nated Japan to China.
By the time Yoshimitsu was ready to acknowledge that the Chinese em-
peror was the Son of Heaven and that Yoshimitsu was in effect his subor-
. 42 .
Trade without Transformative Learning, 838–1862
dinate, Zhu Yuanzhang had died and there was a power strug gle within
China between Jianwen, Zhu’s grand son (son of his first son), and Jian-
wen’s uncle, a son of Zhu Yuanzhang. In 1403 Yoshimitsu sent a mission
of some three hundred people to China to accept the inferior position of
a tributary nation. The mission carried two diff er ent letters, one in case
Jianwen was chosen to be emperor, and one in case Jianwen’s uncle was
chosen to be emperor. By the time the ship arrived, Jianwen’s uncle had
become the Yongle emperor, so the mission handed over the appropriate
letter. An agreement to reestablish a tributary relationship, including trade,
was reached in 1403. The Ming rulers would permit Japan to send two
ships to China every ten years. They would be certified with tallies al-
lowing them to engage in private trade. When Yoshimitsu’s mission re-
turned to Japan, the Yongle emperor allowed eighty Chinese passengers to
return on the Japa nese ship.
There is no rec ord that the Japa nese emperor or the imperial court had
approved the decision by Ashikaga Yoshimitsu to resume the tribute rela-
tionship. Some Japa nese scholars have speculated that since the imperial
court never supported the decision, some members of the court must have
disagreed with the decision. Later, the Japa nese were very critical of Ashikaga
Yoshimitsu for lacking more backbone and allowing Japan to accept an in-
ferior status.
Between 1404 and 1410, in addition to allowing tribute missions to visit
China, the Chinese also allowed six other Japa nese ships to land. There-
after, the Chinese allowed only three ships engaged in private trade to land
every ten years. However, many Japa nese ships went to China as part of a
tribute mission. When a Japa nese tribute mission arrived in Beijing, the
tribute gifts were first exchanged. Then other goods brought in addition to
the tribute were sold to the Chinese at negotiated prices. If Chinese offi-
cials did not purchase all the goods, the Japa nese could sell the remaining
goods on the market in China.
In 1451 a Japa nese mission sailed to China with nine ships and an un-
usually large amount of cargo. The Chinese had trou ble selling so much
cargo at high prices. On one occasion, two warring families, the Ouchi and
Hosokawa, could not reach agreement on a joint mission, and so they sent
separate missions. Some Japa nese officials remained unhappy with the
. 43 .
china and japan
subordination to China required by the tribute system, and by the middle of
the sixteenth century Japan’s domestic disputes made it increasingly difficult
to or ga nize the missions. Between 1403 and 1549, Japan sent a total of eleven
tribute system missions to China, bringing with them gifts and additional
goods to be sold. The last tribute mission was sent to China in 1549.
Japa nese Pirates and Their Enduring Image in China
During the period of the tribute missions, the Ming dynasty prohibited pri-
vate trade except when specifically permitted by tallies, so any Japa nese
merchant attempting to sell goods in China outside that framework was
regarded as a wokou (pirate). For the Chinese, the term wokou included
smugglers as well those who preyed on ships at sea. After the tribute mis-
sions ended, the Ming dynasty did not allow the Japa nese to trade with
China. At that point, any Japa nese person trading with China was classi-
fied as a wokou. Those who smuggled goods and raided the Chinese coast
were sometimes Japa nese, sometimes Korean, and sometimes Chinese.
Scholars, Chinese as well as non- Chinese, have estimated that the majority
of wokou were actually Chinese, and sometimes a single pirate gang included
members from diff er ent countries. Japa nese pirates were reported by the
Chinese as early as the fourth century, but they were small in number until
the mid- fifteenth century. Piracy was fairly widespread throughout the six-
teenth century.
The conditions that led to widespread smuggling and piracy included
prohibitions on trade that were inherently difficult to enforce, domestic tur-
moil in both Japan and China that rendered policing difficult, and the ex-
istence of strong economic incentives for those who were successful
smugglers.
Along the long Chinese coastline there are countless inlets where smug-
glers could enter. Neither Japan nor China had sufficient personnel to
apprehend all smugglers or pirates who raided other ships. It was easy
for foreign smugglers to find local Chinese partners along the coast, in
Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, and along the Yangtze River in Jiangsu prov-
ince, who were eager to share in the rewards. Even though Chinese officials
attempted to relocate those Chinese smuggling participants living near the
coast, those who were relocated could easily sneak back.
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Trade without Transformative Learning, 838–1862
There were excellent economic opportunities for smugglers. Within
China, in the mid- sixteenth century there was great demand for silver, as a
medium of exchange and for making tax payments. In 1530, the Japa nese
discovered silver and opened the Iwami silver mine, which began producing
very large amounts of the precious metal. Compared with silver, gold was
cheaper in China than it was in Japan, so it was pos si ble for sea merchants
to make quick profits by selling Japa nese silver in China and then buying
gold in China for resale in Japan. Chinese smugglers brought silk and other
goods to Japa nese ports from China to exchange for silver, and they em-
ployed Japa nese crew members to work on their ships. When Japa nese mer-
chants and their Chinese collaborators had difficulties smuggling along
the Chinese coast, some used force to obtain what they were unable to buy.
Japa nese pirates came mostly from Kyushu, especially from the Satsuma
domain in the south and from the Hosokawa domain near Kumamoto. The
islands of Hirado, near Nagasaki, and Tsushima became smuggling centers.
Within Japan, the ultimate destinations for most imports were Osaka and
nearby cities served by the port of Sakai.
The Chinese did make some pro gress in controlling piracy. Two Chinese
military leaders who gained a reputation for success in suppressing the pi-
rates are still celebrated as heroes today: General Yu Dayou and Qi Jiguang,
who achieved great success when he was a young military officer. There were
an estimated one hundred military attacks on pirates during the reigns of
the first three Ming emperors (1368–1424). Without consistently strong
leadership, however, military men sometimes joined the pirates rather than
fighting them. Some of the “Japa nese pirates” were in fact Chinese military
personnel with access to ships and military equipment.
Some Ming officials proposed liberalizing the trade
rules to reduce the
incentives for smuggling and piracy. In 1567 the governor of Fujian received
permission to license private trade voyages to Southeast Asia. This partial
liberalization provided incentives for both Chinese and Japa nese traders,
who might other wise have continued to engage in piracy, to begin sailing
to Southeast Asian ports where they could trade with each other and also
acquire local goods for resale in their home ports.
Ming official Xu Guangqi (1562–1633) was in favor of liberalizing the
rules for trading with Japan. After passing the jinshi examination for offi-
cialdom in 1604, Xu then studied with Matteo Ricci, the well- known Jesuit
. 45 .
china and japan
who was then in China, and became a Jesuit, perhaps the most famous
Chinese convert to Chris tian ity before the twentieth century. He developed
a deep knowledge of agriculture and national defense, both of which he con-
sidered very central to national strength. As a Jesuit he had access to infor-
mation gathered by Jesuits in other countries, and he then became an ad-
viser to the emperor. Xu Guangqi argued that it would be impossible to stop
the pirates, who had access to so many locations along the coast. In his view,
piracy was prevalent not because the Japa nese were avaricious but because
they were not allowed to trade, and because some Chinese buyers who pur-
chased goods from the Japa nese did not honor their agreements to pay for
those goods. The solution he proposed was to permit the Japa nese to trade,
so they could obtain the silk, ceramics, and medicines that they wanted.
Xu’s arguments lost the day to those who argued that the Japa nese were
cunning, bloodthirsty pirates, and that the way to deal with them was to
crack down. Chinese and occasionally Eu ro pean piracy remained wide-
spread until after Xu’s death.
The Japa nese began clamping down on piracy in 1587, when Toyotomi
Hideyoshi forced the lords of Kyushu to accept his authority and to sup-
press piracy. When Toyotomi Hideyoshi and his successor, Tokugawa
Ieyasu, banned piracy, sea captains recognized that attacking settlements in
other countries and on the seas would bring the wrath of the Japa nese au-
thorities. In 1592 Toyotomi Hideyoshi legalized trade by issuing nine li-
censes, each with his red seal. After becoming shogun in 1603, Tokugawa
Ieyasu continued the antipiracy policies of his pre de ces sor and the use of
red seals to promote legal trade, thus reducing the need for merchants to
resort to piracy. Pirates learned that if they attacked ships that carried the
red seal, they would face active reprisals from Japa nese officials. In 1635
Tokugawa Ieyasu’s grand son gained further control over piracy by banning
all overseas travel by Japa nese citizens.
When piracy was at its peak, Europeans— first the Portuguese and then
the Spanish, Dutch, and English— began to play a greater role in Asian
trade. From the time the Portuguese established a base in Macao in 1557
until their expulsion from Japan in 1639, the Portuguese provided a legiti-
mate channel for Japa nese silver to be traded for Chinese silk and gold. The
Portuguese profits from this trade cut into profitability for the wokou and,
along with the Japa nese crackdowns, contributed to the decline of piracy.
. 46 .
Trade without Transformative Learning, 838–1862
The combination of Japan’s clamping down on piracy during the
Tokugawa after 1603 and China’s more open trade policy contributed to re-
ducing piracy. Later, during the Qing dynasty, China permitted more open
trade with Japan and, as Xu Guangqi had argued, this further reduced the
need for piracy.
Even though Japa nese piracy fi nally ended, stories of so- called cunning
and bloodthirsty Japa nese pirates remained popu lar in Chinese lit er a ture.
Chinese children were warned to behave or else the Japa nese pirates would
get them. Stories abounded of Japa nese pirates using tricks to plunder local
people. Lurid tales described Japa nese pirates stealing property, setting fires,
robbing graves, killing men, and raping women. It was said they cruelly cut
women open and boiled men in water. Such images of Japa nese cruelty can
be found in the popu lar novel Shuihu houzhuan (Sequel to Water Margin).
Toward the end of this story, the heroes take revenge on the Japa nese. In
another novel, published shortly after Toyotomi Hideyoshi invaded Korea,
Toyotomi Hideyoshi is described as an incarnation of an evil dragon and
is fi nally slain by the heroes. The Treatise on Japan ( Riben zhuan), which is
part of the official Ming history ( Ming shi), is somewhat less fanciful but
still includes descriptions of the bloodthirsty Japa nese. In this way, such
horrifying images of the Japa nese were passed on to future generations in
China.
The Third Sino- Japanese Conflict: Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s
Invasion of Korea, 1592–1597
Just as the Chinese Warring States period ended when a strong leader
emerged victorious and became Qin Shihuang, the first emperor of the
Qin in 221 bc, so Japan’s Warring States strug gles ceased in 1590 when
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, building on the successes of Oda Nobunaga, emerged
victorious and unified Japan. Like such leaders as Qin Shihuang, Alexander
the Great, and Genghis Khan, Toyotomi Hideyoshi had vaulting ambitions
to conquer the world. He had massive numbers of battle- hardened soldiers
on whom he could call, and he did not agonize over the suffering that re-
sulted from conquering new worlds. Some historians have argued that one
reason Toyotomi Hideyoshi pursued foreign conquests was to keep his own
troops occupied, owing to his fear that if they returned to their homes, they
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china and japan
would have trou ble earning a decent living and might become unruly, causing
domestic turmoil. Unlike the later Japa nese who, in the late nineteenth
century, would be preparing for the Sino- Japanese War of 1894–1895,
Toyotomi Hideyoshi did not undertake detailed studies to understand
either his enemy or the terrain where the fighting would take place.
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who believed that he had been endowed by heaven
with the capacity for conquest, succeeded in unifying Japan in 1590, but by
1585, after defeating several rivals in Japan, he had already conceived the idea
of conquering China. He planned to go through Korea and then on to
China, which he believed he could easily defeat. After he conquered China,
he would visit Beijing, make it his capital, and then personally settle down
in Ningbo, where he could govern China and remain in close contact with
Japan. After conquering China, he would then conquer India and the South-
east Asian countries. He began adopting sons and preparing them to serve
as the leaders of the countries he would conquer. But despite his vast am-
bitions, he also had vast ignorance about other countries and the prob lems
he would encounter in trying to realize such ambitions.
Toyotomi Hideyoshi ordered the Koreans to allow his troops to pass
through their
country unobstructed on their way to conquer China. Korea
firmly refused more than once, so in August 1590 Toyotomi Hideyoshi
began preparations to invade Korea. In addition to the experienced
swordsmen, gunmen, and horse back riders whom he called upon, he also
required that all the daimyo, lords of the feudal domains, requisition foot
soldiers from all over Japan. In April 1592 Toyotomi Hideyoshi, from his
base in Nagoya, ordered the transport of 160,000 warriors to Pusan, with
the intention of marching them through Korea into Manchuria, and then
on to Beijing. He mobilized another 120,000 warriors as a reserve force.
Unlike the Mongol invasion of Kyushu when the invaders barely got
ashore, the Japa nese moved north rapidly into Korea after they landed in
Pusan. The Koreans were poorly prepared, and the Japa nese troops, with
horse men and guns and swords backed by cannons, marched 275 miles
northward from Pusan to capture Pyongyang, the capital. Korean troops
were in effec tive in resisting the advances of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s troops.
The Japa nese troops terrorized the local population, and such be hav ior
stimulated local Korean leaders to or ga nize a guerrilla re sis tance that ulti-
mately slowed down the Japa nese advance. The Japa nese could control
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Trade without Transformative Learning, 838–1862
their forts and the narrow roads between towns, but the Koreans con-
trolled the countryside.
Within six weeks the Japa nese troops had marched north from Seoul
to P’yongyang and were preparing to move on to China. By the time the
Japa nese took P’yongyang, several thousand Chinese troops, dispatched by
Ming dynasty Emperor Wanli, had crossed the Yalu River into Korea, but
they were quickly defeated by the Japa nese. Emperor Wanli, surprised by
the failure of his troops, quickly dispatched some 43,000 soldiers, who
crossed the Yalu River into the northern part of Korea. The Japa nese were
shocked by the entry of such large numbers of Ming troops, who succeeded
in driving the Japa nese, overstretched throughout the country, out of
P’yongyang. The Chinese pursued the Japa nese troops as they retreated
southward. In a valley some ten miles north of Seoul, Japa nese and Chi-
nese troops fought once again, and the Japa nese defeated the Ming troops.
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