century, when Fuzhou and Quanzhou, both in Fujian province, gradually
became more impor tant. Because porcelain from Fujian was then a key ex-
port to Japan and Southeast Asia, the production of porcelain increased in
southern Fujian and as far south as Chaozhou, in northeastern Guangdong
province.
Even though Chinese port supervisors allowed Japa nese ships and others
to unload goods in designated ports, there were frequent tensions with
Japa nese merchants because Chinese port officials would often impound
Japa nese goods. In 1309, Japa nese traders in Ningbo were so upset when
Chinese officials confiscated many of their goods that they used sulfur they
had planned to sell to the Chinese for use in gunpowder to set fires, causing
the destruction of many Ningbo buildings, including monasteries and gov-
ernment offices. A Chinese inscription later erected near the site does
not blame the Japa nese; instead, it describes the improper be hav ior of the
Chinese who unfairly tried to take Japa nese property.
In general, during this period Chinese skills in producing goods were
more advanced than Japa nese skills. As traced by Charlotte von Verschuer,
China produced and exported porcelain, medicines, perfumes, and silk,
while Japan exported gold dust, mercury, sulfur, woven silk, pearls, and pot-
tery. Gold was discovered in a Japa nese mine in 749, and as other gold
mines were established, gold soon dominated Japa nese exports. By the ele-
venth century less gold was available, but after new discoveries of gold in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries it again became a key export. Japan also
continued to upgrade its handicraft skills, and by the eleventh century it
was exporting paper fans, swords, armor, silk, and some ceramics. In 1242,
after a fire destroyed the Jingshan Monastery near Hangzhou, because of a
shortage of lumber in China Japa nese Buddhists sent lumber to China to
repair the monastery and to build coffins.
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Trade without Transformative Learning, 838–1862
Merchants
Merchants were of course interested in making profits and paying lower cus-
toms fees. Although supervisors in the port cities could examine goods on
their arrival, it was difficult to control the activities of merchants as they
prepared goods for export and distributed imported goods. Given the
modest size of cargo ships during this period, it was difficult to transport
large items, and because the voyages were expensive, they required consid-
erable preparation. Merchants sometimes shipped lumber to be used for
special building proj ects, and occasionally they shipped horses and other
animals, but the goods exchanged were generally smaller items of lesser
value that could be stored in chests on the ships. Owing to the small quan-
tity of goods transported over these long distances, they were distributed
to people in government offices, large estates, monasteries, and the rich elite,
but not to ordinary farm families.
Since court officials in Kyoto and the well- to-do Japa nese were eager to
buy Chinese goods, Chinese merchants who went to Japan during the Song
dynasty were often able to establish good working relationships with offi-
cials in vari ous localities. After imported goods were taxed by officials in
Dazaifu, the Chinese merchants could sometimes then proceed with their
goods to other cities. Because of high demand, they were often able to reap
substantial profits.
Monks
Monks, as men of faith, were regarded as more trustworthy than merchants
who focused on profits, and Japa nese Buddhist monks who visited China
developed relations of trust with their Chinese counter parts. With the end
of the tribute system, Japa nese monks in China, in addition to their reli-
gious role and as the intellectuals of the day, could, in the absence of gov-
ernment officials, play a role as a trusted go- between, facilitating trade be-
tween the two countries.
Only about twenty Japa nese Buddhist monks visited China during the
Northern Song (960–1126), but during the Southern Song (1126–1279) as
many as one hundred Japa nese monks traveled to China, often on Chinese
merchant ships. In their religious role, Japa nese monks continued to spend
. 37 .
china and japan
time studying in Chinese monasteries and paying homage to famous reli-
gious sites. According to Li Yiwen, who has studied the role of monks in
the six centuries between tribute missions, Japa nese monks, in addition to
making pilgrimages to places like Mount Wutai (in today’s Shanxi prov-
ince) and Mount Tiantai (in today’s Zhejiang province), continued to study
under famous Chinese monks to advance their knowledge of the Buddhist
texts. Although Japa nese monks made great advances in their understanding
of the texts, they still looked up to the leading Chinese teachers. They were
eager to bring back Buddhist texts and objects of art for display in Japan.
Some Japa nese Buddhists also believed that Chinese Buddhists had learned
how to cure certain physical ailments, and they sought to understand such
secrets.
At the time, Buddhist adherents, especially in Japan, identified with par-
tic u lar Buddhist sects. Some leading Japa nese monks, on their return from
study in China, established sects in their homeland that were linked to those
in China. One prominent Chinese sect, the Chan, which emphasized med-
itation and the search for enlightenment more than the study of texts, was
brought to Japan in the eighth century and introduced under its Japa nese
name, Zen. The Zen Buddhist sect grew rapidly and became very popu lar
in Kamakura, where the shogunate was located from 1185 to 1333. The Japa-
nese monk Eisai (1141–1215) introduced one sect of Zen Buddhism in
Japan, and his disciple Dogen (1200–1253) introduced another. Zen’s stress
on developing a strong and determined personal spirit had great appeal
to leading Japa nese warriors, some of whom used Zen to train young
soldiers.
In their broader nonreligious role, Japa nese monks communicated with
the Japa nese court in Kyoto, with Chinese officialdom, with port supervi-
sors in both Japan and China, and with merchants. Although the Chinese
government cracked down on Buddhism in 845 and eliminated China’s
monasteries, which paid no taxes, within several de cades the repression
eased and monks could again openly practice their religion and work with
Chinese government officials.
During the Northern Song period, three Japa nese monks were even
received by the Chinese emperor and brought him gifts, much like Japa nese
envoys had during the earlier tribute missions. In 983 Emperor Song
Taizong, second emperor of the Song dynasty (976–997), welcomed a Japa-
. 38 .
Trade without Transformative Learning, 838–1862
nese monk, Chonen, and accepted two Japa nese scrolls containing infor-
mation about Japan, including a list of the sixty- four emperors claimed by
Japan to represent a continuous line since Jimmu Tenno. Song Taizong
expressed in
terest in Chonen and met him again during the following
two years. A second Japa nese monk, Jakusho, was received by Emperor
Zhenzhong in 1004, and a third, Jojin, was received by Emperor Shenzong
in 1072.
Japa nese monks were sometimes able to negotiate with the Chinese gov-
ernment and with the Japa nese court in Kyoto. Many officials in the Kyoto
court were practicing Buddhists, which facilitated dealings with Japa nese
monks. Some merchants were also Buddhists, which made them more
willing to cooperate with the monks as they or ga nized voyages to China.
Some of the Japa nese monks who played a broad negotiating role
had gained considerable administrative experience from leading Japa-
nese monasteries. During most of this period, Japan’s monasteries oper-
ated tax- free, and some occupied large estates. Often, monks who went to
China were trying to raise money for their monasteries, and they insisted
that a certain portion of the income from their voyages be used for the reno-
vation or expansion of their monasteries. The chief priest of the Tenryuji
Temple, for example, led del e ga tions to China and used the income from
the trips for construction of a temple that was completed in 1345. The large
monasteries situated near ports had greater opportunities than smaller
monasteries located farther away to take part in trade and to obtain credit.
Several monks were reported to have been corrupted by opportunities to
take part in trade.
Although the Japa nese were reluctant to accept the subordinate posi-
tion imposed by China’s tribute system, they remained respectful of Chi-
nese Buddhism and Chinese intellectual life. The great neo- Confucian
scholar Zhu Xi (1130–1200), who created a new synthesis of Confucianism
that emphasized the importance of human reason in forming a harmonious
relationship with the universe, was widely respected in Japan, and the Japa-
nese version of his philosophy later became the under lying philosophy of
the Tokugawa period.
In short, during the Song period China was open to trade, and Bud-
dhist monks helped to smooth Chinese- Japanese relations and facilitate
trade between the two countries.
. 39 .
china and japan
The Second Sino- Japanese Conflict: Yuan Dynasty Troops
Invade Kyushu, 1274 and 1281
The first time that Chinese and Japa nese forces clashed, in the 660s, it was
in Korea. The second time, when the Mongol- led troops of the Yuan dy-
nasty attacked, it was in Japan— the only time in history when Chinese and
Japa nese forces fought in Japan.
Although the Mongols are ethnically distinct from Han Chinese, after
they defeated the Southern Song in the thirteenth century, they established
China’s Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) and ruled over China’s territory, following
Chinese patterns of rule. For several years before the Mongol- led troops in-
vaded Japan in 1274, the Japa nese had been warned that Mongol troops
were advancing down the Korean Peninsula, preparing to invade Japan as
part of their goal of conquering all the known world. Beginning in 1266,
Kublai Khan, whose troops already dominated the Korean Peninsula, sent
messages to Japan demanding that it become a vassal state under the Yuan
dynasty. Kublai Khan began large- scale shipbuilding in Korea in prepara-
tion for an invasion; meanwhile, Japan not only did not respond to Kublai
Khan’s messages but even refused to receive his messengers. Kublai Khan
hoped the Japa nese would not resist his demand, but when a messenger
sent to Japan was killed by the Japa nese, Kublai Khan moved ahead with
his plans to invade.
In 1274 an estimated 23,000 Mongol and Korean troops sailed from
Korea, joined by Han Chinese troops from Zhejiang, to invade Japan. After
taking over Tsushima Island (located between Korea and Japan) and sev-
eral of the smaller islands off Kyushu, the invaders landed in Hakata Bay.
Initially the Mongol forces had some success in defeating the Japa nese, who
had no experience in fighting an outside enemy. But a typhoon struck,
wiping out many of the Mongol ships and stranding those troops that had
already landed. After the typhoon, the invaders were overwhelmed by a large
number of Japa nese troops. The invaders tried to withdraw to their ships,
but further typhoons destroyed most of their remaining forces, and the rem-
nants of the Mongol invasion force withdrew to the Korean Peninsula.
Japa nese officials concluded that they had been saved by the kamikaze
(divine wind). This interpretation, that Japan was a special country pro-
tected by the heavens, would later be employed by ultranationalists to
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Trade without Transformative Learning, 838–1862
propagandize Japan’s undefeatable nationalist spirit, and the term kamikaze
itself would be used to describe Japa nese pi lots who flew suicide missions
during World War II, diving into Allied naval ships in the Pacific. Although
historians differ as to the seriousness of the storms’ actual effect on the out-
come, typhoons did destroy some Chinese ships and leave some Mongol-
led troops stranded.
When the Japa nese learned that the Mongols were planning a second
attack, in preparation they built defensive structures, including a six- foot-
high wall and ditches for flooding the area if the Mongol- led troops were
to land. In 1281 an estimated 40,000 Mongol and Korean troops in Korea
and some 20,000 Han Chinese forces from Zhejiang launched a second
invasion. In the battle, parts of Hakata were burned down, including an
area where Chinese sailors lived. By the time of this second invasion, how-
ever, the Japa nese had amassed a large defensive force, and they were much
better prepared because they had studied the tactics and equipment used
by the invaders during the first attack. The Japa nese warriors fought bravely,
killing nearly all the Mongol and Korean troops who came ashore. They
spared some Chinese troops who were skilled artisans and allowed them to
remain and settle in Hakata to contribute to the Japa nese economy.
After the Yuan soldiers retreated, trade between China and Japan re-
sumed quickly. Several years later, the Yuan’s Mongol leaders, in an effort
to restore relations with Japan, sent as their envoy a Chinese Zen monk,
who stayed in Kamakura, where the shogun was located, and played a role
as trusted go- between, similar to the role that Japa nese monks had played
in China.
Reviving the Tribute Missions, 1403–1547
The founding emperor of the Ming dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang (who ruled
from 1368 to 1398), believed that China had all the goods it needed. Since the
country had a solid income base from taxes on rice agriculture, the leaders
did not see a need to gather further income from foreign trade. Furthermore,
Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang wanted to maintain order along the seacoast.
During his first year in office, he announced the prohibition of all trade with
foreign countries and fortified the coast to clamp down on smuggling. He
recognized that Japa nese merchants wished to trade with
China, but he
. 41 .
china and japan
would permit it only if Japan accepted the tribute system. Furthermore, all
ships sailing between the two countries were required to obtain “tallies” (li-
censes) to transport certain goods. A ship that lacked a license was re-
garded as a pirate ship.
In 1369, during his second year of rule, Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang sent
envoys to Japan and to Southeast Asian countries to promote the revival of
the tribute system and the addition of the licensing system. He was con-
vinced that Japan needed trade more than China did and that he had enough
leverage to maintain firm control over trade. In 1371 Japan sent ten monks
to China, carry ing a letter from Prince Kaneyoshi, son of Emperor Godaigo.
Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang sent a return del e ga tion of eight Chinese monks
bearing gifts for Prince Kaneyoshi. Negotiations between the two sides con-
tinued from 1370 to 1402. All the Japa nese negotiating missions, as well as
the Chinese missions, were led by monks.
Over the next several years, as the Japa nese continued discussions with
the Chinese, they gave no sign of accepting the reestablishment of the trib-
utary relationship. In 1380, when a trade mission from Japan arrived in
China, because Japan had not agreed to resume the tributary relationship
China refused to accept the ship and its goods. Further efforts by Japa nese
traders to unload their ships in China were similarly rebuffed. The situa-
tion was also complicated by Zhu Yuanzhang’s suspicion that his chief min-
ister, Hu Weiyong, was cooperating with the Japa nese to overthrow him.
Chinese officials made their stance very clear: they would not allow trade
with China unless the Japa nese accepted the tribute system, which would
give China ceremonial recognition of its superior position.
Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, who became Japan’s minister of state in 1394, was
acutely aware that the Ashikaga shoguns did not enjoy the widespread na-
tional support that the Kamakura shoguns (1185–1333) had enjoyed at their
peak. Convinced that reviving trade with China would be good for Japan
and would help legitimate the position of the Ashikaga shoguns within
Japan, and aware that Japan had little leverage with China, Yoshimitsu fi-
nally relented and agreed to accept a tributary relationship that subordi-
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