencia, with insufficient strength to make a stand to defend the region. Galway wrote to James, Earl Stanhope with details of the defeat that had been suffered that day: